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This doctoral thesis seeks to investigate the relationship between existentialism, a 
philosophy of life that is as much literary as it is philosophical in effect, and 
German-language literature in the aftermath of the Second World War. The focus 
will be on three German-language writers whose novels have given implicit 
formulation to a range of existential concerns. These include the notions of the self, 
freedom, authenticity, responsibility, angst, Grenzsituation and suffering, and 
constitute what I refer to as an unwritten existentialist manifesto. The writers 
selected for examination in this study are Max Frisch (1911-1991) with his 1954 
novel Stiller, Alfred Andersch (1914-1980) with his 1952 autobiographical report 
Die Kirschen der Freiheit, and Heinrich Böll (1917-1985) with his posthumously 
published Der Engel schwieg (1949/1992). Whilst these writers do not engage in 
explicit philosophical or theological existentialist reflection as such, their novels can 
be seen to provide implicit literary formulation to the aforementioned range of 
existentialist themes. These three writers and their works highlight the extent to 
which existentialist concerns penetrated post-1945 German-language literature even 
where the writers themselves did not openly identify with existentialism as either a 
literary or philosophical phenomenon. As will be shown, their novels deal with the 
principal questions that stand at the core of existentialist philosophy, and indeed that 
stand for the human individual, at this point in Western intellectual history. These 
analyses will consider the idea of existentialism as literature, defining an image of 
existentialism as it developed in not only philosophical but also literary terms, thus 
establishing how existentialism can and should be approached as both a 
philosophical and literary phenomenon. In this regard, the works of literature by 
Frisch, Andersch and Böll can be seen as a crucial means of expression for and 
dissemination of existentialist thought. A study of these literary texts will also 
uncover the continuing relevance of this philosophical movement which grapples in 
such fundamental ways with the concrete aporias and threshold situations of human 
existence then as today. What renders existentialism as a method of inquiry and 
reflection so pertinent is less its preoccupation with existence in general than its 
contention that thinking existentially about human existence leads us to pose 
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‘The novelist is neither historian nor 
prophet: he is an explorer of existence’ 
– Milan Kundera, The Art of the Novel 
 
 
The aim of this study is to explore the relationship between the philosophical 
movement of existentialism, a philosophy of life that is as much literary as it is 
philosophical in effect, and German-language literature in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. This movement, whose roots are traceable in the writings of 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), 
Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), Wilhelm Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1990), Karl 
Jaspers (1883-1969), Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) and Martin Heidegger (1889-
1976), resurfaced in the mid-1940s with Jean-Paul Sartre’s 1938 novel L’Nausée, 
Albert Camus’s 1942 novel L’Étranger and, perhaps most crucially, Sartre’s 1946 
essay L’existentialisme est un humanisme as a kind of Bohemian ferment in the 
Parisian arrondissement of Saint-Germain-des-Prés. Existentialism has since 
remained a subject of intense curiosity and fascination. Yet what explains this 
fascination? Is it attributable to a desire merely to understand the full historical 
ramifications of existentialism as a movement in both philosophy and literature? 
Does it spring from the continuing attraction of the central existential themes (some 
of which we will encounter later)? Or does it perhaps derive from a fundamental 
misunderstanding and even oversimplification of this en vogue social phenomenon 
that re-emerged in Europe around the end of the Second World War? The very 
question ‘can you give me a one-sentence definition of existentialism?’1 serves 
testament to the phenomenal popularisation but also misrepresentation of an 
otherwise vast and complex philosophical and literary tradition. The belief that 
existentialism can be explained in a single sentence, or that one can merely know 
                                                        
1 Maurice Freedman, ‘Introduction’, in The Worlds of Existentialism: A Critical Reader, ed. Maurice 




about it without understanding it from within, has rendered the existentialist 
movement something of an ‘intellectual fad and robbed it of its proper seriousness’, 
affirms Maurice Freedmann in his introduction to the anthology The World of 
Existentialism.2 Contrary to such facile reactions, the gravity of existentialist 
thought does not, as William Barrett contends in his Irrational Man: A Study in 
Existential Philosophy, ‘merely arise out of the despair from a world from which 
God has departed’.3 Rather, it is a complex intellectual movement which envelops 
and fuses disparate philosophies in a reaction against both the purely rational and the 
merely irrational in favour of a dynamic and tangible involvement and engagement 
based on action and choice, commitment and authenticity, as well as the concrete 
situation of the existential subject which is taken as the main departure point of 
existentialist thought. In essence, existentialism is not merely an intellectual fancy or 
a mere heterogeneous throwing-together of various constituents of theistic and 
atheistic thought any more than it is a distinct, clearly defined and, in many respects, 
literary philosophy.  
 
This study shall thus begin with the contention that the movement of existentialism 
can be approached as both a philosophical and literary phenomenon, which has been 
communicated through many diverse forms in recent centuries. Some of the most 
notable and influential existentialist publications include Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonymous philosophical volumes Either/Or (1843), Heidegger’s metaphysical 
treatise Sein und Zeit (1927), and Jasper’s Existenzphilosophie (1938). Equally 
significant, however, are the literary existentialist productions of Sartre, including 
the existentialist plays Les Mouches (1943) and Huis Clos (1944), Simone de 
Beauvoir’s L’Invitée (1943), as well as Camus’s profoundly disturbing existentialist 
novels La Peste (1947) and La Chute (1956). In addition to philosophical treatises 
and novels, the contemporaneity and centrality of the question of human existence in 
the mid-twentieth century has also been widely explored in studies and essays, the 
most notable of which include Hannah Arendt’s essays ‘Was ist 
                                                        
2 Ibid. 
3 William Barrett, Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (New York: Anchor Books, 




Existenzphilosophie?’ (1946),4 ‘French Existentialism’ (1946),5 ‘Concern with 
Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought’ (1954),6 Herbert Marcuse’s 
essay ‘Existentialism: Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre’s L’Être et le Néant’ (1948), as 
well as Otto Friedrich Bollnow’s momentous study Existenzphilosophie (1949). 
 
Rather than simply provide an exploration of existentialism in literature, or a survey 
of those literary works that figure within existentialism, this study will seek to 
examine the idea of existentialism as literature, outlining an image of existentialism 
as it develops in literary rather than purely philosophical terms. In this regard, this 
study stands in opposition to David E. Cooper’s contention that existentialism can 
be regarded as a ‘relatively systematic philosophy’, and that an excessive reliance on 
existentialist literature has resulted in grave misunderstandings about the 
movement’s fundamental essence.7 On the contrary, existentialist literature offers a 
crucial means of interaction with existentialist thought. Whilst one can approach 
existentialism through the philosophical volumes and essays that make it up, such as 
those by Kierkegaard or Jaspers which will form a necessary contextual backdrop in 
this study, one can also approach it through the literary works which constitute a 
parallel yet less systematic and theoretical mode of articulation and communication. 
 
Supposing therefore that the writer is, as Milan Kundera asserts in the opening 
citation, an explorer of existence, should we therefore view all writers and novelists 
as existentialists? The inevitable shortcoming of this contention is that it threatens to 
conflate existentialist literature with literature by and of itself which is always in 
some way about our existence. Yet existentialism as an intellectual tradition is 
radically more circumscriptive than Kundera’s claim would allow, on one account 
naming a historically specific phenomenon that is principally concentrated on the 
literary and philosophical work of Sartre, Camus and de Beauvoir from the late 
1930s through to the 1950s. Yet while most critics agree that this boundary setting is 
too restrictive, it is no easy task to set boundaries better suited to the subject. In his 
                                                        
4 Hannah Arendt, ‘Was ist Existenz-Philosophie?’, in Hannah Arendt: Sechs Essays (Heidelberg: 
Schneider, 1948), pp. 48-80. 
5 Hannah Arendt, ‘French Existentialism’ in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, 
and Totalitarianism, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken, 1994), pp. 188-194. 
6 Hannah Arendt, ‘Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought’, in ibid., pp. 
428-447. 




essay ‘Existentialism as Literature’, Jeff Malpas for instance laments how 
existentialism has at times been so nebulously construed as to acknowledge writers 
as diverse as Emily Dickinson, T. S. Eliot, William Faulkner, Graham Greene, 
Henrik Ibsen, Hermann Melville, Iris Murdoch, and Harold Pinter – to name but a 
few – to be included within the existentialist canon.8 Indeed, one might question 
whether there is any eminent modern literary figure who has not at some point or 
other been studied within an existentialist context.  
 
Yet if existentialism is to be in any way a meaningful literary category, and if we are 
to uphold a sense of existentialism as a distinctive development within modern 
literature as well as philosophy, then it seems that we are called upon to establish an 
explanation of literary existentialism in accordance with existentialist thinking. It is 
precisely this issue that will form the focus of the first chapter of this study, in which 
I will outline a grouping of what I consider to be typical existentialist themes, a sort 
of unwritten existentialist manifesto if one will, that includes the themes of das Ich, 
human freedom, authenticity, responsibility, angst, the ‘other’, Grenzsituation and 
suffering. These themes will subsequently form the methodological backdrop for my 
later discussions of literary texts. 
 
Within this context of existentialism as a broader philosophical and literary 
movement, the focus of this study shall be the prevalence of existentialist thinking in 
specifically German-language literature in the two decades after 1945. Yet in order 
to enter into my discussion I wish to begin by addressing the topicality of the 
existentialist movement in post-war European society and, in particular, of the 
archetypal existential themes of the self, freedom, authenticity, the ‘other’ and angst 
in contemporary culture. ‘Historisch gesehen’, Odo Marquard admits in his 
‘Vorlesungen zur Existenzphilosophie’, first delivered at the Justus-Liebig-
Universität Gießen in the summer semester of 1974, ‘ist [...] die Existenzphilosophie 
nicht gegenwärtigste Gegenwart’.9 Existentialism, he continues,  
 
                                                        
8 Jeff Malpas, ‘Existentialism as Literature’, in The Cambridge Companion to Existentialism, ed. 
Steven Crowell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 291-321, p. 292. 
9 Odo Marquard, Vorlesungen zur Existenzphilosophie: Was bedeutet das alles?, ed. Franz Josef 




ist (blickt man auf Kierkegaard) im 19. Jahrhundert entstanden, sie ist (blickt 
man auf Heidegger) in den 20er Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts zu ihrer 
entscheidendsten Formulierung gekommen, sie ist (blickt man auf den 
frühen Sartre) unmittelbar nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg eine zentrale 
Philosophie gewesen. Und wenn es sich so verhält, dann muss man doch 
wohl die Frage stellen: Stimmt die Behauptung ‘Die Existenzphilosophie ist 
aktuell!’ denn wirklich?10 
 
The significance of Marquard’s leading question is that it serves to make us reflect 
on the on-going contemporaneity and ‘timelessness’ of existentialist themes. What 
makes existentialism as an approach of inquiry and reflection particularly au 
courant is less its concern with existence in general than its claim that thinking 
about human existence, because it is something uniquely temporal, continually 
raises new questions, questions indeed not all found in and confronted by the 
conceptual repertoire of ancient thought or classical philosophy. Regardless of era, 
time, space or place, ‘der Einzelne’, the individual, remains a key focus of human 
curiosity11 and can be understood neither as a substance with fixed properties, nor as 
a subject interacting unchangeably with a world of objects. It is precisely the 
primacy of individual existence, lived experience and human freedom, all of which 
change from generation to generation, that lends and will continue to lend 
existentialism its particular weight and contemporaneity, particularly in a world in 
which, according to Barrett, ‘modern man seems ever further from understanding 
himself than when he first began to question his own identity’.12  
 
Even in the early twenty-first century, the above assertions by Marquard and Barrett 
still resonate strongly. Existentialist themes continue to permeate society, upholding 
the idea that no matter how many ways the individual tries to hide, there is 
essentially no evading the question of what it means to be human. Contemporary 
cinema, media coverage, the impact of celebrity culture and cyber-psychology are 
each carried by the premise that each existing individual is forced to struggle for 
identity and meaning solely in and through his or her own terms. The perpetual 
                                                        
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., p. 12. 




alienation from and isolation within society that come with individual existence 
seem to be exaggerated by our mass communication rather than remedied by it.13 
Although modern society is quick to assuage the anxiety and unease triggered by 
existential awareness, it remains evident that the external world of things, ideas and 
people remains for many human beings inherently absurd and incongruous.  
 
THE TOPICALITY OF EXISTENTIALISM IN POSTWAR GERMANY  
 
This study thus begins in May 1945, a period in time which marks not just the fall of 
Nazi Germany but also the advent of the rebirth of existentialism. In the aftermath of 
the Second World War, the publication of Sartre’s L’existentialisme est un 
humanisme14 can be considered as the most decisive turning point in the history of 
existentialist philosophy; it reverberated far beyond the borders of France. The 
overarching topical significance of existentialism for German-language writers and 
intellectuals in the immediate postwar years resided in those ideological vacuums 
which, both preceding and following the Second World War, had grown into 
feelings of emptiness, powerlessness, despair and fear, painfully experienced by an 
‘ohnmächtige, geschlagene, verlorene Generation’ who, in the words of Heinz 
Ludwig Arnold, was suffering the condition of being ‘zurückgeworfen’ on their 
‘nackte, leidende, zufällige Existenz’.15  
 
For the likes of writers such as Alfred Andersch and Hans-Werner Richter in 
particular, the purported tabula rasa of postwar Germany seemed the ideal chance to 
restore the German spirit in one solitary artistic act. In August 1946 Andersch and 
Richter launched Der Ruf, intended as an independent journal for the junge 
Generation, which became the chief forum for young authors and poets calling for a 
                                                        
13  Wesley Barnes, The Philosophy and Literature of Existentialism (New York: Barren's Educational 
Series, 1968), p. vi. 
14 Sartre’s text was first published in Paris in 1946. The first English translation was completed by 
Bernard Frechtman as Existentialism (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947) and the following 
year by Philip Mairet as Existentialism and Humanism (London: Methuen, 1948). Neither title hints 
at Sartre’s question about the relation between existentialism and humanism. The texts and 
translations were nevertheless widely received in Europe following their publication. 
15 Heinz Ludwig Arnold, Die drei Sprünge der westdeutschen Literatur: eine Erinnerung (Wallstein, 




so-called Stunde Null.16 Taking his lead from Jean-Paul Sartre’s preface to the play 
Les Mouches, Andersch recognised in existentialism an opportunity in the postwar 
years to break free from the shackles of Germany’s recent past and embrace a future 
devoted to the freedom of the individual. In his programmatic essay ‘Deutsche 
Literatur in der Entscheidung’, unveiled at the second meeting of the Gruppe 47 in 
Herrlingen in 1947, Andersch contended that because of the brittleness of previous 
cultural and literary values, a renewal of German spiritual life was imperative:  
 
Aus dem Zwang einer völlig neuartigen Situation heraus, steht die junge 
Generation vor einer tabula rasa, vor der Notwendigkeit in einem originalen 
Schöpfungsakt eine Erneuerung des deutschen geistigen Lebens zu 
vollbringen.17 
 
A unique and creative act, Andersch reasoned, was essential for the regeneration of 
post-war German life, as it would assist in the eradication of an aged and morally 
bankrupt culture. A further appeal of French existentialism was its calling for a new 
understanding of the role of the writer and of literature. Both must now fully 
‘engage’ and commit themselves in the struggle for freedom. The ruthless honesty 
and lucidity of Sartre’s Les Mouches and Huis Clos as well as Camus’s Caligula, all 
of which were performed repeatedly on German stages after the war, resonated 
strongly with disillusioned German writers, in that it offered an alternative to logical 
positivism and empiricism and instead sought to address the concrete realities of 
existence in a war-ravaged nation. In an age of European collapse, existentialism as 
both a philosophical and literary movement offered a response to man’s increasing 
despair and alienation. 
 
                                                        
16 The terms Stunde Null, Nullpunkt and zero hour remain a point of literary controversy; whilst one 
can find declarations by members of a literary postwar generation lamenting the bankruptcy of the 
older generation and indeed of the entire German cultural tradition, - ‘Unser Hass, der Hass der 
jungen Generation, besitzt die Rechtfertigung der unbedingten Notwenigkeit’ -, one fails to find 
specific German references to a Nullpunkt or a Stunde Nul” in 1945. For quote cf. Alfred Andersch, 
‘Notwendige Aussage zum Nürnberger Prozess’, Der Ruf 1, August 1946; reprinted in Der Ruf: Eine 
deutsche Nachkriegszeitschrift, ed. Hans Schwab-Felisch (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 
1962), pp. 26-29, p. 26. 
17 Alfred Andersch, Deutsche Literatur in der Entscheidung: Ein Beitrag zur Analyse der 




Aside from the literary and essayistic output of the Gruppe 47, as well as works by 
other German-language writers such as Max Frisch and Heinrich Böll which will be 
explored later, specific publications from this period that likewise serve testament to 
the contemporaneity and centrality of the question of human existence in postwar 
Germany are Hannah Arendt’s essays ‘Was ist Existenzphilosophie?’ (1946), 
‘French Existentialism’ (1946), and ‘Concern with Politics in Recent European 
Philosophical Thought’ (1954),18 Herbert Marcuse’s ‘Existentialism: Remarks on 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s L’Être et le Néant’ (1948), and Otto Friedrich Bollnow’s 
Existenzphilosophie (1949). Hannah Arendt’s essays are particularly significant in 
how they capture the prevalence of existentialist thought in the midst of the 
traumatic upheavals of twentieth-century European history. The works of the 
German-born Jewish political theorist, who fled from Europe during the Holocaust 
and became an American citizen, deal largely with the themes of power, politics, 
democracy, authority and totalitarianism. Having studied under Heidegger at the 
University of Marburg in 1924, and later under Jaspers at the University of 
Heidelberg, Arendt also developed a strong interest in how existentialism sought to 
sever ties with traditional philosophy and transform philosophising into a public, 
revolutionary activity. In her essay ‘French Existentialism’, Arendt alludes to how 
existentialism took philosophy out of academic institutions and onto the streets, 
shattering the distinction between thought and action in the process; she writes: 
 
A lecture on philosophy provokes a riot, with hundreds crowding in and 
thousands turned away. Books on philosophical problems preaching no 
cheap creed and offering no panacea but, on the contrary, so difficult as to 
require actual thinking sell like detective stories […]. This is what is 
happening, from all reports, in Paris. If the Resistance has not achieved the 
European revolution, it seems to have brought about, at least in France, a 
genuine rebellion of the intellectuals.19 
 
It is precisely this air of intellectual insurrection to which Arendt alludes that 
captures the prevalence and immediacy of existentialist thought also in postwar 
                                                        
18 Hannah Arendt, ‘Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought’, in ibid., pp. 
428-47. 




German society. In the same essay she goes on to argue that the two main features of 
existentialism are firstly the rejection of the identification of man with the social role 
he or she enacts, that is to say, the insistence to disconnect the fundamentally human 
and individual character from the surface persona assigned by society; and secondly 
existentialism’s ‘angry refusal to accept the world as it is as the natural, predestined 
milieu of man’.20 
 
In her 1946 booklet ‘Was ist Existenzphilosophie?’ Arendt expands her perspective 
to look at the historical trajectory of existentialism, focusing especially on Kant’s, 
Kierkegaard’s, Jaspers’ and Heidegger’s conceptions of existence. As the title 
indicates, ‘Was ist Existenzphilosophie?’ is a predominantly philosophical account 
of the currents in post-Kantian thought leading up to the developments of mid-
twentieth-century existentialism. Arendt creatively appropriates the existentialist 
notions of the self, death, angst, responsibility and Grenzsituation, concepts that in 
her view constitute the existential fundamentals that underlie the human condition, 
many of which will also form the basis of what I am calling the German thinkers’ 
implied existentialist manifesto. In the essay Arendt takes care to differentiate her 
insight of the world from the ‘solipsistic’ ontology of her teacher Martin 
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit by presenting his existential visions and exploring the key 
concepts of Sorge, Besinnung, Angst and Vereinzelung: Heidegger’s notion of 
Dasein ‘ist also dadurch charakterisiert,’ she writes, ‘dass es nicht einfach ist, 
sondern dass es ihm in seinem Sein um sein Sein selbst geht’.21 From this juncture 
Arendt probes the Heideggerian notion of Sorge, a phenomenon in which the 
concepts of guilt, conscience and being-unto-death are fundamentally anchored. 
According to Heidegger, these are existential conundrums which remind Dasein of 
the fundamentals of its condition, namely, its temporality of finitude. Dasein 
becomes thrown (geworfen) into a world of facticity, of human circumstances and 
contexts that precede it and in which it is submerged. Only in the process of pulling 
oneself back out of this routine of everydayness to a condition of resolute coming-
to-one’s-senses (Besinnung) is Dasein able to reach a state of authenticity. This 
should not, however, detract from another key existential condition, namely man’s 
                                                        
20 Ibid., p. 189-90. 




perpetual anticipation of his own death. ‘Der wesentlichste Charakter dieses Selbst’, 
Arendt explains, 
 
ist seine absolute Selbstischkeit, seine radikale Abtrennung von allen, die 
seinesgleichen sind. Dies zu erzielen war der Vorlauf zum Tode als 
Existential eingeführt; denn in ihm realisiert der Mensch das absolute 
principium individuationis.22  
Whilst the modern self actively cultivates, according to Heideggerian philosophy, a 
forgetfulness of death by immersing itself in the company and community of others, 
the acknowledgement of death, Arendt elucidates, serves to remind the individual 
that all that truly matters is oneself: ‘Mit der Erfahrung des Todes als der Nichtigkeit 
schlechthin’, she explicates, the individual has the opportunity, ‘[s]ich dem 
Selbstsein ausschließlich zu widmen und die Mitwelt, in die [er] verstrickt [ist], im 
Modus der grundsätzlichen Schuld ein für allemal los zu werden.23  
In the same essay Arendt goes on to expound also upon other key existential tropes 
in her discussion of Karl Jaspers’s Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, in particular 
the concepts of human freedom and responsibility. Jaspers’s philosophy has its 
underpinning in a subjective-experiential transformation of Kantian philosophy, 
which reconstructs Kantian transcendentalism as a doctrine of particular experience 
and spontaneous freedom. It also seeks to underscore the constitutive importance of 
lived existence for authentic knowledge. Jaspers achieved his widest influence not 
through his philosophy, but through his writings on governmental conditions in 
Germany, and after the collapse of National Socialism he emerged as an 
authoritative spokesperson for moral-democratic education and reorientation in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
 
In the essay Arendt, who had studied under Jaspers in the 1920s, agrees with her 
former mentor that existence is not a form of Being but a form of human freedom 
whereby ‘der Mensch als Möglichkeit seiner Spontaneität sich gegen sein bloßes 
Resultatsein wendet’.24 Like Kant, Jaspers conceived of freedom as autonomy: 
                                                        
22 Ibid., p. 72. 
23 Ibid., p. 72. 




human beings are free when they become the master of their deeds and thus become 
fully responsible for them. Jaspers’s concept of freedom entails that the individual 
transforms that which he is into his own freedom, so that his free decisions 
essentially become his own fault. In this way the systematic and tranquil objective 
world exposes an overwhelming array of choices and possibilities in which human 
existence strives to fully actualise its freedom. Against this background, therefore, 
Jaspers claims that the self-disclosure of the innumerable possibilities of human 
existence depends on the capacity of the individual human life to open itself to the 
experience of das Unbedingte. Guided by the unconditioned, existence is placed in 
what Jaspers refers to as boundary situations (Grenzsituationen). Jasperian boundary 
situations, Arendt explains, are moments in which human existence simultaneously 
reflects, confronts and supersedes both its cognitive and practical boundaries. 
Individual consciousness is confronted with the limits of its experiential habits and 
is forced to reflect upon, and thus also to enact, its most extreme existential 
possibilities.  
 
A discussion of the existential concept of Grenzsituation is also presented by Otto 
Friedrich Bollnow in his 1949 systematic exploration of existentialism, 
Existenzphilosophie. Bollnow, who held a post in philosophy, philosophical 
anthropology and ethics at the University of Tübingen and dedicated his academic 
career to the study of phenomenology, existentialist philosophy and Wilhelm 
Dilthey, opens his study with the assertion that ‘Jedes Leben findet sich schon 
immer in eine bestimmte Lage versetzt, in bestimmte “Lebensumstände”’.25 In such 
situations man is confronted with discrepancies and contradictions, and he becomes 
conscious that reason is failing him. Tangled in antinomies, Bollnow continues, the 
individual is thrown back upon himself and is driven to a threshold of his existence 
where he may experience boundary awareness. In this regard, existentialism 
forcefully emphasises 
 
dass die Situation nichts ist, in das der Mensch nur gelegentlich und nur 
äußerlich gerät, sondern dass das menschliche Dasein wesensmäßig ein Sein 
                                                        




in einer Situation ist und dass der Mensch der Verhaftetheit mit seiner 
Situation niemals entfliehen kann.26 
 
Man will live out his existence besieged by situations not of his choosing and which 
defy his wishes and needs; citing the title of one of Sartre’s novels he writes: ‘Sie 
sind wie der “Pfahl im Fleisch”, durch den dem Menschen die Unvollkommenheit 
seines Daseins eindringlich vor Augen geführt wird’.27 Yet ultimately it is only in 
boundary situations that the searing finitude of human Dasein can be fully 
experienced, Bollnow concludes, ‘denn sie bezeichnen die harte Schranke, die jede 
Auffassung der Welt und des menschlichen Lebens unmöglich macht’.28  
 
Next to the existentialist concepts of Dasein, Geworfenheit and die Unheimlichkeit 
der Welt, the notion of angst commands a central position in Bollnow’s work. The 
themes of anxiety, doubt, melancholy and boredom had never been more topical in 
the history of human thought than in the mid-twentieth century, and it is only in the 
context of this intellectual situation, Bollnow contends, that one can understand the 
renewed rise of existentialism: ‘Die Stimmungslagen der Angst und der 
Verzweiflung, der Schwermut und auch der Langweile’, he emphasises, ‘geben der 
Existenzphilosophie ihr eigentümliches Gesicht’.29 Angst characterises a state in 
which the relationship between man and his surroundings becomes bizarre and 
unfathomable; we read: ‘Die ihn sonst so warm und vertraut umgebende und mit 
ihren verschiedenen Lebensbezügen tragende Welt ist plötzlich wie ferngerückt’.30 
All discernable meaning in life is overawed by doubt and questionability. The 
human individual, German or otherwise, has nothing more to hold onto, ‘er greift ins 
Leere und findet sich in völliger schrecklicher Einsamkeit und Verlassenheit’.31 
Expounding on Kierkegaardian doctrine, Bollnow proceeds in his work to explain 
how it is only when the individual consigns and commits himself fully to his despair 
and anxiety that he becomes able to ‘leap’ towards existence; he observes: ‘So ist 
                                                        
26 Ibid., p. 54. 
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die Verzweiflung die Krise, durch die der Weg zur eigentlichen Existenz führt’.32 
We will return to this in the following chapter.   
 
The third publication I wish to draw attention to for its crucial role in the dispersion 
of existentialist thinking in the post-war years in Germany is Herbert Marcuse’s 
essay ‘Existentialism: Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre’s L’Être et le Néant’. During the 
1940s, the German-American philosopher, sociologist and political theorist engaged 
in empirical research that allowed him to develop a substantive theory of the present 
age. Having studied with Heidegger in the 1920s, Marcuse was no doubt captivated 
by the wave of French existentialism. Following his mentorship under Heidegger,33 
Marcuse’s only published article from the late 1940s is his Marxist critique of 
Sartrean existentialism in which he denounces existentialist individualism and 
metaphysics, insisting:  
 
In so far as existentialism is a philosophical doctrine, it remains an idealistic 
doctrine: it hypostatizes specific historical conditions of human existence 
into ontological and metaphysical characteristics. Existentialism thus 
becomes part of the very ideology which it attacks and its radicalism is 
illusory.34  
 
In the spirit of critical theory,35 Marcuse contends that it is social theory and not 
philosophy which conceptualises the tangible historical conditions of human 
existence. Hegel, Marcuse claims, ‘comes close to the structure of human existence’ 
since ‘he interprets it in terms of the historical universe’.36 That said, Hegel 
                                                        
32 Ibid., p. 67. 
33 In 1947 Marcus denounced Heidegger’s allegiance to the Nazi Party as an act of philosophical and 
intellectual self-betrayal. Referring to Heidegger’s claim to have disassociated himself from the 
Hitler regime in 1934, Marcuse insisted that there still remained in 1947 a widespread public 
perception of his continued commitment; cf. Martin Heidegger, Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte 
1931-1938); Überlegungen VII-IX (Schwarze Hefte 1938-1939); Überlegungen VII-XV (Schwarze 
Hefte 1939-1941), (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2014). 
34 Herbert Marcuse, ‘Existentialism: Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre’s L’Être et le néant’, in Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 8.3, March 1948, pp. 309-336, p. 311. 
35 Critical Theory has both a circumscriptive and a broad meaning in philosophy and in the history of 
the social sciences. In the narrow sense it refers to several generations of German philosophers and 
social theorists in the Western European Marxist tradition known as the Frankfurt School, which 
included, in addition to Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer (1895-1973), Theodor W. Adorno (1903-
1969), Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), Friedrich Pollock (1894-1970), Leo Löwenthal (1900-1993) 
and Erich Fromm (1900-1980). 




approaches it from the perspective of Spirit which places his theory within a 
framework of ‘philosophical abstraction’.37 Kierkegaard by contrast turns to 
theology to grapple with the concreteness of human existence and suffering, while 
Marx implements political economy and social theory, both of which underscore 
‘the essential inadequacy of philosophy in the face of the concrete human 
existence’.38 Heidegger and Sartre, however, Marcuse proposes, attempt to develop 
an existential mode of thinking which seeks to grasp the situation of the historically 
concrete individual. Marcuse concludes nonetheless that 
 
no philosophy can possibly comprehend the prevailing concreteness. 
Heidegger’s existential ontology remains intentionally ‘transcendental’: his 
category of Dasein is neutral toward all concretization. […] In contrast, 
Sartre attempts such concretization with the methods and terms of 
philosophy – and the concrete existence remains ‘outside’ the philosophical 
conception, as a mere example or illustration. His political radicalism lies 
outside his philosophy, extraneous to its essence and content. Concreteness 
and radicalism characterize the style of his work rather than its content. 
 
In each of these publications pro and contra existentialism themes of angst, freedom, 
Grenzsituation, authenticity and the self thus command a central place. Yet there is 
another existentialist trope, one that is less often deliberated, yet shall serve as an 
additional thematic cornerstone in our upcoming discussions; it is the theistic 
existential notion of suffering, which is central to Kierkegaard’s philosophy. 
Perhaps the one thinker to explore this metaphysical notion in any considerable 
depth in the mid-twentieth century was existentialist theologian Paul Tillich (1886-
1965). Having emigrated from Germany to German at age 47 in 1933, Tillich was 
one of the few American intellectuals to strongly influence the progression of 
continental philosophy during the twentieth century. He was a prominent moral and 
philosophical figure throughout much of the 1940s and 50s who sought to reconcile 
modern philosophical movements with the Christian faith. Tillich was profoundly 
engaged in existentialist ideas, but his philosophical deliberations can be more 






closely affiliated to those of Heidegger than Kierkegaard. Tillich developed, for 
instance, Heidegger’s notion of Dasein, but unlike Heidegger he contended that God 
is ‘Being-itself,’ which is to say our capability to overcome anxiety and uncertainty 
in order to make the necessary choices to commit ourselves to a particular way of 
living. 
 
In his deliberations on the theme of being, Tillich also goes on to analyse the 
essence of suffering as follows: 
 
Leid fühlen wir, wenn uns unsere innerste Erfüllung versagt ist, weil wir 
etwas entbehren, was zu uns gehört und unsere Erfüllung erst ermöglicht. 
Vielleicht haben wir unsere nächsten Angehörigen und Freunde verloren 
[...]. Durch all dies erfahren wir Leid in mannigfacher Form: das Leid der 
Trauer, das Leid der Einsamkeit, das Leid der Schwermut, das Leid der 
Selbstanklage.39 
 
Tillich contends that suffering is essentially meaningful, but becomes meaningless 
in existence. The main causes of meaningless suffering are aloneness, which also 
has two perspectives or modalities in which solitude is positive in how it is a 
precondition for entering into a community with others, whilst estrangement is 
aloneness and therefore unacceptable. Tillich also acknowledges that whilst 
suffering can be, ‘wie es bei Paulus heißt, “die Traurigkeit der Welt”’ […], die zum 
Tode letzter Verzweiflung führt’, it can also constitute a ‘göttliche Traurigkeit [...], 
die zur Seligkeit führt’.40 Faced with objective uncertainty, with the 
inconclusiveness of objective analysis and rational debate, man experiences 
suffering and anguish, which is compounded by anticipation of one’s own death and 
one’s feeling of insignificance in the face of the eternal order of things. Yet what 
both Tillich and Kierkegaard advocate in their writings is the need for decisiveness, 
a ‘leap’; in other words, a commitment to a relationship with God that defies 
objective analysis. Of course, one may choose not to trust in religious faith, and to 
counter suffering through rational understanding and knowledge. One might 
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alternatively embrace the logic which governs Camus’s recognition of man’s absurd 
condition, in which a leap is also proposed as a solution to existential despair, yet 
into an existence without God. Ultimately, Kierkegaard contends, there are only two 
possibilities presented to man in such a scenario: ‘One is to suffer; the other is to 
become a professor of the fact that another suffered’.41  
 
The impact of existentialism on German social and political theory is merely a 
symptom of the interest shown by society at large in existentialism’s themes and 
tenets. As this study hopes to show in the following chapters, the movement of 
existentialism reverberated palpably also within German literary circles, and the 
existentialist themes of das Ich, authenticity, Grenzsituation, angst, freedom and 
suffering readily found expression in essays, works of literature and on the stage. 
Literature constitutes a key to providing an understanding of the unique existence of 
human beings. Philosophy had traditionally taken a fundamentally instrumental 
view of man, namely, assuming man had been created for a specific purpose and it is 
the task of philosophy to decipher that purpose. Modern existentialism, and in its 
wake modern literature, or more specifically, the postwar German novel, hesitates to 
pose this question; rather, for German authors of this period their novels constitute 
an opportunity through which they can pose the question What is man? and explore 
it more fully by contemplating the life-stories of their protagonists specifically in 
existentialist terms. 
 
Taking my cue from Arendt that existentialism is an ideal springboard to tackle the 
very question What is man?, the remainder of this study will be dedicated to 
exploring three German-language writers whose novels have given implicit 
formulation to an array of existential issues, especially the aforementioned notions 
of the self, angst, death, responsibility, Grenzsituation, suffering and authenticity. 
These writers are Max Frisch (1911-1991) with his 1954 novel Stiller, Alfred 
Andersch (1914-1980) with his 1952 autobiographical report Die Kirschen der 
Freiheit, and Heinrich Böll (1917-1985) with his posthumously published Der Engel 
schwieg (1949/1992). Of course, these three writers and their works in no way pick 
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up on all the facets of existentialism, nor is it the intention of this study to label 
them as fully-fledged existentialist writers. These three writers and their works, 
however, do seem to me to show up the depth to which existentialist concerns 
infiltrated, or seeped into, post-1945 German-language literature even where the 
writers themselves did not explicitly identify with existentialism as either a literary 
or philosophical movement. Even where they clearly seek to maintain their distance 
from their existentialist predecessors, for me their novels raise the principal 
questions that stand at the heart of existentialist philosophy, and indeed that stand 
for man himself, at this point in Western intellectual history. 
 
In light of existentialism’s undiminished relevance, as Odo Marquard would have it, 
it strikes me as a worthwhile endeavour not just to (re)trace the impact of 
existentialism on German-language writers at this crucial juncture of German and 
European history, but also, in doing so, to revisit these texts in order to weigh how 
topical their messages might still be. My study will begin in the following chapter, 
however, not with those writers themselves but by surveying the key themes as they 
emerge from the history of existentialist thought; it is these key themes that we will 
later pursue in the chapters devoted to Stiller, Die Kirschen der Freiheit and Der 
Engel schwieg. These three texts will bring to light the centricity and prevalence of 

















GENESIS OF EXISTENTIALISM 
 
This introductory chapter seeks to provide a history of the process of systemising 
and canonising existentialism as a philosophical movement of thought. As such, it 
will reconstruct a common dialogue about the conditio humana in the form of a 
series of reception histories. This thesis treats existentialism as a philosophy that 
takes the existence of man as its starting point. Since the beginning of human 
history, people have mused over the origins of their existence. They have questioned 
the nature of the universe, what brings them into association with their fellow 
human beings and nature, who they really are, and a multitude of other matters that 
unsettle the quietude of humankind. This is what we broadly and generally 
understand as existentialism. It is a life-view of which the individual constructs his 
own system of ethics through the choices he or she makes, and in which the 
individual bears sole responsibility for his or her actions. One cannot ignore, 
however, the fundamental difficulties in the task of defining existentialism as a 
philosophical movement, for it provides neither a consistent or systematic 
philosophy nor approach to thought.1 One might hope that an overview of the 
history of existentialism would offer a comprehensive explanation of this 
philosophical concept, yet existentialism is an enfant terrible, forever rejecting a 
concise dictionary definition or formula. As Hazel E. Barnes rightly affirms, ‘There 
is no common creed to which each writer is pledged. Admittedly there are areas of 
                                                        
1 Situating Existentialism: Key Texts in Context, ed. Jonathan Judaken and Robert Bernasconi (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2012), p. 10. 
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Begriff, so kann das nicht heißen, er ist der klarste 
und aller weiterer Erörterung unbedürfig. Der 
Begriff des ‘Seins’ ist vielmehr der Dunkelste.  




sharp disagreement’.2 Otto Friedrich Bollnow similarly remarks on the difficulty in 
defining who precisely is an existentialist in his work Existenzphilosophie – 
‘Versucht man die Existenzphilosophie mit den Namen bestimmter typischer 
Vertreter zu bezeichnen, so stößt man zunächst auf eine gewisse Schwierigkeit’.3 
This lack of intellectual consistency should not lead to an outright rejection of the 
existentialist label, however. In this sense, it shall be among the key aims of this 
thesis to locate an identifiable set of philosophical themes and tendencies that will 
serve to defend our positioning the writers, whose works I have selected for 
analysis, within the existentialist tradition. 
 
In locating a hitherto unwritten existentialist manifesto, this thesis will draw on three 
philosophical schools. Firstly, that of Kantian transcendental idealism and post-
Kantian idealism. It is perhaps one of the gravest oversights, or perhaps even 
misunderstandings in modern philosophy to assume an abrupt break between the 
two major schools of continental philosophy, German idealism and phenomenology 
or existentialism. Many prominent existentialist thinkers, most notably Søren 
Kierkegaard and Gabriel Marcel, habitually branded idealism as a philosophy of 
desertion from the human perspective. Instead they viewed it as a philosophy of the 
absolute that failed to comprehend the concrete richness of human life in the bleak 
abstractions of thought. For these existentialists, idealism is a form of ideology, 
estranged from its roots in lived experiences. Other scholars tend to approach the 
two schools with a view to juxtapose them, underlining their purported radical 
differences, thus reinforcing the idea that existentialism is a disdainful rejection of 
idealism in all its forms.4 This thesis, however, will attempt to argue otherwise. 
Post-1945 existentialism cannot be understood without acknowledging its roots in 
the cultural milieu and general philosophical atmosphere of the late eighteenth to 
mid-nineteenth century. This study contends how the fundamental assertions in the 
writings of Kant and Fichte, and other prominent idealists are not as remote from 
mid-twentieth-century philosophy as they appear. Indeed, many existentialists’ own 
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analyses of concrete existence, including those of Sartre, Heidegger,5 and even 
sceptics of idealism like Kierkegaard and Marcel, draw on the theoretical resources 
of German idealism, often to a striking degree. As will be shown in more extensive 
detail below, idealist philosophers were profoundly concerned with human 
existence, and one can discern several strands of thematic overlap that are central to 
both philosophical schools, which are as follows. Firstly, the perennial problem of 
the nature of the self, ‘das Ich,’ in the form of the human ego. Secondly, the true 
conception of human freedom and responsibility. And thirdly, the notions of theism 
and atheism in existentialist thinking. Within this context, this investigation will 
concurrently explore the concept of nihilism, the belief that there is no inherent 
value to be found in the world, or beyond it, and that there is no intrinsic purpose to 
human existence.  
 
The second philosopher that demonstrates clear existentialist tendencies is 
Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard’s concept of angst alludes to a state of extreme despair 
and uncertainty in people caused by their state of freedom to choose. It is a complex 
phenomenon that Kierkegaard believes is operative at every level and in every 
sphere of human existence. As described in The Concept of Anxiety (1844), 
Kierkegaard understands angst as an indefinable emotion, which has nothingness as 
its object. It is a feeling of dizziness that unnerves us, an alien power that grasps us. 
It seizes a person as they face a particular possibility, that is, ‘as one’s psychical 
sensitivity projects a vague image or adumbration which acquires the quality of 
being “possible,” of being capable of (or even demanding) enactment of one’s 
finitude’.6  Angst will thus serve as a fourth existentialist theme to be analysed as 
part of this thesis.  
 
The third and final school of philosophical thinking to be included in the virtual 
existentialist manifesto is that of early twentieth-century philosopher Karl Jaspers, 
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den Humanismus,’ in Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit; mit einem Brief über den Humanismus (Bern: 
Francke, 1947), pp. 72-75, it is evident that there are a great many existentialist themes in his writing. 
For instance, his insistence that authentic existence is a crucial aspect of ontology, and similarly his 
claim that anticipatory resoluteness or authentic Being-towards-death is a necessary prerequisite for 
experiencing Being in a philosophically primordial way.  
6 Arnold B. Come, Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering My Self, (Montreal, Quebec: McGill-




specifically his notion of Grenzsituation. In his 1919 work Psychologie der 
Weltanschauungen, Jaspers explained how Grenzsituationen can arise when the 
individual confronts an existential, and not just an intellectual, antimony – opposing 
values that cannot be evaded yet also cannot be reconciled. The individual is 
catapulted into a state of mental and existential suspense, unable to fathom the 
nature of that which he or she is called on to evaluate, yet equally unable to escape 
it. This philosophical concept can thus be understood as transformative. It shakes 
mankind out of a complacent and dreary perspective and drives him or her towards 
an awareness of transcendence and, correlatively, to his or her own freedom. 
 
The identification of a set of existentialist themes will effectively help us to 
underpin the essentially existentialist nature of many eighteenth-, nineteenth and 
early twentieth-century philosophies, reaffirming the notion that post-1945 
existentialism is by no means a stand-alone movement, but rather has a rich myriad 
of philosophical influences. As will soon become apparent in the upcoming 
overview, the history of existentialism is long and extensive. The prospect of 
establishing a chronological review of existentialism would be a complex, if not 
impossible task in this thesis, for it is not simply a case of linking up one 
existentialist thinker to the next. With this in mind, the first section of this 
introduction will offer a broad and general overview of where existentialist notions 
have featured in the history of philosophy, as well as in other academic disciplines, 
including art, psychology and education. It will also consider the transatlantic 
diffusion of existentialist ideas, and its position within international literatures. In 
the second part, it will explore in greater depth a selection of the aforementioned 
philosophers and expound upon the five overarching existentialist themes and 
concepts that feature in their writing. 
 
TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF EXISTENTIALISM 
 
Existentialism entered as a global cultural phenomenon at the Club Maintenant in 
Paris on October 29 1945, where Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) first delivered his 
momentous lecture ‘L'Existentialisme est un humanisme’ (‘Existentialism is a 
Humanism’), which he subsequently published in 1946. It is significant to mark 




peculiarities of existentialism is that few philosophers labelled themselves as such. 
Sartre initially rejected the term after it was first applied to him by Gabriel Marcel 
(1889-1973) whilst in discussion with a group of Dominicans at Le Cerf. Sartre 
defended his position as a philosopher of existence, but insisted that ‘existentialism’ 
carried no meaning.7 Nevertheless, his weighty 1945 lecture, poignantly delivered in 
the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, indicates Sartre’s adoption of 
and engagement with the existentialist label. It is perhaps Sartre’s belated 
acceptance of the term that fellow philosopher and novelist Simone de Beauvoir 
(1908-1986) was alluding to when she spoke of a set of young bohemian denizens of 
Saint-Germain-des-Prés who really did call themselves existentialists, wear a ‘new 
existentialist uniform of black sweaters, black shirts and black pants,’ frequent the 
same cafés and bars, and assume an air of ennui.8 Despite Sartre’s reconciliation 
with the term by 1945, fellow writer and philosopher Albert Camus (1913-1960) 
always insisted that he had never been an existentialist, and that he didn’t really 
know what it was.9 He preferred to classify himself as a courageous humanist, and 
saw his own undertakings as part of the philosophie de l’absurde, which he felt 
represented a more accurate explanation of his early viewpoint. Furthermore, he was 
resentful of his work being assimilated to that of his French counterpart, Sartre, 
despite their close associations. As he recounted in an interview with Jeanine 
Delpech in 1945:  
 
No, I am not an existentialist. […] Sartre and I published all our books, 
without exception, before meeting each other. When we met, it was to verify 
our differences. Sartre is an existentialist, and the only book of ideas I have 
published, The Myth of Sisyphus, was directed against philosophers called 
existentialists.10  
 
                                                        
7 For the complete version of this account, see: Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, trans. 
Richard Howard (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1964), pp. 45-46. 
8 Ibid., p. 142. 
9 By 1960 ‘existentialism’ (much like ‘structuralism’ a few years later) had become a general-purpose 
catchphrase, roughly approximating to ‘bohemian’ in earlier decades. According to Tony Judt, ‘the 
unemployed art students who came to hear the Beatles on the Reeperbahn in Hamburg all called 
themselves ‘Exis.’ Cf. Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (London: Random 
House, 2007), p. 400. 
10 Albert Camus, ‘No, I am not an Existentialist…,’ in Lyrical and Critical Essays, trans. E. Kennedy, 




German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) also vehemently rejected the 
existentialist label. This was first articulated in his 1947 work Brief über den 
Humanismus, which was partly intended as a response to Sartre’s Existentialism is a 
Humanism. Decidedly disassociating himself from Sartre’s isms, Heidegger 
affirmed that every form of humanism involves a metaphysics, an understanding of 
beings as a whole that does not concern itself with the truth of Being. Like Camus, 
he renounced any similarity between his philosophy and that of Sartre, who he 
appeared to hold in low esteem. William H. Werkmeister confirmed Heidegger’s 
position in this regard when he visited the philosopher in 1937; ‘[…] knowing that 
Jean-Paul Sartre had been his student, I asked Heidegger about his relationship to 
existentialism. His reply was an emphatic “My God, that I have never intended”’.11 
Whilst Heidegger’s overt denunciation of Sartreanism remains indisputable, several 
points must be recalled in order to contextualize his position. Firstly, Heidegger’s 
1947 repudiation was made during the height of the French existentialist movement, 
‘and was thus based on a narrow identification of existentialism with Sartre’s 
philosophy of the time,’ as Stephan Michelman argues.12 Furthermore, the two 
philosophers radically differed in their political standpoints, Sartre being a leftist 
activist and Heidegger a former defendant of National Socialist ideology during the 
Nazi era.13 Furthermore, Heidegger did not wish to be labelled as a ‘philosopher of 
nothingness’ or as an ‘advocate of meaninglessness,’ a view which may derive from 
his erroneous combining of the terms ‘existentialism’ and ‘nihilism.’ In this way, 
Heidegger may have come to interpret existentialism in a largely and solely 
destructive sense.  
 
With this in mind, to define existentialism as a primarily European theo-
philosophical and literary movement that reached its peak in the mid-twentieth 
century would be a relatively fair assessment. Yet despite the movement’s rise to 
prominence in the early to mid 1940s, and the then widespread perception of 
                                                        
11 William H. Werkmeister, Martin Heidegger on the Way, ed. Richard T. Hull (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
1996), p. xxii. 
12 Stephan Michelman, Historical Dictionary of Existentialism (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2008), p. 
176. 
13 Heidegger’s motivation for joining the Nazi Party was his belief that National Socialism could 
provide a renewal of German culture. He was certain that this would lead to the salvation of Western 
Europe from the effects of nihilism and mass technological civilisation. A key text to understand 




existentialism as a novel and unprecedented undertaking, it is crucial to consider 
existentialism’s long and extensive tradition in the history of Western philosophy. 
As David Breazeale contends, philosophy can be understood as a ‘cumulative 
affair’,14 and existentialist scholars commonly identify a range of historical 
antecedents, thus supporting Breazeale’s hypothesis. Formerly an unnamed view of 
human existence, existentialist ideas were first articulated in ancient Greece, and a 
major exponent of this hypothesis was the French philosopher Emmanuel Mounier 
(1905-1950), who proclaimed how the air of post-war existential ennui made 
famous by the likes of Sartre, de Beauvoir and Camus was in fact part of a vast 
arbre existentialiste of philosophical influences extending back to Socrates (469-399 
BC).15  
 
The classical Greek Athenian philosopher is commonly credited as one of the great 
founders of Western philosophy. Besides Socrates’ major contribution to Western 
thought, namely his dialectic method of inquiry, known commonly as the Socratic 
method, he can also be regarded as a proto-existentialist philosopher. This derives 
from his philosophic preoccupation with the ‘caring of the self,’ or epimeleia 
heautou. According to Socrates, the self was, above all, the individual’s own 
concern and responsibility. The Greek philosopher maintained that epimeleia 
heautou was not a question of abstract theoretical truths and blind conformity to 
social norms and predetermined standards of behaviour, but rather an attempt to 
examine one’s life. His position demonstrated a need for introspection and self-
tending to ensure the soundness of man’s soul.16 In twentieth-century thinking, 
French philosopher, social theorist and literary critic Michel Foucault (1926-1984) 
demonstrated a particular fascination with the proto-existentialist ethics of ancient 
Greece, and alluded to the potential of epimeleia heautou17 in the secularised, post-
modern world: 
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and Bernard, and Kierkegaard; cf. Emmanuel Mounier, Introduction aux existentialismes (Paris: 
Editions de Noël, 1947). 
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Why do we care for ourselves only through the care for truth? I think that we 
are touching on a question which is very fundamental and which is, I would 
say, the question of the Western world. What caused Western culture to 
begin to turn around this obligation of truth, which has taken on a variety of 
different forms?18    
 
What Foucault found striking was how morality in ancient Greece was not an 
arrangement of rules or codes of conduct, but an ethos. It was not related to religion 
or religious preoccupations, neither was it connected to legal, social or institutional 
systems. Its domain was the relationship one had towards the self, namely the 
aesthetics of existence. Foucault remarks on how the expression epimeleia heautou 
carried a particular significance in Greek: ‘It does no mean simply being interested 
in oneself, nor does it mean having a certain tendency to self-attachment of self-
fascination […] it describes a sort of work, an activity; it implies attention, 
knowledge, technique’.19 Foucault goes on to note the distinctly existentialist nature 
of epimeleia heautou, and ancient Greek society’s disinclination to see ethics as a 
religious, legal or institutional matter enabled Foucault to note parallels with 
twentieth-century Western society:  
 
I wonder if our problem is not, in a way, similar to this one, since most of us 
no longer believe that ethics is founded in religion, nor do we want a legal 
system to intervene in our moral, personal, private life. Recent liberation 
movements suffer from the fact that they cannot find any principle on which 
to base the elaboration of a new ethics. They need an ethics, but they cannot 
find any other ethics than an ethics founded on so-called scientific 
knowledge.20 
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Foucault argues that modern civilisation has unwillingly inherited a tradition of 
Christian morality with its values of self-renunciation and self-sacrifice, as well as 
the secular tradition that sees in external laws the basis for morality. Against these 
traditions, epimeleia heautou appears as immorality, egoism or a means of escape 
from rules and responsibility towards others. The French theorist advocates however 
that this should be understood as stemming from an entirely different conception of 
ethics – ethics as practise, creative activity, the permanent training of the self by 
oneself. Whilst Foucault never directly advocated that the ethics of ancient Greece 
be fully incorporated in contemporary Western civilisation,21 he remained steadfast 
in the view that modern Western society could learn something from it: 
 
My idea is that it’s not necessary to relate ethical problems to scientific 
knowledge. Among the cultural inventions of mankind there is a treasury of 
devices, techniques, ideas, procedures, and so on, that cannot exactly be 
reactivated but at least constitute, or help to constitute, a certain point of 
view which can be useful as a tool for analysing what is going on now – and 
to change it.22   
 
Socrates’ philosophies, among which we can include his considerations of justice 
and man’s pursuit of the virtue areté (or, in its fundamental sense, ‘excellence’ or 
‘goodness’), proved to be a source of controversy in Athenian society and saw him 
brought to trial in 399 BC. He was condemned to death for impiety and corruption 
of the youth. Yet what is particularly significant about these series of events is that 
despite the then polemic nature of Socrates’ theories, his philosophical concept 
triggered an existential interest amongst Stoic (300 BC) and Epicurean (circa. 307 
BC) philosophers of the Hellenistic period, who similarly directed their attentions 
towards questions of ethics, morality and human existence. Within Stoic philosophy, 
for instance, one can clearly identify attempts to build on and further Socratic 
existential attitudes; specifically, its interest in a total existential transformation of 
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humankind, its preoccupation with the active relationship between cosmic 
determinism (constantia) and the freedom of man, authenticity, and, as became a 
subject of controversy among later generations of existentialist thinkers, conformity 
to the dictates of a Natural Law.23  
 
As already alluded to, another major philosophical epoch to have concerned itself 
with the problematics of human existence was the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century, specifically in the form of Kantian transcendental idealism and post-
Kantian idealism. This philosophical era began in the 1750s and lasted until the 
1840s, and its most reputable representatives include next to Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804) himself, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 
Schelling (1775-1854), and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). Often 
referred to in Germany as the age of ‘Classical German Philosophy,’ this description 
alludes to the level of distinguished achievement rather than serving to exemplify a 
specific philosophy or school of thought. It thus evades questions on how 
philosophers of this period match up with the divide in German literature between 
classicism and romanticism, and how a distinction can be made between the 
‘critical’ or ‘transcendental’ idealism of Kant on the one hand, and the so-called 
‘absolute’ idealism that culminated in the works of his successors on the other.24  
 
In order to fully comprehend the background for the existentialists’ thoughts on 
ethics, it is necessary to dedicate some attention to Kant’s theory of morality. Kant 
departs from classical moral theory by largely rebuffing the notion of a human being 
with a fixed essence that has a determinate content. To be sure, he conceives of 
humans as essentially rational, but he limits this conception to the notion of a 
rational will that requires self-reflection and self-consistency. In this way, Kant is 
preparing the ground for philosophers like Sartre who categorically deny any a 
priori human essence that could serve as a basis for a moral theory. Kant similarly 
breaks with medieval moral thought in his rejection of heteronomy. For human 
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freedom to be truly meaningful, only the individual moral will itself can form the 
basis of the moral law. Kant rejects the notion that God or any external sources 
provide the grounds for moral commands; his philosophy instead centres on the will 
of the individual. This position thus prepares the way for later existentialists who 
insist on a form of voluntarism of the individual and deny that a given situation can 
ever fully determine an individual’s actions. 
 
Building on the theoretical and ethical writings of Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s 
proto-existentialist orientation also deserves attention here. Contemplating Fichte’s 
views on the task of philosophy, Daniel Breazeale explores the theoretical quest that 
animates the Jena Wissenschaftslehre, that is, ‘the quest for a coherent and certain 
philosophical system able to furnish us with a fully adequate, transcendental account 
of the full range of everyday experience […].’ He observes, however, that this ‘is 
not conceived of by Fichte as an end in itself.’ Rather, Fichte’s philosophical project 
represents a response to a greater, practical demand – ‘a demand not for theoretical 
or even for practical certainty, but rather for personal unity or wholeness. We seek 
systematic unity in the realm of theory [philosophy] not primarily for its own sake, 
but rather, as a means for coming to terms with and if possible mitigating the 
painful, existential division within ourselves’.25 Fichte is credited with developing 
the first theory that treats self-consciousness as its subject. The conclusions he drew 
from his philosophical investigations had momentous historical consequences. 
Principal among these deductions was that there is no immediate, undifferentiated 
structure of self-reference in the human mind, thereby effectively rejecting the view 
that self-reference accompanies single perceptions (as in Aristotelian philosophy, 
and later in the writings of Brentano and Husserl). In its place, Fichte concentrates 
on the mental self-reference that makes up the I and on the I’s self-identification. 
Fichte developed this idea in his post-1800 versions of the Wissenschaftslehre, 
where he affirmed that self-reference is neither the only, nor even the primary 
structure of the mind. It is rather an indication of more basic processes that underlie 
the mind, but in a way that these processes necessarily constitute the mind’s self-
reference. From this Fichte derived the dynamic monism that propelled his 
                                                        
25 Daniel Breazeale, ‘Philosophy and the Divided-Self: On the Existential and Scientific Task of the 
Jena Wissenschaftslehre’, in Realität und Gewissheit, vol. 6, ed. Helmut Girndt & Wolfgang H. 




systematic analysis of all mental structures, which, in turn, led to the theories of the 
absolute self. These have since been elaborated on by Heidegger and Sartre and will 
be dealt with in more detail in the upcoming section ‘Key Themes of 
Existentialism.’ 
 
Hegel’s philosophy was also a significant milestone in the development of 
existentialism, first as an object of criticism and subsequently, in the twentieth 
century, as a source of inspiration. Hegel’s particular brand of idealism was an 
attempt to demonstrate that the ultimate nature of everything that exists – human 
subjects, beliefs, and institutions, along with non-human nature and the entire 
material universe – is ‘rational.’ To say that the universe is rational is to say not only 
that it is governed by intelligible laws, but also that it is guided by an intrinsic 
purpose. The fundamental intelligibility and purpose, what Hegel called die Idee, 
remains dormant at the level of non-human nature. In human beings, however, die 
Idee becomes conscious and active. Hegel’s ‘absolute’ idealism defined itself in 
contrast to Kantian idealism, where human reason has intrinsic limits which 
philosophy is required to set forth and justify. Hegel rejected Kant’s thesis that 
reason is constrained to operate within the limits of space and time and that reality 
beyond the spatial-temporal realm must remain an unknowable ‘thing-in-itself.’ 
Jettisoning Kant’s distinction between appearance and the thing-in-itself, Hegel 
boldly proclaimed that human reason knows no limits, and that everything that 
exists must eventually receive the imprimatur of human understanding. This process 
according to which reality is progressively comprehended, gradually but following a 
necessary logic throughout human history, is called ‘dialectic.’ The dialectic of 
human history is at the same time a dialectic of reason, or alternatively of 
‘consciousness,’ as the same logic operates both in the objective unfolding of events 
and in our subjective apprehension of them. Significantly, the dialectic is a 
collective and not simply an individual accomplishment; it is fuelled by the 
distinctive manner of understanding that typifies whole cultures and eras, and thus 
undergirds individuals’ thoughts and actions. To this collective manner of 
understanding Hegel gave the name Geist, as indicated in the title of his most 
famous work, the 1807 Phänomenologie des Geistes. Hegel’s dialectic is ultimately 
governed by the logic of Aufhebung, where each subsequent form of spirit or 




preserves their truth at a higher level. Thus, for example, while the early modern and 
Renaissance discovery of scientific laws negated the medieval notion of divine 
providence (God’s inscrutable plan) that sees natural events as an expression of 
God’s will, at the same time it preserved the idea that God is active in the world in 
the assumption that the laws of nature are created by God to be amenable to human 
understanding.  
 
Moving closer to a modern version of existentialist thought, Søren Aabye 
Kierkegaard (1813-1855) sought in his philosophy to define himself as a ‘thinker of 
the self.’ This can be understood as an attempt to deal with his existence or, more 
precisely, to understand the meaning of his life. Kierkegaard was a Copenhagen 
born philosopher, theologian, poet, social critic, and religious author, who wrote 
texts primarily on organised religion, Christendom, morality, ethics, and the 
philosophy of religion. He was profoundly interested in the fundamentals affecting 
the life of an individual; it is for this reason that he is often referred to as the first 
existentialist philosopher, if not the ‘Father of Existentialism.’ The Danish 
philosopher was an intensely religious thinker, and his views on ethics are tightly 
bound up with his views on Christianity. Whilst there is no single work which can 
be regarded as the definitive statement of Kierkegaard’s ethical position, Either/Or 
(1843), Fear and Trembling (1843), and Works of Love (1847) all contain extended 
discussions of his ethical thinking. For Kierkegaard, the realm of objectivity is a 
realm of necessity and logic, whilst the realm of subjectivity is governed by a 
different set of laws. Regardless of how much objective knowledge an individual 
has or how thorough a logician one is, mankind will always be given a moral choice 
where discursive knowledge and logic carry no weight or relevance and can provide 
no normative assistance. Kierkegaard maintains that if morality were simply a 
question of working out a particular equation according to a utility calculus, then 
genuine choice would be eradicated and humans would not be free. This kind of 
logical calculus in effect produces a plan for action independent of the individual 
since it must be considered a universal, objective procedure which, in principle, can 
be deciphered by any given moral subject. The real choice, which is perniciously 
hidden by theories of rationality, occurs much earlier, namely when the individual 
chooses to allow his or her actions to be governed by these objective procedures, or 




such methods, a decision has already taken place, and one has tacitly forfeited one’s 
freedom in order to escape into the illusory security of the realm of rational 
foundations. For Kierkegaard, any theory which purports to ground human morality 
in objective rational standards is simply preposterous. An additional category 
inherent in Kierkegaard’s existentialist ethical thought is that of ‘the religious.’ This 
is perhaps best illustrated by the famous analysis of the Abraham and Isaac story 
that the Dane sets forth in Fear and Trembling. God orders Abraham to sacrifice his 
son Isaac, an order which, looked at from an ethical point of view, would seem 
objectionable. But, says Kierkegaard, the religious ‘suspends’ the ethical in the 
sense that normal human ethical comprehension must cede to divine command. But 
once again when answering the call of the religious, and when answering the call of 
the ethical, one does not have recourse to objective reasons, justifications or 
principles. The individual simply decides and acts. For Kierkegaard, true religion 
and ethical life is experienced with these emotions of fear and trembling, and never 
ultimately comes to a stable place of rational certitude or equanimity. These notions 
will be further explored in the upcoming discussion of existential angst. At the time 
of Kierkegaard’s death in 1855, this momentous philosopher was generally 
unknown outside his native Denmark. Whilst never read by Nietzsche or 
Dostoyevsky, Kierkegaard’s works did come to be a decisive influence on later 
existentialists, including as Heidegger, Sartre and Camus.  
 
No survey of pre- and proto-existentialist thought can be complete without referring 
to Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), whose philosophy shaped much of the thinking 
of the later tradition of aesthetic existentialism. Notably, Nietzsche was the first to 
try and provide a positive solution to the problems posed for ethics and morality by 
the absence of God or a transcendent force, placing him in direct contrast to 
Kierkegaard. His attack on Christian morality, epitomised in the destructive claim 
that ‘Gott ist tot’,26 is in many regards original and unique within the pre-
existentialist tradition. Indeed, the controversial remark became a vehicle through 
which Nietzsche affirmed how the traditional belief in a transcendent basis for moral 
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values was no longer credible in the modern world. Virtually all of his works are 
replete with ethical considerations, but the main books that are commonly referred 
to in this context are Also sprach Zarathustra (1883), Jenseits von Gut und Böse: 
Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft (1886), and Zur Genealogie der Moral 
(1887). Nietzsche’s view of moral life can be seen as a response to Kant’s account 
of autonomy. While he agrees with Kant with regards to the self-determining will of 
the individual as a focus of ethical action, Nietzsche departs radically from the 
Kantian view in his conception of how the will decides and acts autonomously. For 
Nietzsche, morality is concerned with ideals which are posited by the individual. 
Unlike in Kant’s conception, these ideals are not in need of any universal validity or 
internal consistency. Furthermore, they need not be conducive to the compatibility 
of individual wills in the social sphere. The ideals and virtues of the Übermenschen 
are the expression of their own individual choice, and require no further justification 
either from the inherent nature of the virtue or ideal itself, or from the general 
approbation of others. The only criterion seems to be that the virtues be life 
enhancing in the sense that they are conducive to the expression of the will to 
power. Likewise, the ideals posited by the Übermenschen have a claim on them 
alone, and are not universalized or extended to others.  
 
Following this discussion, it seems pertinent to expand on that contested and 
misunderstood concept in Nietzsche’s positive ethical program – that of the 
Übermensch, or ‘overman,’ cited above. This concept has often been read as a 
forerunner of the Nazi ideology and the superiority of the German race, but 
Nietzsche, who never hesitated to express condemnation for his fellow compatriots, 
was anything but a racist or nationalist. It has also been disputed whether the notion 
of the Übermensch was intended as a prediction about the future in a nihilistic age, 
or as a concrete normative proposal for ethics. Ultimately, the Übermensch can be 
understood as an ideal or positive model for an ethics without transcendent 
grounding. In a world after the death of God, the Übermensch is the one who has the 
strength and clear-headedness to receive life on its own terms without delusions or 
promises, and who has the capacity and creativity to posit his own values in place of 
the traditional Christian moral code. Whilst the Übermensch would have radically 
different conceptions of the good, one normative characteristic that they would have 




the exercising of their natural powers, a grain of thought that comes to fruition in 
twentieth-century existentialism.  
 
No other philosopher of the early twentieth century wrote more on Nietzsche than 
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), the author of Sein und Zeit (1927) and arguably 
German philosophy’s chief spokesperson of existentialism. Celebrated for his 
existential and phenomenological explorations of the question of Dasein, or Being-
in-the-world, Heidegger is commonly regarded as one of the most important 
philosophers of the twentieth century. Dasein is first and foremost a concept of 
temporality. There could be no time except for Dasein; conversely there can be no 
Dasein without there being time. Just as Dasein is essentially ‘in’ space, Dasein is 
equally ‘in’ time. This ‘in’ does necessarily function in the same way as when we 
talk about a coat being in the wardrobe or how the French Revolution took place in 
the eighteenth century. Dasein constitutes or projects temporality. Time is 
‘originally with’ Dasein. In this regard Heidegger shows himself as a successor of 
Kant in Kritik der reinen Vernunft. For Heidegger, time is an a priori condition for 
Being-in-the-world. Time does not exist apart from human consciousness or Dasein, 
and all ‘objective’ time is based on this ‘subjective condition.’ Heidegger also uses 
Dasein’s existence as Being-in-the-world to describe a concept of everydayness. 
Heidegger brings attention to the everyday features of the world that in practical 
activities tend to go unnoticed, because the everyday life world presents itself as a 
holistic context of significance of which individual components are easily 
overlooked. Heidegger acknowledges that everyday Being-with-Dasein represents 
the existentialist concept of Being-with-others, and this eventually leads to bad faith. 
As Woelfel explains: ‘Heidegger talked about Das Man, the anonymous or ‘they’-
self of everyday life, which passively conforms to what ‘they’ (the surrounding 
society) say and do. He describes this state as a ‘falling away’ from what we are as 
finitely free beings, characterized by the tranquillizing, disintegration, and alienation 
of the self’.27 The other end of the spectrum from this ‘falling away’ (bad faith) is 
authenticity, a key concern also in French existentialism. Authenticity is something 
that individual Dasein must work to attain. It is not obtained by isolation from 
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others, but is rather a modification of the ‘they’-self. For Heidegger, authenticity is, 
as Haim Gordon phrases it, the ‘conditioning of gathering one’s existence from its 
dissipated immersion in the world of the they into one’s most proper way of being 
[…] Authenticity may be achieved but never permanently attained, because Dasein 
is inevitably immersed in the average everyday’.28 
 
As the above discussion reveals, existentialist notions come in many shades and 
colours of philosophical thought. And yet, the movement of existentialism is not just 
confined to the disciplines of philosophy. As Medard Boss put it, existentialism has 
a potential voice in ‘everything in which human beings have something to do’.29 The 
art world is a particularly germane instance. The sculptures of Swiss artist Alberto 
Giacometti (1901-1966) are seen as a quintessential expression of existentialism. 
Although Giacometti never claimed to have pursued existentialist ideas in his art, his 
sculptures can be viewed as epitomes of existentialist humanity – alienated, solitary, 
and disoriented in the world’s immensity. His sculpture ‘Homme signalent’ (‘Man 
Pointing’) from 1947, reveals a thin, featureless figure with rough, agitated surfaces, 
which appears engulfed by the vast space surrounding him, imparting a sense of 
remoteness and vulnerability. The paintings of Jean Dubuffet (1901-1985) similarly 
capture a tortured vision of the world through manipulated materials. Other 
European painters whose names have been associated with existentialism are Henri 
Michaux (1899-1984), Jean Fautrier (1898-1964), Germaine Richier (1902-1959), 
and Bram van Velde (1895-1981). The thoughts and insights of existentialist writers 
such as Sartre, Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) have also had 
conspicuous echoes in theatrical works, most notably in Samuel Beckett’s (1906-
1989) literary canon. Existentialist themes are likewise traceable in the plays of 
Tennessee Williams (1911-1983), Arthur Miller (1915-2005), and Jean Anouilh 
(1910-1987). Further writers to have portrayed the struggle and predicament of man 
in their works include Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-1881), Leo Tolstoy (1829-1910), 
T.S. Eliot (1888-1965), Ernest Hemingway (1899-1961), Graham Greene (1904-
1991), Eugene Ionesco (1909-1994), and Harold Pinter (1930-2008), to name only 
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some branches of this extensive literary arbre existentialiste. Existentialism also 
developed a rich and established basis in early to mid-twentieth-century psychology. 
For instance, the existentialist notion that our conscious experience is of particular 
value became central to the approach taken by Gestalt psychologists.30 It also 
extended into the realms of education, notably in ‘open schooling’ and aesthetic 
education, where more focus is given to the individual student. Here the student is 
encouraged to experiment and explore, and students and teachers commonly work 
together as collaborators.  
 
Few if any other modern Western philosophical movements have had as profound 
an impact on such an array of academic disciplines as has existentialism. Its 
influence was also very much felt on general, day-to-day culture. As mentioned 
previously, the ‘epicentre of this impact was certainly Paris, especially the Latin 
Quarter of Paris’,31 where the likes of Sartre, de Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty and 
Camus were becoming the major cultural force in defining the intellectual debate of 
the generation. They produced newspaper articles, radio shows, plays and novels, as 
well as the leading left-wing periodical Les temps modernes, which appeared to 
impart a ‘new way of thinking’ among the post-war French populace. Paramount to 
the success of Sartrean existentialism, in particular, was, without doubt, the 
historical context surrounding it, for it is by no means a coincidence that 
existentialism resonated so intensely among the intellectual vanguard in the era of 
two catastrophic world wars. As the Iron Curtain descended, and in the wake of the 
Holocaust and Hiroshima, existentialism emerged as the post-war cultural force 
most capable of responding to, and engaging with Europe’s post-1945 trauma and 
anxieties. It was similarly a time of deep uncertainty in Paris, which had been under 
German occupation until August 1944. Against this background of torment and 
despair, Sartre and de Beauvoir’s advocating of a value system based upon the 
individual’s commitment to bettering him- or herself outside the sanctions of 
traditional belief systems was a captivating prospect. Theirs was a philosophy based 
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upon freedom of choice, and a belief in the individual’s capacity for self-realisation, 
which appealed to a nation’s need to pose questions, and to reflect on the ostensible 
hollowness of man’s existence. Whilst the majority of French people never fully 
engaged with the extensive philosophical substructures of existentialism, and most 
likely never grappled with the subtleties of the movement’s antecedents, 
existentialism experienced ‘a remarkable vogue’ in post-war France,32 and none 
were perceived to have been more profoundly affected or influenced by this 
philosophical fad than the young generation. 
 
It would be a mistake to suppose, however, that post-war French existentialism was 
not affected by ideas outside of France. The shock waves of existentialism 
reverberated far beyond Europe, and reports were even traced in popular 
transatlantic publications, such as leading American fashion magazines and journals 
like Vogue, Harper’s Bazaar, Life magazine and Partisan Review,33 from which 
readers learned about the existentialist ‘caverns,’ or basement bistros of Paris. It was 
in the latter publication that American philosophy professor William Barrett first 
discussed Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. Barrett’s review of the work was not 
without its criticism, but he nevertheless praises it as ‘the Bible of French 
existentialism’.34 Barrett’s 1958 publication Irrational Man: A Study in Existential 
Philosophy, similarly served to communicate concepts of existentialist thinking to 
the English-speaking world. Here his admiration of Sartre is, once again, 
resounding. He describes Being and Nothingness as ‘a great, uneven, brilliant and 
verbose tome,’ and flatteringly labels Sartre as ‘one of the most brilliant minds alive 
– sometimes too brilliant, for the greatest mind needs a little saving streak of earth-
bound stupidity somewhere […]’.35 Adulation aside, Irrational Man must also be 
credited for offering a highly systematic and comprehensive explanation on the 
fundamentals of Sartrean philosophy, as the below citation demonstrates: 
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But again like every humanism, it leaves unasked the question: What is the 
root of man? In this search for roots for man – a search that has, as we have 
seen, absorbed thinkers and caused the malaise of poets for the last hundred 
and fifty years – Sartre does not participate. He leaves man rootless. This 
may be because Sartre himself is the quintessence of the urban intellectual – 
perhaps the most brilliant urban intellectual of our time, but still with the 
inevitable alienation of this type. He seems to breathe the air of the modern 
cities, its cafés, faubourgs, and streets, as if there were no other home for 
man.36 
 
Whilst existentialism remained something of an underground tradition in American 
philosophical institutions, it thrived in the analytic tradition, and propelled Barrett 
and Hazel Barnes towards international recognition, both of whom became 
translators and interlocutors of existentialism. Female existentialist figure Simone de 
Beauvoir was also majorly influential in the flourishing ‘second wave’ of American 
feminism in the 1960s. The ‘mother of movement’ Betty Friedan learned much from 
de Beauvoir about the structural and existential forces that conditioned women to 
accept their position as ‘the second sex,’ and encouraged them to redefine their roles 
along more egalitarian lines. On a general cultural level, New York in particular 
became the target of a sort of ‘existentialist offensive,’ with Sartre and de Beauvoir 
guiding the way. Both of them toured there, Sartre first as a reporter for the 
newspaper Combat, and again soon thereafter as a lecturer, and de Beauvoir first as 
a lecturer at several different colleges and universities. What is evident from their 
reports is that ‘existentialism’ was already a familiar term with many Americans, 
who were at the same time fascinated to learn more about the philosophical 
movement. Although the original texts would for the most part not become available 
in English translation until 1947-48 at the earliest (Hazel Barnes’ translation of 
Being and Nothingness was first published in 1956), it is evident that already in the 
1940s there was a growing awareness in the United States that a serious intellectual 
movement was underway.  
 
                                                        




As Martin Woessner explains in his chapter on existentialism ‘Angst Across the 
Channel,’ the philosophical movement was introduced in England primarily by two 
German Jewish émigrés, Werner Brock and F. H. Heinemann, who facilitated the 
transmission of the existentialist themes of life and existence.37 With regards to 
Sartrean existentialism, it was the novelist and philosopher Iris Murdoch who 
popularised the movement by introducing Sartre and the themes of the Paris school 
to English readers. A. J. Ayer, who was later to become the dean, so to speak, of the 
British philosophers of his generation, was also a major player in the dissemination 
of Sartrean ideas. At times Ayer showed a notable lack of enthusiasm for Sartre’s 
philosophy. In 1945 he wrote ‘L'Être et le Néant […] is exceedingly long, over 700 
large and closely printed pages, always difficult and often obscure’.38 He and others 
were also of the opinion that Sartre did little more than revise the ideas of Heidegger 
in Sein und Zeit. Ayer did, however, grudgingly acknowledge the importance of Sein 
und Zeit, saying that its ‘metaphysical pessimism,’ which fit comfortably ‘[with]in 
the existentialist tradition,’ was in accordance with the spirit of the age.39 
 
French existentialism was also heavily influential in Spain and Latin America, 
although the movement was already a generative philosophical current long before it 
rose to prominence in the United States and Europe. Since the birth of Latin 
America’s first autonomous universities following the region’s independence from 
Spain, Latin American philosophy has been saturated with existentialist themes. A 
post-colonial identity crisis and Latin America’s marginal situation led the nations to 
persistently muse over the nature of being. Philosophers preoccupied themselves 
with questions of becoming authentically Latin American and of authentic versus 
inauthentic philosophical practise. It is especially this focus on inter-subjective 
relations and national and continental identity throughout Spanish and Latin 
American history that distinguishes the movement from its European counterparts. 
The influential works of Spanish liberal philosopher and essayist José Ortega y 
Gasset were strongly embraced as a new way of recasting existence, culture, and 
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history, as they ultimately contributed to become an integral part of Latin American 
self-identity and self-understanding. The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 
forced Ortega y Gasset into exile in Buenos Aires, where he taught and gained a 
group of followers. By the time he returned to Madrid in 1945, the philosophies of 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Heidegger had become heavily entrenched in 
Spanish culture in helping the nation recast a ‘Latin American, philosophical 
account of its own marginalization, historical, and axiological commitments vis-à-
vis its colonial past’.40 Another important figure in the development of 
phenomenological and existentialist philosophies in Latin America is Ortega y 
Gasset’s compatriot disciple and close friend, José Gaos (1900-1969). From his 
earliest critical study of Husserl (La crítica del psicologismo en Husserl, 1930) to 
his introduction to phenomenology (Introducción a la fenomenología, 1960), Gaos 
defined himself as a key contributor in the dissemination of phenomenological ideas 
in Latin America, in addition to his meticulous Spanish translation of Heidegger’s 
Sein und Zeit. Francisco Romero (1891-1962) is also considered a leader in the 
Latin American philosophical movement, especially in Argentina. He is particularly 
celebrated for his contributions to recasting the myth of the gaucho of Martín Fierro 
within the framework of a philosophical anthropology that conjugated the 
phenomenological, essential concepts of transcendence, intentionality, and existence 
with Hegelian-Marxist notions of historical self-consciousness and social 
transformation. The works of Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges similarly reveal a 
preoccupation with the universal theme of human existence, and his metaphysical 
attitude can be located in his restlessness tied to the question of time, and his 
awareness of human transience on the path of oblivion. Borges deals for instance 
with the mystifying nature of existence in his 1941 short story El Jardín de senderos 
que se bifurcan (The Garden of Forking Paths), in which he describes an infinite 
series of times, which blur into a tangled web of divergent, convergent and parallel 
times. In this sense Borges is depicting time as a nonlinear, existential puzzle. A 
further novelist to have played a significant role in the development of the Spanish 
American essay in the twentieth century was the Argentine Ernesto Sábato (1911-
2011). Influenced particularly by Sartre and Camus, Sábato was a thinker of the 
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European humanist tradition. His intellectual evolution and his decision to write 
literature were largely governed by several extraneous factors: his disillusionment 
with science (he received his doctorate in physics in 1938), his initial allegiance to 
and subsequent retraction from the Communist Party, and his first hand experience 
of Europe on the brink of the Second World War. Despite his involvement with the 
surrealist group in Paris in 1939, and ‘his intellect […] succumbed to the fascination 
of the irrational,’41 Sábato’s work is heavily coloured by existentialist ideas. This is 
shown not only in matters that immediately concerned him, namely freedom, evil, 
rebellion against the dehumanizing abstractions of social normalities, the 
psychological impact of every day tasks, but also in his embittered, sombre, and 
anguished tone, seen in such works as Yugo de niebla (1948), El Túnel (1948), 
Sombras al sol (1951), and La ciudad y el viento (1961). His fiction has been 
recognised and celebrated by the likes of Albert Camus, Graham Greene, Thomas 
Mann, and the Italian author and poet, Salvatore Quasimodo.  
 
Finally, to conclude this brief and necessarily selective overview of the transnational 
dissemination of existentialist ideas in the twentieth century, let us contemplate in 
preliminary outline its reception in post-war German culture, which will be the 
subject of the following chapters of this study. In the immediate aftermath of the 
Second World War, Germans felt plagued by feelings of anguish and anxiety. The 
nation had lost not just a war and an ideology of supremacy and racial superiority, 
but was simultaneously confronted with the extraordinary and unprecedented 
magnitude of terror and devastation it had unleashed on the world. As this thesis 
aims to demonstrate, this condition of dejection and torment came to be articulated 
widely in its national literature, and one of the early instigators of this initiative was 
the German writer, Alfred Andersch (1914-1980). For Andersch, the tabula rasa of 
post-war Germany was an opportunity to rid the nation of its fascist past, and to 
‘cleanse’ the German spirit in one single creative act. Using Sartre’s 1943 play Les 
Mouches (The Flies) as a springboard, which recounts the story of Orestes and his 
sister Electra in a quest to avenge the death of their father Agamemnon, King of 
Argos, by killing their mother Clytemnestra and her husband Aegisthus, who had 
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deposed and murdered him, Andersch identified a chance in existentialism to break 
away from Germany’s atrocious past and embrace a future obligated to freedom. 
This guarantee of a new beginning has often been referred to as the ‘Stunde Null,’ or 
‘zero hour’ of German literary history, although as many scholars have already 
ascertained, this concept was at best a myth. As a matter of fact, Andersch 
unintentionally gave credence to this when he declared in his seminal essay 
Deutsche Literatur in der Entscheidung from 1948, ‘The significance of 
existentialism is self-evident from the fact that it has worked its way throughout 
every camp [of thought]’.42 Although post-war existentialism’s roots extend back to 
a myriad of French, German, and Danish sources which precede the end of German 
fascism, it was not only Alfred Andersch who was captivated by existentialism in 
the immediate post-war era. Other writers include Herman Kasack (1896-1966), 
Arno Schmidt (1914-1979) with his 1949 publication Leviathan oder Die beste der 
Welten, Max Frisch (1911-1991) with Stiller (1954) and Mein Name sei Gantenbein 
(1964), and other authors such as Wolfgang Koeppen (1906-1996), and Günter 
Grass (1927-2015). Less overt but nevertheless discernable references to 
existentialism are similarly traceable in the works of Catholic writers Elisabeth 
Langgässer (1899-1950) and Heinrich Böll (1917-1985), although this point will be 
expanded upon in more detail later. Another intriguing angle from which to view the 
infiltration of French existentialist ideas in post-war Germany is that of exile 
writing. Whereas post-fascism existentialism ‘endorsed a radical individualism 
borne out of temporary nihilism’,43 existentialism in the exile experience was 
steeped in isolation, seclusion, and despair. In this regard, Sartre and Camus’ cast of 
aliens, outsiders and strangers, who strove in vain to find a sense of belonging, most 
notably Meursault in Camus’ 1942 novel L’Étranger (The Stranger), or Antoine 
Roquentin in Sartre’s 1938 work La Nausée (Nausea), is curiously reminiscent of 
those protagonists (in exile novels by writers like Hermann Bloch, Klaus Mann, and 
Stefan Zweig), for whom solitariness and futility were cornerstones of existence. 
The question as to how far the exilic experience can be understood in connection to 
the philosophical and literary permutations of existentialism offers no definitive 
conclusion. These tentative thematic correspondences are nevertheless justification 
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to contemplate the dissemination of existentialist philosophy in war-ravaged 
Germany. 
 




As suggested by my earlier survey, and especially the close ties between 
existentialism and German idealism, the first key theme within the unformulated 
existentialist manifesto is the perennial problem of the nature of the self, das Ich, in 
the form of the human ego. The idealist philosopher to have most strongly engaged 
with the continuous actualisation of man’s will, freedom, and, as such, authentic 
existence in the empirical world was arguably Johann Gottlieb Fichte. In his 
theorising about the self, Fichte made manifold methodological and substantial 
contributions to our understanding of the human mind and its relation to the physical 
and moral world. Fichte is widely viewed as one of the founding proponents of 
German idealism, whose philosophy bridges the ideas of Immanuel Kant and those 
of his idealist contemporary Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. One particular feature 
of Fichte’s philosophical writing is that they present a particularly unwelcoming 
exterior, for his convoluted grammar and linguistic artificialities envelop all the 
visions of his system in an air of mysticism. Even the order of exposition followed 
in the most widely studied version of his Grundlage der gesamten 
Wissenschaftslehre (1794) defies clear interpretation, despite being intended to 
clearly outline the lectures on his system that he delivered in Jena. As Walter E. 
Wright affirms, ‘[t]he difficulty of Fichte’s style, more than anything else, is 
responsible for his relative obscurity’.44 Wright also observes, however, that the 
final analysis in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre is not as inaccessible as it first appears; 
rather, ‘if it is to be understood, and if it is to communicate something of value to us, 
then his system must be read as an analysis of human finitude’.45 
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Fichte’s writing can be viewed as primarily ethical and practical rather than 
speculative. The question he poses at the outset is not ‘what can we know?,’ but 
rather ‘what is the mission of man?’ It is only after this initial query that a second, 
weightier question can be asked, namely ‘what are the essential conditions that make 
man exist?’ The following discussion will begin with an exploration of Fichte’s 
autonomous world-creating ego and, most crucially, how it underpins his 
preoccupation with the doctrine of freedom, a doctrine that was later to underpin so 
much of existentialist thought. It is an extraordinarily difficult task to approach the 
issue of freedom from the ‘correct’ point of view. While the problem is one that 
inherently concerns human action, freedom ‘is not […] a kind of act to be classed 
with a person’s other acts; it is rather something specific, which is common to all 
moral acts,’ as Hartmann recognises.46 Furthermore, it is important to remember that 
freedom is not a negative state of being free ‘from something’ but rather suggests a 
unique determination ‘towards something.’ 
 
Before exploring the Fichtean position in greater depth, it is imperative to consider 
Fichte’s engagement with and attitude towards his philosophical forerunners. 
Fichtean idealism can be understood as a development of Kantian transcendental 
idealism. In Section Six of the second introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre, for 
instance, Fichte expresses his aims to dedicate his life to the task of producing a 
correct rendition of Kant’s philosophy: The Wissenschaftslehre ‘[stimme] mit der 
Kantischen Lehre vollkommen überein, und [sey] keine andere als die 
wohlverstandene Kantische.’ Yet whilst Fichte considered himself a Kantian, his 
Kantianism markedly deviated from that of his philosophical predecessor.47 Kant 
presupposed the thing-in-itself (Ding an sich), or the noumenon. This can be 
understood as a thing as it might be apart from the way it appears to man and is 
experienced by man. Kant claimed that one can never know whether there is actually 
anything to things beyond what we experience of them, but maintained that we can 
and indeed must entertain the thought that there is. A more comprehensive 
philosophical explanation of the thing-in-itself is provided by Horrigan, who 
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describes it as an ‘extra-mental, extra-subjective knowledge that would be the cause 
of the raw sense data of the senses that would go to be formed by the two a priori 
forms of sensibility, namely, space and time (which are wholly subjective)’.48 
Against this background, Fichte’s project took a different direction. Copleston 
affirms how ‘Kant’s Copernican revolution was a great step forward, and for Fichte 
there could be no question of moving backwards to a pre-Kantian position. If one 
had any understanding of the development of philosophy and of the demands of 
modern thought, one could only go forward and complete Kant’s work. And this 
meant eliminating the thing-in-itself.49  
 
Fichte believed that Kant’s noumenal reality restricted and conditioned the activity 
of the transcendental ego and suggested that in order for the human ego to be fully 
liberated mankind must disregard this ineffectual appendix, i.e. the noumenon. Since 
idealism dictates that that which cannot be known doesn’t exist, it is on these 
grounds that Fichte justified his rejection of Kant’s extra-subjective noumenon as 
unknowable. The young Fichte took a crucial step in expanding the theory of 
freedom, which was a crucial issue in philosophy around 1800, yet from the point of 
view of his doctrine of science. Fichte was predominantly interested in man’s innate, 
metaphysical ego, as opposed to the ego that exists empirically. For him, the ego 
represented the carrier and determinant of human freedom. The primacy of the 
ethical and practical in Fichte’s writing is predominantly identifiable in the fact that, 
for him, the essence of the human ego consists in the will, and that the world, or 
what Fichte calls the ‘non-ego’, cannot be conceived of as an object of 
contemplation, or a piece of knowledge, but rather as a hurdle to overcome. Man 
must not contemplate the world; rather, the world is the world of man’s duties. At 
the heart of Fichte’s philosophy is a triadic dialectic between the ‘pure ego,’ the 
‘empirical ego,’ and the ‘non-ego.’ This configuration is necessary for man to 
establish his identity and consciousness of self.  While the ‘pure ego’, itself an 
expression of absolute freedom, cannot contradict itself, the ‘empirical ego’, 
conditioned by the ‘non-ego’, is self-contradictory and not free. As such, the aim of 
man is to bring himself into absolute identity with himself. 
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Fichte understands the ego to be the finite and the infinite simultaneously. The ego 
is infinite because it is a ‘thinking reality,’ for in its inexhaustible activity it can 
think all things. The ego is also finite as ‘thought reality,’ because each of its 
thought acts is confined to a determinate reality. For Fichte, therefore, the ego is to 
be understood as free and absolute activity, wherein life articulates itself by means 
of boundless finite acts. The ego is both ‘thinking reality’ and ‘thought reality.’ The 
ego is also known as the ‘pure ego,’ ‘ego’ because it is subject, and ‘pure’ because it 
draws out everything from itself and thus a priori. It is this issue of the freedom, or 
non-freedom, of the thinking subject in its relation to thought reality that also 




In addition to the philosophical concept of the self, both idealist and existentialist 
thinking circulates around the notion of freedom and self-constitution. This shall be 
the second existentialist theme in our virtual manifesto. This twin desire to 
recognize being as it is and to construct a system originally came together in 
Kantian philosophy. Immanuel Kant’s system was an attempt to ground a system of 
philosophy concerned with the free and autonomous use of reason. At the very core 
of his ethics are the concepts of self-determination and autonomy: freedom consists 
in giving oneself one’s own law out of one’s own essence. According to the Kantian 
maxim ‘du sollst, denn du kannst,’ the right action must always be possible, or put 
differently: I must always be free to perform it. The moral agent judges that he can 
do things because he is conscious that he ought, and he comprehends that he is free, 
a fact which, but for the moral law, he would never have known. In other words, the 
practise of morality forces the idea of freedom upon us. Kant’s notion of freedom 
becomes clearer when seen in the context of the problem that it was intended to 
solve. Rational beings exist not only as self-conscious centres of knowledge, but 
also as agents. Their reason is not separated from their agency, but forms a 
constitutive part of it. As such, for a rational being, there is not only action, but also 
the question of action, i.e. what shall I do? which requires a reasoned answer. 
Mankind’s rationality is expressed in the fact that some actions are intentional, for 




Why do that? and Why should I perform only good acts and not evil ones? These 
questions demand neither a cause nor explanation, but a reason. If someone were to 
ask a pickpocket why they robbed an old lady of her purse, the answer ‘because 
electrical impulses from my brain triggered muscular contractions which resulted in 
my putting my hand in her bag’ would seem strange and insolent, however accurate 
as a causal explanation. The answer ‘because I am poor and need to feed my family’ 
may be an insufficient justification, but it is certainly comprehensible.  
 
Kant’s moral philosophy stems from the combination of the idea of transcendental 
freedom with that of an imperative of reason. He believes that reasoning about ends 
must always presuppose just the kind of transcendental freedom that his metaphysics 
claims exists. Freedom is the power to will an end of action for oneself. An act that 
originates from the individual can be attributed only to him or her, and is therefore 
in a real sense his or hers. In respect of such an action one is free. One acts freely 
whenever one acts, and unfreely whenever some other agency limits or restricts 
one’s actions. Mankind does not consult his or her desires, interests or any other 
‘empirical condition,’ since that is to subject oneself to the causality of nature. One 
simply reflects on the action, and chooses it for one’s own sake. As Roger Scruton 
notes, ‘this is the paradigm of a free action: one that is brought into being by reason 
alone. Such an action can be attributed […] to no “natural” force, no chain of 
“empirical” causality. It arises spontaneously out of the rational processes that 
constitute my will’.50  
 
It is precisely at this juncture where Kantian notions of human freedom reappear, in 
more rhetorical form, in existentialist writing. As Kant affirms, freedom does not 
belong to nature, but precisely to the ‘intelligible’ or transcendental realm to which 
categories like causality do not apply. Mankind exists in a world of nature, as an 
‘appearance’ among others. This recognition that we can conceive of human beings 
independent from the objectivity of the natural world retained its attractiveness 
during the nineteenth century, as seen in its adoption by Kierkegaard, and also 
features as a centrepiece in Sartre’s philosophy of freedom. Both philosophers 
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identify the source of human meaning concretely in the immediate experience of 
making ungrounded choices, and although their respective approaches were less 
sympathetic to pure rational speculation than was Kant’s, they also conceived of 
freedom in sharp opposition to nature.  
 
Kant’s philosophical concern with the concept of freedom also made a profound and 
lasting impression on subsequent idealist philosophers, most notably, of course, 
Fichte, as we saw above. As Beck affirms, ‘Kant’s theory of human freedom was to 
become a veritable Leitmotiv of Fichte’s philosophy throughout its development’.51 
In the idealist philosophies of man, insistence on freedom is a conspicuous feature. 
But it does not follow, as shown above with the notion of the human ego, that the 
concept of ‘freedom’ is always used or understood in precisely the same sense. Let 
us begin by examining the Fichtean concept of freedom.  
 
As a young man, Fichte was a fervent advocate of the French Revolution, which he 
viewed as an opportunity to liberate humanity from all strictures of social and 
political life that hampered man’s free moral development. Central to Fichte’s 
Wissenschaftslehre, as also his philosophy overall, is the doctrine of freedom. ‘Mein 
System ist vom Anfange bis zu Ende nur eine Analyse des Begriffs der Freiheit [...]’ 
Fichte affirmed in a letter to Karl Leonhard Reinhold on January 8, 1800.52  With 
Fichte, the emphasis is placed on individual freedom as manifested in action. For 
Fichte, man represents, from one perspective, a system of natural drives, instincts 
and impulses. The individual is similarly not restricted to the automatic satisfaction 
of one desire after another. Instead, he can direct his activity towards an ideal goal 
and act in accordance with a sense of duty. As is similar in Kantian notions of 
freedom, it tends to involve rising above the life of sensual impulse and acting as a 
rational, moral being. And Fichte is inclined to speak as though activity were its 
own end, emphasising free action for the sake of free action. Although Fichte’s 
primary emphasis lies on the individual’s activity and on his rising above the slavery 
of natural drives and impulses to a life of action in accordance with duty, he sees, of 
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course, that some content has to be given to the idea of free moral action. And he 
does this by underlining the concept of moral vocation, or ‘Bestimmung des 
Menschen’.53 Man’s vocation, the series of actions that he ought to perform in the 
world, is predominantly dictated by his social circumstance, for example by his role 
as the father of a family. With this, Fichte meant to lend concrete content and 
individual determination to the Kantian formal moral imperative, creating the 
movement of a progressive extension of individuality and its limits. Following one’s 
moral vocation, man extends the domain of his individuality in the world.  
 
A second strand of idealist principles concerning human freedom that deserves 
attention here is that of inter-subjectivity. As Fichte explains, the mutual recognition 
of one another that self-conscious, rational beings must exercise is not merely 
theoretical. It is recognition, also, in the sense of honouring one another’s status. In 
Hegel’s well-known discussion of the Herr-Knecht relationship, as outlined in 
Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), he establishes that the master cannot, as he 
hoped to, gain a sense of dignity through the recognition afforded to him by 
someone he regards merely as an object, a slave.54 For such recognition to have 
significance and meaning, Hegel believes that it must come from individuals who 
are themselves respected and accorded human dignity. Both Hegel and Fichte 
express this point in terms of freedom: for an individual to have genuine 
appreciation of his or her own freedom as a rational being, they must recognise the 
freedom of others. This aspect of Hegelian thought is explored in depth in Simone 
de Beauvoir’s 1943 ‘metaphysical novel’ She Came to Stay. In the preface de 
Beauvoir opens with the Hegelian epigraph ‘Ebenso muss jedes Bewusstsein auf 
den Tode des anderen gehen’ (Chaque conscience veut la mort de l'autre’/’each 
consciousness pursues the death of the other’).55 Through this de Beauvoir is 
depicting Xavière as the Knecht figure who represents the sense of displacement or 
délaissement of the female ‘other.’ Whereas in Hegel’s’ Phänomenologie 
des Geistes the fight to the death is portrayed as a struggle between two men, in the 
closing scene de Beauvoir’s work, which can be read as an immense effort to depict 
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alterity and ‘otherness’, the battle is between two females, with Françoise playing 
the role of the honorary male Herr who annihilates the other who threatens her 
supremacy. This social aspect of an ideal of reciprocity or mutual recognition is also 
inherent in the works of Sartre. In Existentialism and Humanism, for instance, Sartre 
maintains that ‘freedom unrecognised remains abstract,’ and argues for a ‘universal 
freedom conditional’ in which our freedom ‘depends entirely on the freedom of 
others and their freedom depends on ours’.56 What also appears to be a direct 
extension of Hegel’s Herr-Knecht discussion is Sartre’s emphasis, in a clearly 
egalitarian tone, that the ‘bourgeois oppressor is a victim of his own oppression’ and 
that his freedom ‘can be asserted only by the recognition bestowed upon it by other 
freedoms’.57 Developing his concept of freedom in light of his experiences of the 
Resistance movement, Sartre can be seen here to be taking a notable step towards 
social consciousness and collective identity. Sartre’s German counterpart, Karl 
Jaspers, similarly incorporates this notion into his philosophy of freedom, stating: 
‘Freiheit verwirklicht sich in Gemeinschaft. Ich kann nur frei sein in dem Maße wie 
die Anderen frei sind’.58 Jaspers is indicating here that, in order to live as authentic 
beings – in full mindfulness, that is, of one’s own freedom – the individual must 
honour the freedom of others and work together with them to nurture a community 
of human beings who exist in recognition of their reciprocal freedoms. Clearly both 
idealist and existentialist thinkers have grappled with the notion of human freedom 
and the question of an individual’s relationship to others; what becomes equally 
clear is that, following in the footsteps of Kant, Fichte and Hegel, Heidegger, Sartre, 
de Beauvoir, Jaspers and Marcel all acknowledge that it is not only to respect one’s 
own freedom, but in doing so to respect the freedom of others as well. 
 
The second strand of this discussion of human freedom will focus on freedom’s 
relationship to faith and atheism. One intriguing feature of nineteenth and twentieth-
century existentialism is that it specifies no definitive religious position. 
Existentialist philosophers can be placed into two general groups: theists and 
atheists. Whilst Kierkegaard, Marcel and Jaspers, as well as Protestant theologians 
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like Paul Tillich, Rudolph Bultmann, Karl Barth, and Emil Brunner can legitimately 
be classified as theists, Heidegger, Sartre, and most French existentialist thinkers 
can be considered, roughly and broadly, as atheists. Within the realms of 
existentialist thinking, this theological disparity is by no means a recent trend, for 
what is also evident in Kantian and Fichtean philosophy, namely those to have 
critically engaged with existentialist themes, is again a sense of theological 
ambiguity surrounding questions of human freedom. Whilst Kant and Fichte both 
repudiated the atheist label, 59 their tendencies to ground theism in practical rather 
than theoretical reason, as well as their seeking a rational kernel in Christian 
doctrine, was viewed, at times, as heretical. This tradition of ‘grappling’ with the 
God question, and the oscillation between the theistic and atheistic, is of particular 
interest here, for what can also be seen in twentieth-century existentialism is a 
mirror image of the deviating theological positions that characterised eighteenth-
century pre-existentialist thinking. What the upcoming discussion on nihilism will 
demonstrate is how, on the one hand, twentieth-century existentialism shows a clear 
engagement with atheistic and nihilism themes. On the other hand, it simultaneously 
emphasises how the theistic and spiritual dimension within existentialist writing 
remains both extensive and relevant. 
 
It was Baruch (later Benedict) de Spinoza (1632-1677) who gave rise to the debate 
about faith and atheism in eighteenth-century Europe, and his work remains a 
decisive influence in the development of atheistic and pantheistic thinking. Spinoza 
was, in a sense, an intensely religious figure – Novalis once referred to him as a 
‘Gott-trunkener Mensch’60 – but his God was radically different from that of the 
Christian tradition. In his most celebrated and influential philosophical treatise 
Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order (Ethica, ordine geometrico 
demonstrata), published posthumously in 1677, Spinoza defines God as ‘an 
absolutely infinite being; that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of 
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which expresses eternal and infinite essence’.61 Spinoza’s writing is early evidence 
of a radical change in Western thinking about the nature of God and human 
understanding. He rejected the supernaturalism of popular religion in favour of a 
scientist’s confidence in the ‘natural light’ of reason. Spinoza saw divine law and 
scientific law as identical and believed that human beings learnt about God through 
rightly comprehending natural phenomena. Spinoza saw the mysterious events 
commonly attributed to God’s unknowable will as no more than natural occurrences 
for which science was yet to proffer a plausible explanation. God exists, in other 
words, but only philosophically. Spinoza similarly differentiated between God and 
nature, perceiving the latter from is own angle on some occasions, and from God’s 
angle on other occasions. Spinoza referred to the sum of beings, perceived from 
their own aspect as beings which are modes (modi) of a single, divine substance, as 
natura naturata (nature created by nature), and referred to God, who is the 
substance of all nature, as natura naturans (nature which creates nature).62 It was 
this denunciation of traditional virtues and his ontological arguments for the 
existence of God that led to accusations of atheism during Spinoza’s lifetime.  
 
The precise connections between the various strands of modern thought and the 
underlying pantheistic and atheistic revolutions remain a topic of scholarly 
contention. Furthermore, the break with the Christian worldview in the western 
tradition occurred in a subtle and gradual form.63 Yet the importance of Spinozism 
in this regard cannot be disputed. Richard Popkin similarly points to the esoteric 
background of Spinoza’s pantheism that anticipated the theological and intellectual 
crises of subsequent philosophical movements,64 an assortment of examples for 
which are presented below. Clearly, it would be a gross misapprehension to label the 
following philosophers and writers as atheists, pantheists or spinozists. It must also 
be noted that theism still dominated eighteenth-century religious thinking, with the 
likes of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi sternly challenging the contentious ‘atheistic’ 
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positions of his contemporaries, Fichte in particular. Most central to this discussion 
are the implications and repercussions of Spinozism in directing and guiding 
Kantian and post-transcendental idealist thinking in understanding the status of God, 
the individual, of the moral order, and of freedom. 
 
One of the most notable features of Kantian philosophy is its inclination towards 
reason and rationality. This is rightly suggested in the titles Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft (1781), and Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen 
Vernunft (1793). Rationalistic religious belief of the period typically proposed to 
base religious belief on the metaphysical proofs of the existence of God, yet it was 
Kant’s momentous 1781 work that polemically challenged this viewpoint, enforcing 
the view that nature and the intrinsic limitations of human thought and knowledge 
confute such metaphysical demonstrations. The faith Kant has in mind is a purely 
rational faith, and one that is ‘grounded in practical (action-guiding, moral) reason 
rather than in theoretical reason’,65 hence his term Vernunftreligion. Again, whilst 
this position cannot be considered atheistic, Kantianism, in the wake of Spinozism, 
came to represent an important current of eighteenth-century scholarship that 
centred itself upon the existence of God and the question of whether His existence 
can be rationally proved.  
 
Fichte is a particularly interesting case when one considers his connections with 
Spinozist philosophical sources. The idealist thinker became embroiled in the so-
called Atheismusstreit and was branded an atheist following the 1798 publication of 
the blatantly atheistic article by Friedrich Karl Forberg ‘Über die Entwicklung 
des Begriffs der Religion,’ to which Fichte prefaced his own essay. Fichte’s unique 
religious theory resulted in accusations of atheism and nihilism, the latter of which 
will be expounded upon in the following pages. Fichte purportedly rejected many 
conventional religious notions, including the divine creation of the world, the 
substantiality and personality of a deity, and the temporal or eternal retribution of a 
supreme being. The Atheismusstreit ultimately cost Fichte his professorship at the 
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University of Jena in 1799.  
 
Hegel’s principal reactions to Spinozism are also noteworthy. Unmistakably, the 
two philosophers present deviating views on the nature of God: Hegel accuses 
Spinoza’s God or Nature as being static, compared to the Hegelian God who is 
dynamic. In this way, God unfolds himself in the world through a constant process 
of determinate negation. Additionally, in Spinoza’s universe the human, or what 
Hegel calls Geist, is simply one of the finite beings within God. Hegel, on the other 
hand, claims that it is only through Geist that God can be truly actualized. Despite 
these fundamental differences, the German idealist nevertheless acknowledges the 
weight of Spinoza’s contribution to philosophical thinking:  
 
Wenn man anfängt mit philosophieren, muß man zuerst Spinozist sein. Die 
Seele muß sich baden in diesem Äther der einen Substanz, in der alles, was 
man für wahr gehalten hat, untergegangen ist. Es ist diese Negation alles 
Besonderen, zu der jeder Philosoph gekommen sein muß; es ist die 
Befreiung des Geistes und seine absolute Grundlage.66 
 
German Romantic theistic writer Johann Paul Friedrich Richter (Jean Paul) is 
another interesting case in this regard. Despite being a close friend and admirer of 
Jacobi, Jean Paul sought to engage with and respond to the strong wave of atheism 
that was sweeping across eighteenth-century Europe. In his Rede des toten 
Christus vom Weltgebäude herab, daß kein Gott sei (1796), which was embedded in 
his novel Siebenkäs, Jean Paul explores the idea of mankind in a universe without 
God, ruled by chaos and marked by abandonment. The final paragraph of the Rede 
confirms, however, that this does not point towards annihilation, but the possibility 
of an atheism that enables man to envisage a future life:  
 
Für andere, die nicht so weit sind wie ein lesender Magistrand, merke ich 
noch an, daß mit dem Glauben an den Atheismus sich ohne Widerspruch der 
Glaube an Unsterblichkeit verknüpfen lasse; denn dieselbe Notwendigkeit, 
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die in diesem Leben meinen lichten Thautropfen von Ich in einem 
Blumenkelch und unter einer Sonne warf, kann es ja im zweiten 
wiederholen; ja noch leichter kann sie mich zum zweiten male verkörpern als 
zum ersten male.67 
 
In the Rede, the theistic writer also describes a prophetic vision, whose nihilistic and 
apocalyptic undertones are evocative of the nihilistic writing of Nietzsche that will 
appear less than a century later.  
 
Das ganze geistige Universum wird durch die Hand des Atheismus 
zersprengt und zerschlagen in zahlenlose quecksilberne Punkte von Ichs, 
welche blinken, rinnen, irren, zusammen- und auseinanderfliehen, ohne 
Einheit und Bestand. Niemand ist im All so sehr allein als ein Gottesleugner 
– er trauert mit einem verwaiseten Herzen, das den größten Vater verloren, 
neben dem unermesslichen Leichnam der Natur, den kein Weltgeist regt und 
zusammenhält, und der im Grabe wächset; und er trauert so lange, bis er sich 
selber abbröckelt von der Leiche. Die ganze Welt ruht vor ihm wie die 
große, halb im Sande liegende ägyptische Sphinx aus Stein; und das All ist 
die kalte eiserne Maske der gestaltlosen Ewigkeit.68 
 
Clearly the Rede contemplates the possibility of a chaotic and godless universe, yet 
what cannot be overlooked in this regard Jean Paul’s underlying philosophical and 
theological standpoint, namely that loneliness and abandonment will serve as the 
ultimate effects of atheism. Thus despite the writer’s deliberations on the notion of 
atheism, it cannot be read as an atheistic avocation. 
 
Niemand ist im All so sehr allein als ein Gottesläugner – er trauert mit einem 
verwaiseten Herzen, das den grössen Vater verloren, neben dem 
unermesslichen Leichnam der Natur, den kein Weltgeist regt und 
zusammenhält, und der im Grabe wächset; und er trauert so lange, bis er sich 
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selber abbröckelt von der Leiche. Die ganze Welt ruht vor ihm wie die 
grosse, halb im Sande liegende ägyptische Sphynx aus Stein; und das All ist 
die kalte eiserne Maske der gestaltlosen Ewigkeit.69 
 
In addition to Jean Paul’s Rede, there are several other notable publications of the 
late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century that demonstrate a prevalent 
thematic interest in the notion of mankind in a Godless world, beginning with 
Novalis’ Hymnen an die Nacht of 1800. In the work Novalis presents darkness as a 
place of knowledge and speaks of apocalyptic visions in the fifth, sixth and final 
hymns. As Malinowski observes, in this way the hymns ‘can be read as poetic 
testimonials of Romantic melancholy’.70 Ernst August Friedrich Klingemann’s 1804 
work Die Nachtwachen des Bonaventura also engages with atheistic themes. What 
is evidently a study into the ‘darker’ side of human nature, Klingemann’s novel 
alludes to conditions of godlessness, fragmentation, loss of identity, and the nature 
of a divided self. This overwhelming sense of nothingness is effectively 
encapsulated in the words: ‘Da sah ich mich selbst mit mir allein im Nichts’.71 
Klingemann’s godless void is also comparable to Heinrich von Kleist’s 1808 drama 
Die Hermannsschacht, where the same themes of remoteness, despair and a crisis of 
human identity can be made out: ‘Wo komm ich her? […] Aus nichts […] Wo geh 
ich hin? […] Ins Nichts […] Wo bin ich? […] Hart zwischen Nichts und Nichts’.72  
  
The Enlightenment of the eighteenth century reveals the progression of a new form 
of atheistic thinking, which sought to challenge traditional theistic values. Defined 
by Keiji Nishitani as ‘“the first wave” of atheism in the modern era’,73 it saw the 
increasing denial of the existence of God from the standpoint of a mechanistic view 
of nature. To the degree that God disappears, humans as a controlling force of 
human destiny become self-empowered, and with this ‘Mündigkeit,’ in Kant’s 
                                                        
69 Johann Paul Friedrich Richter, Sämtliche Werke, p. 316. 
70 Bernadette Malinowski, ‘German Romantic Poetry in Theory and Practise: The Schlegel Brothers, 
Schelling, Tieck, Novalis, Eichendorff, Brentano, and Heine’, in The Literature of German 
Romanticism, ed. Dennis F. Mahoney (Rochester, N.Y.: Camden House, 2004), pp. 147-169, p. 154. 
71 Ernst August Friedrich Klingemann, Die Nachtwachen des Bonaventura, ed. J. Schillemeit 
(Frankfurt a/M: Insel, 1974), p. 168. 
72 Heinrich von Kleist, Die Hermannsschlacht: ein Drama in fünf Aufzügen (Ditzingen: Reclam, 
1963), p. 78f.   
73 Keiji Nishitani, The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, trans. Graham Parkes & Setsuko Aihara (Albany, 




phrasing, comes man’s freedom of choice and an increase of responsibility. But with 
the atheism that leads to self-empowerment and self-responsibility also came an 
increased doubt in the meaningfulness of life. This spawned the concept of nihilism, 
which too emerged from idealistic philosophy, as we shall see. 
 
GOD AND NIHILISM 
 
The reason the philosophical movement of nihilism deserves attention in this thesis 
on existentialism is twofold. Firstly, nihilism, as a godless human philosophy that 
rejects all positive values, beliefs, moral absolutes or life meanings, is inextricably 
linked to existentialism, in that it also concerns itself with the themes of freedom 
and the self. Secondly, and most crucially for the purposes of this dissertation, 
nihilism enables us to place existentialism’s on-going ‘grappling’ with its diverse 
theistic and atheistic positions in a more illuminating context. Viewing nihilism as a 
development and intensification of eighteenth-century pantheism, what can be seen 
in twentieth-century existentialism is a denunciation and reformulation of the 
nihilistic position. Nihilism can broadly be understood as the state of belief in 
nothing, and represents a form of surrender or despair. It is a wallowing in 
nothingness, and a concern that humanity will be consumed by its own fears and 
anxieties. This results in a state of stagnation, immobility and, at worst, self-
destruction. Twentieth-century existentialism, on the other hand, engages with 
nihilism in the way it responds to nihilism. It attempts to find a way out of nihilism, 
either through God, like Jaspers, Marcel or Tillich, or without God, like Sartre, 
Camus, and Heidegger. Both theistic and atheistic positions within existentialism 
can be viewed as a process of self-creation, about creating ground for man’s own 
meaning, creating value and establishing his or her own world. One can assume the 
role of being the author of one’s own existence. Regardless of the religious position, 
the existentialist proclaims that life is not meaningless. As such, the movement of 
nihilism is essential here, for it serves to accentuate how the on-going theistic and 
atheistic positions of twentieth-century existentialism have come full circle. Despite 
the committed and ardent atheism that characterises nihilistic thinking, the God 
question remains a matter of disagreement within twentieth-century existentialism, 
and simultaneously reveals how the movement has operated cyclically, returning to 





The task of adequately defining nihilism or determining the precise nature of the 
phenomenon that the term alludes to is thus a difficult one. In its basic sense, 
‘nihilism’ stems from the Latin nihil, meaning ‘nothing.’ The same root is also 
traceable in the verb ‘to annihilate,’ meaning to reduce to non-existence, or to blot 
out of existence. Nihilism can thus be understood as ‘nothingism,’ a study in 
‘nothingness,’ and nihilists are ‘nothingists.’ Typically, ‘ism’ terms, such as 
nationalism or liberalism, refer to a substantive movement or school of thought, yet 
as also appears to be the case with existentialism, nihilism is a pure negation and has 
no fixed content. This has led some scholars to conclude, most notably Helmut 
Thielicke, that such ideological ‘isms’ cannot possess enduring life, nor are they 
capable of providing a complete truth universally valid for all human beings. 
Thielicke maintains that ideologies and creeds have themselves been reduced to 
nihil, supported in the momentous phrase: ‘[…] der letzte “-Ismus” [ist] notwendig 
der Nihilismus’.74 
 
The term nihilism was allegedly first used by F. L. Goetzius in De nonismo et 
nihilismo in theologia of 1733, but the work was little known, and probably did not 
impact upon the subsequent development of the notion. The term then reappeared in 
the late eighteenth century in theosophist Jacob Hermann Obereit’s 1787 work Der 
wiederkommende Lebensgeist der verzweifelten Metaphysik, and also in the works 
of Daniel Jenisch, who in 1796 defined transcendental idealism as nihilism in his 
Über Grund und Werth der Entdeckungen des Herrn Professor Kant in der 
Metaphysik, Moral und Aesthetik. In this work he used nihilism to describe the work 
of the extreme Kantians who preach that the things-in-themselves are nothing for 
our cognition. It must be noted, however, that whilst Jenisch employed the term, he 
never fully developed the concept of nihilism. Similarly, Obereit used the concept of 
nihilism to denote the apparent subjectivist consequences of Kant’s epistemology, 
but his use of the term remains somewhat vague and unsystematic. Nihilism was 
used for the first time in its more modern sense by Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, as 
mentioned above, who borrowed and subsequently coined the term to express what 
                                                        





he viewed as the unfortunate consequences of the prevalent philosophical school of 
transcendental idealism. Jacobi famously used the word in a published letter to 
Fichte in 1799: ‘Wahrlich, mein lieber Fichte, es soll mich nicht verdrießen, wenn 
Sie, oder wer es sey, Chimärismus nennen wollen, was ich dem Idealismus, den ich 
Nihilismus schelte, entgegensetze [...]’75 Raised as a pietist, Jacobi was a notable 
theistic critic of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, affirming that man 
must ultimately rely on feeling and a belief in God. In 1780 he had been the main 
antagonist in the Pantheism Controversy, when he defined the Spinozism of thinkers 
such as Lessing and Mendelssohn as atheism. The 1799 letter to Fichte ignited the 
so-called Atheism Controversy, a controversy that ultimately cost Fichte his 
professorship at the University of Jena. In this short letter, Jacobi condemned the 
inherent tendency of transcendental idealism to dissolve not just the reality of the 
external world, but also the notion of God into the ‘nothingness’ of consciousness 
by focusing on the subjective conditions for the possibility of knowledge. Idealism 
hence culminates, according to Jacobi, in mere ‘chimerism or nihilism.’ To his 
mind, this objection revealed the fundamental flaws of idealism. It would seem that, 
for Jacobi, ‘nihilism was a term of reproach, a slur of sufficient proportions that it 
almost functioned as an argument reductio ad absurdum. If one could show that 
nihilism was the consequence of a particular position, then that position was 
obviously invalid’.76 Jacobi was convinced that Fichte recognised no truths beyond 
those of consciousness or reason and thus fell into an absolute subjectivism which 
attributed everything to man and left no room for God – indeed, which rendered God 
a figment of the human imagination. Jacobi believed that man has the following 
choice: 
 
[D]as Nichts oder einen Gott. Das Nichts erwählend macht er sich zu Gott; 
das heißt: er macht zu Gott ein Gespenst; denn es ist unmöglich, wenn kein 
Gott ist, daß nicht der Mensch und alles was ihn umgiebt blos Gespenst sey. 
Ich wiederhole: Gott ist, und außer mir, ein lebendiges, für sich bestehendes 
Wesen, oder ICH bin Gott. Es giebt kein drittes.77 
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Important to consider here is that although Jacobi appears to rebuke and rebuff 
Fichtean idealism in his Brief an Fichte, it is imperative to view his critique as part 
of a wider denunciation of the inherent nihilism of transcendental idealism. The 
question as to the precise date Jacobi first used the term ‘nihilism’ remains an area 
of scholarly contention, but, significantly enough, the disputants are unified in their 
views on its extension and applicability. According to Günter Zöller:  
 
For Jacobi, the transcendental idealism introduced by Kant and radicalized 
by Fichte dissolves reality into a mere figment of the mind. Rather than 
combatting scepticism, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre is seen as supporting 
doubt in everyday reality by replacing the realist worldview of ordinary 
consciousness with the idealist production of a world that is nothing but 
appearances and hence appearances of nothing. In his earlier critique of 
Kant, Jacobi had already coined the term ‘nihilism,’ which he reuses in the 
letter to Fichte to brandish the metaphysical and moral implications of 
transcendental idealism.78 
    
The question of whether Kant or Fichte is the original inspiration for Jacobi’s 
critique is, for the moment, extraneous; what can be gleaned from his Brief an 
Fichte is the true origin and target of his objection, namely ‘philosophy (or rather 
philosophies) that conceive the subject and its representations as the fons et origo of 
the world, that is, what Foucault calls “empirico-transcendental reduplication”’.79 
Jacobi views Kant’s philosophy, especially as it is consistently and systematically 
developed by Fichte, as the paradigm of all philosophy – and hence as the very 
epitome of nihilism. Jacobi’s denunciation of idealist philosophy is first and 
foremost an attack on Kant and Fichte, whom Jacobi sees as nothing more than a 
radical Kantian. In Jacobi’s view, Kant is the first thinker to discover the principle 
of all knowledge, or what Jacobi refers to as the ‘principle of subject-object 
identity.’ It implies that the self knows only the products of its own activity, and 
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makes self-knowledge into the paradigm of all knowledge. Jacobi’s term thus refers 
to that self-knowledge where the subject makes the object into the mirror of its own 
activity. Jacobi’s chief objection to Kant, or Kantian inspired philosophies, is that 
this principle results in nihilism. If it is universalized, like Fichte would have 
intended, such that knowledge through reason is made into the paradigm of all 
knowledge, then it leads directly to ‘speculative egoism,’ that is, a solipsism that 
dissolves all reality into man’s own representations, as it does in Fichte’s system. 
This solipsism is a direct consequence of Kant’s principle, Jacobi affirms, because it 
suggests that all we know is our own representations, the products of our intellectual 
activity. We do not know any reality that exists apart from and prior to this activity, 
something that is not created by it, whether that be nature, others minds, God, or the 
very self that is the source of this activity. Hence man is caught inside the circle of 
his or her own consciousness, a circle consisting of nothing but representations 
which represent nothing. It was the sad fate of Fichte, Jacobi claims, to expand upon 
Kant’s philosophy in just this direction. As Frederick Beiser affirms, ‘Fichte rid 
Kant’s philosophy of the thing-in-itself; but in doing so he revealed its true tendency 
and inner spirit: nihilism’.80 
 
Since then, the term nihilism has also come to describe a philosophical phenomenon 
that began in the second half of the nineteenth century and was during that time 
given its guiding definition by the likes of Ivan Turgenev and Friedrich Nietzsche. 
Russian novelist Turgenev is believed to have popularised the term in his 1862 
novel, Fathers and Sons (Отцы и дети), in which the character Bazarov displays a 
nihilistic ideology. He dismisses conformist values, principles, and all forms of 
conventional wisdom and is fanatically dedicated to the cause of social justice. As 
such, Turgenev can be seen to project a distinctly Russian form of nihilism, which is 
‘transformed into a clear-eyed, unromantic, and action-oriented form of protest 
against the old and decaying forms of Russian political and social convention’.81 
Nietzsche is of course the philosopher most prominently associated with nihilism, 
and one who similarly regards nihilism as an opportunity for a total transvaluation of 
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values (‘Unterwertung aller Werte’). Nietzsche, however, is concerned with turning 
the calamity of the so-called ‘Tod Gottes’82 into a prelude to the rebirth of the 
humanly divine and to mankind’s elevation and self-overcoming. In Nietzsche’s 
nihilistic vision, there is no objective order or structure in the world except what we 
give it. He thus concludes that values are baseless and that reason is everything: 
‘jeder Glaube, jedes Für-wahr-halten [ist] nothwendig falsch: weil es eine wahre 
Welt gar nicht giebt’.83 Nietzsche believes that nihilism will expose all cherished 
beliefs and sacrosanct truths as symptoms of a defective Western mythos, and this 
collapse of meaning, relevance, and purpose will be the most destructive force in 
history, constituting a total assault on reality and producing nothing less than the 
greatest crisis of humanity: 
 
Was ich erzähle, ist die Geschichte der nächsten zwei Jahrhunderte. Ich 
beschreibe, was kommt, was nicht mehr anders kommen kann: Die 
Heraufkunft des Nihilismus. Diese Geschichte kann jetzt schon erzählt 
werden: denn die Notwendigkeit selbst ist hier am Werke. Diese Zukunft 
redet schon in hundert Zeichen, dieses Schicksal kündigt überall sich an; für 
diese Musik der Zukunft sind alle Ohren bereits gespitzt. Unsere ganze 
europäische Kultur bewegt sich seit langem schon mit einer Tortur der 
Spannung, die von Jahrzehnt zu Jahrzehnt wächst, wie auf eine Katastrophe 
los: unruhig, gewaltsam, überstürzt: wie ein Strom, der ans Ende will, der 
sich nicht mehr besinnt, der Furcht davor hat, sich zu besinnen.84  
  
Nihilism also dominated in the first half of the twentieth century, driving and 
informing not just German thought during the inter-war years, but also French and 
German existentialism in the aftermath of the Second World War. Michael Novak 
alludes to the weight and primacy of this philosophical movement, stating ‘[…] the 
dark underground river of the twentieth century [had] not been fascism nor 
communism but their presupposition: nihilism.’ For example, these nihilistic 
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experiences of devastation and war can be seen in the works of D. H Lawrence, 
Arno Schmidt, Paul Celan, and modernist Japanese writer Riichi Yokomitsu. 
Celan’s nihilistic tone is visible in his depiction of the corrosive nature of the death 
camps in his Todesfuge (1945), as well as in his later work, most notably Die 
Niemandsrose of 1963. Schmidt’s writing is recognized for its cosmic, mythological 
and experimental treatment of war. His momentous text Leviathan (1949) depicts 
the doomed attempt to escape a bombing raid in a commandeered train, and exposes 
the plight of humanity as a plaything. 
 
The above discussion on nihilism allows us to reach two overarching conclusions 
about existentialism. Firstly, the intrinsic atheism of nihilism succeeds in 
underscoring the essential diversity and disparity of theological positions that 
continue to occupy the existentialist realm. As was first seen in Kantian and post-
Kantian idealist thinking, the nature of God remains intrinsic and complex in 
philosophical discussions over the self and human freedom. It has generated 
controversy and disagreement, with self-proclaimed theists like Kant being branded 
as atheists for offering a practical approach to Christian doctrine. Similarly in 
twentieth-century existentialism, thinkers remain divided in their theological 
standpoints. Heidegger, for instance, can be viewed as a ‘methodological atheist’. 
His philosophical thinking is neither for nor against the affirmation of God, but is 
rather ‘a-theistic’ in the sense of being ‘without God.’ What is at issue for Heidegger 
regarding questions of human freedom is not a question or God or being, but rather 
an interpretation of God from the question of being. Conversely, existentialist 
theologians like Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich attempt to understand God in 
relation to a particular situation concerning the concretely existing human 
individual. Their interpretation of human existence is one that emphasizes the 
freedom of individuals to dictate their own identities through choices, and the 
paradoxical, ambiguous or even absurd nature of the reality that humans encounter. 
They similarly view religious faith as being closely related to feelings of despair and 
isolation, and suggest that faith can grow out of such emotions, or can provide the 
tools to overcome them. 
 
What can also be seen following the above discussion is how twentieth-century 




nihilistic themes, and serves to respond to them. Whilst Sartre is treated as an 
existentialist in this thesis, his atheistic existentialist ethics could arguably be seen to 
hover on the edges of nihilism. For instance, his 1945 play Huis Clos, in which he 
depicts the annoyances of other people as hell, Sartre readily expresses the nihilism 
of subjectivity in the form of selfish absurdity and meaninglessness. Marie-Luise 
Raters also observes: ‘Wie Nietzsche, so ist auch Sartre Nihilist. Für ihn gibt es 
keine Vollendung des menschlichen Lebens im Jenseits und keine Werte. Der 
Mensch muss selbst setzen, was gut und böse ist. Zu dieser Freiheit ist er quasi 
“verdammt”’.85 The problem with this assessment is its flippant pigeonholing of 
Sartre as a man advocating despair in the face of a harsh and meaningless universe. 
Whilst Sartre certainly explores and engages with this attitude, he ultimately does 
not take the position of a nihilist. Sartre defines nihilism as ‘bad faith’ (la mauvaise 
foi), which signifies a ‘giving up’ on existence. Bad faith consists in the false belief 
that man is his or her own nothingness, in the manner of being a nothingness-in-
itself. As Sartre outlines in the footnotes in Being and Nothingness, one can escape 
bad faith only through a self-recovery of being in authenticity.86 In other words, the 
individual aims at substantiality by continually founding himself upon the 
affirmation and assertion of his or her own freedom. Sartre’s philosophy can thus be 
viewed as one that distinguishes between authenticity and inauthenticity, genuine 
freedom and mauvaise foi, and ultimately, existentialism and nihilism. 
Fundamentally, theistic and atheistic existentialism offer a response to nihilism and 
its godlessness, for what can be located in twentieth-century existentialist literature 
is an oscillation between the antitheses of despair and uncertainty, on the one hand, 
and, most significantly, hope and expectation on the other. It is precisely this 
possibility for optimism, liberation, authenticity, truth, and self-determination that 
affirms how existentialism functions as a response to nihilism; it is an attempt to 
find a way out of the godless void. 
 
GRENZSITUATION 
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The notion of Grenzsituation was coined by German psychiatrist, philosopher, and 
major exponent of existentialism in Germany, Karl Jaspers (1883-1969). The term 
has been translated in several different ways, including ‘boundary situation’, 
‘ultimate situation’, ‘limit situation,’ or, as Paul Goodman applied it in Gestalt 
Therapy, the ‘extreme situation’.87 Jasper’s Grenzsituation denotes a central concept 
within his Existenzherstellung, as delineated in the major philosophical tomes 
Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (1919) and Existenzphilosophie (1938), 88 and 
describes the inescapable truths in relation to which alone human life can be made 
truly meaningful. 
  
It is a psychological truth about mankind, affirmed Jaspers, that the conditio humana 
is fundamentally insufferable; ‘[...] diese gesamte Überlieferung gibt keine 
Geborgenheit, aber auch keine absolute Verläßigkeit’.89 The individual is driven by 
the need for unquestionable absolutes to fully comprehend his own reality, and 
achieves a sense of security in ‘fundamental principles, dogmas, matters susceptible 
of proof, traditional dispositions, […], or rules that exhibit a formalistic and rational 
form’.90 Yet in some instances the individual is forced to acknowledge the 
inherently irrational and incongruous nature of reality, which seizes him from the 
security of his indubitable convictions. As Jaspers outlines in Psychologie der 
Weltanschauungen, it is these challenging instances that remind human beings, ‘daß 
[…] nichts Festes da ist, kein unbezweifelbares Absolutes, kein Halt, der jeder 
Erfahrung und jedem Denken standhielte’.91 In such Grenzsituationen, which 
typically refer to bereavement, guilt, anguish, or poverty, ‘der Mensch [wird] an die 
Grenze seines Daseins geführt’.92 He experiences intense pain and sorrow, and is 
forced to grapple with the unavoidable perplexities and contradictions embedded in 
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Ralph Hefferline & Frederick Perls, Gestalt Therapy: Excitement and Growth in the Human 
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88 Cf. Karl Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (Heidelberg: Julius Springer, 1945), and Karl 
Jaspers, Existenzphilosophie (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1938). 
89 Karl Jaspers, Einführung in die Philosophie (Munich: Piper, 1971), p. 19. 
90 Peter E. Gordon, ‘German Existentialism and the Persistence of Metaphysics: Weber, Jaspers, 
Heidegger’, in Situating Existentialism: Key Texts in Context, ed. Jonathan Judaken and Robert 
Bernasconi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), pp. 65-88, p. 70. 
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his own reality; the co-existence of good and evil, beauty and ugliness, the positive 
and negative, the infinite and the finite, the whole and the incomplete. Bollnow 
offers a metaphorical explanation of this concept, referring to it as ‘der “Pfahl im 
Fleisch,” durch den dem Menschen die Unvollkommenheit seines Daseins 
eindringlich vor Augen geführt wird’.93  
 
The notion’s overarching insight is that it is only through true scheitern, or 
foundering, that man can become a fulfilled cipher of Being. As Jasper affirms in his 
critical work from 1932, Philosophie, ‘Dies echte Scheitern allein, dem ich 
rückhaltlos wissend und übernehmend offen bin, kann erfüllte Chiffre des Seins 
werden’.94 Furthermore, it is only through this intensity of anguish and contradiction 
that the individual can comprehend the possibility of a superior existence beyond all 
human knowledge and limits. This is what Jaspers called ‘transcendence,’ and what 
he defines as the crossing of a boundary and the realisation of a new condition of 
self-conscious authenticity. Through transcendence, man becomes aware of the 
absolute and of the infinite and insentiently rejects the finitude of his existence.  
 
Exploring the Jasperian notions of Grenzsituation and transcendence is of 
indisputable relevance and interest within an existentialist context. Yet it remains 
particularly pertinent for the purposes of this overarching discussion to reflect on 
how transcendence following a Grenzsituation might be physically experienced 
within the individual’s own empirical realm, or articulated in fiction. Of particular 
significance here is the question of Jasper’s own religious faith. Like Sartre and 
Heidegger, Jaspers can be seen as an atheistic existentialist who openly rejected 
Christian faith. Yet unlike other existential philosophers, he ‘still offered a point of 
contact for “conversing” with the Christian religion’.95 In Der philosophische 
Glaube angesichts der Offenbarung, Jaspers affirmed that he did not accept 
Christian faith grounded in an objective revelation of God, and maintained that 
transcendence manifests itself exclusively through ciphers,96 otherwise understood 
                                                        
93 Der Pfahl im Fleisch (originally La mort dans l’âme) is incidentally the title of the third novel 
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as a secret, symbolic writing. In opposition to religious faith, Jaspers’ concept of 
transcendence exemplifies a philosophical faith that is ‘not bound to rituals, priests 
and demonstrations of a revealed God,’ but is rather ‘an optimistic credo and 
confidence in freedom, humanity, and transcendence that favours an attitude of […] 
confidence that human life is worth living’.97 Thus, it is entirely unconnected to the 
biblical idea of revelation or the deification of human individuals. Leszek 
Kolakowski similarly explores the matter of Jasperian transcendence in correlation 
to religious faith and concludes that it offers ‘no universally accessible God and 
consequently no salvation’.98 Within Jasper’s concept of transcendence, man is and 
remains in Grenzsituationen in which he gains awareness of his transcendence and 




The fifth and final theme to be discussed here as part of this existentialist manifesto 
is that of anxiety, or ‘angst’. Angst is a distinctively if not uniquely modern 
category, and is known as a consequence of an encounter with the ‘Nothing.’ It 
nonetheless purports to call forth a universal human condition, upon which 
Kierkegaard and Heidegger have been the deepest thinkers.  The prevailing idea 
here is that human existence is in some way ‘on its own.’ To offer a brief 
etymological explanation of the term in its various contexts, ‘angst’ can mean in 
German both ‘fear’ and ‘anxiety’. In English, the term is used to refer to intense 
anxiety or distress. In both psychology and existential philosophy, however, fear and 
anxiety are distinguished. Fear tends to be focused on a particular object or situation 
and can be reduced or even eliminated. Anxiety, on the other hand, is usually more 
general and diffuse and is harder to reduce. As such, angst, in a specifically 
existentialist realm, is much closer in meaning to anxiety than to fear. Angst can be 
understood as a type of feeling that seizes the individual as he or she is confronted 
with a certain possibility, that is, as one’s ‘psychical sensitivity projects a vague 
image or adumbration which acquires the quality of being “possible,” of being 
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capable of (or even demanding) enactment in one’s finitude’.99 Kierkegaard was one 
of the notable philosophers to describe this state of extreme despair and uncertainty 
in people caused by their state of freedom to choose in The Origins of Dread, 
published in 1844 under the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis. The mere fact that 
Kierkegaard, or Haufniensis, attributes such great importance to angst, so great that 
he makes it the subject of a whole treatise, is in itself quite extraordinary. It would 
appear that angst, or anxiety were uncommon phenomena in nineteenth-century 
psychology.100 It is certainly not uncommon for the reflective modern view, but this 
is due not least to Kierkegaard-Haufniensis’s analysis of angst which has left 
profound traces in the literature, philosophy, and psychology of the twentieth 
century. There are many indications that we live in an age of anxiety, and these 
indications are supported by the fact that angst became a dominant theme in 
twentieth-century literary and philosophy. Since the literature and philosophy of an 
epoch also interprets the present, our time seems to be characterised by an intense 
experience of angst. If one extracts from the fact that this modern self-consciousness 
might be blinding us to the anxiety of a previous age, then anxiety must be linked to 
‘modern’ experiences of emptiness and loss of meaning, until one reaches the point 
where nothing has meaning.  
 
Kierkegaard-Haufniensis described angst as ‘an alien power which grasps’ the 
individual. As such, the simple ‘peace and repose’ of innocence is permeated by 
angst, as when a nightmare appears and disrupts undifferentiated sleep. But what is 
particularly intriguing about Kierkegaard-Haufniensis’s usage of this philosophical 
concept is how it designates the simultaneity of two opposing feelings or emotions, 
which he explains as a ‘sympathetic-antipathy’ and an ‘antipathetic sympathy.’ On 
the one hand, one experiences in angst feelings of alarm, fright, repulsion, and the 
desire to flee from the object of anxiety; on the other hand and at the same time, one 
can feel allured, enticed, and tempted, as well as desirous to seek this so-called 
object.101 This prompts one to consider further the nature of a psychological state 
                                                        
99 Arnold B. Come, Kierkegaard as Humanist, p. 50. 
100 Kierkegaard observes that ‘the concept of anxiety is almost never treated in psychology.’ See: 
Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the 
Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin, trans. Reidar Thomte (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1980), p. 42. 




that evokes the ambiguity of feeling both temptation and dread. Unsurprisingly, this 
feeling is not triggered by such possibilities as deciding to wear a navy suit instead 
of a grey suit, or as going out to a restaurant one evening instead of preparing dinner 
at home. Arnold Come expands on the complexities of this notion by describing the 
angst that may be felt by a child who is about to enter the ‘haunted house’ at a theme 
park, or by an adult who is deciding what kind of career to pursue, or whether to 
marry a particular person.102 But as Come continues, none of these depict the 
decisive, qualitative angst which, as Kierkegaard-Haufniensis asserts, affects every 
human being, beginning at the moment of abandoning innocence and throughout the 
rest of his or her life. For Kierkegaard-Haufniensis, the particular instance that 
brings about existential angst appears when ‘[d]reaming, the spirit projects its own 
actuality,’ that is to say, when finitude and infinitude interact causing one’s 
innocence to be disturbed by a shape ‘outside itself,’ a positive unification of the 
two, a unification which appears as a ‘third,’ a third something that differs from 
either of the other two. This is what Kierkegaard-Haufniensis refers to as the ‘spirit’ 
or ‘self.’ He summarises this in the following quotation. 
 
The human being is a synthesis of the psychical and the sensuous. But a 
synthesis is unthinkable if the two are not united in a third. This third is a 
spirit. […] The spirit is present, but as immediate, as dreaming. Inasmuch as 
it is now present, it is in a sense a hostile power, because it constantly 
disturbs the relation between soul and body. […] On the other hand, it is a 
friendly power, which precisely wants to constitute the relation. What, then, 
is the human being’s relation to this ambiguous power; how does the spirit 
relate to itself and to its condition? It relates as angst. Get rid of itself, the 
spirit cannot; neither can it grasp itself as long as it has itself outside of itself; 
nor can the human being sink down into the vegetative, because he is 
qualified as spirit; one cannot flee from angst, because one loves it; yet one 
cannot really love it, because one flees from it. Innocence has now reached 
its uttermost point.103  
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Much as biologists have shown avid curiosity in this application by inducing 
frantically undirected behaviour in animals by removing their natural structures of 
reference, angst can be viewed as the humanly equivalent state in which the world 
as such presents itself no longer as home. Kierkegaard formulates this notion in a 
metaphor. ‘Anxiety can be compared with dizziness. The person whose eye happens 
to look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy’.104 This state of dizziness is 
said to be freedom. That is to say that the individual suddenly uncovers the 
possibility for self-relating, but also that one must be accountable for the way he or 
she relates. It is, however, important how we discover this possibility. It is found in 
angst by already relating to the possibility. That which angst manifests is thus that 
we cannot escape ourselves as somebody who relates even if we try. Angst is not 
only discovering the possibility of freedom; angst also becomes the anxiety for this 
possibility. And in this anxiety or the dizziness of freedom, ‘freedom succumbs’.105  
 
Heidegger offers a dissimilar view of angst. His problematic engagement with 
Kierkegaard is also not without relevance here. Generally speaking, Heidegger 
shows little appreciation for the Kierkegaardian school of thought, whereby ‘a brief 
pattern of acknowledgement’ is often quickly followed ‘by critical distancing in 
almost all […] remarks about Kierkegaard’.106 And yet many critics and scholars of 
Heidegger remain steadfast in the belief that he learned much from Kierkegaard, far 
more than he was perhaps prepared to admit. As McCarthy contends, Sein und Zeit 
has the stamp of Kierkegaard all over it’.107 John Caputo serves as a prime example 
of a philosophical scholar to criticise Heidegger’s distant stance towards 
Kierkegaard; he observes: 
 
Heidegger not only understates his dependence on Kierkegaard, he misstates 
it. In borrowing upon Kierkegaard’s theory of repetition – without 
acknowledgement – he invokes Kierkegaard at the most crucial ontological 
juncture in the published text of Being and Time. And when he does mention 
                                                        
104 Ibid., p. 61. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Vincent McCarthy, ‘Martin Heidegger: Kierkegaard's Influence Hidden and in Full View,’ 
in Kierkegaard and Existentialism (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, 9), ed. 
Jon Stewart (Farnham/Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 95-126, p. 96. 




Kierkegaard, it is always to dress him down as an ontico-existentiell author 
[…] It is clear that Kierkegaard’s contribution to Being and Time goes right 
to the heart of the ontology which is defended there. Heidegger differs from 
Kierkegaard, not as an ontological thinker from an ontic, as he likes to make 
out, but principally in terms of the degree to which Heidegger has formalized 
and articulated Kierkegaard’s ontology in a more systematic, professional 
manner.108   
 
Caputo is highlighting what many informed readers interpret as being Heidegger’s 
minimisation of Kierkegaard’s influence on Sein und Zeit and other works. 
Heidegger’s lectures that were delivered before and after the publication of Sein und 
Zeit reveal some passing references to Kierkegaard, but this brevity is nevertheless 
indicative of his substantial preoccupation with Kierkegaardian material. In 
reference to Heidegger’s engagement with the theme of existential temporality 
found in the second volume of Kierkegaard’s Either/Or, Dan Magurshak is similarly 
prepared to entertain the hypothesis that ‘Heidegger, deeply influenced by 
[Kierkegaard], made this work his own to such an extent that he failed to realize 
how much his own existential reflections relied upon Kierkegaard’s writings’.109 
Magurshak also underlines the borrowings and influence of Kierkegaard’s The 
Sickness unto Death that are traceable in Sein und Zeit, and reproaches Heidegger 
for failing to appropriately acknowledge Kierkegaard. He maintains that Heidegger 
‘focus[es] upon shortcomings rather than accomplishments,’ and notes how the rare 
‘praise bestowed upon Kierkegaard is almost damning in its faintheartedness’.110 
 
Before reflecting more closely on the areas of agreement and disagreement in 
Kierkegaardian and Heideggerian angst, it is pertinent to outline the fundamental 
details of the latter’s philosophical position. Heidegger defines angst as a basic 
disposition or ‘mood’. In a crucial passage in part two of Was ist Metaphysik? 
Heidegger explains how there is a basic requirement, or ‘Grunderfordernis,’ for the 
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possible development of the question of nothingness, namely that the ‘Nichts’ must 
be given beforehand, and that we must be able to encounter it.111 This ‘Nothing’ is 
experienced in the fundamental mood, or ‘Grundstimmung,’ of angst. As is 
delineated in Sein und Zeit, what the individual experiences in angst is that the 
meaningful world, in which ‘Dasein’ goes about its every day life, fades away into 
insignificance. Human life is devoid of meaning, and one might experience uncanny 
feelings of not-being-at-home and of being thrown. This is why, as Kierkegaard 
explains in his own clear distinction, angst is not to be understood as a fear of a 
particular object or entity in the world. No specific ‘thing’ is the cause of angst, and, 
in this way, it reveals no-thing or nothing.112 Taking this notion that in angst all 
particular things lose meaning, Herman Philipse observes how this should 
undermine what Heidegger refers to as ‘Verfallen’ – the idea that mankind flees 
from his or her self into worldly occupations – which brings us back to ourselves as 
contingent and fixed beings in the world. As Philipse explains, ‘Nichts’ in the 
Heideggerian sense refers to a positive phenomenon, the phenomenon that 
everything becomes insignificant in angst.113 Furthermore, Heidegger maintains that 
experiencing ‘das Nichts’ is a prerequisite to thematically experiencing being 
(‘Sein’), in the sense of being-in-the-world as such. This is why, according to Was 
ist Metaphysik?, the ‘Nichts’ and ‘Dasein’ belong together. 
 
Heidegger also examines the concept of angst in relation to death. In this instance, 
angst alludes to ceasing to be-in-the-world of ‘Dasein,’ and thus is to be 
differentiated from the type of angst that concerns being-in-the-world. Heidegger 
asserts that it is in the fundamental nature of Being, as a groundless and contingent 
state, to come to an end. To await or anticipate death in one’s thinking, to give 
oneself up is, in this sense, a supreme achievement, in that it brings ‘Dasein’ to its 
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most extreme possibility.114 This analysis makes angst about being present, as well 
as ceasing to be present. Angst about the possibility of not being is also angst about 
being, in the sense that the anticipation of non-being in the form of death is a unique 
expression of ‘Dasein.’ This is essentially the ‘tour-de-force by which Heidegger 
transforms anxiety from something negative, an expression of fear, unacceptance, 
and evasion, into something positive, into acceptance of one’s uniqueness’.115 
  
Whilst Heidegger’s engagement with Kierkegaardian philosophy is critical in parts, 
his concept of angst and anxiety does, nevertheless, reveal some notable parallels to 
those of his Danish predecessor. For instance, Heidegger fully shares the perception 
of eeriness in the self-alienated individual, as well as the conflict that derives from 
desiring to change one’s condition, and wanting the condition to continue. 
Heidegger similarly identifies with how Kierkegaard attributes the appearance of 
angst to a deeper, more complex human nature. Kierkegaard links angst with the 
problem of melancholy and inclosing reserve, and although Heidegger does not 
explicitly use these terms, his discussion of ‘Entfremdung’ as closing off ‘Being’ or 
‘Dasein’ from authenticity and possibility echoes Kierkegaard’s use of inclosing 
reserve.  Regardless of their precise provenance the terms angst, melancholy, 
Entfremdung and (in)authenticity all have great import for the development of 
existentialist thought in and after the 1920s, when Heidegger was writing Sein and 
Zeit.  
 
*    *    * 
 
The aim of the following study will be to offer an extensive exploration not just of 
angst but also of those other aforementioned themes that together constitute what I 
am calling the unwritten existentialist manifesto, namely das Ich, freedom and 
responsibility, authenticity, Grenzsituation, angst and suffering. Chapters Two to 
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Four will include discussions of the atheistic existentialist writing of Max Frisch and 
Alfred Andersch and the theistic existentialist works of Heinrich Böll. But my focus 
will not be philosophy or theology but rather twentieth-century literature, more 
specifically post-1945 German language literature. I will seek in the subsequent 
chapters to document how these existentialist themes and concerns ‘infiltrated’ 
postwar novels written in German, illustrating how the cataclysmic events of the 
mid-twentieth century – the Second World War, the Holocaust, the widespread 
destruction and upheaval caused by the Nazi regime – made writers particularly 
susceptible to existentialist thought. Each of these writers’ works exhibits strands 
and strains of existentialist thinking, even where these authors might not be 
considered full-fledged existentialists per se. It is these strands and strains that my 
dissertation seeks to uncover, in the process showing how existentialist thought 





















In the year 1961 Max Frisch gave an interview with Horst Bienek, in which he 
proclaimed: ‘Bei jeder neuen Arbeit hatte ich das naive Gefühl, dass ich jetzt, Gott 
sei Dank, ein radikal anderes Thema angehe, um früher oder später festzustellen, 
dass alles, was nicht radikal misslingt, das radikal gleiche Thema hat’.1 It is among 
the aims of this chapter to probe the truth behind Frisch’s dry remark within the 
thematic framework of his 1954 novel Stiller. The characteristic note of irony in this 
comment, however, should warn readers from hastily pigeonholing Frisch as a one-
dimensional novelist of limited scope. Far from contending that Frisch’s literary 
repertoire is simplistic or repetitive, this chapter aims to demonstrate how, through 
his works’ exploration of the cornerstones of existentialist thought, namely identity, 
individual freedom, self-realisation and angst, they possess a remarkable thematic 
unity. It is precisely through this unity in multiplicity that Frisch has been able to 
produce a range of novels and plays which have come to constitute a major 
contribution to post-1945 European fiction. 
 
 
THE TRILOGY: STILLER, HOMO FABER UND MEIN NAME SEI GANTENBEIN 
 
As has already been established in the introductory chapter, a key concern of 
twentieth-century German language writing has been the existentialist concern that 
man has lost his vital centre.2 Michael Butler observes how innumerable German-
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language writers have ‘struggled with the problems produced by the collapse not 
just of traditional values but also of the self, the human personality, which this loss 
of centricity has induced’.3 Thomas Mann, Bertolt Brecht, Hermann Hesse, Franz 
Kafka, Alfred Andersch, Arno Schmidt, Günter Grass and Heinrich Böll constitute a 
handful of the many twentieth- and twenty-first-century authors who have sought in 
their divergent ways to cast light on an ostensibly increasing degeneration of human 
individuality and who have wrestled with the complexities of depicting man in 
fiction that this involves. As Frisch wryly alludes to in the above citation (‘um 
früher oder später festzustellen, dass alles [...] das radikal gleiche Thema hat’), it is 
precisely this existentialist theme of man’s positioning and ‘centricity’ within 
society that remains a consistent feature of his literary repertoire. In this way, 
Frisch’s three major texts Stiller (1954), Homo Faber (1957) and Mein Name sei 
Gantenbein (1964) can be read as a trilogy connected by the motif of their 
characters’ struggles with the immutability of their individual biographies. 
 
The characters in Frisch’s novels are entrenched – with the exception of the 
protagonist in his first novel, Jürg Reinhart (1937) – in the clearly defined context 
of a modern, conventionalist bourgeois society that is depicted as being deeply 
flawed. This society requires the compliance and conformity of its members who 
have designated roles they are expected to perform. It is a society shown to be 
indifferent, if not adverse, to the development and preservation of personal integrity. 
Before we examine the existentialist notions of identity, authenticity, ‘centricity’ 
and dislocation in Stiller, which forms the main analytic focus of this chapter, it is 
worth surveying the prevalence of these themes in the other two novels from 
Frisch’s unofficial trilogy. His 1957 novel Homo Faber is a text that deals with a 
crisis of the self and its identity. The central protagonist and narrator is Walter 
Faber, an engineer who works for UNESCO in the field of ‘technische Hilfe für 
unterentwickelte Völker’.4 The figure of Faber constitutes an exaggerated type of 
modern-day rationalist and technologist, who renounces mythical and natural 
structures of thought and chooses to see life in terms of systematic principles and 
mathematical probabilities. As the title of the novel suggests, Faber is the ultimate 
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homo faber, a working, functional being, yet he is socially withdrawn and 
injudicious. He lacks the traits that are unique to homo sapiens, namely the need to 
contemplate and understand mankind’s natural environment. In this regard, Manfred 
Jurgensen describes Faber as a man, ‘der an die Errechenbarkeit des Lebens glaubt, 
für den die Wissenschaft und Technik die Rolle Gottes übernommen haben und dem 
Formeln und Statistik mehr bedeuten als seine lebendig-ungewisse menschliche 
Verbindung’.5 Bernhard Irrgang similarly labels Faber as an ‘Ingenieur und 
Verfechter einer emotionslosen Weltbetrachtung [...] ein Vertreter der konstruktiv-
technischen Weltanschauung’.6 Hela Michot-Dietrich observes the distinctly 
existentialist nature of Faber’s disengagement with the world around him, and draws 
a comparison between Frisch’s protagonist with Meursault, the young Algerian 
pied-noir from Albert Camus’ 1942 novel L’Étranger; she notes:  ‘Es handelt sich 
dabei vorwiegend um die anfängliche Gleichgültigkeit vor dem Leben, dessen Wert 
durch die Gegenüberstellung mit dem Tod gehoben und erkannt wird’.7 Michot-
Dietrich goes on to draw a series of thematic parallels between the two novels, an 
example for which is the ‘unerbittliche Sonne’, which surfaces and irks both 
Meursault and Faber at moments of existential crisis.8 Faber travels about the globe 
with his cine-camera (HF: 23) and Hermes-Baby typewriter (HF: 32), his cherished 
devices that mediate his perceptions and lend them durability. He also carries his 
electric shaver (HF: 9), on which he relies to fend off any reminder of the residual 
degree to which he is still a creature of nature: ‘Ich fühle mich nicht wohl, wenn 
unrasiert; nicht wegen der Leute, sondern meinetwegen. Ich habe dann das Gefühl, 
ich werde etwas wie eine Pflanze, wenn ich nicht rasiert bin, und ich greife 
unwillkürlich an mein Kinn’ (HF: 27). Yet Faber is more than a ‘typical’ engineer or 
technologist. He fears human relationships – ‘Menschen sind anstrengend’ (HF: 8) – 
and he hides behind the orderly system of rules and structures that is technology. 
What the reader uncovers in Homo Faber is a certain attitude of mind fixed in rigid 
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mental categories which Frisch has explored before in other fields of human 
endeavour, for example the legal world (Dr. Bohnenblust in Stiller), architecture 
(Willi Sturzenegger in Stiller), business (Hauswirt in Die Schwierigen oder J’adore 
ce qui me brûle),9 as well as the military (Ammann in Die Schwierigen). Like 
Walter Faber, these individuals live on the surface of life, clinging to facts and 
ideologies as endorsements of truth and stability. Such a perspective enables 
Frisch’s characters to take refuge in practical affairs and neglect the more 
problematic aspects of human nature. As Butler confirms, it is ‘precisely the process 
of showing an individual confronted with the disastrous one-sidedness of this type 
of thinking [that] gives Homo Faber its particular shape and interest’.10  
 
 
The existentialist themes of identity, ‘centricity’ and freedom are also explored in 
the third novel of Frisch’s unofficial trilogy, his 1964 novel Mein Name sei 
Gantenbein. It is here that the writer’s philosophy once again comes to light, 
namely, that individual identity is constructed through the roles one plays – either in 
isolation or in relation to other individuals, whose roles are created in turn in 
interaction with that first individual and others. Redolent of a Bach fugue, or, as 
Wilma Iggers explicated in her 1965 review of the novel’s English version, ‘of 
Leonardo’s multiple sketches of persons, or of Picasso’s composite portraits’,11 
Mein Name sei Gantenbein offers multiple variations on an inexorable existentialist 
dilemma without providing any clear answers: is human freedom possible for an 
individual (or a couple)? Not merely an aesthetic exercise, Frisch’s Gantenbein 
functions as a sort of mystery novel, whereby the reader is propelled by curiosity to 
learn the identity of the anonymous man who dies in the opening scene but 
resurfaces as a character or narrator orchestrating the creation of these numerous 
identities and stories. The reader can never establish beyond reasonable doubt 
whether Gantenbein, a writer who following a car accident pretends to be blind in 
order to save his marriage, is the main narrator or the creation of another narrator or 
antagonist, among them the architect Svoboda and the art historian and Hermes 
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expert Enderlin. Rather than embracing storytelling as a safeguard against 
psychological disintegration, the narrative voices in Mein Name sei Gantenbein 
appear to consent to the crumbling of their personal identities and allude to an 
‘implizierte moderne “Krise” der kollektiven Identität’.12 With dizzying shifts 
between the merging of narrative perspectives, the work presents a narrator’s and his 
conceived characters’ fantasies about deliverance from the monotony of emotionally 
starved middle-aged life. As Frisch outlined in a letter of February 9 1964 to one of 
his Suhrkamp editors, the novelist Martin Walser, Mein Name sei Gantenbein, 
instead of developing a character, consists in the polyphonic task of ‘encircling’ 
characters with their projections and associations, ‘ein Ego einzukreisen durch seine 
Assoziationen,’ in his own words.13  
 
But it is the 1954 novel Stiller which predates these other attempts to grapple with 
these issues of identity, self-diffusion, authenticity, freedom,14 angst, self-
expectation and guilt in human relationships. Strikingly reminiscent of the themes of 
duplicity and identity dislocation later explored in Camus’ 1956 novel La Chute, in 
which the Parisian lawyer Jean-Baptiste Clamence abandons his former identity and 
takes refuge in a squalid bar in Amsterdam, part one of Stiller sees Frisch’s writing 
take on a zealous subjectivity in portraying man’s wretched position in mid-
twentieth-century society and his incapability of making an intelligent deduction 
from the world in which he lives. Man is weary and frustrated, and it is from this 
departure point that Frisch’s protagonist in Stiller becomes embroiled in a, what he 
claims to be, case of mistaken identity. In possession of an American passport and 
calling himself Jim White, the protagonist is arrested at the Swiss border after being 
recognised as Anatol Stiller, the missing Swiss sculptor. Advised by his defence 
counsel to provide ‘nichts als die schlichte und pure Wahrheit,’ White/Stiller 
emphatically maintains throughout the course of the novel ‘Ich bin nicht Stiller!’ 
(ST: 9-14). At the end of the resulting court proceedings, the protagonist is 
convicted of being Stiller, and in Part Two, written from the perspective of his 
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public prosecutor and friend Rolf, the reader discovers how Stiller ultimately 
accepts his fate and moves back in with his wife Julika. Stiller’s final hope of 
finding happiness with his wife is doomed to failure because of their dissimilar 
needs and fundamental personality differences. Although Stiller continues to seek 
pleasure in erotic relations and rebuffs the comfort and security of spiritual or family 
inclusion, it is only in the wake of Julika’s death that Stiller is truly able to confront 
and live with his deficiencies.  
 
Together with Homo Faber and Mein Name sei Gantenbein, Stiller forms part of an 
unofficial post-war trilogy in which Frisch strives to confront the humanistic and 
existential concerns of post-war European society. Yet, as has already been 
indicated, it is also a characteristic Frischean trait to leave matters unresolved in his 
writing. His literary works are rife with ultimately unresolved questions regarding 
the pressing problems of modern man, and at the end of each of them we find those 
very same questions redirected towards ourselves as readers. Frisch appears to 
challenge his audience to answer these questions for themselves, for they are 
‘questions that only we as individuals can answer’15: Is freedom possible? Is 
selfhood possible? Do we act in accord with our knowledge of the world and its 
dilemmas? Frisch provides no systematically formulated philosophy in answer to 
these questions, but rather presents to his audience a motley array of novels and 
plays that translate these abstract questions into concrete terms. Like the concrete 
contingencies of everyday life, the situations in Frisch’s literary works are correlated 
with varying degrees of freedom, of self-realisation, and of deliberate action. As 
such, it remains as problematic a task to capture Frisch’s views as it is to try to 
compartmentalise his responses to life and existence.16 Perhaps it is this trait that led 
Marcel Reich-Ranicki to conclude that Frisch ‘kein Philosoph [sei].’ Frisch at times 
seems more explicit about these concerns in his Tagebücher,17 in which he defines 
his political engagements, his capacity for resentment, the vigour of his enthusiasm 
for human rights, and his sensitivity to the conflict between culture and morality. He 
repeatedly refers to the state of remoteness and detachment experienced by artists, a 
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predicament which he attempted to address in his ‘Rede zur Verleihung des Georg-
Büchner-Preises’ of 1958, affirming that it is the writer’s task to challenge critically 
and question (‘zersetzend zu wirken’). He goes on; ‘Indem wir keine Stellung 
nehmen (so sagt man doch?) zu Alternativen, die keine sind, haben wir durchaus 
eine Wirkung’.18 Victor Brombert also remarks on Frisch’s tendency for ‘self-
questioning, in the form of self-addressed unanswered questionnaires, [which] 
betrays [Frisch’s] uneasiness and frustration. Suspicious of his own intellectual 
relation to reality, he yearns for an unmediated relation to life’.19 Yet for the most 
part these personal concerns raise more questions than they answer while 
nevertheless serving as valuable sources of orientation within Frisch’s literary 
oeuvre.  
 
Like many of his other works, and like Homo Faber and Mein Name sei Gantenbein 
in particular, Frisch’s Stiller, we can begin with basic assertion that Frisch’s work 
deals with the continual self-exploration of a man’s identity and his fraught 
existence between subjective and objective reality. The novel’s central themes, 
human existence, identity and freedom, are generally held to signify the 
existentialist quest for the modern self and, in close correlation to that, the intricate 
dynamics of male-female relationships. In a draft of a dust-jacket blurb for the first 
edition, Frisch denied that Stiller is a novel about marriage, despite the fact that in 
the novel two marriages in crisis serve as experimental projection screens: ‘Dieses 
Buch ist, obschon es sein Anliegen an der Krise zweier Ehen demonstriert, kein 
Ehe-Roman’. He also insists that Stiller is not a travel book: ‘Es ist auch, obschon es 
von Granada, von Spanien, (...), von New York, von Kalifornien (...) erzählt, kein 
Reise-Buch’.20 Applying the Kierkgaardian dictum ‘sich selbst wählen’ as a point of 
departure (ST: 7), Frisch confirms that the overarching themes of the novel are 
indeed the human personality and individual freedom, and suggests that his 
protagonist’s path can be divided into three stages of seeking to acquire freedom: 
‘Selbsterkenntnis auch über seine Leistungen, Leben entfremdet, Annahme seiner 
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selbst (wähle dich selbst), Verzicht darauf [...]’.21 The following section of this 
chapter will thus focus on these existentialist notions of the self and human freedom 
and will be divided into three main parts. Firstly it will look at Stiller/White’s 
inauthentic living by way of his fixation with images, or Bildnisse, his experiencing 
what we might refer to as a Rollenzwang, i.e. an individual’s entrapment in a certain 
social role, as well as the Motiv des Ausbruchs in the form of his physical and 
psychological ‘Selbstflucht’.22 Secondly, it will explore Frisch’s inclusion of the two 
Kierkegaard mottos and their religious significance in the novel. Thirdly, it will 
expound upon other existentialist traces in Frisch’s 1954 work, in particular the 
themes of ontological guilt and freedom as well as the non-compliance with one’s 
‘true’ identity which are located in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, his essay 
‘Existentialism is a Humanism’, Huis Clos and Les jeux sont faits, followed by the 
notion of the world as a fugitive structure and the existence of the ‘they-self’, both 
of which are explored by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit.  
 
In the opening lines of a short essay ‘Konfrontation mit Julika,’ Frisch comments on 
the existentialist notions of self-alienation and self-acceptance that constitute 
integral themes in his post-war writing; he writes: ‘Unstimmigkeit unsere Existenz 
durch irgendeine Art von Selbstüberfordung, die zur Selbstentfremdung führt und 
schließlich zur Sterilität, weil es uns nicht gelingt, uns selbst anzunehmen – das ist, 
psychologisch gesprochen, das Problem’.23 The protagonist in Frisch’s novel suffers 
from precisely such an ‘Unstimmigkeit’, or an intense case of identity diffusion and 
claims not to know who he is. He insists that he is James Larkin White, a symbolic 
name that evokes the image of an untarnished, clean sheet of white paper that is 
ready to be written on. Stiller wishes to dispose himself of his past and to begin with 
a new identity, wiping the slate clean, so to speak. It is his wish to be released from 
a world of forced images that he perceives as purely superficial. In his role as Mr 
White he tries to fulfil this need. He attempts to convince the outer world, including 
his wife Julika, to release him from the image of how everyone perceives him, 
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namely, the image of Anatol Stiller. The following reveals Stiller/White’s 
propensity for self-negation: 
Mit Lügen ist es ohne weiteres zu machen, ein einziges Wort, ein 
sogenanntes Geständnis, und ich bin ‘frei’, das heißt in meinem Fall: dazu 
verdammt, eine Rolle zu spielen, die nichts mit mir zu tun hat. Anderseits: 
wie soll einer denn beweisen können, wer er in Wirklichkeit ist? Ich kann’s 
nicht. Weiß ich es denn selbst, wer ich bin? Das ist die erschreckende 
Erfahrung dieser Untersuchungshaft: ich habe keine Sprache für meine 
Wirklichkeit! (ST: 65) 
In his Tagebuch 1946-1949 Frisch utters a secularised version of the Second 
Commandment, ‘Du sollst dir kein Bildnis machen’ (‘Thou shalt not make unto thee 
any graven image’).24 Stiller echoes Frisch’s repudiation of graven images in the 
way in which the novel problematises the adequacy, or inadequacy, of convictions 
and systems of belief in general. Generally speaking, the ‘graven image’ can be 
understood as a fixed image which human beings project onto others, making it 
difficult if not impossible for those persons to change or to exercise their own 
freedom. For Frisch, this represents a vicious attempt to destroy ‘the living truth’ of 
the free individual, who should be open to the possibility of change.25 The Swiss 
writer Kurt Marti writes ‘Man darf behaupten, dass das zweite Gebot in dieser 
mitmenschlichen Perspektive und Anwendung das strukturelle und ideelle Leitmotiv 
des ganzen Romans ist’.26  
 
Interestingly, it is not only in Stiller that Frisch probes the theme of inauthenticity 
and role-playing. In the 1961 play Andorra the question of existential freedom 
lingers insistently behind the ostensible theme of anti-Semitism. Frisch expresses 
these ideas most clearly in the blinkered attitudes of the Andorrans who force the 
protagonist Andri into the role of a Jew. The local carpenter is unwilling to believe 
that Andri is capable of doing anything other than selling furniture, despite his 
proven aptitude for carpentry. The soldier too refuses to recognise Andri’s courage, 
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even though he was prepared to stand up to the former’s threatening advances and 
knock his cap off his head. The irony lies not only in the fact that the Andorrans 
perceive ‘Jewish’ features in Andri when he is not even a Jew, but more 
significantly in the fact that Andri adapts to the images which others project onto 
him. Andri is essentially robbed of his authenticity, a notion which Sartre deals with 
in both Being and Nothing and in his 1944 play Huis Clos, in which it is proclaimed: 
‘L’enfer, c’est les autres’ (‘Hell is other people’). Andri fights in vain to defend his 
authenticity, and his helplessness is exemplified by his reactions to looking in a 
mirror: ‘Man hat mir gesagt, wie meinesgleichen sich bewege, nämlich so und so, 
und ich bin vor den Spiegel getreten fast jeden Abend. Sie haben recht. Ich bewege 
mich so und so. Ich kann nichts anders’. Frisch is emphasising that human minds do 
not, like mirrors, reflect a pre-existing world of reality; the world of reality is a 
projection of our consciousness. This danger is similarly illustrated in Sartre’s 1943 
play Les Mouches, where the character King Aegisthus is trapped in the image 
which he forced upon his people. Looking at his reflection, he laments, much like 
Andri: ‘I have come to see myself only as they see me. I peer into the dark pit of 
their souls and there, deep down, I see the image that I have built up. I shudder, but I 
cannot take my eyes off it. Almighty Zeus, who am I? Am I anything more than the 
dread others have of me?’27 Frisch’s 1948 play Als der Krieg zu Ende war similarly 
appears to repudiate Bildnisse created by prejudgment and cliché-ridden thinking 
about national characteristics. After being compassionately treated by a Russian 
soldier, the character Agnes seeks to move away from all ideas pertaining to Nazi 
ideology and see the Russians as human beings. Yet the Russian’s silence in 
conversation succeeds in educing the whereabouts of Agnes’s husband, who is in 
hiding, thus proving that the reality of the situation is in fact thornier than Agnes 
first envisaged. As W. G. Cunliffe rightly observes, Frisch is seeking to impart in his 
play that it is not merely stereotyped ideas that dictate our actions and lead us into 
inauthenticity, but rather the words that can obfuscate the nature of things.28 
Ultimately Agnes’s desire to rebuff stereotypes touches upon the fundamental 
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existentialist issue of authenticity, as aphoristically expressed by Nietzsche: 
‘Überzeugungen sind gefährlichere Feinde der Wahrheit als die Lüge’.29    
 
Despite releasing himself from his former image, Frisch’s protagonist Stiller 
exhibits an inability to maintain his role. This derives from two sources, firstly from 
his rejection of the unreasonable demands of his fellow human beings, and secondly, 
and perhaps most crucially, from the demands he exerts on himself. The themes 
concerning the self, existential angst and self-alienation essentially derive from 
Frisch’s narrative, namely, how Ludwig Anatol Stiller is remanded in custody in a 
Swiss prison. Through his newly assumed role, Stiller had sought to distance 
himself from himself by attempting to modify his former identity, but the Swiss 
court seeks to prove that he in fact remains Anatol Stiller. In order to confirm their 
suspicions, the court requests that he recount his life in a journal. In his role as Mr 
White, Stiller proceeds to write about himself from the perspective of a stranger. 
Claiming not to know Stiller, he writes down that which he is told by Stiller’s 
friends and relatives who visit him, which simultaneously enables him to work 
through his own history. Throughout the course of the novel the characters Stiller 
and White steadily combine until there can be little doubt remaining that they are 
outwardly the same person.  
 
During Stiller’s incarceration period the ruthlessness of these images becomes clear. 
His fellow beings recognise him as Stiller and refuse to acknowledge the existence 
of Jim White. When questioned about his external identity, Stiller wishes to express 
his inner identity. His fictitious stories also fulfil this function, whose reality cannot 
be measured on factuality but only on personal experience. The prison guard Knobel 
asks him: ‘Sind Sie denn Jim White?’ (ST: 130) forcing Stiller to commit himself to 
matters of external reality. Yet Stiller’s reply is targeted towards his inner identity 
when he remarks: ‘Nein, [...] das gerade nicht! Aber was ich selbst erlebt habe, 
sehen Sie, das war genau das gleiche – genau’ (ST: 130). With the exception of 
Knobel, nobody attempts to understand Stiller’s assertions regarding his true self. 
They insist on his external identity as Anatol Stiller, denying him both physical or 
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mental freedom. As such Stiller fails as much to enter into genuine contact with the 
outside world, as does this outer world fail to understand Stiller’s psychology.   
The shape and substance of Stiller’s spiritual odyssey can be plotted via a series of 
subjective contemplations which occur exclusively in the novel’s odd-numbered 
Hefte and which bring them into dialectical relationship with the more objective 
content of the even-numbered ones. Expectedly, these observations, some of which 
appear more like philosophical deliberations, others more like pangs of anxiety and 
existential angst, are most numerous in the seventh and final Heft, in which the 
battle to fuse the identities of Jim White and Anatol Stiller into a viable union is 
evidently successful. However, the deeply sombre nature of Stiller’s psychological 
journey is plain enough in the first Heft. Alongside the humour and amusing 
occurrences, and thus relativising them, Frisch has placed clear pointers to Stiller’s 
existential crisis. 
 
The problem surrounding the question of his self-acceptance is rooted in Stiller’s 
inferiority complex. The reader learns that as a child Stiller was adored and admired 
by his mother who readily exaggerated and inflated his uniqueness and talents:  
 
Meine Mutter war überzeugt, dass ich mit diesem Leben schon fertig werde. 
[...] Sie liebte es, wenn ich ihr etwas vormachte, und [...] die Sorge meiner 
Mutter bestand eher darin, ob wohl die Person, die ich dereinst [heiraten] 
würde, auch meiner wirklich ganz würdig wäre. […] Meine Mutter und ich 
hielten zusammen, nach einer Aussage meines Stiefvaters, wie die Kletten. 
(ST: 245/6) 
 
In his psychoanalytical study of Frisch’s novel, Fritz Gesing comments on the 
notion of ‘Kletten,’ and concludes how ‘dieses überzogene “Bemuttern” ein 
distanzlos-enges Verhältnis [schafft]’.30 Stiller’s mother refuses to see her son as he 
really is and smothers him with her own demands and expectations. Stiller reflects 
on how his mother once painstakingly collected money to enable her son to have 
flute lessons: ‘Meine Mutter, weiß ich, sparte es sich an Putzfrauen und Glätterinnen 
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ab, putzte und bügelte selbst, auf daß sie jeden Monat eine Flötenstunde bezahlen 
konnte; denn ich galt als begabt’ (ST: 246). Stiller subsequently learns to embrace 
his mother’s wishes as best he can so as not to risk losing her affections and causing 
her disappointment. This is reflected in Stiller’s recollection of how he once tried to 
spit cherry stones at his old neighbour as he sat reading in the garden: ‘[…] meine 
Mutter ereiferte sich über seinen unerhörten Verdacht dermaßen, dass ich alles 
bestritt, um sie vor dem Herrn nicht bloßzustellen’ (ST: 246). As such, the young 
Stiller becomes adept at not only deceiving and misleading those around him, but 
also at complying with and conforming to these fabricated and deceitful images of 
himself. As Gunda Lusser-Mertelsmann affirms, it is most likely Stiller’s 
duplicitous relationship with his mother that triggers his lifelong distorted sense of 
self: ‘Seine [Stillers] Selbstverwirklichung bestand darin, die Erwartungen der Welt 
wie ehemals die der Mutter zu erfüllen’.31 Also commenting on the long-term 
consequences of Stiller’s ‘Selbstüberforderung’ and his fundamental lack of self-
acceptance, Gesing writes: ‘Gleichzeitig schafft überfordernde Erziehung 
Dauerlabilität des Selbstwertgefühls, und entsprechend leidet Stiller [...] an der 
klassischen Minderwertigkeitsangst aus übertriebener Anforderung an sich selbst 
[...]’.32   
 
As a result, the adult Stiller remains transfixed with falsified images, for he is unable 
to accept the reality of himself as an everyday human nullity. Commenting on 
Stiller’s compliancy with fraudulent Bildnisse, Kurt Marti observes: 
 
Er [Stiller] begnügt sich damit, ein Mensch nach eigenem Entwurf und Bild 
sein zu wollen. Dieses eigene Bild, nach welchem der Mensch sich zu 
‘bilden’, zu schaffen versucht, erweist sich jedoch paradoxerweise als 
fremdes und deshalb falsches Bild, das darauf ausgerichtete Leben als 
Unmöglichkeit. […] Er will nicht sein, der er ist. So zerfällt er mit sich 
selber, gerät, wie Frisch es nennt, in die Selbstüberforderung und 
Selbstentfremdung.33 
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Over the course of the novel Stiller steadily undergoes a process of self-realisation, 
which takes place over multiple phases. These are not depicted chronologically by 
Frisch, but appear as random fragments. In the first phase Stiller is shown living 
together with his wife Julika in Zurich. During this period his life is dominated by a 
multitude of self-created images which stem from the incessant 
Selbstüberforderungen that Stiller makes of himself. These roles include an artist, 
soldier, and saviour to his wife Julika. Stiller initially appears to exercise an 
authentic relationship towards his artistry, but following his first public success, he 
becomes overwhelmed by the need to satisfy the expectations of his surroundings. 
Due to this his artistic world rescinds into inauthenticity and roleplaying. Stiller 
remarks retrospectively: 
 
Ganz im Anfang meiner Künstlerei, mag sein, war ich allein, vermochte ich 
es beinahe, in einem wirklichen Sinn allein zu sein in der Hoffnung, in Lehm 
und Gips mich verwirklichen zu können; aber diese Hoffnung währte nicht 
lang, und schon war der Ehrgeiz da, die Freude in Hinsicht auf 
Anerkennung, die Sorge in Hinsicht auf Geringschätzung. (ST: 252-253) 
Stiller’s loss of identity can be partly explained due to the fact that he is intensely 
dependent on the opinions and recognition of his fellow beings. He is simply not 
able to establish a sense of self-reference dictated by his inner security that would 
allow him a sense of emotional autonomy when facing the demands and opinions of 
the outside world. The protagonist Stiller tries to impart to his fellow beings a 
definitive image of himself which he hopes to correspond to, whether or not it 
appears this way in reality. His artist’s studio for instance seems less as an authentic 
site of his artistic productions than a means for him to preserve the busts and plastic 
figures which exemplify his fixation with idols and false images. These four walls of 
his atelier can similarly be viewed as some sort of monastic enclosure that protects 
Stiller’s hermit-like existence. Stiller’s defence of his withdrawn and cloistered 
lifestyle in his artist’s studio is reinforced during a heated exchange with Julika after 
she insists that he leave the atelier. Julika’s command that her husband get out of her 
sight and thereby leave his workshop (‘Geh! Bitte. Geh hinaus! (ST: 74)) can be 




preoccupation with false images, yet Stiller’s response ‘Julika, das ist mein Atelier’ 
(ST: 74) denotes an unequivocal territorial claim and, by implication, an ardent 
defence of his ‘inauthentic’ lifestyle. This monastic and isolated freedom is 
something that Stiller/White similarly learns to value during his period of 
incarceration: ‘Ich sitze in meiner Zelle, Blick gegen die Mauer und ich sehe die 
Wüste’ (ST: 22), ‘Ich sitze in meiner Zelle, Blick gegen die Mauer und ich sehe 
Mexico, die schwimmenden Gärten von Mexico’ (ST: 23). Both locations constitute 
a prison of the inner life for Frisch’s protagonist, and it is in these two places, away 
from everyday interferences and distractions, that Stiller/White can reach the still 
centre of self.     
 
In an attempt to compensate for his feelings of personal inadequacy, the character 
Stiller internalises both the alleged and actual demands and pretensions of the 
outside world, which become a benchmark for his actions, and which will ultimately 
bring about his downfall. Unnerved by a favourable review of his work as a 
sculptor, and feeling overwhelmed by the sudden expectations aroused in the world 
around him, Stiller feels his only option is to flee from his situation. The outbreak of 
the Spanish Civil War merely offered a convenient and convincing escape route 
from what Stiller felt to be constricting social pressures. This incidentally represents 
yet another attempt by Frisch’s protagonist at Selbstüberforderung: the role of a 
soldier, in which he perceives himself as a failure when he is overpowered without a 
struggle by enemy soldiers at the river Tajo. What Monika Wintsch-Spiess denotes 
as a ‘Bewährungsprobe seines Größenwahns’,34 Stiller’s injudicious gesture of 
courage and grandeur in Spain, stemming from his ‘Angst [davor], minderwertig zu 
sein’, leaves him feeling ill at ease in his chosen role once again.  
 
As a soldier in the Spanish Civil War, Stiller was unable to shoot at his enemies, 
who quickly move to capture him. He subsequently convinces himself of the 
following: ‘– warum ich nicht geschossen habe? [...] Weil ich ein Versager bin. 
Ganz einfach!’ After returning home to Zurich, the protagonist’s deception deepens 
when he is asked to recount his ‘tolle Geschichte von Toledo’ (ST: 106), and to 
                                                        





explain why he didn’t shoot. Knowing that his failure of courage is being interpreted 
as humanitarianism, Stiller explains: ‘er [erlebte] die vier Faschisten einfach als 
Menschen, und es war ihm unmöglich, auf Menschen zu schießen. Punktum!’ (ST: 
107). His Swiss friends herald him as ‘Held des Menschlichen,’ and honour his 
performance as a ‘Sieg […] über alles Ideologische’ (ST: 108). In this way he 
becomes a prisoner of his friends’ and acquaintances’ view of himself. For Stiller, 
his experience in Spain was a failure, an act of cowardice, and a symbol of sexual 
impotence: ‘Ich bin kein Mann. Jahrelang habe ich noch davon geträumt: ich möchte 
schießen, aber es schießt nicht – ich brauche dir nicht zu sagen, was das heißt, es ist 
der typische Traum der Impotenz’. This conclusion is also reached in Klaus Müller-
Salget’s study of the novel, where he writes: ‘Was andere einen Sieg des 
Menschlichen nennen, ist für ihn selbst ein Versagen, und zwar in umfassendem 
Sinne: ein Verrat an den Kameraden und ein Versagen als Mann’.35  Yet as the 
reader later discovers, Stiller’s experiences at Tajo are presented to the reader in two 
separate versions. When in conversation with his former lover Sibylle, posing with 
self-pity and feelings of inferiority that resulted from his time in combat, Stiller tells 
his story in anecdotal form. It was a ‘Sieg des Menschlichen, [...] Sieg des konkreten 
Erlebnisses über alles Ideologische’ (ST: 203), in which he pretends, at the decisive 
moment, to have recognized the enemy as moral beings. Through this he achieves 
the desired effect of making others see him as he wishes to be seen.  
Following this, Stiller assumes another role, through which he hopes to compensate 
for his failings as both a man and a combatant, namely the role of saviour for his 
wife Julika. Ultimately, the theme of marriage in the novel and the misaligning of 
images that it brings about become a vehicle through which Frisch articulates the 
profundity of Stiller’s existentialist despair. Despite Frisch’s own claims that Stiller 
is not a novel about marriage (‘kein Ehe-Roman’), marriage remains a central 
preoccupation of much of his dramatic work and his novels, and one through which 
he is able to probe questions of the self and human identity. In the novel, the theme 
of marriage constitutes an expression of the protagonist’s relationship with his wife 
Julika at its deepest level and represents ‘the institution to which Frisch’s characters 
look in their search for a centric principle to give coherence and purpose to their 
                                                        




lives’,36 as Butler has put it. The marital life of Julika and Stiller is heavily 
influenced by the fact that both of them ‘auf eine unselige Weise zueinander paßten. 
Sie brauchten einander von ihrer Angst her’ (ST: 69). Both possess a fear of 
personal inadequacy, yet both live in the hope that their partner can compensate for 
their respective personal defects.  
Julika is plagued by her insecurity of not being a complete woman; we are thus 
informed ‘Jedenfalls hatte die schöne Julika eine heimliche Angst, keine Frau zu 
sein’ (ST: 69). Stiller, on the other hand, worries about his impotence and 
unmanliness: ‘Und auch Stiller, scheint es, stand damals unter einer steten Angst, in 
irgendeinem Sinn nicht zu genügen’ (ST: 69). His perceived act of spinelessness at 
the river Tajo during the Spanish Civil War, for instance, is related by Mr White as a 
decidedly feminine reticence and a hypersensitivity which earns Stiller the label of 
‘eine männliche Mimose, [...] ein Mann von krankhafter Ich-Bezogenheit und 
entsprechender Empfindlichkeit’ (ST: 82/3). Thus the tensions and strains between 
the couple are seen to be expressed on the one hand by frigidity, and on the other by 
virility. This can also be seen in Julika’s relationship with her work as a ballerina 
which exposes her fundamental narcissism – ‘pure Narzißmus’ (ST: 77) – 
exemplified most clearly by her voluptuous pleasure on stage, from which she 
derives almost sexual delight. She perceives it as ‘ein Labsal, auf der Bühne zu 
stehen; tausend fremde Blicke auf ihren Körper zu fühlen’ (ST: 78). The thrill of the 
performance even ‘machte Julika weniger aus, als wenn Stiller, ihr Mann, seine 
harte und von der Bilderhauerei etwas rauhe Hand auf ihren Köper legte’ (ST: 78). 
The stage allows her to be the centre of everyone’s attention. In an ironic sense, it is 
only in the act of performing that Julika feels wholly natural, free and uninhibited. 
She can be entrancing yet untouchable, protected by the music. As Jurgensen notes, 
‘Frisch läßt keinen Zweifel daran, daß das Ballett für Julika die einzige Möglichkeit 
der Selbstgestaltung bedeutet’.37 Stiller, by contrast, feels his impotence highlighted 
through his shortcomings as a soldier and confirmed by his comparative failure as an 
artist and breadwinner. This sexual imbalance can be seen to taint their relationship 
from the outset, foreshadowed by a flippant remark uttered by Julika on their 
wedding night after she made him feel like he had contaminated her. The comment 
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itself is never made explicit, although it most likely alludes to Julika’s intense 
aversion to sexual contact. From this point onwards, Stiller perceives himself as a 
repulsive and repellent being. He notes: ‘ich [komme] mir vor wie ein öliger, 
verschwitzter, stinkiger Fischer mit einer kristallklaren Wasserfee!’ (ST: 76) The 
result of this sterile impasse – Julika’s deteriorating health and her prioritising her 
career over children, and Stiller feeling forced to accept her dog Foxli as a substitute 
(‘Stiller war einfach eifersüchtig auf ihren Hund’ (ST: 81)) – can be seen as a 
‘mutual retreat from self-commitment’.38 Julika engrosses herself in her dancing 
with its concomitant need for care and protection, whilst Stiller succumbs to his 
blatant egocentricity. It is essentially this disguised sense of self-reference that 
prevents them from having a true connection with the other. They are both equally 
incapable due to their feigned self-relations to recognise themselves, let alone talk 
about it. As such, they lack an effective means of communication 
In addition to this disguised self-reference, a location of their ‘true’ identities 
becomes virtually unachievable due to their mutual projecting of images onto one 
another. Public prosecutor Rolf affirms in the afterword: ‘Es gibt allerlei Sorten von 
Prüfsteinen; Stiller hatte immerhin den seinen gefunden’ (ST: 307-8), and Stiller 
finds his touchstone by forcing his wife Julika into the role of a stand-offish, dull, 
sickly, frigid woman, whilst he sees himself playing the part of her liberator. 
Through misalignment of these images, any attempt to detect a true sense of being 
or the individual’s original identity becomes increasingly impossible.  
This propensity for inauthenticity does not go unnoticed, however. The characters 
Stiller and Julika both recognise the mechanism of images and roles under which 
their relationship suffers. During her early time in hospital (ST: 100ff.), Julika meets 
a young sanatorium veteran in the hospital, who perceptively observes in Julika’s 
marriage to Stiller a domineering interrelationship between images of the self and 
images of the other: ‘Wer sich selbst immer nur als Opfer sieht, meine ich, kommt 
sich selbst nie auf die Schliche,’ he says; ‘Ursache und Wirkung sind nie in zwei 
Personen getrennt, schon gar nicht in Mann und Frau [...]: eigentlich alles, was sie 
tun oder nicht tun, begründen Sie mit etwas, was beispielsweise Ihr Mann nicht 
getan oder getan hat’ (ST: 101-2). Yet the resentful Julika refuses to tolerate any 
                                                        




further interference and, consequently, the couple remain in a vicious circle, trapped 
in their roles as sufferer and offender, unable to enter into an honest, truthful 
dialogue. Julika constantly excuses herself before her husband, even when there is 
nothing to excuse, and thereby implies the recognition of Stiller’s guilt whilst he 
permanently excuses himself: ‘mit schlechtem Gewissen von vornherein [...], der es 
stets als seine Schuld empfinden wird, wenn etwas nicht klappt’ (ST: 173). Unable 
to confront his existential despair, Stiller eventually flees Zurich, not without 
summing up their discussions for separation: ‘Hätte ich dich nicht zu meiner 
Bewährungsprobe gemacht, wärest du auch nie auf diese Idee gekommen, mich 
durch dein Kranksein zu fesseln, und wir hätten einander auf natürliche Weise 
geliebt, ich weiß es nicht, oder uns auf natürliche Weise getrennt’ (ST: 113). 
In the sixth Heft, his former lover Sybille attempts to alert Stiller/White to his 
fixation with inauthentic images and role-playing. During a meeting in his artist’s 
studio Stiller/White starts miming the role of a bull in a bullfight, encouraging 
Sybille to play the matador (ST: 195-196). Stiller/White appears engrossed in his 
role, whilst Sybille finds difficulty in sharing his admiration for the game. In this 
scene, it is a plausible assertion that Stiller/White is unconsciously seeking to project 
multiple images onto Sybille: firstly that of the matador, but also that of a pseudo 
wife-figure, in how the careful, spritely ‘dance’ of the matador evokes the 
composed, artful dance of the ballet, as performed by his wife Julika. Any exchange 
or dialogue between Stiller/White and Sybille becomes increasingly difficult and 
their conversation becomes, as a result of Stiller/White’s projecting images, a mere 
masquerade. According to Martin Balle, their discourse dwindles into ‘die 
gemeinsam ausgehaltene Leere’.39 Stiller/White is engrossed in his role as the bull, 
envisioning the sights and sounds as if awaiting the matador in the arena: ‘Der Geist 
erscheint als silbern-weißer Matador, die blanke Klinge unter dem roten Tuch, nicht 
um zu töten, o nein, sondern um zu siegen’ (ST: 197). It is only through clicking her 
‘Dunhill-Feuerzeug’ (ST: 197) that Sybille is able to rouse Stiller/White from his 
trance-like state. Unlike Julika, the shrewd Sybille succeeds in looking behind the 
images and locates Stiller’s underlying problem: ‘Du schämst dich, dass du so bist, 
wie du bist. Wer verlangt von dir, dass du ein Kämpfer bist, ein Krieger, einer, der 
                                                        




schießen kann? Du hast dich nicht bewährt, findest du, damals in Spanien. Wer 
bestreitet es! Aber vielleicht hast du dich als jemand bewähren wollen, der du gar 
nicht bist’ (ST: 204). Sybille exposes Stiller/White’s propensity to make excessive 
demands of himself and encourages him to speak openly, which proves 
unsuccessful: ‘wahrscheinlich kann eine Frau das nicht verstehen’ (ST: 204). 
Stiller/White is ‘[...] nicht bereit, nicht imstande, geliebt zu werden als der Mensch, 
der er ist, und daher vernachlässigt er unwillkürlich jede Frau, die ihn wahrhaft liebt, 
denn nähme er ihre Liebe wirklich ernst, so wäre er ja genötigt, infolgedessen sich 
selbst anzunehmen – davon ist er weit entfernt!’ (ST: 192) 
 
Stiller/White’s urgent wish to convince his fellow beings of being a different Stiller 
reveals how, in spite of his awareness of the need for self-acceptance, he is still very 
far from being an internally independent self. Furthermore it is impossible for him to 
do without the recognition of others and to use himself as a benchmark for his 
behaviour and actions. Just before his reunion with Julika following his flight from 
Zurich he prepares his story about Isidor in order to warn her from treating him like 
the old Stiller. Isidor is a reputable pharmacist who lives in ‘bester Ordnung.’ He is, 
however, so distressed by his wife’s constant nagging and questions that he breaks 
free from his life and escapes to the foreign legion. The parabolic significance of 
this reveals itself to Julika in the erroneous reaction of his wife upon his return. She 
receives him with the same nagging words as before, whereupon Isidor leaves her 
for good. Yet Julika does not understand what Stiller wishes to impart through his 
story and reacts to the story in a similar way to Isidor’s wife, affirming that he is 
‘noch immer der gleiche, kein vernünftiges Wort kann man reden mit dir’ (ST: 44). 
She refuses to accept Stiller’s transformation, and Stiller verifies: ‘Ich könnte 
aussehen wie ein Gnom, wie ein Minotaurus, wie – ich weiß nicht was! – und es 
würde nichts ändern, überhaupt nichts, sie ist einfach außerstande, ein anderes 
Wesen wahrzunehmen als ihren verschollenen Stiller’ (ST: 46). 
By contrast, he himself in his role as James White attempts to see her in a new light. 
He speaks of ‘zwei verschiedene[n] Juliken’ (ST: 130),  and discovers that she is 
different than he initially thought. He strives for a new beginning in the hope that a 
new relationship is possible. It soon becomes clear, however, that neither are 





Ich fand es nun ebenfalls traurig, dass zwei Menschen, obzwar sie einander 
gegenübersitzen, Aug in Auge, einander nicht wahrzunehmen vermögen. [...] 
Jedes Gespräch zwischen dieser Frau [Julika] und mir [Stiller] so schien mir, 
ist fertig, bevor wir’s anfangen, und jede Handlung [...] ist schon im voraus 
gedeutet, [...] indem sie in jedem Fall nur als eine angemessene oder 
unangemessene, eine erwartete oder unerwartete Handlung des verschollenen 
Stiller erscheinen wird, nie als meine. (ST: 64) 
Stiller/White nevertheless clings to the idea that she will acknowledge his 
transformation and will accept him as a new person. For him this would mean a 
successful new phase for their relationship, and would represent an attempt to prove 
himself in his transformation. For Stiller/White this implies being recognised by 
Julika in his alteration, wherein the proof of this pointlessness has already been 
obtained: The necessary changes consist in self-acceptance, which implies being 
freed from the dependency on the outside world. Stiller/White is able to free himself 
from Julika’s judgement and believes that the success of his relationship is an 
existential prerequisite for his self-acceptance.  
Just when he wants to ask Julika for a new start in their relationship, he describes 
her as his last and only chance at salvation. He likens this new start to walking on 
water: ‘Versuch, auf dem Wasser zu wandeln’ (ST: 321). In his Tagebuch 1946-
1949, Frisch can be seen to use this motif as a means to symbolise the wonder of 
self-discovery and self-acceptance, where Marion is alleged to have walked on water 
with help of the angels. ‘Warum kommst du nicht?’   ‘Über das Wasser...?’  [...] 
  Marion fragt: ‘Wo, wenn du ein Engel bist, führst du mich hin?’ ‘Zu dir –’.40 It 
thus becomes evident that Stiller/White deems Julika as an essential function on his 
journey of self-discovery. Once the proof of his faux external identity has been 
crushed, he is ready to give up on everything so long as Julika, ‘so sie mich [Stiller] 
wirklich liebt, kein Geständnis von mir braucht, daß ich ihr verschollener Gatte sei’ 
(ST: 276). Yet the on-site inspection, which, through the confrontation with Stiller’s 
old atelier and then with his father, ultimately confirms his former identity, also 
                                                        




reveals that Julika is anything but ready to release him from his fixing of images. He 
feels betrayed by her, and in an act of helplessness against his indomitable 
surroundings he ruptures in a final rebellious outburst against his fixation of images 
the sculptures that symbolize his past life as Stiller. The symbolism of this is self-
evident. He destroys ‘nur so das Kleine, während die größeren Arbeiten […], weil 
ich sie nicht vom Sockel heben konnte, meine Wut überdauern würden’ (ST: 282). 
As he demolishes these sculptures and mementos of his past he is ‘ohne Angst, das 
Falsche zu tun, und wieder einmal [er] selbst’ (ST: 283). Yet this rage and desire for 
destruction is essentially futile. Julika still does not understand, and Stiller appears 
utterly resigned. He comments: ‘und ich stehe unverwandelt wie sie’ (ST: 284). 
Even conquering his Bildniszwang is not enough to rekindle his relationship. 
Nevertheless, the demolition of his art from the past represents a pivotal step 
towards his self-acceptance. Stiller/White resents their need to have control over 
him – ‘bloß um mich einbürgen zu können und Ordnung zu haben’ (ST: 259), yet in 
order finally to ‘free’ himself from his past he demonstrates his willingness ‘daraus 
hervorzugehen als ein nichtiger und ohnmächtiger Mensch’ (ST: 259), i.e. to attend 
to his perceived ‘Nichtigkeit.’  
Shortly after this incident Stiller/White is convicted of being Anatol Stiller. His 
attempts to convince the world have failed, and Stiller complies with his conviction. 
The final phase appears in the form of an afterward from Rolf, the public prosecutor, 
and is no longer told from Stiller’s perspective. In a sense both Stiller and Julika are 
freed from the subjective, one-sided view of the diarist Stiller/White and are now 
depicted from a different perspective: 
Das Bildnis, das diese Aufzeichnungen von Frau Julika geben, bestürzte 
mich; es verrät mehr über den Bildner, dünkt mich, als über die Person, die 
von diesem Bildnis vergewaltigt worden ist. Ob nicht schon in dem 
Unterfangen, einen lebendigen Menschen abzubilden, etwas Unmenschliches 
liegt, ist eine große Frage. Sie trifft Stiller wesentlich. (ST: 305) 
In the meantime Stiller and Julika have begun a new life in Glion, but it soon 
becomes clear that they have managed neither to free themselves from their bilateral 
Bildnisse nor to find mutual ground for cooperation and communication. Julika asks 




Rolf, was er immer von mir erwartet?”’ (ST: 304). The interaction between the two 
remains severely damaged. Julika simply cannot comprehend Stiller’s expectations 
of her, and remains plagued by her insecurities that he is looking to change her. As a 
result, she cloisters herself away even more. She does not inform Stiller about her 
worsening state of health. Rolf perceives Stiller’s obliviousness regarding his wife’s 
condition in the following passage: ‘Ich lenkte das Gespräch auf den Wein, als 
Stiller mich fragte, wie ich denn Julika fände. “Ich meine gesundheitlich”, sagte er. 
“Sieht sie nicht großartig aus? ”’ (ST: 305). After all this time, Stiller continues to 
live with an idealised image of his wife that thoroughly fails to correspond to the 
advanced stage of her illness.  
Rolf’s later accounts of their cohabitation reveals how their allocation of roles 
remains unchanged. Julika fashions herself as the sufferer, and Stiller as the 
redeemer. Both live separate lives, incapable of achieving a sense of togetherness. 
Tragically, Julika dies before the couple are ever able to rectify their differences: 
‘Der Tod war vor einer halben Stunde erfolgt, für den Arzt offenbar überraschend. 
Meinem anderen Wunsch, Frau Stiller zu sehen, wurde nicht entsprochen’ (ST: 
327). Stiller arrives at the hospital too late, and it is left to the reader to infer whether 
Stiller’s love for his wife could have been her saviour. Prior to Stiller’s final visit to 
the hospital, Rolf urges his friend to see sense: ‘Du liebst sie. Du hast angefangen, 
sie zu lieben, und Julika ist nicht gestorben, noch ist alles möglich’ (ST: 323).  
Following Julika’s death, Stiller resumes a solitary life in Glion. Unable to find 
security in his own self-reference without being defined by others, Stiller concludes 
that a remote existence is the only viable solution in his attempt to avoid external 
dependencies. In his life as a hermit in total isolation he can retain and protect his 
inner security and independence from possible images. 
 
KIERKEGAARDIAN EXISTENTIALISM IN STILLER 
 
There are two Kierkegaard citations in Stiller; before we look at them in more detail 
it is worthwhile to briefly remind ourselves of the most prominent tenets that 




thinking emerged in opposition to Kantianism and Hegelianism, the speculative, 
systematic philosophies that characterised late-eighteenth and early-to-mid-
nineteenth-century thinking. According to Kierkegaard, any objective philosophy is 
inadequate for human beings, as it disregards the situatedness of the thinker by 
whom it is thought and for whom it is intended. Life is inherently contradictory and 
this cannot be resolved, as Hegel suggested, by simply annulling opposites and 
dialectically merging them into higher entities, i.e. through the practice of 
mediation, and the fusing of theses and antitheses into syntheses. A system like this 
does not assist the individual in his practical and subjective existence, as it is 
thought for its own sake, and it does not implicate or commit the individual. 
Existence requires that decisions be made and all necessary decisiveness be rooted 
in subjectivity. For Kierkegaard every personal decision in life is a leap of thought 
from the known into the unknown; life is a perennial question of choosing and 
taking risks. The greatest and most challenging leap the individual can make is the 
leap into what is not merely unknown but even absurd, beyond human 
comprehension, viz. the leap into faith, i.e. accepting what Kierkegaard regards as 
the paradox of the existence of God (whereby the infinite reveals itself as finite). 
This is an objective uncertainty that, through the leap into faith, becomes a 
subjective truth. However, before taking the risk, the individual can suffer the 
greatest possible dread and anxiety; it is only by consciously embracing the risk and 
facing up to one’s anxiety that one can become free. 
 
Kierkegaard marks the Three Stages of Life’s Way as the aesthetic, the ethical and 
the religious phase. The aesthetic individual ‘lives in the blue yonder’.41 He explores 
all of life’s possibilities without binding himself to a previously made decision. He 
does progress, but only arbitrarily so; he does not will his own progression, he never 
becomes committed by his own choice. The ethical individual, on the other hand, 
wills his own progression by making a previous decision binding upon himself, i.e. 
by making the same choice repeatedly and continually. As a result, his actions are 
no longer determined merely by accidental circumstances, and so he becomes more 
free. The religious individual has made the final choice, the leap into faith. In the 
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religious stage alone can the individual overcome life’s uncertainty successfully, 
which is inherent in the process of becoming. But in order to choose at all, he must 
first have embraced the ‘doubleness’ characteristic of existence, i.e. he must 
understand that he is not necessarily ‘within himself’, he must learn to be subjective, 
which means that he must strive to become what he already is. 
 
This essentially sums up the content of Stiller, most notably before his escape. 
Stiller was engaged in wanting to be what he was not, and in doing so was striving 
away from himself. To strive to become what one already is, is what Kierkegaard 
calls ‘choosing oneself’. Before one can carry out this task of choosing oneself one 
faces two main conditions. The first is the degree of resignation. This resignation is 
not merely passive endurance, or what Rolf calls in the Epilogue ‘eine schlappe 
Resignation’ (ST: 316), but an active renunciation of temporal things with a view to 
eternity. It is not faith, but ‘the last stage which goes before faith’. The second 
condition for choosing oneself is despair. There are various types of despair 
corresponding to the various stages in life. The ethical individual has chosen himself 
in his despair. By active despair, i.e. the willing it, the individual chooses his eternal 
self and thereby is born anew, is transformed. He chooses a self that was there 
before (otherwise it would have been created) and yet was not there until it was 
chosen. 
 
The search for truth and therefore freedom is a movement of increasing inwardness. 
Only that which is related to the self can be actually true for the self. It is not an 
objective truth, outside the self, but a subjective one. For Kierkegaard subjectivity is 
truth, and the highest truth for an individual is an ‘objective uncertainty’ which is 
faith. To attain such a truth that enables the individual to ‘exist’ and to overcome the 
dread of life’s uncertainty, i.e. to become free, the individual must first become 
subjective. He must choose himself through angst and despair. The greatest leap he 
can take is a leap into faith. 
 
In the opening pages of the novel, Frisch readily explores these existentialist notions 
of the self, freedom, subjectivity, as well as religious faith, through his inclusion of 





Sieh, darum ist es so schwer, sich selbst zu wählen, weil in dieser Wahl die 
absolute Isolation mit der tiefsten Kontinuität identisch ist, weil durch sie 
jede Möglichkeit, etwas anderes zu werden, vielmehr sich in etwas anderes 




– : indem die Leidenschaft der Freiheit in ihm erwacht (und sie erwacht in 
der Wahl, weil sie sich in der Wahl selber voraussetzt), wählt er sich selbst 
und kämpft um diesen Besitz als um seine Seligkeit, und das ist seine 
Seligkeit.43 
 
Frisch’s two Kierkegaard mottos are taken from the second volume of Either/Or, in 
which a certain Judge Vilhelm is deliberating the cure for the ‘aesthetic’ way of life 
– the unrevealed life which is empty and meaningless. Judge Vilhelm locates the 
solution in the act of choosing, by which the individual creates himself (as, for 
instance, the protagonist Andri, in Andorra is unable to do). By making this choice, 
the deeper, ethical level of the personality is able to surface. Any failure to choose 
(as is the case with Herr Kurmann in Biografie: ein Spiel) or allowing others to 
choose on the individual’s behalf means to lose one’s personality entirely. As John 
M. Michelsen affirms, Kierkegaard’s underlying assertion here is that ‘the ethical 
dimension of life properly speaking has to grow out of the aesthetical […] and – 
more specifically – the transition from the lower to the higher stage has to be 
motivated by an existentialist failure on the aesthetic plane’.44  
 
The precise significance of these quotations in the opening pages of Stiller is not 
immediately obvious. Towards the end of the novel the reader discovers how public 
prosecutor Rolf gave Stiller/White a volume by Kierkegaard – ‘auf Grund eines 
Gesprächs über die Schwermut als Symptom der ästhetischen Haltung gegenüber 
dem Leben’ (ST: 296), which evokes Judge Vilhelm’s discussion in Either/Or 
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regarding an ‘aesthetic’ existence.45 From this perspective we may associate Stiller, 
the failed sculptor, with such an aesthetic attitude, while Rolf’s professional affinity 
with Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous Judge Vilhelm would place him in a position 
comparable to Judge Vilhelm’s. The connection between Judge Vilhelm and Rolf is 
further reinforced by the latter’s notions of active resignation and self-acceptance 
(das Sichabfinden), which mirror Judge Vilhelm’s insistence on the individual’s 
choice. As Rolf explains: 
 
Man ergibt sich, man kehrt zurück, um sich zu ergeben, aber man ergibt sich 
nie ein für allemal. Dann, wer weiß, wäre es auch nur ein schlappe 
Resignation, nichts weiter, ein Sichabfinden, das Ergebnis davon irgendeine 
Art Spießigkeit. Du zitterst, hast du gesagt. Zittere! Du weißt schon, wie ich 
das meine. (ST: 316) 
  
As the above citation indicates, the individual must experience angst and despair 
before he can choose. ‘Zittere!’ Rolf thus says to Stiller, referring to his despair at 
his own weakness. What he means precisely is left to the reader to infer: Stiller has 
been reading the volume of Kierkegaard given to him by Rolf. Stiller does despair, 
but clearly not deeply enough, and he has resigned, but not once and for all. Here we 
observe Kierkegaard’s distinction between passive, finite resignation and positive, 
infinite resignation. Even before he has read Kierkegaard, Stiller knows that his 
despair is not intense enough and he uses the word in the literal sense of not hoping: 
‘Ich bin nicht hoffnungslos genug, oder wie die Gläubigen sagen würden, nicht 
ergeben genug. Ich höre sie sagen: Ergib dich, und du bist frei’ (ST: ). Rolf 
acknowledges that the individual suffers from self-alienation because we are subject 
to intense conflict between our consciousness and emotional lives, ‘making the latter 
incapable of living up to the image of ourselves generated by the former’.46 
Emulating the first of the two Kierkegaard citations that introduce Frisch’s novel, 
Rolf affirms that a true attempt to strive towards one’s self requires firstly 
identifying who we really are (our emotional selves), and secondly, accepting this 
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self in a way that is more than mere resignation. For Rolf this means that Stiller’s 
Sichabfinden must be founded on faith in God as the absolute patron of his true self: 
‘immer wieder hast du versucht, dich selbst anzunehmen, ohne etwas wie Gott 
anzunehmen. Und nun erweist sich das als Unmöglichkeit. Er ist die Kraft, die dir 
helfen kann, dich selbst anzunehmen [...]. Und trotzdem sagst du, daß du nicht beten 
kannst’ (ST: 325). This position unmistakably echoes passages in Either/Or where 
Judge Vilhelm describes the act of choice as that in which we will our empirical 
characteristics and look upon them as both a gift and a task from God, i.e. the one 
who chooses him or herself in the right way ‘chooses the absolute from the hand of 
the eternal God’.47 Rolf’s guidance is similarly redolent of Kierkegaard’s The 
Sickness unto Death, where faith is defined as both an infinite passage to become 
what we are, and secondly, the willingness to become ourselves before God: ‘Faith 
is: that the self in being itself and in willing to be itself is grounded transparently in 
God’.48 Stiller is reluctant to accept this position, and even at the end of the novel he 
fails to achieve happiness despite having accepted the actuality forced upon him. 
Rolf subsequently interprets this as his failure to proceed to the religious grounding 
of the self that makes the ethical more than a merely regulative ideal.  
 
Pertinent to note here is that, in the midst of Frisch’s deliberations on the self and 
personal identity, he is also probing matters of faith and conviction. W. G. Cunliffe 
also speaks of this ‘sturdy missionary purpose,’ which he considers to be somewhat 
alien considering ‘the deliberate inconclusiveness that marks the ending [of the 
novel]’.49 As such, Frisch’s religious explorations ultimately serve to underscore the 
inherent contradiction involved in the idea of God, and similarly indicate how 
religious faith is incapable of ‘saving’ Stiller from his existentialist despair. This 
‘inconclusiveness,’ as termed by Cunliffe, is explored sympathetically by 
Kierkegaard, who in The Sickness unto Death depicts a state of mind that is: 
 
[…] despair about the eternal or over oneself […]. The despairer [in this case 
Stiller] understands that it is weakness to take the earthly so much to heart, 
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that it is weakness to despair. But then, instead of veering sharply from 
despair to faith, humbling himself before God for his weakness, he is more 
deeply absorbed in despair and despairs over his weakness.50    
 
Rolf appears to mirror this analysis in his summary of Stiller’s angst-ridden 
dilemma: ‘Du klammerst dich an deine Ohnmacht, die du für deine Persönlichkeit 
hältst, und dabei kennst du deine Ohnmacht so genau – und all dies wie aus Trotz, 
nur weil du nicht die Kraft bist’ (ST: 325). Stiller’s situation functions as a near 
mirror image of Kierkegaard’s portrayal. He is immobile, hopeless, overcome by 
existential angst, yet essentially unable to take a leap of faith.  Stiller has been 
drinking heavily when Rolf discovers him in an unheated living room in the early 
hours of the morning (ST: 314-15). Here Rolf attempts to coax him into a 
conversation about his love for Julika, –‘Julika ist dein Leben geworden, Stiller […] 
du liebst sie!’ (ST: 316) – although he demonstrates little confidence in his ability to 
revive Stiller from his existential grief: ‘Ich hatte, wie gesagt, nie erwartet, daß 
Stiller mir zuhörte, sondern geredet, nur um vor seinem Weinen nicht sein stummer 
Zuschauer zu sein’ (ST: 324). It is namely in Rolf’s parting words in which the 
novel’s fundamental religious ambiguity is most clearly exemplified: ‘Es macht dich 
stutzig, daß du selber noch darum flehen mußt, glauben zu können; dann hast du 
einfach Angst, Gott sei deine Erfindung’ (ST: 325).  
 
As is characteristic of this great Swiss writer, Frisch offers no immediate answers, 
but redirects the question towards us as readers. Whether Stiller succeeds in 
overcoming the dread of life’s uncertainty to become a fully liberated cypher of 
Being is left for us to deliberate and judge. If we briefly recall a citation from 
Frisch’s 1984 interview with Jodi Daynard, which he gave in English; ‘To defend 
myself, I will say that that was one of the very few times when I seriously tried to 
find out whether I could become religious or not. […] And as my other books 
showed, I couldn’t retain it. I had started to read Kierkegaard because of this great 
feeling’ – one might assert that the novel’s religious ambiguity could be read 
autobiographically. Whatever the conclusion, Frisch incites his readers to 
contemplate the role of religious faith as a remedy to existentialist angst.   
                                                        








SARTREAN AND HEIDEGGERIAN EXISTENTIALISM IN STILLER 
 
It is perhaps not coincidental that, much like Frisch’s fictitious protagonist Stiller, 
the real life philosopher Sartre is to be found exploring the notions of self and being, 
and the search for one’s self, which has come to be labelled as ‘identity,’ despite the 
fact that this act of searching is sometimes viewed as identity-denial, or the non-
compliance with one’s ‘true’ identity. As Dorothea Wildenburg justly notes in the 
introduction to her study of Sartre: ‘“Ich bin nicht Stiller”, beginnt der Roman Stiller 
von Max Frisch. “Ich bin nicht Sartre” könnte der Titel einer Biographie Sartres 
lauten’.51 Surprising parallels can be drawn between the French philosopher and 
Frisch’s 1954 novel, beginning with the interlinking themes of freedom and 
ontological guilt, which manifest themselves in Stiller and Julika’s relationship. 
 
As has been outlined above, the marriage between Stiller and Julika is an unhealthy 
partnership founded upon mutual self-reproach. In Sartre’s post-war essay 
‘Existentialism is a Humanism,’ he explains that freedom, which is essential to the 
being of each individual, entails moral responsibility and the freedom of everyone 
else: ‘Obviously’ Sartre writes, ‘freedom as the definition of a man does not depend 
upon others, but as soon as there is a commitment, I am obliged to will the 
liberty of others at the same time as mine. I cannot make liberty my aim unless I 
make that of others equally my aim’.52 The question of freedom and mutual co-
dependency posed in Frisch’s novel is similarly reminiscent of Sartre’s momentous 
claim ‘L’enfer, c’est les autres’ in Huis Clos. For Sartre hell, like paradise, can only 
come to men through men. All worldly hindrances, such as illness, poverty, 
incarceration, inasmuch as they appear to be natural, are neither good nor bad, but 
are intended to be defeated. By contrast there is a veritable and absolute evil, which 
is the bad will of the individual who seeks to harm another being. And human nature 
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is such that each man, in a sense, is an enemy to other men due to the very fact that 
he coexists with them and wants to posit himself as consciousness and as freedom, 
seeing Others only as objects. This state of being can be overcome through 
friendship and trust, but as soon as men (as in the example of Stiller and Julika) 
refuse friendship and trust their coexistence becomes insufferable. Sartre expands 
this discussion in Being and Nothingness by describing a feeling of ontological guilt 
that derives from the individual’s treatment of Others as objects. By recognising 
oneself as not-being the Other, the individual can recognise the Other as related to 
his or her freedom and as capable of being limited by his or her own possibilities. As 
such, the Other becomes a ‘transcendence-transcended,’ an object in the world, 
which evokes the master-slave dialectic.53 He goes on: ‘I shall never touch the Other 
save in his being-as-object’. In this way, although Sartre admits that we may provide 
the Other with opportunities to reveal his freedom, he simultaneously denies that we 
ever help to increase that freedom. Our fundamental guilt can be seen as man’s 
shameful inability to overcome his or her misuse of other people, and it is at this 
juncture that thematic parallels to Stiller, specifically the strained relationship 
between Stiller and Julika, become increasingly apparent. It is ultimately Rolf who 
acknowledges Stiller and Julika’s mutual ontological guilt in the following passage: 
 
‘Es ist ja doch unser Leben, was da schiefgegangen ist. Unser allereigenstes 
und einmaliges Leben. Und dann’ – Stiller hatte mich unterbrechen wollen; 
doch als ich schwieg, schwieg auch er. ‘Ich weiß nicht’ sagte ich, ‘was du 
unter Schuld verstehst. Jedenfalls bist du soweit, sie nicht mehr bei andern 
zu suchen. Aber vielleicht, ich weiß nicht, meinst du, sie hätte sich 
vermeiden lassen. Schuld als eine Summe von eigenen Fehlern, die man 
hätte vermeiden können, meinst du es so? Ich glaube allerdings, die Schuld 
ist etwas anderes. Die Schuld sind wir selbst.’ (ST: 319) 
 
Inverting Sartres ‘Hell is the Others’ to make ‘Guilt are we Ourselves’, Frisch 
imparts here that, in the act of denying the other individual’s striving for existential 
freedom (in this case Julika’s), his protagonist Stiller has denied himself the 
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potential for freedom. This is evident in Stiller’s patent indifference towards his 
wife’s work as a ballerina, which, according to Jurgensen, represents her ‘einzige 
Möglichkeit der Selbstgestaltung’. Stiller similarly accuses his wife of frigidity and 
sexual aloofness, when she in fact enjoys the sensual thrill of unknown eyes on her 
body. Julika is ontologically guilty of denying her husband’s augmentation of 
personal freedom, for instance her aversion to sexual contact leaves Stiller feeling 
emasculated and pathetic, engendering insecurities which readily juxtapose the 
image of strength, dominance and ‘manliness’ he seeks to expose in his various 
roles, for example as a soldier fighting in the Spanish Civil War, or as a hero who 
rescues a woman from a burning sawmill. Existentialist freedom in the Sartrean 
sense is thus fundamentally unachievable due to Stiller and Julika’s mutual 
projecting of false images onto one another, which thereby obstructs the Other’s 
extension and enrichment of individual freedom. It is only towards the very end of 
the novel, when Julika is in the advanced stages of her illness, that Stiller begins to 
comprehend his feelings of ontological guilt: ‘Sie hat gewartet. Hörst du? Auf meine 
Einsicht gewartet […], vierzehn Jahre lang. Drum ist sie erschöpft, [...] Ich habe sie 
kaputt gemacht [...]. Ich habe sie gedemütigt’ (ST: 318). By projecting false images 
onto his wife, he has failed to understand her, thus denying her freedom. Essentially 
it is within this ontological framework that Stiller and Julika, having both treated 
each other as objects, are shown to be victims of Sartrean guilt. 
 
In addition to the thematic overlap between Stiller and Huis Clos, the harsh 
contingences that characterise the world of the principle male and female 
protagonists in Sartre’s 1943 screenplay Les jeux sont faits can also be seen echoed 
in Frisch’s 1954 novel, most markedly through the Swiss writer’s thematising such 
notions as second chances, individual choice and freedom in a fundamentally absurd 
world. Sartre first illustrates these concepts through his protagonists Pierre and Ève, 
whose projects in life backfired and resulted in their death. Reminiscent of Stiller’s 
and Julika’s predicament following Stiller’s release from incarceration, Pierre and 
Ève are awarded a second chance at life on the condition that they make their love 
honest and real: they return to life with the knowledge they gained in death to try 
again. After his death, Pierre is convinced that his work is complete: the insurrection 
he has been preparing for will be a success, and his actions will have the meaning he 




court, believes he will be able to seamlessly resume his former life with his wife 
Julika. Theoretically, nothing can go wrong.54 Sartre’s Pierre believes that the future 
meaning of his life will be assured by his past actions, yet through being dead he 
discovers that he no longer has a role to play in the determination of meaning. He 
has in fact completely misunderstood: the insurrection will fail, his relationship with 
Ève is unsalvageable, and his efforts will prove to have been pointless. Rather than a 
heroic leader who died on the eve of his greatest triumph, he will be remembered as 
a failure whose labours were in vain. The term ‘les jeux sont faits’, from which 
Sartre’s script takes its title, refers to the moment in, for instance, a game of roulette 
when bets have been placed and it is too late to retract them, but the spin of the 
wheel has not yet determined who will win or lose. It is a moment of uncertainty: 
decisions have been taken, but their consequences remain unknown. Because Pierre 
and Stiller have both envisaged and planned their respective ‘insurrections’, they are 
convinced of their success. They both believe that they control the meaning of their 
actions because their successes will flow directly from their choices, yet neither 
Pierre nor Stiller can ultimately determine the significance that will be attached to 
their lives. Their freely taken decisions set up a chain of events in which they are not 
free to intervene, and to which they are not free to give the meaning they might 
desire. What fundamentally distinguishes Sartre and Frisch in this regard is Sartre’s 
application of death as a thematic structure, for Stiller, unlike Pierre, never 
encounters death in the novel. What nevertheless unites the two works is the 
underlying premise that second chances and alternative outcomes cannot be 
modelled in the form of individual desires. There is no second chance for the dead, 
as there is none for the living. The individual may well be condemned to freedom, in 
Sartre’s words, but this does not mean that one can simply do whatever he or she 
wants. The incarcerated Stiller was not free to leave the prison, for instance. He was 
free to exercise a plan of escape or work for his release, but there was never any 
guarantee that his project would succeed. In this regard, Sartrean freedom is a far cry 
from the promise that desire can be realised, and in Les jeux sont faits, as in Stiller, 
Pierre, Ève, Stiller and Julika each learn that inscrutable contingency rather than 
benevolent destiny causes their projects to falter. As Sartre explains in Being and 
Nothingness: ‘That means that, for them, the chips are down and they will now 
                                                        




undergo their changes without being at all responsible for them’.55 For each of these 
characters, freedom is a terrible given and a doomed undertaking. The second 
chance is missed as surely as the first one, the insurgency is as certain to fail as is 
their love. 
 
Further Sartrean elements are located similarly in Frisch’s general deliberations on 
the themes of identity negation and the fugitive nature of the ‘I.’ “Ich bin nicht 
Stiller!” (ST: 9-14) reflects in novelistic prose such key tenets of Sartre’s philosophy 
as the inability to define one’s liberty in a world of social and intellectual constraint:  
 
Denn ohne Whisky, ich hab's ja erfahren, bin ich nicht ich selbst, sondern 
neige dazu, allen möglichen guten Einflüssen zu erliegen und eine Rolle zu 
spielen, die ihnen so passen möchte, aber nichts mit mir zu tun hat, und da es 
jetzt in meiner unsinnigen Lage (sie halten mich für einen verschollenen 
Bürger ihrer Städtchens!) einzig und allein darum geht, mich nicht 
beschwatzen zu lassen und auf der Hut zu sein gegenüber allen ihren 
freundlichen Versuchen, mich in eine fremde Haut zu stecken, unbestechlich 
zu sein bis zur Grobheit, ich sage: da es jetzt einzig und allein darum geht, 
niemand anders zu sein als der Mensch, der ich in Wahrheit leider bin […] 
(ST: 9) 
 
The ‘I’ of the ‘I’m not Stiller’ unifies and binds together an experience and a denial 
of a person in the world. This ‘I’ does not refer to an isolated subject but, rather, 
expresses the consciousness and the presence of a person called Stiller. The ‘I’ 
expresses too that, at the every day level, the conviction that inside the skin of this 
person ‘called’ Stiller is a real person who is not Stiller. In saying ‘I’ the person, in 
every case, is referring to himself – to a particular, real person located in the here 
and now of the world. However, the real person is always just out of reach, always 
just ahead of the person, or located somewhere in the distant or not so distant past. 
Searching to find himself in the present, the person is always at a loss. The ‘who-
ness’ of the person, the ‘who’ of the ‘who am I’ always lies out of immediate reach. 
                                                        




In a fugitive way, the person tries to catch himself through this fleeting ‘I.’ 
Commenting on related themes in Being and Nothingness, Sartre writes:  
 
The world by nature is mine in so far as it is the correlative in-itself of 
nothingness […]. Without the world there is no selfness, no person; without 
selfness, without the person, there is no world […]. It would be absurd to say 
that the world as it is known is known as mine. Yet this quality of ‘my-ness’ 
in the world is a fugitive structure, always present, a structure which I live. 
The world is mine because it is haunted by possibilities, and the 
consciousness of each of these is a possible self-consciousness which I am. It 
is these possibles as such which give the world its unity and its meaning as 
the world.56 
 
Sartre maintains that in ipséité (or ‘self-ness’) the individual becomes present not 
only to the identity that he or she is, but also to the identity that he or she could be. 
As is also evidently the case in Stiller, the individual understands him or herself in 
relation to a past or future identity that cannot be adequately derived from or 
determined by who he or she currently is, i.e. Jim White / smuggler / soldier / artist / 
wife murderer / rescuer of women from burning sawmills. The individual’s being is 
to be present to what it is (through consciousness), and present-yet-absent to what 
one could be but is not yet (through ipséité). Just as consciousness in the very 
structure of its being refers to an identity it denies, it also refers to a possible future 
identity. Sartre also writes in The Transcendence of the Ego: ‘The self, the “I”, is not 
a thing but, rather, a process that unifies the streams of thoughts and experiences the 
person has about himself around a single pole or point of reference’,57 a viewpoint 
which again neatly correlates with the fundamental instability and fluidity of human 
identity which is experienced by Frisch’s protagonist in the novel.  
 
Pursuing this discussion of the ‘fugitive nature of the self’ in Stiller, one can also 
draw links to Heidegger’s philosophical meditations, as outlined in Sein und Zeit. 
According to Heidegger, the individual has fallen into the world and ‘flees’ in the 
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face of him or herself into the ‘they’,58 which represents the so-called ‘publicness’ 
(Öffentlichkeit) of Dasein. Heidegger insists that when the ‘I’ talks in the natural, 
inauthentic way, this is performed by the they-self or, to employ Heideggerian 
terminology, das Man or das Neutrum.59 This alludes to when the individual accepts 
expectations and interpretations and allows his or her world to be structured by 
them. C. Agustin Corti describes: ‘Dem Man geht es als Seinsart der Alltäglichkeit 
nicht um sein Selbst, sondern um die Durchschnittlichkeit der Existenz’.60 
Heidegger explains this mode of inauthentic being in the following passage: 
 
In der Benutzung öffentlicher Verkehrsmittel, in der Verwendung des 
Nachrichtenwesens ist jeder Andere wie der Andere. Dieses Miteinandersein 
löst das eigene Dasein völlig in die Seinsart ‘der Anderen’ auf, so zwar, dass 
die Anderen in ihrer Unterschiedlichkeit und Ausdrücklichkeit noch nicht 
verschwinden. In dieser Unauffälligkeit und Nichtfeststellbarkeit entfaltet 
das Man seine eigentliche Diktatur. Wir genießen und vergnügen uns, 
wie man genießt; wir lesen, sehen und urteilen über Literatur und Kunst, 
wie man sieht und urteilt; wir ziehen uns aber auch vom ‘großen Haufen’ 
zurück, wie man sich zurückzieht; wir finden ‘empörend’, 
was man empörend findet. Das Man, das kein bestimmtes ist und das Alle, 
obzwar nicht als Summe, sind, schreibt die Seinsart des Alltäglichen vor.61 
 
Thus, what expresses itself in the ‘I’ is the self which, proximally and for the most 
part, the individual is not authentically. Essentially the individual loses him- or 
herself and becomes self-forgetful (Heidegger speaks of Seinsvergessenheit), 
surrendering him or herself to its practises and to the practical scrutiny of das Man. 
The ‘they,’ those indefinite others of the social world, of whom one is a part, enter 
into the individual’s idle talk, repartee and everyday discourse.62 The individual 
hides within this discourse, fleeing and seeking to find his- or herself in such talk 
and in those practises he or she shares with others. It is arguably this inauthentic 
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state of being as outlined by Heidegger which accounts for Stiller’s existentialist 
crisis that precedes the opening of the novel, through whose narrative the reader 
learns of the protagonist’s physical and, evidently, mental flight from ‘die 
öffentliche Wir-Welt’63 as experienced by das Man, to use Heideggerian 
terminology. It is also perhaps this inauthentic state of being to which the 
protagonist is forced to return after he is convicted of being Stiller, whereupon he 
resumes his ‘they-existence’ as before, living together with his wife Julika in marital 
disharmony. Beneath this ‘natural “I”,’ however, Heidegger speaks of another ‘I’, a 
phenomenological ‘I’, namely, one which exists alongside the everyday ‘I’ and 
constitutes the ‘I’ of the moral being. It is the ‘I’ of the person who feels, has 
feelings, feels oneself feeling, and possesses dignity, self-respect, responsibility, and 
an inherent sense of moral worth. Moral self-consciousness is at the core of this 
person, which evokes the validity and legitimacy felt by Stiller when playing 
different roles. For instance, in his role as an adventurer and romancer of the biracial 
American woman, Florence (ST 142-47), Stiller is projecting his wish for a 
passionate relationship with an erotically desirable, healthy woman who dances in 
an uninhibited way – ‘ich träumte von ihr, gewiß, die wildesten Träume; [...] 
Florence tanzte noch immer allein; [...]; dazu machte Florence eine so königliche 
Gebärde mit dem Arm, [...] und landete auf dem Parkett wie ein Vogel ohne 
Schwere’ (ST: 142-3), thus representing an antithesis to his wife Julika, who he 
thinks of as a cold sea beast. As this passage indicates, beneath the surface of 
Stiller’s inauthentic ‘they-existence,’ he has the capacity of being, as Heidegger 
describes, a self-respecting, passionate, sensitive and emotionally involved being, 
who differs radically from his distant, aloof and socially introverted ‘natural’ state, 
as revealed in the following passage: ‘wenn er [Stiller] so brütete, untätig wie ein 
Lahmer und verstockt und schweigsam [...], menschenscheu, lustlos, gleichgültig, 
willenslos’ (ST: 86). Frisch’s differentiation between his protagonist’s natural and 
non-natural self, or, expressed otherwise, between his inauthentic and authentic 
existence, reflects the existentialist thematic overlap with this side of Heideggerian 
philosophy.     
 
 
                                                        




PHILOSOPHICAL PROVENANCE OF FRISCHIAN EXISTENTIALISM  
 
Based on the above discussions of the echoes of Kierkegaardian, Sartrean and 
Heideggerian existentialist thinking in Frisch’s Stiller, the question is not whether or 
not, but rather the degree to which, these existentialist concepts manifest themselves 
in Frisch’s writing. Because it is so difficult to establish, this remains heavily 
contested in Frisch scholarship. Whilst scholars such as Steffen Steffensen, continue 
to evince that Frisch’s literary works have evolved from an intense examination of 
Kierkegaard’s work,64 others remain more sceptical. Hans Mayer, for instance, 
contends that the purported links between Frisch’s theme of ‘Reproduktion’ and 
Kierkegaard’s ‘Wiederholung’ (‘Gentagelse’) maxim are implausible; he speaks 
instead of ‘einem ironischen Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Kierkegaardmotto und 
Romanverlauf [...]’.65 Kerstin Gühne-Engelmann reaches a similar conclusion and 
maintains that links to Kierkegaard’s philosophy can be perceived only in the very 
early phases of the novel. Drawing attention to ‘der unreligiösen Haltung Frischs 
[…], welche sich vom christlichen Weltbild Kierkegaard absetzt’, she continues:  
 
 
Als Fazit ist daher zu ziehen, dass Frisch mit Kierkegaard in der Diagnose 
des ästhetischen Lebens, seiner Komponenten und Gefahren übereinstimmt. 
Die Lösung Kierkegaards, sein sogenanntes drittes, das religiöse Stadium, 
jedoch ist für Frisch keine Lösung, die er annehmen und umsetzen kann.66 
 
In this particular regard, the validity of Gühne-Engelmann’s assertion regarding 
Frisch’s interweaving of Kierkegaardian themes is largely dependent on one’s 
interpretation of the ‘religious dimension’ in the novel. Whereas Gühne-Engelmann 
notes a veering away from a Christian stance, Wolfgang Stemmler emphasises a 
lack of definitiveness regarding the novel’s religious position and believes Frisch 
                                                        
64 Cf. Josef Imbach, ‘Entfremdung als Identitäts- und Transzendenzverlust. Kierkegaard als Schlüssel 
für eine theologische Interpretation von Max Frischs Roman “Stiller”’, in Geist und Leben 52 
(Würzburg: Echter, 1979), pp. 133-46. 
65 Hans Mayer, Dürrenmatt und Frisch: Anmerkungen (Pfullingen: Neske, 1963), p. 49. 
66 Kerstin Gühne-Engelmann (1994), Die Thematik des versäumten Lebens im Prosawerk Max 




structured it to embrace the possibility of spirituality as a response to existentialist 
anguish; he remarks:  
 
Offen bleibt aber auch am Ende, ob er [Stiller] später die Kraft gefunden hat, 
durch das Einbekenntnis seiner Schuld sich in sich selbst und in Gott zurück 
zu reuen, um in christlichem Existenzverständnis endlich zu sich selbst zu 
finden. Der Roman endet, wie alle Werke Frischs, mit einer Frage.67  
 
An interview between Frisch and Jodi Daynard from September 1984, twelve years 
after Stemmler outlined this notion in his 1972 doctoral thesis, would appear to 
validate his position regarding the novel’s intended open-endedness and religious 
capaciousness. When questioned by Daynard about his engagement with 
Kierkegaard, Frisch explained in this discussion given in English how his reading 
the Danish philosopher awakened in him a personal spiritual dilemma, although it 
never resulted in a conventionally Kierkegaardian ‘leap of faith’ (or ‘Troens 
Spring’): 
 
I wouldn’t go as far [sic] to say the whole religious element in the book 
[Stiller] is not honest, but it’s rather an influence I had at the time from 
reading Kierkegaard, and it was more a reading experience than a real one. I 
tried to live up a little bit to something – I don’t know what […]. To defend 
myself, I will say that that was one of the very few times when I seriously 
tried to find out whether I could become religious or not. I was trying it out, 
you know. And as my other books showed, I couldn’t retain it. I had started 
to read Kierkegaard because of this great feeling.68 
 
The significance of this statement lies in how it reveals Frisch’s willingness to 
embrace the possibility of religious belief. Equally significant is his apparent 
echoing of this position in Stiller, whereby no definitive conclusion is reached as to 
whether Stiller is able to embrace God as a saviour or not. The interview affirms that 
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Stemmler was correct to acknowledge the novel’s ethical-religious dimension and 
its deliberate inconclusiveness vis-à-vis the existence-of-God question. Stemmler 
goes on to conclude, however, that these are not definitively Kierkegaardian traces, 
but rather that they could refer to any number of philosophers or philosophical 
movements. He readily acknowledges for instance that Frisch’s ‘Arabeske’ motif, 
which reverts back, amongst other works, to Don Juan oder die Liebe zur Geometrie 
(1952), is not unambiguous proof of this purported philosophical relationship to 
Kierkegaard, as the crucial link between sensuality and Christian morality, which is 
a typical element of any Kierkegaardian exegesis, is essentially lacking in this novel.  
 
Other critics simply deny the general philosophical potential in Frisch’s works and 
attribute the misreading of works of literature to the adherence to and insistence on 
longstanding thought patterns. Regina Sedekerskyte thus contends: ‘Einer der 
wichtigsten Gründe der Missdeutung oder des Nicht-verstehen-könnens eines 
literarischen Texte ist [...] das Verharren auf den alten Denkmustern und das 
Nichtwollen, anders zu sehen’.69 Walter Schmitz labels Frisch’s intellectual 
involvement with existentialism as a mere ‘Plagiatprofil’, for no ‘präzise Rezeption’ 
takes place. For Schmitz, it is a rather a case that ‘umstrittene Konzepte [werden] 
übernommen und in das literarische Experiment Max Frischs eingeführt’70 without 
any substantive theoretical engagement. Marcel Reich-Ranicki similarly conveys 
doubts regarding the alleged philosophical dimensions in Frisch’s literary oeuvre, 
affirming that Frisch is a mere storyteller, not a philosopher: 
 
Frisch ist kein Philosoph, auch wenn er sich gern auf Kierkegaard und 
andere Denker beruft. Er ist ein Erzähler und Stückeschreiber. So scheint es 
mir auch müßig, ihm, wie das häufig geschieht, nachzusagen, seine 
Kernfragen zielten auf das Zentrum unserer Existenz. Sie haben eine andere, 
eine vornehmlich schriftstellerisch-handwerkliche Funktion: Es sind 
Vorwände [...]. Wir haben es also mit Gedankenspielen zu tun. Sie sollen die 
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mit den Mitteln des Epikers oder Dramatikers erteilten Antworten 
ermöglichen – und nur auf diese kam und kommt es an.71 
 
There is some merit in these observations; indeed, Frisch was never explicit about 
precisely which of Kierkegaard’s works he read, nor has he ever confirmed precisely 
when and in what context Kierkegaard first caught his attention. His letters and 
diaries also fail to provide any exact information. Any reflections on typical 
Kierkegaardian themes – such as choice, freedom, and the self – appear only in an 
isolated manner. Furthermore, except where Frisch cites verbatim from Kierkegaard 
in the epigraph to Stiller, it is virtually impossible to conclude definitely whether the 
thematic correspondences really are allusions to Kierkegaard, or whether it is only a 
case of Frisch engaging with issues that are central for existentialist philosophy from 
Fichte to Kierkegaard to Sartre.72 Regardless of such issues of provenance, what is 
more significant is what a writer like Frisch actually does with such references – 
specifically, how they are transformed into his literary thought. In this context, 
Frisch revealed that for him the most important texts were those that aroused 
opposition, rather than demanded acquiescence; he observes in his diary:  
 
Die anderen Bücher, die uns mit unseren eigenen Gedanken beschenken, 
sind mindestens die höflicheren; vielleicht auch die eigentlich wirksamen. 
Sie führen uns in den Wald, wo sich die Wege in Sträuchern und Beeren 
verlaufen, und wenn wir unsere Taschen gefüllt sehen, glauben wir durchaus, 
dass wir die Beeren selber gefunden haben.73 
 
Surely this observation can notably be applied to Kierkegaard’s works. Essentially it 
is only from isolated comments such as these that one can speculate about the nature 
of Frisch’s relationship to Kierkegaardian philosophy. The earliest trace that 
circuitously links Frisch to Kierkegaard is a comment made in a letter first published 
in 1960 from Dürrenmatt to Frisch. Here Dürrenmatt offers an interpretation of 
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Frisch’s early drama Graf Öderland, in which the protagonist Graf Öderland is 
overwhelmed by the strictly bureaucratic world that surrounds him and starts 
murdering people out of desperation. In the letter Dürrenmatt contends that 
Öderland is an aesthete, and then directly references the Danish philosopher: 
‘Entschuldigen Sie, dass ich das, was ich das Ästhetische in seiner letzten 
Konsequenz nenne, nicht näher umschreibe, ich lehne mich hier an Kierkegaard an. 
Nehmen Sie das Ästhetische hier als das Nicht-Religiösabgründige’.74 In the early 
1950s Dürrenmatt had begun writing a doctoral thesis on Das Tragische bei 
Kierkegaard, which ratifies his engagement with the Danish existentialist. 
Dürrenmatt also remarked some years later, ‘Ohne Kierkegaard bin ich als 
Schriftsteller nicht zu verstehen’.75 It is precisely these sources that led Hans 
Bänziger to conclude that it was Dürrenmatt who initially introduced Frisch to 
Kierkegaardian philosophy.76 
 
Another incident which serves to confirm Frisch’s early knowledge of and possible 
engagement with Kierkegaard is his stay in the United States from 1951-52, an 
experience which he termed as ‘ein Jahr des bloßen Aufnehmens […],’ during 
which he ‘[las] mehr als sonst’.77 In a letter to Peter Suhrkamp, Frisch discusses his 
work-in-progress on Stiller and cites Theodor Adorno’s 1951 Minima Moralia: 
Reflexionen aus einem beschädigten Leben:78 
 
Ich habe viel entworfen, glaube bei aller Vorsicht sagen zu können, dass der 
Roman zustande kommt, er ist in der Gesamtanlage da, wichtige Teile sind 
auch schon geschrieben [...]. Ab und zu lese ich in den Minima Moralia, 
teilweise sehr fasziniert, dann wieder hängt es mich ab, vielleicht wie die 
Quintessenzen zu selten sich aus einem Beispiel ergeben. Halten sie mir den 
Daumen für den Roman, ohne Arbeit wird es schlimm werden, in jedem Fall 
ist es gut, dass ich außerhalb der Gewöhnung bin.79 
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Frisch’s allusion to Adorno’s Minima Moralia is of note here, for, much like his 
letter correspondence with Dürrenmatt, it circuitously suggests Frisch’s contact with 
Kierkegaardian philosophy. In 1933 Adorno wrote his post-doctoral dissertation 
‘Kierkegaard–Konstruktion des Ästhetischen’;80 hence it is unsurprising to find 
Adorno expound upon Kierkegaardian aestheticism in the later Minima Moralia, 
where he names the concepts ‘das Schöne’ and the ‘Pantheons der Klassizität’ 
examples of an ‘idealistischen Kunstvorstellung’. Kierkegaard’s existential 
teachings, characterised as a ‘Zurücktreten des Einzelnen in sich selber’ with a view 
to ‘sich seiner Fülle habhaft zu werden’, a key theme in Stiller, are classified by 
Adorno as bourgeois moralities.81  
 
Other notable sources that serve to verify this engagement with existentialist thought 
are two comments Frisch made in the 1970s and 1980s. The first occurs in a letter 
exchange between the Swiss writer and his former Suhrkamp editor, Jürgen H. 
Petersen. In a letter dated 21 October 1978 Petersen asks Frisch to clarify the 
existentialist traces in Mein Name sei Gantenbein; he asks: ‘[...] Und in 
Zusammenhang mit “Gantenbein” und Möglichkeits-Problematik: Hat Heidegger 
oder existenzphilosophisches Denken – mittelbar oder unmittelbar – in Ihrem 
Umgang mit der Philosophie eine Rolle gespielt?’ In his belated reply to Petersen of 
28 February 1979, Frisch readily admits to having read Nietzsche in his youth, and 
insists that whilst his knowledge of existentialism is marginal, it may still have 
served as a direct creative impulse in his writing. He answers: 
 
Lieber Herr Professor Petersen,  
es tut mir leid, dass Sie ohne Antwort geblieben sind, und ich bitte Sie um 
Nachsicht. Die Fragen über die philosophischen Voraussetzungen kann ich 
ohnehin nie beantworten; freilich habe ich Nietzsche gelesen und als junger 
Mann mit großer Begeisterung, die Existentialphilosophie kenne ich vom 
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Rande her, aber das alles heisst nicht, dass sie nicht Einfluss gehabt haben. 
Nur muss ich selber das wissen?82 
 
The second source is an interview between Frisch and the critic Volker Hage that 
was conducted in 1981. More than several decades after the publication of Stiller, 
Frisch continues to maintain that the creative process was ‘ein rasches 
Wegschreiben, ohne viel Überlegung’. Frisch also describes his astonishment at the 
subsequent interpretations of his literary work: ‘Als das Buch fertig war und es hieß, 
da gehe es doch um das Identitätsproblem... ja richtig! Aber das Wort Identität, das 
ich ja nun doch kannte, ist während der Arbeit an dem Roman gelöscht gewesen’.83 
As both citations illustrate, while Frisch may have been captivated by the 
existentialist concerns of identity and freedom, he exhibits genuine difficulty in 
recalling his philosophical influences, a fact that suggests that he had not sought to 
write his novel in accordance with any particular philosophical manifesto, 
existentialist or otherwise. Other than the above quotations which have been found 
in magazines and in the Max Frisch Archiv, there are no other known sources which 
serve to confirm a Kierkegaardian, Heideggerian, Nietzschean, Sartrean or 
Camusean philosophical agenda in any of Frisch’s three novels. In recalling Frisch’s 
response to Jürgen Petersen – ‘Nur muss ich selber das wissen?’ –, one is forced to 
conclude that even if the various strands and strains existentialist thinking that can 
be located in Stiller, Homo Faber and Gantenbein, most discernably those of 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre, are consciously residual, they are part of an 
unconscious literary imagination, which is nonetheless remarkable and relevant.   
      
 
 




Any study on the existentialist dimension of Max Frisch’s literary oeuvre would not 
be complete without acknowledging the breadth of literary criticism surrounding 
this topic. Three pinnacle early studies of Frisch’s novels are Philip Manger’s 
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‘Kierkegaard in Max Frisch’s Novel “Stiller”’ (1966), Charles W. Hoffman’s ‘The 
Search for Self, Inner Freedom, and Relatedness in the Novels of Max Frisch’ 
(1967) and W. G. Cunliffe’s ‘Existentialist Elements in Frisch’s Works’ (1970).84 
Manger proceeds as if Frisch had written Stiller according to a Kierkegaardian 
programme, as a detailed demonstration of Kierkegaard’s view of the individual’s 
movement toward self and freedom. Whereas Manger presents Frisch more as a 
philosopher and less as a creative artist working with the tools and materials of 
everyday life, Hoffman examines Frisch’s themes in terms that are lacking 
philosophical focus. The themes Hoffman identifies are existential in origin, but are 
not pursued in existentialist terms. The notions of identity, freedom, and relatedness 
have come to represent common dilemmas in our time, for the obstacle to these ends 
have proliferated – technological enhancement has led to estrangement and isolation 
and restricts the occasions for self-determination. Thus one can muse over these 
issues beyond the confines of an existentialist framework. Hoffman’s approach to 
these problems in Stiller, Homo Faber, and Gantenbein is both helpful and 
enlightening, for it brings us close to the novels, casting the themes in terms of the 
actual day-to-day problems of the characters. In Hoffman’s view, the protagonists of 
the novels seek to be in touch with themselves and in touch with an inner freedom 
so that they might achieve, through self-discipline, a relatedness and harmony with 
others that can overcome their isolation. According to this approach, selfhood and 
freedom are seen more as means than as ends in themselves, and to this extent they 
are not really existential tropes. Cunliffe’s study, on the other hand, takes as its 
focus the existentialist elements in Frisch’s works and centres the work around 
Frisch’s thematic preoccupation with the Second Commandment ‘Du sollst dir kein 
Bildnis machen.’ The study takes Stiller as its predominant focus and draws on a 
range of existentialist philosophers, such as Kierkegaard, Sartre and Camus, to 
explore Frisch’s treatment of the themes of authenticity, despair, choice, and the 
leap of faith. Cunliffe’s work is nevertheless interspersed with references to Frisch’s 
other novels and plays, where similar existentialist themes emerge. Other valuable 
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essays from Cunliffe on the subject of Max Frisch and existentialism include the 
afore-cited ‘Die Kunst, ohne Geschichte abzuschwimmen: Existenzialistisches 
Strukturprinzip in Stiller, Homo Faber und Mein Name sei Gantenbein’, which 
dedicates itself solely to the study of Frisch’s post-war trilogy.85  
Other early studies point more directly to the existential nature of Frisch’s thematic 
interest. In her 1965 study Zum Problem der Identität im Werk Max Frischs, Monika 
Wintsch-Spiess writes: 
 
Unsere Ausführungen erhellen die am Anfang geäußerte Behauptung, es 
handele sich bei Max Frisch um ein zutiefst existentielles Problem, das sich 
dem denkenden modernen Menschen in einer ungesicherten, alles in Frage 
ziehenden Welt stelle.86 
As the title of the work suggests, Wintsch-Spiess identifies this existential problem 
as ‘das Problem der Identität’ and discusses several related themes over the course 
of four sub-chapters (‘Die Sehnsucht nach der Jugend’, ‘Der Fluch der 
Wiederholung’, ‘Du sollst dir kein Bildnis machen’, ‘Die Sehnsucht nach dem 
“anderen Leben”’), all of which she relates specifically to the problem of identity. 
Despite Wintsch-Spiess’ limited discussion of the existential elements in Frisch’s 
plays, and an altogether lack of exploration of the existential themes in either 
Gantenbein or Homo Faber, Wintsch-Spiess’ analysis of the ‘vertiefte existentielle 
Problematik des Stiller’, which essentially forms the major thrust of her study, is 
nevertheless rigorous and comprehensive. In a similar way, Lusser-Mertelsmann’s 
1976 study on Frisch, cited earlier, also investigates the ‘Ich-Problematik’ in his 
literary oeuvre but from a predominantly psychoanalytical perspective.87 Rather than 
merely focussing her work on the ‘centricity’ of the self, Lusser-Mertelsmann 
integrates a myriad of aspects pertinent to the question of the self and analyses 
Frisch’s characters both from a psychoanalytic angle, as well as in relation to 
themselves and to society.  
 
Kerstin Gühne-Engelmann’s 1994 doctoral thesis focuses predominantly on ‘Die 
Thematik des versäumten Lebens’ in Frisch’s Stiller, Homo Faber and Gantenbein. 
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It also probes in considerable depth Frisch’s engagement with Kierkegaardian 
philosophy, and its traces in the novel Stiller.88 Frederick Alfred Lubich’s 1990 
study Max Frisch: Stiller, Homo Faber und Mein Name sei Gantenbein has the 
Frisch ‘trilogy’ as its focus, although its emphasis is predominantly the texts’ plot 
structure and narrative perspective, and, in the case of Stiller, the functions of 
Switzerland and America as a ‘Gefängnis und Fluchtpunkt persönlicher 
Selbstverwirklichung’.89 Erica Natale’s study of 2000, entitled ‘Rollendasein und 
verhindertes Erleben: Literatur und literarische Bezüge im Kontext des Stiller von 
Max Frisch’90 likewise probes the issues of the self, identity and role-playing in 
Frisch’s 1954 novel. Nedialka Bubner investigates in her 2005 study ‘[…] die 
Mechanismen des Wechselspiels und der gegenseitigen Determinanz zwischen Ich-
Figuren [...] und einem fiktionalen Möglichkeitsraum [...]’; she restricts herself to a 
detailed investigation of Bin oder Die Reise nach Peking (1944), Mein Name sei 
Gantenbein, Biografie: Ein Spiel (1967) and Montauk (1975), and concludes that 
Frisch’s novel essentially results in the abandonment of an identity based on the 
individual’s life story in favour of the free roaming of individual imagination, 
‘wohlwissend, dass das Erreichen der höchsten Stufe der Selbsterkenntnis zugleich 
das Ende der Variabilität und des Spiels und ein zwangsläufiges Bekenntnis zum 
einzigen unaustauschbaren Selbst bedeutet’.91 
 
These studies cover a total timespan of forty years; what is particularly notable 
about them is how they all, in one way or another, approach Frisch’s literary oeuvre 
primarily from the standpoint of the existentialist issue of Identitätsproblematik. 
Some of them have isolated the specific societal obstacles that prevent identity 
formation or lead to the establishment of pseudo-identities. None of these studies, 
however, has attempted to come to terms with the specific existential values of 
freedom of choice, authenticity, angst, guilt, and individual responsibility and to 
trace these concepts through Frisch’s novels. The unique qualities of the above 
chapter are thus its focus on the prototypical existentialist elements, such as 
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freedom, identity, authenticity and ontological guilt, as delineated in the previous 
methodological chapter, within the framework of Frisch’s Stiller, and secondly, its 
location of not just Kierkegaardian, but also Heideggerian and Sartrean 
philosophical motifs, and their infiltration into and significance for his 1954 novel. 
As the letters and interviews clearly demonstrate, much of the existentialist thinking 
which features in Frisch’s oeuvre can be seen to be unconscious and intuitive, for 
Frisch readily admits not to have approached the writing task with any particular 
philosophical or theoretical agenda. Identification of these philosophical influences 
is nevertheless illuminating, for it serves to reinforce the argumentation that 
underlies this thesis regarding the widespread dissemination and proliferation of 
existentialist ideas within literary thought in the decade or so following the Second 
World War.      
*    *    * 
 
In conclusion, Frisch’s literary trademark clearly has become, to the exclusion of 
virtually any other theme, the problem of identity – a trademark to which he once 
replied sarcastically: ‘Mein literarisches Warenzeichen, ich weiß, ist das 
Identitätsproblem. Dass ich mich mit dem Warenzeichen nicht identisch fühle, 
kommt noch hinzu’.92 It is perhaps not surprising that Frisch should respond this 
way, since the entire impetus of his writing is away from formulations, definitions 
and categorisations, toward the recognition of the openness, flexibility and 
insecurity of existence. At the same time, however, one cannot fail to recognise how 
the existentialist concerns about the nature of the self and human freedom run 
through Frisch’s literary repertoire. The world reflected in Frisch’s oeuvre is, albeit 
unconsciously, the world of existentialist philosophy – a world in which no set 
meaning is given and identities are unstable. Stiller/White’s inauthentic living by 
way of his fixation with images, emblematic of the individual’s entrapment in a 
defined social role, the physical and psychological Selbstflucht motif, as well as 
Stiller and Julika’s experiencing ontological guilt, are clearly reminiscent of the 
themes of identity denial or non-compliance with one’s ‘true’ identity which are 
located in the philosophical writings of Sartre. The dual existence of Stiller and 
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White similarly evokes the fugitive structure and the existence of the ‘they-self’, as 
discussed by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit. Finally, the notions of the attainment of 
freedom by way of ‘choosing oneself’, and the overcoming of existential angst by 
means of a ‘leap of faith’, as first deliberated by Kierkegaard, are explored by Frisch 
in considerable depth in the final sections of the novel, lending the work a ‘sturdy 
missionary purpose’,93 according to Cunliffe. Ultimately, Stiller’s failure or perhaps 
unwillingness to embrace the restorative powers of religious faith eventually serve 
to underscore the work’s wider significance regarding the inherent contradiction 
involved in the idea of God, and similarly indicate how religious faith is incapable 
of ‘saving’ Stiller from his existentialist despair. 
 
Within this cosmos Frisch finds individuals as much as societies in degeneration, 
succumbing to what he terms a ‘Zeitalter der Reproduktion’,94 a predicament which 
the author of Stiller later highlights in the novel: 
 
Wir leben in einem Zeitalter der Reproduktion. Das allermeiste in unserem 
persönlichen Weltbild haben wir nie mit eigenen Augen erfahren, genauer: 
wohl mit eigenen Augen, doch nicht an Ort und Stelle; wir sind Fernseher, 
Fernhörer, Fernwisser. Man braucht diese Städchen nie verlassen zu haben, 
um die Hitlerstimme noch heute im Ohr zu haben, um den Schah von Persien 
aus drei Meter Entfernung zu kennen und zu wissen, wie der Monsun über 
den Himalaja heult oder wie es tausend Meter unter dem Meeresspiegel 
aussieht. [...] Was für ein Zeitalter! Es heißt überhaupt nichts mehr, 
Schwertfische gesehen zu haben, eine Mulattin geliebt zu haben, all dies 
kann auch in einer Kulturfilmmatinée geschehen sein, und Gedanken zu 
haben, ach Gott, es ist in diesem Zeitalter schon eine Rarität, einen Kopf zu 
treffen, der auf ein bestimmtes Plagiatprofil gebracht werden kann, es zeugt 
von Persönlichkeit, wenn einer die Welt etwa mit Heidegger sieht und nur 
mit Heidegger [sic], wir andern schwimmen in einem Cocktail, der ungefähr 
alles enthält, in nobelster Art von Eliot gemixt, und überall wissen wir ein 
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und wieder aus, und nicht einmal unsere Erzählungen von der sichtbaren 
Welt, wie gesagt, heißen etwas. (ST: 141) 
  
Stiller (and possibly Frisch himself?) lament that human beings can no longer 
express their personal thoughts and feelings. The despairing protagonist bemoans 
that in the modern age an individual’s ability to furnish an exact, true-to-life 
description of a distant location or event is no cogent proof of his firsthand 
knowledge thereof. Individuals create meaning and value, and the values implied by 
this view of the human condition, along with the obstacles to the realisation of those 
values, constitute the essential cornerstones in Frisch’s writing. This also 
corresponds with his tendency to leave matters unresolved in his writing. As was 
mentioned, Frisch’s literary works are rife with unanswered questions regarding 
these pressing problems surrounding modern existence. Frisch’s works conform to 
no pre-defined philosophical or theoretical formula, which leaves his readers with 
the task of working through these problems for themselves. Meaning can only be 
generated by mankind, and it is essentially this hypothesis which constitutes on 







































‘Ich weiß nicht genau, ob es Gott gibt. 
Aber es scheint mir ziemlich absurd 
anzunehmen, es gäbe ihn nicht.’ 
 
- Alfred Andersch, Die Kirschen der Freiheit 
 
 
Within the field of German studies there remains little doubt about Alfred Andersch 
playing a ‘zentrale Rolle für die literarische Szene der ersten Nachkriegszeit’.1 As an 
instrumental figure of the young generation movement of post-1945 German 
literature, it has long been supposed that Alfred Andersch’s literary works were 
primarily shaped by the experience of defeat in the Second World War and the 
condemnation of the values of National Socialism; this period of historical rupture 
triggered by widespread social and political turmoil in the 1940s has since been used 
to support the notion of a literary ‘zero hour’ or a ‘Stunde Null’, as evidence of a 
more or less complete break with a discredited national heritage.2 Within the 
academic discipline Alfred Andersch is celebrated principally as a novelist and 
writer of short stories, although his career also includes his work as a prominent 
journalist and broadcaster as well as mediator and populariser of unknown foreign 
literature in the new Federal Republic, mainly from the English, Italian and French 
speaking world.3 The year 1948 saw the publication of his profoundly influential 
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essay ‘Deutsche Literatur in der Entscheidung: Ein Beitrag zur Analyse der 
literarischen Situation,’ which was followed in 1949 by a representative collection 
of essays by international authors entitled Europäische Avantgarde. Andersch 
founded the discussion-based ‘Evening Studio’ of Radio Frankfurt, and he edited the 
brochure series ‘studio frankfurt,’ that circulated radical new literature and sought to 
capture the vigour and dynamism of the young generation.4 From 1955 to 1957, 
Andersch was also editor of the literary journal Texte und Zeichen in which an 
eclectic variety of intellectuals, writers, and poets, for example, Theodor W. 
Adorno, Paul Celan, Günter Grass and Arno Schmidt were represented, as well as 
foreign writers such as Samuel Beckett, Roland Barthes, Ernest Hemingway and 
Albert Camus, all of whom came to shape Andersch’s own writing and thought. 
These achievements constitute the apex of Andersch’s influence on West German 
cultural development. 
 
As the names Roland Barthes and Albert Camus here testify, as well as to some 
degree Beckett, it was French culture and literature in particular that played a crucial 
role in the reshaping of the postwar German culture sphere. In his reflections on the 
literary scene in postwar Germany, Walter Heist encapsulates the sense of collective 
German postwar admiration for France as a hothouse of new and exciting ideas; in 
1948 he wrote: ‘Von der Außenwelt abgeschnitten, uns selbst überlassen, 
weggestoßen, gebrandmarkt und verzweifelt, wir waren allein. Wohin richteten wir 
in dieser Situation spontan unsere Blicke? Nach Frankreich’.5 It is among the aims 
of this chapter to consider the significance of French literary, philosophical and 
theological exports for Andersch’s artistic productions; a special role will, for 
reasons that will become obvious, fall to French existentialism. As early as 1946, 
Andersch refers to France as ‘das Land, in dem die Menschenrechte formuliert 
wurden’.6  According to Margaret Littler, Andersch recognised ‘a new strain of 
existentialist thought, an exciting new literature and the most genuine democratic 
aspirations in Europe’.7 In the plays of French dramatist Jean Anouilh (1910-1987), 
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turned 31 in 1945. 
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p. 13. 
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for instance, Andersch saw youth depicted as ‘unbedingtes Streben nach Wahrheit, 
Gerechtigkeit, Ehre’, victimised by the mistakes of former generations.8 In an 
unpublished appreciation of the French playwright, Andersch defends him against 
charges of neo-fascist tendencies, while supporting his main theme as ‘eine Predigt 
der Unbedingtheit, der Kompromisslosigkeit, der Verachtung aller Toleranz, der 
Absage an die Weisheit des Alters, des Appells an die Jugend, für die Reinheit ihres 
Wollens einzusetzen’ (sic).9  In his post-war journalism, similarly, Andersch 
presents all progressive and innovative forces in France as an achievement of the 
youth, and the particular appeal of French existentialism in this regard was the 
possibility of rehabilitating the integrity of a whole generation. 
 
It was Andersch’s own lifelong conviction that one of his most formative cultural 
encounters was with Sartrean existentialism. Enthralled by modernism, Andersch 
embraced the innovative and experimental forms of the new existentialist literature. 
Indeed, the influence of Jean-Paul Sartre on Andersch has been the subject of great 
interest; Ingeborg Drewitz writes: ‘Die Hinneigung zum Existentialismus 
Sartre’scher Prägung war deutlich’;10 Wolfgang Rath positions Andersch’s 
autobiographical report ‘in der geistigen Nähe von Jean Paul Sartre’;11 Rhys 
Williams asserts ‘Als Alfred Andersch “Die Kirschen der Freiheit” schrieb, hatte er 
sich Sartres existentialistische Theorie zu eigen gemacht [...]’, 12 and according to 
Livia Z. Wittmann, also writing about Die Kirschen der Freiheit; ‘Das beglückende 
Erlebnis der Freiheit am Ende des Buches kann nur als Zeichen des Sartreschen 
Existentialismus begriffen werden’.13 Studies by Anja Koberstein, Margaret Littler, 
Irène Heidelberger-Leonhard and Volker Wehdeking constitute particularly 
significant contributions to this area of research. The role of Sartrean existentialism 
is certainly not to be underestimated, for it heavily coloured Andersch’s views on 
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the ‘task’ of literature in the post-war years; the subversive nature of literature and 
its mission to keep society in a constant state of flux, the notion of ‘committed’ or 
‘engaged’ literature (famously termed littérature engagée by Sartre), as well as the 
concepts of the flight into freedom, situational freedom in the form of ‘Augenblick,’ 
and bad faith form an important existential backdrop to Andersch’s literary oeuvre. 
Taking into consideration the abundance of scholarly interest in this topic, this 
chapter shall set itself the task of exploring Andersch’s existentialism within a wider 
framework, thus relativizing the importance of Sartrean existentialism. Whilst 
strands of Sartrean atheistic existentialism are certainly identifiable in Andersch’s 
works, one should not constrict oneself to a purely Sartrean interpretative approach 
when reading Die Kirschen der Freiheit, in which Andersch appears to rebuff 
certain aspects of the French philosopher’s doctrine, most notably in his treatment of 
the notion of predestination (Schicksal) in conjunction with individual freedom. This 
need for caution regarding an exclusively Sartrean reading of Andersch’s oeuvre is 
also expressed by Koberstein, whose study centres around the overarching premise: 
‘Andersch hat zwar zentrale existentielle Begriffe produktiv rezipiert, diese jedoch 
so sehr an sein Weltbild angepasst, dass sich deren Inhalt kaum mehr mit Sartres 
Philosophie vereinbaren lässt’.14 Indeed, the very name of her study, Gott oder das 
Nichts, as quoted in Die Kirschen der Freiheit,15 denotes the fundamental difference 
between Sartre and Andersch’s philosophical positions, namely Andersch’s 
Gottesverständnis and Sartre’s atheism. Koberstein’s study essentially concludes 
that Andersch has ‘[Sartre’s] Philosophie an das Christentum angenähert’,16 a line of 
argumentation that will form my own methodological approach.  
 
As part of this process of philosophical reassessment, and using Koberstein’s basic 
premise as an interpretative springboard, this study will examine Andersch’s 
awareness of and concern for theistic branches of the arbre existentialiste. With an 
innate conservatism, Andersch publically voiced an admiration for the 
representatives of the French renouveau catholique, as well as exponents of the 
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English Catholic revival, most notably Graham Greene and Evelyn Waugh. With 
regards to the former, Andersch observes: ‘Besonders Sartre und die jungen 
Kämpfer aus der “résistance” fordern diese Übereinstimmung von Tat und 
Gedanken, die bruchlose Existenz’.17 This reformist movement in the French 
Catholic church, of which the junge Kämpfer François Mauriac, Emmanuel 
Mounier, Jacques Maritain and Léon Bloy were notable advocates, welcomed a 
progressive outlook which anticipated new certainties to replace those abolished by 
the radical scepticism of early twentieth-century Europe, a philosophy which closely 
corresponded with Andersch’s own existentialist viewpoint in as much as it ‘das 
Aufsteigen einer großen Eingebung ankündigt und ihr nur den Weg bereitet’.18 In 
the same vein, Andersch in 1949 publically extolled Greene and Waugh in the 
Frankfurter Rundschau as exponents of a similar Catholic renewal movement in 
England.19 Andersch professes elsewhere: ‘Ich kann nur die Fakten geben, ich bin 
nicht imstande, zu erklären, warum unsere Kenntnis des englischen Romans mit 
Graham Greene und Evelyn Waugh aufhört’, adding: ‘Bei diesen beiden habe ich 
noch dazu den Eindruck, dass ihre Wirkung in hohem Maße ihrem Katholizismus 
zuzuschreiben ist’.20 As will be explored in more detail later, Andersch’s public 
acclamation of these French and English Catholic writers is indicative of a more 
profound philosophical and religious engagement than perhaps initially expected. 
Revealing his personal deviation from Sartrean doctrine, what can be located in 
Andersch’s Die Kirschen der Freiheit is a programmatic exploration of such themes 
as fate and causality, themes which form the very crux of Mauriac’s, Mounier’s and 
Greene’s theistic writing. 
 
Yet these philosophical figures were not the only source of inspiration for 
Andersch’s unique brand of existentialism. In addition to these Sartrean and English 
and French Catholic renewal influences, this chapter will also explore how 
Kierkegaard’s concept of angst as well as his notion of the aesthetic and the ethical 
stages of existence form an additional existentialist philosophical backdrop against 
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which to read and interpret the characters populating Andersch’s literary oeuvre. As 
Anne Raabe’s extensive study of Kierkegaard on Andersch demonstrates, 
Kierkegaardian theistic philosophy, most notably his consideration for the 
distinctive existential stages of human life as explained, for example, in Either/Or, 
serves as an edifying model for various characters in Andersch’s prose. With 
palpable echoes of Koberstein’s underlying hypothesis, Raabe’s study similarly 
centres on Andersch’s uniting of aspects of existentialist thinking with fundamental 
theistic principles; Raabe observes;   
  
Wer Anderschs Werke liest mit den Schriften Kierkegaards im Hintergrund, 
gewinnt den Eindruck, Andersch habe mit Kierkegaards Hilfe seinen Figuren 
philosophische Tiefe gegeben. Es ist wenig wunderlich, dass er gerade 
Kierkegaard so intensiv rezipiert hat. Denn zum einen fand er bei ihm die 
Verbindung von existentialistischem Denken und der Hinwendung zum 
Christentum, die seinen eigenen Vorstellungen entsprach.21  
Whilst it is not the intention of this chapter to overstate the overarching significance 
of Andersch’s treatment of religious themes, as my upcoming discussion of 
Andersch’s interest in the theistic philosophical positions of Kierkegaard, Greene, 
Mounier and Mauriac will reveal, it is crucial to reflect, as Koberstein and Raabe 
have done, on the inherently eclectic and individualist nature of Andersch’s 
theoretical Weltanschauung. Siegfried Lenz’s oxymoronic depiction of Andersch as 
‘ein religiöser Atheist’ would appear to endorse precisely this hypothesis.22 Indeed 
Andersch’s protagonist’s spiritual musings - ‘Ich weiß nicht genau, ob es Gott gibt. 
Aber es scheint mir ziemlich absurd anzunehmen, es gäbe ihn nicht’ (KDF: 113) - 
reveal a complexity, yet also an apparent open-mindedness underlying Andersch’s 
philosophical and theological stance, and - ‘Die Freiheit ist das Alleinsein mit Gott 
oder dem Nichts’ (KDF: 113) -, something which the following study of Die 
Kirschen der Freiheit will hope to illuminate. 
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THE GRUPPE 47  
 
In order to better contextualise the diverse existentialist influences that shaped 
Andersch’s ideological and aesthetic thought, it is helpful to begin by placing his 
works in their cultural and literary context of production in post-war West Germany. 
This context is defined first and foremost by the Gruppe 47, of which Andersch and 
Hans Werner Richter were co-founders. Prior to this, Andersch and Richter, in 
conjunction with Walter Kolbenhoff, Wolfgang Weyrauch and Wolfdietrich 
Schnurre, had intended to set up another literary journal called Der Skorpion, yet 
this never got beyond the dummy issue stage on account of the American authorities 
withdrawing the necessary publishing license. Friedhelm Kröll notes that it was 
indeed the failure of Der Skorpion which provided the catalyst for the founding of 
the Gruppe 47.23 The Gruppe 47 was the primary postwar organisation of writers to 
assert its resistance to Germany’s fascist past, and it was among the aims of the 
Group’s founding fathers to establish the credibility of their generation and to 
pioneer German letters by founding a loose society of young, anti-fascist writers 
keen to use literature as a vehicle through which to reconstruct a social and 
democratic Germany. As Rhys Williams observes: 
 
Both Alfred Andersch and Hans Werner Richter were to devote most of their 
own literary production to a reappraisal of their experiences in the Third 
Reich, playing out respectively a range of possible reactions to National 
Socialism, justifying and explaining their own failure to resist and presenting 
themselves as psychological victims of a totalitarian regime.24  
 
Richter and Andersch formed the group independent from political parties and the 
official cultural bodies financially subsidised by the Allies. Over the years, the 
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group acquired an aura of resistance and non-conformism, an aura so formidable 
that fifty years later scholars found it necessary to reassess critically some of the 
Group’s founding values.25 The organisation’s radical image was reinforced by the 
group’s origins. The American authorities censored and then expelled Andersch and 
Richter from editing and writing for the German language cultural-political 
publication Der Ruf, first established in 1946, labelling them as nihilists for 
criticising U.S. re-education politics.26 Andersch explained this point of cultural 
conflict in a 1979 interview: ‘Eine Zeitschrift mit unserer Linie passte überhaupt 
nicht in das damalige publizistische US-Konzept, und aus diesem Grund wurde sie 
abgewürgt’.27 Hans Werner Richter had initially marketed the journal as an 
alternative to the ideological positions of the United States and Russia, proposing 
instead a via media between capitalism and communism initiated by Germans 
shaped by the experience of war and fascism. Both Andersch and Richter sought to 
use literature as a means of political pedagogy. Mindful of the complicity of 
intellectuals in Nazi Germany the aims were as follows: 
 
Sie wollten unter allen Umständen und für alle Zukunft eine Wiederholung 
dessen verhindern, was geschehen war, und sie wollten zur gleichen Zeit 
damit den Grundstein für ein neues demokratisches Deutschland, für eine 
bessere Zukunft und für eine neue Literatur legen, die sich ihrer 
Verantwortung gegenüber der politischen und gesamtgesellschaftlichen 
Entwicklung bewusst ist.28 
 
Given these aspirations to use literature as a public vehicle for political change, it is 
not surprising that literary ambition played out vividly in the meetings of the Gruppe 
47. Reputations were made or broken at its summits, since a successful reading 
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could result in prizes, publicity, and prestigious publishing contracts.29 Soon after its 
founding the Gruppe 47 included poets, playwrights, novelists, and critics who ran 
literary programmes at national radio stations and wrote popular criticism and 
reviews for major newspapers. Legitimating and popularising the literature of its 
members through these forums, the group became one of the most influential literary 
organisations in German history and is credited with making at least two major 
contributions to German culture. First, it brought international fame to German 
letters by producing Nobel-Prize winning authors such as Heinrich Böll and Günter 
Grass, two early, contentious, and dedicated participants. Secondly, it contributed to 
the formation of a public intellectual culture in Germany, creating a powerful stage 
for the writer as a safeguard of the values of the social democratic republic. Hans 
Magnus Enzensberger has called the Gruppe 47 ‘das Zentralcafé einer Literatur 
ohne Hauptstadt’ for its ability to gather together an eclectic group of young writers 
in a war-torn culture around the ideals of nonpartisan inquiry and rigorous literary 
critique.30  
 
POST-WAR EXISTENTIALISM: SARTRE AND THE EUROPEAN CATHOLIC RENEWAL 
 
This development of a new intellectual culture in Germany is not without import for 
the influx of wider European literary and philosophical influences, most famously 
the post-1945 revival of existentialism in Paris. One of Andersch’s foremost 
encounters with Sartrean existentialism came about through Sartre’s 1943 play Les 
Mouches. In a brief introduction to the German edition of the dramatic work, Sartre 
indicates that he had originally written the play in response to the German invasion 
of France, after which ‘unsere Vergangenheit nicht mehr [existierte]’. Andersch 
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quotes from the same introduction in his ‘Deutsche Literatur in der Entscheidung’, 
attesting to his knowledge of the Frenchman’s dramatic work; he writes:  
 
Und er fährt fort, und wendet sich an die Deutschen (denn wir befinden uns 
in der Vorrede Jean-Paul Sartres zur deutschen Ausgabe seines Dramas ‘Die 
Fliegen’): ‘Heute haben die Deutschen das gleiche Problem vor sich. Auch 
für die Deutschen, glaube ich, ist Selbstverleugnung unfruchtbar. [...] Dazu 
verhelfen ihnen nur: eine totale und aufrichtige Verpflichtung auf eine 
Zukunft in Freiheit und Arbeit, ein fester Wille, diese Zukunft aufzubauen, 
und das Vorhandensein der größtmöglichen Zahl von Menschen guten 
Willens’.31 
 
Les Mouches is essentially an existentialist retelling of Aeschylus’s The Liberation 
Bearers. In killing his mother Clytemnestra and her lover Aegisthus in revenge for 
their previous murder of his father Agamemnon, Orestes is also killing off the gods 
to whom he had previously sworn fealty. As Jupiter, the king of the gods, confesses 
to Aegisthus: ‘Once freedom lights its beacon in a man’s heart, the gods are 
powerless against him’.32 In realisation of his absolute freedom, Orestes feels the 
cold night of an ‘endless emptiness, as far as the eye can reach’.33 By relinquishing 
his belief in the gods, the warmth and comfort of the value systems set up around 
him are gone; he now lives alone and for himself. ‘I am free, Electra. Freedom has 
crashed down on me like a thunderbolt’, he declares.34 To regret the crime he has 
committed would be a denial of himself and thus of his own freedom; Orestes 
therefore refuses repentance, declaring allegiance to his crime as his only real 
possession. ‘I have done my deed, Electra, and that deed was good’, he contends. ‘I 
shall bear it on my shoulders as a carrier at a ferry carries the traveller to the farther 
bank. […] The heavier it is to carry, the better pleased I shall be; for that burden is 
my freedom’.35 The goddesses of vengeance have no power, he tells his sister, 
unless human beings choose to listen to them. In the play’s final act Jupiter, who had 
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previously sought to convince Orestes of his godlike omnipotence, appears ‘tired 
and dejected’.36 Orestes explains to Jupiter: 
 
Suddenly, out of the blue, freedom crashed down on me and swept me off 
my feet. Nature sprang back, my youth went with the wind, and I knew 
myself alone, utterly alone in the midst of this well-meaning little universe of 
yours. I was like a man who’s lost his shadow. And there was nothing left in 
heaven, no right or wrong, nor anyone to give me orders.37  
 
In light of his new freedom, Orestes understands that he is ‘outside nature, against 
nature,’ and ‘doomed to have no other law but’ his own.38 Both Electra and the 
citizens of Argos whom Orestes has freed from the yoke of tyranny resent and fear 
him. They do not want the new and terrifying freedom that Orestes has claimed. 
Electra regrets her crimes and does penance at the feet of Jupiter, thus saving herself 
from the vengeful Furies, who are symbolised by the diabolical flies of the play’s 
title. Henceforth Electra will dedicate herself to the received order of earth and 
heaven. But Orestes becomes a ‘king without a kingdom’ and understands that ‘all 
here is new, all must begin anew’.39 A naturalised German hero of the ‘Stunde Null,’ 
Orestes leaves Argos pursued by the spirits of the old order that he has destroyed. 
 
In Sartre’s depiction, the citizens of German-occupied France were faced with a 
clear choice; they could succumb to unproductive regret and self-hatred, or they 
could choose a new life of freedom. It is this freedom from the past and from self-
loathing that Sartre’s protagonist Orestes represents. Germans at the end of the 
Second World War, Sartre believes, are faced with a similar situation: 
 
Neu aber war – auch wenn ein feindliches Heer Frankreich besetzt hatte – 
die Zukunft! [...] Heute haben die Deutschen das gleiche Problem vor sich. 
[...] Ich will damit nicht sagen, dass die Erinnerung an die Fehler der 
Vergangenheit aus ihrem Gedächtnis verschwinden soll. Nein. Aber ich bin 
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überzeugt, dass nicht eine willfährige Selbstverleugnung ihnen jenen Pardon 
verschafft, den die Welt ihnen gewähren kann. Dazu verhelfen ihnen nur: 
eine totale und aufrichtige Verpflichtung auf eine Zukunft in Freiheit und 
Arbeit.40  
 
For Andersch, Sartre’s philosophy embodied the new freedom of both Germany and 
German literature, severed from ties to the past and facing a self-created future. In 
Andersch’s view Germans must, like Orestes, disunite themselves from all ties to 
harmful literary and cultural traditions, and they must do so without self-hatred and 
false repentance. The catastrophe of Nazism demonstrated the complete bankruptcy 
of German morality, Andersch argued: ‘Wie gut wäre es gewesen, wenn die 
Deutschen in den letzten zwölf Jahren der Suggestion einer Philosophie entronnen 
wären, die gerade in ihrer Entartung ihr Wesen enthüllte’.41 American occupation 
authorities were hostile to the philosophy of existentialism because, as Stephen 
Brockmann puts it, it ‘did not fit their neat, optimistic plans for re-educating the 
German people. But a return to previous moralistic naiveté would be,’ as 
Brockmann continues, ‘detrimental if not point-blank impossible’.42 Andersch goes 
on: ‘Die Philosophie des Idealismus, welche die Freiheit als Bindung an die 
Verantwortung begreifen wollte, trug sich mit ihrer Perversion selbst zu Grabe’. In 
contrast to an idealistic philosophy which sought to bind human beings to objective 
values, existentialism offered ‘Freiheit an und für sich,’ unfettered freedom. 
‘Begreifen wir nicht die göttliche Heiterkeit, die uns diese Freiheit gibt?’ Andersch 
asks. He continues: 
 
Ergreifen wir sie nicht endlich, endlich, nachdem uns die Bindung der 
Freiheit an die 'objektiven Werte' überall nur zu Sklaverei geführt hat? Oder 
wollen wir morgen wieder Menschen töten, weil wir angeblich im Besitz der 
hohen Werte und ethischen Ziele sind, welche die nicht haben, die wir töten? 
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Statt dass wir zurückkehren zur menschlichen Existenz und von ihr aus, vom 
Grund unseres menschlichen Seins aus uns entscheiden: nicht zu töten?43  
 
If Germans were not to accept this freedom, then they would probably soon find 
themselves once again waging war and killing other people who did not share their 
supposedly higher ideals.  
 
As a sort of acknowledgement for Sartre’s direct appeal to his German readership in 
the German edition of Les Mouches, Andersch’s poem ‘andererseits’ can be viewed 
both as a retort and homage to the French philosopher’s influence on him, as well as 
post-war Germany at large; it reads: ‘die anderen // seien die hölle // hat sartre 
gemeint // vor allen schriftstellern / meiner zeit / derjenige der mich / am stärksten 
bewegt hat // ich liebe sartre [sic]’.44 In the poem he dissociates himself from the 
French philosopher, however, by also proclaiming: ‘ich glaube nicht mehr daran / 
das wir uns / von hölle / zu hölle / grüssen // die anderen / sind nicht // die hölle 
sondern / höchstens / die einsamkeit’. In the same year Andersch writes: ‘Meine 
eigene Biographie ist ohne Sartre und Beckett nicht denkbar. Ich relativiere diese 
Erlebnisse nicht; Sartres Ekel und Becketts Warten auf Godot betrachte ich noch 
heute als einzigartige Abenteuer des Geistes’.45 Andersch’s interest in and 
knowledge of French intellectual movements is already evident in his journalistic 
contributions to ‘Der Ruf. Unabhängige Blätter der Jungen Generation’, which he 
co-edited with Hans Werner Richter from 15 August 1946 until 15 April 1947.46 
‘Schon 1946 hatte er [Andersch] mit intensiver Beschäftigung des französischen 
Existentialismus begonnen,’ explains Georg Böhringer, ‘der nicht nur auf Andersch, 
sondern auch auf den Ruf großen Einfluss ausübte’.47 As Margaret Littler observes: 
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‘[t]he united left-wing politics of post-Résistance France, combined with the new 
form of Existentialism developing in the group around Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir 
and Camus, made France appear a source of genuinely new and constructive ideas 
for the future of Europe’.48  
 
There are nevertheless also some indications even at this time that Andersch 
regarded Sartrean existentialism as little more than a philosophical ‘fad’ and that his 
opinions were based on slight knowledge of the Frenchman’s work. In ‘Die Existenz 
und die objektiven Werte’, Andersch’s fervent defence of existentialism against the 
denunciation of Marburg Professor Julius Ebbinghaus, he portrays it as the antithesis 
of National Socialism, which constituted a distortion of the objective values of 
German Idealism. Yet even in this 1947 article, Andersch accepts: ‘Sie [die 
Existenzphilosophie] ist insofern eine Modephilosophie, als sie allerdings ihre 
erregende Aktualität aus dem apokalyptischen Zustand dieser Zeit bezieht’.49 In 
hindsight thirty years later Andersch concedes that it was erroneous to conduct such 
an argument with a professor of philosophy: 
 
Ich fürchte, ich habe mich mit einer Erwiderung gründlich blamiert [...] Es 
war ja auch Hochstapelei gewesen, über Sartre zu schreiben, obwohl ich 
damals von ihm nichts gelesen hatte als Die Fliegen, Die Mauer und Ist der 
Existentialismus ein Humanismus? Aber ich hatte den Eindruck, mit ihm 
käme etwas Neues.50    
 
And yet, Andersch does make the most of his sparse familiarity with French 
existentialism; for instance the 1948 essay ‘Deutsche Literatur in der Entscheidung’, 
which Andersch read at the second meeting of the Gruppe 47, conspicuously 
concludes with a quotation from Sartre’s foreword to the German edition of Les 
Mouches. Elsewhere though, as in his 1948 article ‘Nihilismus oder Moralität’, 
Andersch deemed it necessary to defend and qualify his response to Sartre’s words, 
highlighting the limited availability of German translations of the philosopher’s 
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writing: ‘Über Sartre können wir ja alle nicht reden, denn wir kennen sein Werk nur 
in Fragmenten. Es bedeutet jedenfalls keine Annahme der Sartreschen Philosophie, 
wenn ich das Vorwort zu den Fliegen zitiere’.51  Later in this article he refers to 
Sartre’s ideas ‘nur als Hilfsmittel’ in the regeneration of German literature and ‘die 
notwendige Korrektur’ for a misguided Naturalism. Nevertheless, ‘Deutsche 
Literatur in der Entscheidung’ was an important theoretical statement both for 
Andersch and the Gruppe 47. Although written at almost the same time as Sartre’s 
‘Qu’est ce que la littérature?’52 and thus uninfluenced by it, Andersch’s argument is 
based on the existentialist premise of ‘die tiefe Verwandlungsfähigkeit des 
Menschen im Allgemeinen, des künstlerischen Menschen im Besonderen’.53 
Commenting on these two literary-philosophical works and their societal function, 
Anja Koberstein observes: 
 
Sowohl Sartre als auch Andersch geht es um die Frage nach dem 
‘gesellschaftlichen Standort des Kunstwerks wie des Schriftstellers’. Beide 
gehen von einer Wechselwirkung von Literatur und Politik aus, wobei 
Freiheit die Voraussetzung und das Ziel der Literatur sei und diese durch ein 
sekundäres Handeln durch Enthüllen der Realität eine zukunftsweisende, 
gesellschaftsverändernde Wirkung habe.54 
 
Andersch nevertheless concludes that existentialism can be seen as a provisional 
stage on the way towards a new anthropology; he writes in ‘Deutsche Literatur in 
der Entscheidung’: 
 
Hier soll nicht der Versuch gemacht werden, den Zusammenbruch aller 
Werte mit einem neuen Rezept zu beantworten, dem des Existentialismus. 
Wahrscheinlich ist der Existentialismus in seiner gegenwärtigen Form nicht 
mehr als die Vorstufe einer neuen und umfassenden Anthropologie, auf die 
wir warten.55 
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A brief comparison of the programme developed by Andersch in ‘Deutsche Literatur 
in der Entscheidung’ with Sartre’s ‘Qu’est-ce que la littérature?’, in which the 
French existentialist famously coins the notion of littérature engagée, serves to 
reveal both similarities and significant differences between their aesthetic positions. 
For Sartre, Littler writes, ‘all prose writing is a social act, and creative freedom 
inseparable from social responsibility’.56 We understand this notion of 
responsibility, distinct from responsibility as liability, as an obligation or duty that 
attaches to an agent via his or her occupancy of a particular social role. A teacher’s 
responsibilities might include lecturing and nurturing; a police officer is responsible 
for safeguarding the law; a doctor is responsible for taking adequate care of his or 
her patients. Sartre claims that writers have a responsibility to combat oppression. 
Language reveals itself as an extension of the revealing power of consciousness and, 
for Sartre, the ‘committed’ or ‘engaged’ writer invites the reader to reflect critically 
upon the situation and to realise freely his or her responsibility for bringing about 
change. As he explains in ‘Qu'est-ce que la littérature?’:  
 
The prose-writer is a man who has chosen a certain method of secondary 
action which we may call action by disclosure. […] The ‘engaged’ writer 
knows that words are actions. He knows that to reveal is to change and that 
one can reveal only by planning to change. He has given up the impossible 
dream of presenting an impartial picture of society and the human 
condition.57   
 
‘The function of the writer,’ Sartre goes on, ‘is to act in such a way that nobody can 
be ignorant of the world and that nobody may say that he is innocent of what it’s all 
about’.58 The reader who is confronted with the real world in his readings cannot 
pretend to be unaware of the problems contained within it. With this awareness, the 
reader too must act to change the world, a belief which readily harks back to the 
Sartrean notion of willing the ‘other’ as free so that I may be free. The reader may 
be confronted with the fact that individual freedoms are impinged upon. Because 
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human beings long to be free, they need the greatest number of people to be free. It 
becomes the individual’s duty to act in such a way that ensures the freedom of 
others. Man’s own desire for freedom entails that he or she takes concrete measures 
to make the world one in which all human beings can experience freedom. The 
writer and reader thus come to recognise each other by mutually appealing to the 
freedom of the other. The reader/writer relationship is reciprocal in the sense that 
each party accepts his or her need for the other. Sartre summarises this dynamic as 
follows: 
 
Thus, the author writes in order to address himself to the freedom of readers, 
and he requires it in order to make his work exist. But he does not stop there; 
he also requires that they return this confidence which he has given them, 
that they recognise his creative freedom, and that they in turn solicit it by a 
symmetrical and inverse appeal. Here there appears the other dialectical 
paradox of reading; the more we experience our freedom, the more we 
recognise that of the other; the more he demands of us, the more we demand 
of him.59 
 
Just as Sartre believed it to be the task of literature to keep society ‘open’, in a state 
of permanent revolution and flux, Andersch too shared the notion of the inherently 
subversive nature of literature. For Andersch, literature became the place of 
dwelling for possibility, experimentality and uncertainty. As an existentialist form of 
self-encounter and self-liberation, literature and art carry within themselves the 
possibility of breaking away from the political and private situations that are 
difficult to bear. Literature was, for Andersch, a vehicle through which individuals 
could disentangle themselves from falsity and repression and strive towards change.  
 
Andersch’s fundamental premise is that art embodies freedom and stands in 
opposition to power. Any form of artistic expression which does not oppose power 
is thus not true art, and art which limits its freedom by adopting a cause does so to 
the detriment of its aesthetic value. Hence in a repressive regime all art which 
supports the regime is unworthy of the name. This can be used in defence of the 
                                                        




literature of Innere Emigration, as any literature that Andersch’s perceived of 
having ‘aesthetic value’ written under National Socialism must have been 
oppositional by nature. As he explains in ‘Deutsche Literatur in der Entscheidung’: 
 
Von ihr [der Literatur der inneren Emigration] zu behaupten, sie habe durch 
ihr reines Verbleiben schon das System gestützt, ist absurd; sie hat vielmehr 
in einem jahrelangen aufreibenden Kleinkrieg mit der offiziellen Propaganda 
zur inneren Aushöhlung des Systems beigetragen.60 
 
Ernst Jünger is offered as the perfect example to support this hypothesis, as 
Andersch detects a qualitative change in his prose coinciding with the rejection of 
National Socialism: ‘Die Konversion Ernst Jüngers ist das letzte Schlußstück in den 
Beweisen für unsere These, daß echte Künstlerschaft identisch war mit Gegnerschaft 
zum Nationalsozialismus’.61 
 
Andersch’s intellectual curiosities are nevertheless manifold and embrace other 
strands of existentialist philosophy that extend beyond Sartrean doctrine. An 
additional influence here was, as I mentioned at the outset, the renouveau catholique 
which took root in France at the beginning of the twentieth century. In a radio 
feature on Jacques Maritain it becomes clear that Andersch’s interest in the French 
Catholic revival was linked to perceptual and philosophical issues, as well as to 
what he saw as its progressive and constructive nature. Taking as its focal point ‘die 
revolutionäre Wiederentdeckung der thomistischen Philosophie und die Entstehung 
eines neuen geistigen Kraftzentrums in Frankreich’, Andersch provided a historical-
philosophical excursus from the perspective of a ‘Nicht-Philosophen, der die 
Leistung der Maritains [both Jacque Maritain and his wife Raïssa] innerhalb dieser 
katholischen Reformbewegung herausarbeitet’.62  
 
During this period Catholicism in France was suffering from the anti-Catholic and 
anti-clerical policies of the Third Republic. Education had undergone a process of 
secularisation and the Jesuits and most other teaching orders had been expelled in 
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the late nineteenth century. Religion was banished from the public sphere as 
religious symbols were removed from courtrooms, public acts of devotion 
prohibited, and diplomatic relations with Rome terminated. Divorce was introduced 
and Sunday work permitted. Separation of church and state became the law of the 
land. Catholicism was tolerated but not supported. On the contrary, it was seen by 
significant segments of the population as inimical to people’s well being. Those who 
retained ties with Catholicism were mostly from society’s upper echelons who had 
maintained an emotional attachment to the Church, which they associated with 
monarchical grandeur. The peasantry, who had been largely de-Christianised and 
given only rudimentary and insufficient religious instruction, relied on the Church 
primarily for baptisms, marriages or funerals. Even for those who regularly practised 
their religion, nineteenth-century Catholicism seemed fundamentally lethargic and 
inert.63  
 
In this dire situation there were serious and sensitive Catholics whose fervour was 
increased by their sense of being a community under siege. These individuals had 
often abandoned their childhood faith and become atheists in their youth, but had 
reconverted to Catholicism in adulthood. One of them was the poet, dramatist and 
diplomat Paul Claudel (1868-1955), whose works, among them Partage de midi 
(1906), L’Otage (1911), and Le Soulier de satin (1929), featured the recurring 
themes of human and divine love and the search for salvation. Poet and essayist 
Charles Péguy (1873-1914) explored in his essays, most notably ‘Un Nouveau 
Théologien’ (1913) and ‘L’Argent’ (1913), the importance and even holiness of 
poverty, the shallowness of the Church’s believers, and the sanctity of tradition. The 
novelist, essayist, pamphleteer and poet Léon Bloy (1846-1917) similarly discussed 
in his work the doctrine of the communion of saints and called attention to the poor 
as an integral part of that communion, thus depicting poverty as both a social evil 
and source of sanctification. A selection of Bloy’s prophetic tomes on reparatory 
suffering and the imminent advent of the Holy Spirit includes Le Désespéré (1886), 
La Femme pauvre (1897), Le Salut par les Juifs (1892), and Celle qui pleure (1908), 
works which constitute a strong critique of the hypocrisy and materialism of many 
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merely nominal Catholics. The philosopher and political thinker Jacques Maritain 
(1882-1973) converted to Catholicism under the influence of Bloy and dedicated 
himself to the challenge of giving Catholicism a new voice. In particular, Maritain 
stressed the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas and the philosophy of Aristotle, both of 
whose insistence on approaching the sensible world within a framework of rational 
thought struck Maritain, as outlined in his Introduction générale à la philosophie of 
1937, as the perfect means of combatting what he perceived as the materialist and 
irrationalist worldview as denounced by Pope Leo XIII in his Rerum Novarum of 
1891. The philosopher Emmanuel Mounier (1905-50) was likewise captivated by 
the Christian mysticism of Bloy and Péguy and, later, the neo-Thomist 
existentialism of Maritain. As a guiding spirit in the French movement of 
personalism, Mounier saw human beings as wholly responsible for taking an active 
role in history, even if the ultimate goal lies beyond temporal existence. As he 
articulated in his philosophical tome Qu’est-ce-que le personnalisme? (Be Not 
Afraid): ‘a philosophy of engagement […] is inseparable from a philosophy of the 
absolute or of the transcendence of the human model’.64 As a prominent figure in 
what Felix Ó Murchadha defines as the ‘revitalization of the intellectual tradition of 
Roman Catholicism’,65 Mounier offered a personalist doctrine which endeavoured to 
bridge the gulf between the individualist existentialism of philosophers such as 
Kierkegaard, and the emphasis on social and political revolution within the Marxist 
tradition. Also in his 1946 article on existentialism, published in the literary journal 
Esprit, Mounier depicts a figurative genealogical ‘arbre existentialiste’ which is 
shown with predominantly Christian roots and thick boughs of modern religious 
movements.66 Although Mounier identifies his personalism as a branch of the 
existentialist tree, he outwardly rejects what he perceived as the inherently nihilistic 
facets of the existentialist thinking of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Heidegger. In 
arguing that personal and political regeneration remained an honest possibility, he 
instead adopts a more utopian position regarding the possibilities of human 
emancipation more attuned to Marxism.  
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In keeping with the papal encyclical of Leo XIII, all of the above believed 
themselves called upon to mount an offensive against the forces of scientism and 
positivism. They sought to make use of their considerable intellectual gifts and their 
ability to structure their ideas in the form of the written word. Thus, the renouveau 
catholique in France always had about it the quality of a pro-active force, a dynamic 
counter-thrust to joust with the spiritually dead conceits of the modern world.  
 
The writings of Emmanuel Mounier, François Mauriac and Jacques Maritain in 
particular are indicative of this spirit of intellectual activism, and it is here that clear 
parallels with Andersch’s Die Kirschen der Freiheit are discernible. These men 
sought to bring a vigorous exposition of the Catholic alternative to the widespread 
despair and suffering of twentieth-century European life. Generally characterised as 
an aggressive explication of Thomistic philosophy, Maritain’s essay ‘Court Traité de 
l’Existence et de l’Existant’ of 1947 shows the philosophy of St. Thomas as one 
which has immediate applications to human life in the age of science. Written at the 
height of the post-war Sartrean revolution, when Sartre, de Beauvoir and Camus 
brought the grimness of war-torn Europe into the realm of philosophy with their 
existentialist approach towards humanity, Maritain’s ‘Court Traité’ offered a 
salutary alternative. Maritain was not content simply to rail at the twentieth-century 
existentialists as godless nay-sayers. Rather, he offered his own Christian version of 
existentialist philosophy that was founded on a Thomistic understanding of the 
human condition. Though sympathetic with what we might call popular 
existentialism’s claims about the centrality of existence, Maritain criticised its 
Cartesian disregard for essence. Particularly in the Sartrean version, existentialism is 
bereft of any determinate understanding of reality or of action. Maritain explains 
how Thomism forms the basis for his consideration of existentialist thought and 
regards St. Thomas as the only true exponent of existentialism. Describing this 
thought as ‘the only authentic existentialism’,67 Maritain seeks to demonstrate that 
far from being a distant part of history, the thirteenth-century Dominican friar 
speaks to the twentieth century as forcefully as ever. Alluding to Sartrean 
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existentialism as something of a post-war philosophical fad, Maritain also insists 
that he was not ‘attempting to trick out Thomas Aquinas in a costume fashionable to 
our day’; he was instead ‘asserting a prior right’ to the tag word of the moment. 
 
The first point to note in relation to Alfred Andersch is that Maritain’s neo-Thomist 
existentialism starts by linking human and divine freedom, and by citing St. Thomas 
in connection with his doctrine of freedom: man’s freedom is grounded in our 
reason, it is inescapably our nature,68 a notion which is reiterated in Andersch’s 
explorations of the themes of fate and predestination. Maritain sharply distinguishes 
the Kantian doctrine of freedom, which he characterises as ‘opposing the order of 
freedom to the order of nature or being,’ from Thomism which ‘unites without 
confusing them, and grounds the former in the latter’.69 For all his references to our 
nature and even to nature in general, Maritain sees as a ‘most awesome mystery’ 
‘the problem of the relation between the liberty of the created existent and the 
eternal purposes of uncreated liberty’.70 As Laura Westra affirms, ‘this should not be 
surprising in a thinker who states categorically that metaphysics precedes essence, 
and who discusses the question of freedom against the backdrop of good and evil 
and the moral life’.71  
 
Maritain’s treatise sets itself the task of answering the following question: ‘What is 
the situation of man and of his fallible liberty in the face of the absolutely free and 
absolutely immutable eternal plan established by the Uncreated in respect of the 
Created?’72 In order to answer this question, he begins by affirming the absolute 
immutability of the divine nature, the perfect comprehension by the divine scientia 
of all possible and actual creatures and created states of affairs (past, present and 
future, from the point of view of time), and the sovereign causality of God as the 
immutable One who sovereignly moves all created agents and their powers to act, 
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including the human will.73 In a word, Maritain holds that God, as Ipsum esse per se 
subsistens, is the first exemplary, efficient, and final Cause of every iota of being 
and actuality in the created order. But if Ipsum esse is the first efficient Cause of 
every iota of being and act in the created order, then it follows that He is the first 
Cause of every human act insofar as it has any ontological status whatsoever. 
Andersch’s explorations of causality in his 1952 novel again seem to echo this 
theistic position. Thus Maritain says that in every morally good human act the given 
act proceeds wholly and entirely from God, as from the first efficient cause, and 
wholly and entirely from the created agent, as from the secondary efficient cause, 
the latter being completely dependent upon and subordinated to the causal influx of 
the former.74 As Maritain explains:  
 
Let it be said right off that there are two fundamentally different ways of 
interpreting the word existentialism. One way is to affirm the primacy of 
existence, but as implying and preserving essences or natures as manifesting 
the supreme victory of the intellect and of intelligibility. This is what I 
consider to be authentic existentialism. The other way is to affirm the 
primacy of existence, but as destroying or abolishing essences or natures and 
as manifesting the supreme defeat of the intellect and intelligibility.75   
 
In making his reliance on reason known, Maritain comes as close to existentialism 
as he will permit himself to come. Maritain distinguishes between man as 
individuality and personality. Man is both an individual and a person. As an 
individual he or she is related to a community of other individuals as the part is to 
the whole. Because man is also a person, he or she is more than a social and political 
entity. Mankind possesses natural rights, and thus belongs to a society as an 
individual and has higher rights than society as a person. These higher rights involve 
the individual’s relationship with God.76     
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Mounier was also part of the French Catholic intelligentsia which took inspiration 
from the theological climate of the early twentieth century. Mounier, like his 
philosophical confreres, believed that the Catholic faith, albeit reinvigorated, offered 
a saving alternative to the age of materialism. In his eyes, the age of materialism was 
a many-headed hydra; as Seth Armus explains, it was made up of a number of 
components, all of which he saw as threats to the human spirit. Armus observes how 
Mounier was mistrustful of products of the modern era which he referred to as 
‘liberalism’ and ‘individualism’.77 Mounier proceeded to organise a counter-
movement through which he could arouse the faithful to the perils of liberal 
democracy. In 1932 he established the literary journal Esprit, which would serve as 
a forum for the dissemination of his ideas. As editor, Mounier encouraged Catholic 
writers to contribute articles not only supportive of the faith, but which were also 
critical of the whole range of evils that had arisen from the age of materialism. At 
the heart of Mounier’s revolutionary movement was the philosophy of personalism, 
whereby the individual maintains his or her individuality, but at the same time 
remains part of the body of Christ in the Catholic community. Such individuality 
was certainly not to be confused with that wilfulness of the individual that Mounier 
identified as a legacy of the popular democratic movement. On the contrary, he saw 
what passed for the emphasis on the individual or the ‘person’ in twentieth-century 
society as ‘a variety and a vagueness which risk bringing to the metaphysics of the 
individual rather peculiar obligations. In fact, every day an unrepentant 
individualism renews itself in forms of a “personalism” which is an easy 
consciousness of the self. We are thus able to see this inexhaustible “person” stand 
out as a complaisant devil’.78 In this sense, the title ‘personalism’ can legitimately be 
applied to any school of thought that focuses on the reality of persons and their 
unique existential status among beings in general. Mounier believes that the human 
person should be the ontological and epistemological starting point of philosophical 
reflection and seeks to investigate the experience, the status, and the dignity of the 
human being as person, regarding this as the starting-point for all subsequent 
philosophical analysis. 
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Alongside the vogue of atheistic French existentialism in the mid-twentieth century, 
the Catholic revival movement operated as a sort of existentialist counter-force, 
whose influence and authority was not to be underestimated. Indeed, the magnitude 
of this movement serves to underpin the spread and depth of French Christian 
existentialism before the Second World War. Other notable figures in this context 
include René le Senne, Gabriel Marcel, and Louis Lavelle. In le Senne’s second 
edition of his 1939 Introduction à la philosophie, his discussion of modern 
philosophy was divided into two sections entitled ‘l’existentialisme allemand’ and 
‘l’existentialisme français,’ and it was in this second grouping that he placed his 
own philosophy. Incidentally, all his French examples were Christian.79 Even after 
the Second World War, Christian existentialism maintained its position. In his 1946 
study on existentialism Que sais-je, Jesuit Paul Foulquié moved through atheistic 
existentialism to Christian existentialism before concluding with the Christian 
‘existentialisme essentialiste’ of Lavelle.80 Given this strong Christian tradition of 
Christian existentialism in the twentieth century it is not surprising that the most 
significant Christian response to Sartre was not to contest existentialism as such in 
toto, but rather to argue for the validity of a specifically Christian existentialist 
approach. As Mounier put it: ‘historically, existentialism is more often synonymous 
with Christian philosophy, transcendence and humanism, than atheism and despair’. 
Even if these two movements showed great divergence on metaphysical issues, they 
could nonetheless be considered as ‘comrades in the same battle’.81  
 
As will be explored in more detail shortly, Andersch readily embraced this positive 
outlook, which anticipated new certainties to replace those abolished by the radical 
scepticism of the moment. In an FAZ article from 1950 Andersch expressed his 
admiration for Bloy, whom he saw as a voice crying in the wilderness, and a 
precursor for writers like Péguy, Bernanos and Claudel. He also recognised Bloy’s 
unorthodox mysticism as prefiguring Marxism and existentialism; he observes: 
‘Aber vorläufig redet er, Bloy, allein, ein wütender Mönch, in den Urwäldern des 
Unglaubens eine Lichtung für den Glauben’.82 Describing the route from the home 
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of the Maritains to that of Bloy in Montmartre, it becomes for Andersch a spiritual 
journey, and the Parisian names invoke for him a new intellectual awakening: 
‘Banales Aufzählen von Namen!’, he explains, ‘Immerhin verbirgt sich darunter das 
geistige Feld, überzogen von spirituellen Linien und ihren Schnittpunkten, in dem 
der renouveau catholique zu kommen beginnt’.83  
 
As we will see in the following discussion, Andersch in his novels creates characters 
whose situation in life, and whose life crises, very much mirror not just Sartrean 
existentialism, but are also profoundly influenced by the theistic notions of fate and 




ANDERSCH’S NOVELS  
 
In Andersch’s literary oeuvre, existentialist flight into freedom and retreat into the 
artistic world can be seen to constitute prevailing themes, and the author’s personal 
experiences are the source of inspiration for much of his writing. Even if his 
characters – anti-heroes, disillusioned, ironically broken Hamlet figures – aspire to, 
envision or carry out visions of flight that are each individual and diverse, these 
reveries of escape are fundamentally connected by the notion that man is entitled to 
such flight. In his prose, Andersch can be seen to continually accentuate the 
individual’s right to say ‘no’ – to liberate him- or herself from autocracy and 
control, to rebuff social constraints, and strive for radical new beginnings. 
Literature, for Andersch, plays a decisive role in securing this realm of individual 
freedom because literature becomes the place of dwelling for possibility and 
freedom, experimentality and uncertainty. As an existentialist form of self-encounter 
and self-liberation, Andersch claims that literature and art carry within themselves 
the possibility of breaking away from arduous political and private situations, even 
if just in imagination, and that they thereby permit individuals to disentangle 
themselves from falsity and repression and to develop alternatives. ‘Unsere 
Betrachtung,’ he writes: 
                                                        





hat das Ausmaß des Widerstandes erwiesen, das die deutsche Literatur gegen 
den Nationalsozialismus geleistet hat, eines Widerstandes, der nicht 
abgewertet werden sollte, nur, weil ihm der endgültige Erfolg versagt war. 
Sie hat aber auch nachgewiesen, daß dieser Kampf ein riesiges Maß an Kraft 
verzehrt, viele gesunde Tendenzen in die Isolation oder in Sackgassen der 
Form getrieben und eine ganze Generation geistig schöpferischer Menschen 
verbraucht hat. Aus diesen Gründen, wie aus dem Zwang einer völlig 
neuartigen Situation heraus, steht die junge Generation vor einer tabula rasa, 
vor der Notwendigkeit, in einem originalen Schöpfungsakt eine Erneuerung 
des deutschen geistigen Lebens zu vollbringen.84  
 
Offering the possibility of self-determination and freedom, literature becomes the 
accessory of flight, whilst never being escapist. To perform their task as a 
seismograph of society and as those who encourage alternatives to the status quo, 
post-war writers like Andersch, Hans Werner Richter, Günter Eich, Wolfdietrich 
Schnurre and Wolfgang Weyrauch,85 as solitary individuals, can be seen to free 
themselves from social conventions and leap into the wilderness, the radically new. 
Andersch in particular can be seen to embrace the role of preserving the sphere of 
the non-identical and the penumbra in order to counter the collapse into self-
sameness and conventionality.  
 
The existentialist notion of the self and freedom through flight can be located in 
Andersch’s works as early as his first novel, Sansibar oder Der letzte Grund (1957). 
The novel enjoyed a warm critical reception and was lauded as a work of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung which transcends its backdrop of 1937 Germany, 
safeguarding the freedom of the individual against totalitarian ideology.86 It recounts 
the story of a group of people who in 1937 are haphazardly thrown together in the 
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small coastal town of Rerik on the Baltic Sea. Ostensibly the work deals with escape 
from Nazi Germany, for each of the individuals have been affected in some way by 
Nazi persecution: Judith is Jewish, Knudsen’s wife is threatened by the euthanasia 
programme, clergyman Helander represents the church and its accommodation with 
the regime, Gregor stands for the communist underground, and a statue by the artist 
Ernst Barlach, which the group seeks to rescue, symbolises spiritual freedom and 
entartete Kunst. Whilst Littler insists that Sartrean existentialism cannot function ‘as 
an interpretative straightjacket’ for the novel,87 there can be little doubt that 
Andersch had such an intellectual framework in mind. Gregor, as a Soviet-trained 
KPD functionary, is sent to Rerik to pass Party directives to the remaining comrades 
in the town, but plans instead to use the opportunity to escape from Germany and his 
political involvement. His is essentially a flight from communist totalitarianism 
which can be interpreted in philosophical terms. Much like the ‘Wildnis’ of Die 
Kirschen der Freiheit, the novel I will be discussing in more detail later in the 
chapter, the muffled, deadly silence of Rerik becomes a scenario of existential 
choice. As Gregor reflects upon his arrival: ‘War der tote Punkt der Ort, von dem 
aus man sein Leben ändern konnte?’88 Demonstrably reminiscent of Orestes in 
Sartre’s Les Mouches, Gregor becomes a defender of the oppressed in an act of 
emancipation, but refuses to take political advantage of the situation and ultimately 
remains in Germany. Whilst he recognises loyalty to communist ideology as a 
deplorable form of ‘bad faith’, he is unable to fathom the prospect of a life without 
ready-made standards and ideals, pondering: ‘Konnte man ohne einen Auftrag 
leben?’ (SG: 38). Knudsen similarly, as another disillusioned communist, is unable 
to understand the meaninglessness of life without the Party: ‘Knudsen wollte gar 
nicht frei sein,’ we read: ‘er wollte resignieren, still werden, sitzen und schweigen’ 
(SG: 84-5). Helander, who wishes to save the Barlach statue from the church, 
recognises the existential angst experienced by both Gregor and Knudsen, affirming 
that it is not fear of reprisal for resistance towards the regime, but a profound dread 
of deserting the only ideals which lend their lives significance (SG: 53). The figure 
of Helander denotes what Volker Wehdeking has identified as ‘der neue christliche 
Existentialismus Anderschs’, in which the absurd possibility of existence is 
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rationalised in the momentary absence of God.89 The Jewess Judith Lewin 
exemplifies in the novel the horror of objectification described by Sartre as ‘being 
for others’ or ‘être pour autrui’, having had an identity enforced on her by National 
Socialism: ‘Früher dachte ich, ich sei eine Deutsche,’ she says at one point. 
‘Seitdem hat man mich zu einer Jüdin gemacht’ (SG, 100). Redolent of the identity 
crisis experienced by Max Frisch’s Stiller (Stiller) and the believed-to-be Jewish 
Andri (Andorra), Judith similarly has been deprived of her freedom of self-
determination, which is man’s inalienable right and the only valid aim of the 
existential hero. It is only through confrontation with Judith’s existential dilemma 
that Gregor can fully comprehend his own privileged position: 
 
Nur wir drei wollen weg – ich, der Klosterschüler, das Mädchen. Aber es ist 
ein Unterschied, dachte er plötzlich, zwischen mir und den beiden 
anderen. Ich will weg, aber sie müssen weg. Ich bin zwar bedroht, mit dem 
Konzentrationslager, mit dem Tod, aber ich kann trotzdem frei entscheiden, 
ob ich bleibe oder gehe. Ich kann wählen. (SG: 57) 
 
Whilst Sansibar reveals clear strands and strains of Sartrean thinking, what can 
simultaneously be located in Andersch’s novel is a clear preoccupation with the 
theme of religious belief, and in particular, a palpable engagement with passages 
from Kierkegaard’s 1843 text Repetition (Gjentagelsen). Since the beginning of the 
war, clergyman Helander’s community, his church, and his house have become an 
empty, echoless space. For both Helander and Gregor, God has become a remote 
force. Reflecting on the white interior of the church, the young KPD functionary 
battles with his crisis of faith: ‘Das Weiß ist lebendig, [...] aber für wen lebt es? Für 
die Leere, für die Einsamkeit. [...] Die Leere, das Nichts. Kein Heiligtum. Diese 
Kirche ist zwar ein guter Treff, aber sie ist kein Heiligtum, das Schutz gewährt (SG: 
49). The cleric Helander also prays ‘gegen die Leere an’ (SG: 9), and is tormented 
by the insufferable stillness. He remarks: ‘Die Stadt, die Kirche und das Pfarrhaus 
waren zu einem schalltoten, echolosen Raum geworden’ (SG: 89). Indeed, this 
omniscient Nichts is for him ‘die Hölle’ (SG: 139). Yet it is precisely at this juncture 
that one can pinpoint parallels with Kierkegaardian doctrine, specifically his 
                                                        




deliberations on the Book of Job.90 Like Helander, that righteous and prosperous Job 
believes that God would deliver the righteous from the evils in his present life, yet 
when confronted with suffering, he is thrown into a state of confusion and despair. 
Helander similarly doubts God (SG: 51), he scorns and derides Him (SG: 48/142), 
and rebels against Him (SG: 142-3). How Kierkegaard describes Job’s quandary is a 
virtual mirror image of Helander’s dilemma; he represents  
the voice of the suffering, the cry of the grief-stricken, the shriek of the 
terrified, […] a faithful witness to all the affliction and laceration there can 
be in a heart, an unfailing spokesman who dared to lament in bitterness of 
soul and to strive with God.91 
The end of Job’s story is also comparable to Helander’s death scene. God speaks to 
Job in a great thunderstorm, and as it passes over Job is blessed and receives 
everything double that he had lost previously; as Kierkegaard explains: ‘This is what 
is called repetition’92 (‘Job er velsignet og har faaet alt dobbelt. Det kalder man en 
Gjentagelse’). For Helander there is no thunderstorm, but rather the sound of gunfire 
as he shoots at the Nazis who have come to arrest him. Angst-ridden by his moral 
predicament whether to shoot or be shot at, Helander experiences his decision-
making as a Divine act, the release of the gun as a unique expression of the 
thunderous voice of God: ‘Gott lässt mich schießen, weil er das Leben liebt’ (SG: 
144). In doing so, Helander receives, like Job, that which had previously gone awry 
– his personal understanding and love of God. This affirmation of God’s existence 
comes to him in the very moment when it seems furthest from him. Here once again 
the words of Kierkegaard seem remarkably fitting: 
 
Who would have thought of such an ending? And yet, no other ending is 
conceivable, even if this one also is inconceivable. When everything has 
ground to a halt, when thought ceases and speech is silenced, when 
explanation retreats in despair – then a thunderstorm is necessary.93 
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Andersch’s thematic interest in Kierkegaardian thinking is aptly summarised in the 
following words by Anne Raabe: ‘Die Parallele zu Kierkegaard hingegen ist wie fast 
immer bei Andersch erst auf den zweiten Blick ersichtlich und damit um so 
frappierender’.94 What can in fact be located in Andersch’s prose is, in addition to 
the mimicry of elements of Sartrean rational, an earnest and seemingly theistic 
deliberation on the absurd nature of God’s existence.  
 
Returning to discussions on the existentialist leitmotif of flight into self-fulfilment, 
this can be partly located in Andersch’s second novel, Die Rote (1960). Here the 
female protagonist, Franziska, a 31-year old translator from Dortmund, flees from 
the conflicting demands of her marriage and an affair to Venice, where after 
becoming involved in the revenge of an Irish victim of Nazism against his former 
Gestapo interrogator, she finds the emotional fulfilment she seeks in a relationship 
with ex-communist musician Fabio Crepaz. Despite the immediate popular success 
of Andersch’s 1960 novel, it was subject to considerable negative critical reception, 
the most ruinous of which denounced it as a descent into Trivialliteratur, with its 
‘whodunnit’ elements, extravagant yachts and murder plot.95 Andersch nevertheless 
defends the solemnity of his novel, emphasising the Italian Neo-Realistic elements 
in the work, but also the protagonist’s existentialist deliberations on self-
determination. In defence against the critics who objected to the timeworn happy 
ending, in which Franziska finds sanctuary in Fabio’s family home in northern Italy, 
Andersch emphasises that this was intended as a consistent and logical conclusion of 
the protagonist’s deliberations on freedom. For instance, her taking employment in a 
local soap factory constitutes, as Andersch argues, ‘ein[e] existenziell[e] und 
grundlegend[e]’ decision.96 Franziska’s act of self-determination can be seen to take 
place before the start of the novel when she encounters a Grenzsituation and 
abandons her husband. Elisabeth Plessen similarly describes Franziska’s being alone 
in a foreign land, with no money, prospects or acquaintances as ‘eine “situation” im 
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Sartreschen Sinne’.97 Franziska’s later visit to the tea-room in the luxury Hotel 
Pavone can be seen as a lapse into Sartrean ‘bad faith’, returning to the familiar 
world of her ‘leichtes Dasein als Frau’.98 Yet Littler is correct to doubt the 
consistency of the notion of existentialist freedom in this novel, claiming that 
Franziska’s desertion of her husband does not constitute an altogether rational 
choice. For instance, her experiencing a Grenzsituation is ‘wie […] ein Gottesurteil’ 
(DR: 16) which alludes to a predestined chain of causality and, indeed, a subject 
more commonly associated with the theistic existentialism of Catholic revivalists 
such as Mounier, Mauriac and Greene, as my later discussion will confirm. Littler 
similarly points out how Franziska’s destination is the result of random selection. As 
such, her decision can hardly be deemed an authentic choice in an existential sense: 
‘Es ist wie im Roulette, ich habe auf Zero gesetzt und es ist eine Farbe 
herausgekommen. Irgendwohin hieß Zero. Herausgekommen war Venedig’ (DR: 
12).99 Yet despite these critical reservations, the protagonist’s admittedly polarised 
version of existential alternatives can nevertheless be seen to evoke a curiously 
Sartrean mode of thought; contrasting the freedom of ‘l’être pour soi’ against that of 
‘mauvaise foi’, Franziska reaches the irrefutably existentialist conclusion: ‘Es gibt 
nur zwei Möglichkeiten zu leben, ganz allein oder unter den Massen’ (DR: 31).  
 
In the 1974 novel Winterspelt one can locate, in contrast to in Die Rote, a notably 
sturdier Sartrean philosophical agenda. The work’s title refers to its setting, a village 
in the Eifel close to the Belgian frontier, where German major Joseph Dincklage, 
confronted by the Americans towards the end of 1944 and convinced of the futility 
of further combat, plans to surrender his battalion with the assistance of 
schoolteacher Käthe Lenk, Czech communist Wenzel Hainstock and art historian 
Dr. Bruno Schefold. The latter of these, having salvaged a painting by Paul Klee 
from Nazi confiscation, undertakes to act as an intercessor in discussions with the 
American side, but he is detained and shot by German sentry Corporal Reidel who 
hopes thus to protect himself. The tragic futility of Schefold’s death only becomes 
apparent when it is revealed that he is carrying Dincklage’s message of withdrawal 
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from the conspiracy, for which Schefold ultimately risks, and loses, his life. A 
passage from Sartre’s ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’ is quoted in a footnote of 
Dincklage’s letter:  
 
Der Mensch ist zuerst ein Entwurf, der sich subjektiv lebt, anstatt nur ein 
Schaum zu sein oder eine Fäulnis oder ein Blumenkohl; nichts existiert vor 
diesem Entwurf; nichts ist im wahrnehmbaren Himmel, und der Mensch 
wird zuerst sein, was er zu sein geplant hat; nicht, was er sein will.100   
 
Critical interpretations of Dincklage’s plan and its failure have been manifold. 
Ursula Reinhold’s Marxist reading centres on the importance of Hainstock in the 
novel,101 whilst Max Walter Schulz stresses the positive depiction of Dincklage as 
indicative of Andersch’s sympathy with the conservative, humanistic German 
middle class.102 A significant philosophical assessment is offered by Elisabeth 
Plessen, whose essay on the women characters in Andersch’s writing draws 
particular attention to Käthe Lenk, as well as Die Rote’s Franziska and Sansibar’s 
Judith, as new manifestations of a well-established pattern of women aspiring to a 
specifically Sartrean mode of freedom: ‘In existentieller Hinsicht ist ihre Grund- 
oder Ausgangsposition allemal dieselbe. Sie heißt: frei sein, Leben in Freiheit 
wählen’.103 Considering Andersch’s inclusion of a Sartrean quote in the novel, as 
well as Plessen’s classification of Käthe Lenk, Franziska and Judith as existentialist 
heroines, Littler concedes that an existentialist reading of Winterspelt is ‘not without 
reason’,104 and that there is little doubt that Andersch intended a straightforward 
identification of Dincklage’s plan with Sartre’s ‘Entwurf’ (‘projet’). What these 
novels nevertheless accentuate is the need to exercise some scepticism when 
approaching Andersch through a solely Sartrean existentialist lens. According to 
Littler, Andersch’s understanding of Sartre’s text is ‘somewhat superficial’,105 and 
she insists that Andersch obscures the significance of the word ‘projet’ as used by 
the French philosopher. According to Littler, Käthe is, in contrast to the figure of 
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Franziska, essentially a primarily instinctive woman, whose choices derive from the 
depths of her personality, as opposed to an existential insight into human freedom.  
 
Die Kirschen der Freiheit, published as his second novel in 1952, alongside 
Sansibar oder der letzte Grund, is Andersch’s most famous work and was a succès 
de scandale following its publication. This putative autobiographical report recounts 
the story of a young German who ‘had impeccable credentials as a writer of the 
young generation: early opposition to National Socialism, a literary career which 
began after 1945 and was therefore uncompromised, and experiences of the war 
within Germany rather than from exile’.106 Although Die Kirschen der Freiheit 
evidently has an autobiographical basis and is indeed subtitled Ein Bericht, the 
details described are highly selective. Certainly, no autobiography can or should 
include exhaustive detail, but the nature of the details which are excluded from 
Andersch’s report are noteworthy. The word ‘Bericht’ implies a sober recitation of 
facts, an examination of these facts and, conceivably, the positing of a theory on 
future development based on that examination. According to Maggie Sargeant, 
Andersch’s ‘Bericht’ lacks ‘the dispassion which would normally be expected and 
the “facts” used to produce the analysis, which is itself often inconsistent, do not 
bear close scrutiny. The Geschichte created is not so much history as narrative 
bordering on the fictional. The omission of certain “truths” slant the Geschichte’.107 
Sargeant insists that Andersch’s ‘Bericht’ is not factual reporting of a life or even of 
the most important factors which constitute this life, but instead the account which 
has rehabilitation as its dominant motive and which provides Andersch’s fellow 
German countrymen with strategies for their own rehabilitation. Of the fifty-four 
‘Kriegsromane’ studied by Jochen Pfeifer in his 1981 study Der Deutsche 
Kriegsroman 1945 bis 1960, he believes Die Kirschen der Freiheit to be the greatest 
success, precisely because of the narrow picture of the war which is depicted: 
‘Durch die konzentrierte Abhandlung einer speziellen, aber zentralen Problematik 
des Zweiten Weltkrieges stellt dieser Bericht inhaltlich den gelungensten Beitrag zur 
Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit dar’.108 Pfeifer asserts that the 
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‘Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Individuum und Gesellschaft’ releases Andersch 
from encumbrances such as the depiction of affiliations with senior officers and 
wartime brutalities and that this approach allows him to focus his attention on other 
more important issues. Like Sargeant, Hanjo Kesting upholds the assertion that 
Andersch omits considerable detail from his autobiographical report, but he 
nevertheless credits the writer’s positive intentionality – Andersch was not writing 
an autobiography in the traditional sense and the logical conclusion to this argument 
is that he should not be reprimanded simply because the work does not fit with the 
critics’ expectations. It must be accepted, Kesting insists, as existing outside the 
genre, as a one-off:  
 
Er schreibt keinen Bildungs- oder Entwicklungsroman, sondern konzentriert 
sich auf die Augenblicke existentieller Entscheidung, die Stunde der Angst 
und die Stunde der Freiheit. Ein Buch mehr der abstrahierenden 
Selbstanalyse als des erzählenden Lebens. Es beweist viel Bekennerlust und 
Mut zur Selbstentblößung, aber vieles bleibt auch ausgespart: die Zeit, die 
Gesellschaft, die Menschen.109  
 
Significant here is the question of intentionality. In his biographical work on 
Andersch Stephan Reinhardt attests that the German writer considered his work to 
be an autobiography, but it also functioned as a vehicle through which to inform 
public opinion on the Adenauer government’s commitment to rearmament.110 
Andersch, therefore, also considers Die Kirschen der Freiheit in terms of the socio-
political situation in post-war Germany. As Kesting affirms, Andersch consciously 
bares a number of personal inadequacies in his work, but it is also true that some of 
his ‘confessions’ lack consistency. The details that are omitted say as much about 
Andersch’s personal and literary Vergangenheitsbewältigung as those which are 
actually contained within the work. For instance, there is no mention of Andersch’s 
half-Jewish wife and child, from whom he separated in 1937, and the period 
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between 1933 and 1945 is covered very briefly with much of the narrative devoted 
to that period relating to his introversion and withdrawal from the political world 
into the aesthetic world. He identifies this withdrawal as an ‘Emigration aus der 
Geschichte’111 and as a protest against Nazism. 
 
Some have understood Andersch’s literary ‘strategy of withdrawal’, his emphasis 
upon the freedom and at least not direct political engagement of the writer, as a lack 
of engagement with social and political realities. For instance, Günter Grass sharply 
attacked Andersch following his acceptance speech for the Georg Büchner Prize in 
1965 for his lack of political engagement and lack of direct support for Willy 
Brandt, the Social Democrats’ candidate for the chancellorship.112 In particular Die 
Kirschen der Freiheit, which will form the focus of the remainder this chapter, was 
regarded as a testimony to the de-politicisation of Andersch himself. Other scholars, 
such as Stephan Reinhardt, have argued that Die Kirschen der Freiheit remains an 
eminently political book: its publication coincided with the beginning of West 
German rearmament followed by West Germany’s incorporation into NATO in 
1955.113 Publishing a book in defence of the individual’s decision to desert as a form 
of self-encounter and self-liberation was a form of indirect critique of an affluent 
West German society, where a collective focus on consumerism in the wake of an 
era of political restoration and rapid economic recovery swept aside concerns about 
the coming to terms with the National Socialist past and its crimes, and obscured 
questions of individual and collective guilt and responsibility. 
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 In his 1952 memoir, ‘mit dem Andersch erstmals einer breiten Öffentlichkeit 
bekannt wurde’,114 Andersch recounts his experience as a soldier in the Second 
World War and his subsequent desertion in Italy, a moment that is depicted as pure, 
existential freedom and personal rebirth. The hero of this short autobiographical 
novel is Andersch himself. When the work first appeared, it was readily compared 
with Erich Maria Remarque’s autobiographical account Nichts Neues im Westen 
(1929), which had been a best-seller in the aftermath of the First World War.115 
Andersch’s work is, however, not only far less brutal and less visceral, but also far 
more introspective than Remarque’s, and more politically critical in its depiction of 
Andersch’s gradual transformation from a faithful Marxist to an advocate of 
personal freedom – a conversion that earned the book almost as much denunciation 
as the act of desertion. The book begins with the execution of a communist partisan 
who had participated in the Spartacist uprising in Berlin during January of 1919. 
This incident is of profound significance for the adolescent narrator, and he becomes 
a confirmed communist at the age of sixteen, full of courage, optimism and 
commitment to the cause of liberating the oppressed. His activities lead to his 
imprisonment and later to the concentration camp at Dachau, where he undergoes a 
kind of ideological revelation: political engagement will solve nothing, not even in 
the totalitarian state that Germany had become after Hitler and the Nazis seized 
power: ‘Ich antworte auf den totalen Staat mit der totalen Introversion,’ the narrator 
writes (KDF: 46). Subjected to psychological examination and diagnosed with 
depression, Andersch’s protagonist is nevertheless drafted into the Germany army in 
1943 and sent to the Italian front. There, on 6 June 1944, he deserts and surrenders 
to American troops about sixty miles north of Rome. In this act, he tastes for the 
first time what he describes as ‘die Kirschen der Freiheit’, the sweet moment of 
breath between contemplation and desire. As Christoph Nickenig observes: ‘Es ist 
der Moment, in dem man die Kirschen der Freiheit pflückt, die “frisch und 
herb” schmecken’.116 
   
The work’s overarching thematic premise is that human beings can never be free for 
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more than a moment. But it is upon such moments of freedom, Andersch believes, 
that lives are founded: ‘Mein Buch hat nur eine Aufgabe: einen einzigen Augenblick 
der Freiheit zu beschreiben’ (KDF: 84). It is this single and singular moment of 
freedom – Andersch’s flight from the Germany Army on 6 June 1944 – that, 
Andersch asserts, gave his life meaning: ‘dass ich, […] in einem bestimmten 
Augenblick die Tat gewählt habe, die meinem Leben Sinn verlieh und von da an zur 
Achse wurde, um die sich das Rad meines Seins dreht’ (KDF: 71). In deserting from 
the German army Andersch is breaking the bonds to his comrades and to his 
national community, as well as to the oath of allegiance he had sworn. However: 
‘der Eid kann nur von Gläubigen einem Gläubigen gegenüber geleistet werden’ 
(KDF: 107); once an individual has freed him- or herself from belief, he or she is no 
longer bound by such oaths.  
 
In exploring the intricacies of freedom and responsibility, Sartre develops the notion 
of ‘situation’ (Sartre calls his volumes of literary, political and philosophical essays 
that appeared from 1947 Situations), which has palpable echoes in Andersch’s 1952 
novel. In Sartrean philosophy, a human being is not separable from the human 
condition. A person divorced from the totality of their situations is an intellectual 
abstraction that can only be partly achieved. Fundamentally the being is 
transcending a situation that is constricted by the body, the family, the social class, 
the country, the ethnicity, etc. What I make myself is inseparably bound up with my 
projects, with my surroundings as I take them to be. In essence, the situation is the 
material objective set of the human being’s life. It is something that cannot be 
avoided, changed, or gotten rid of. The for-itself is a being-in-situation. But this 
being-in-situation is a being that constantly acts upon his or her situation. This is the 
action of the for-itself as project, which Sartre describes as the paradox of freedom: 
‘There is freedom only in a situation, and there is a situation only through 
freedom’.117 Sartre asserts that since consciousness is freedom, freedom is in a 
situation. Consciousness is in a body, and this body is its anchoring point in the 
world. It is its point of view in the world. Minimally then, the individual is situated 
in that point of view where his or her body is. Yet there is also an objective aspect of 
this situation, Sartre argues: an individual cannot help but be born in a male body, in 
                                                        




a working-class family, in Canada, in the twenty-first century. However, it is he who 
determines the meaning of this situation. This is what allows Sartre to say that the 
situation exists through freedom: the individual’s free consciousness gives meaning 
to the situation into which he or she is born. In doing so, the human being is in a 
position to transcend and surpass the situation. The situation is thus not entirely 
determining of the person’s being.   
 
In Sartrean existentialism, human being and human situation form a mutually 
dependent totality. The relations between a human being and his or her situation are 
dialectical or reciprocal. The situation presents the agent with a range of 
possibilities. The agent acts to realise some of these possibilities and this action 
alters the situation and thereby presents a new range of possibilities. Agency 
constitutes both the agent and the situation. The situation only exists as a situation 
for some agent. The agent only exists as an agent in some situation, so to be in a 
situation is to choose oneself in a situation. It follows that the relation between agent 
and situation is very close. The reciprocal relation is not only causal, nor is it only 
constitutive. Agent and situation may only be adequately understood as two aspects 
of one reality. Sartre does not express it this way, but it is as though the agent is 
inside of the situation and the situation is the outside of the agent. Thus in order to 
reconcile this dialectic relation between agent and environment with Sartre’s 
absolute libertarianism one must invoke his distinction between freedom and power. 
Although our freedom is absolute, our power is limited. Although there is no 
situation in which we do not have a choice, there is no situation which does not limit 
our power, a notion which Sartre explains in his 1947 essay ‘La Liberté Cartésienne’ 
in Situations I.118 Here he insists that the situation of a person and their powers can 
neither increase nor limit their freedom. Although what one can do is limited by 
where, as well as who or when one is, that one can do something rather than nothing 
is in no way affected. The individual retains the dispositional property of being a 
choosing agent even though the choices one might exercise vary from situation to 
situation. Clearly some choices may be unpleasant or difficult but, logically, an 
unpleasant choice is nevertheless a choice. In this sense, the expression ‘I had no 
choice’ is nonsensical. 
                                                        




These Sartrean notions concerning situations and absolute choices also evoke certain 
Jasperian existentialist concepts, most crucially, the theory of limit situations 
(Grenzsituation), and their function as unconditioned moments or situations of 
human existence. A Jasperian Grenzsituation, as outlined in his Psychologie der 
Weltanschauungen (1919),119 describes an exceptional states of existence, which 
shows when individuals face the unconditioned (das Unbedingte), a deductive and 
existentialist limit for all forms of rational, practical or experimental orientation, in 
particular modes of angst or experience their actual situation in the light of death 
and illness. It can imply that one puts into question one’s perceptual schemes, the 
implicitness of one’s daily routine, and so forth. According to this theory, a 
Grenzsituation can be understood as the unconditioned Augenblick of human reality, 
in which reason is drawn by intense impulses or imperatives, which impel it to 
expose itself to the absolute limits of its consciousness and to seek higher or more 
reflected modes of knowledge. The Unbedingte, a term transported from Kantian 
doctrines of synthetic regress,120 is thus proposed by Jaspers as a vital impetus in 
reason, in which reasons encounters its form as conditioned or limited and desires to 
transcend the limits of this form. 
 
The following utterance from the narrator in Die Kirschen der Freiheit clearly 
reveals how these Sartrean and Jasperian positions on moments and absolute choices 
are being echoed, namely that ‘life has no meaning a priori,’ since ‘it is up to us to 
give it meaning,’ as Sartre remarks; ‘value is nothing else than the meaning we 
choose’:121  
 
Mein Buch hat lediglich die Aufgabe, darzustellen, dass ich in einem 
bestimmten Augenblick die Tat gewählt habe, die meinem Leben Sinn 
verlieh, und die von da an zur Achse wurde, um die sich das Rad meines 
Seins dreht. (KDF: 71) 
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As Koberstein observes, this notion of ‘einem bestimmten Augenblick’, i.e. the 
moment in which he decided to flee from his comrades, reiterates the Sartrean and 
Jasperian notions of situation and Augenblick and the absolute freedom these both 
entail.122 Koberstein writes: ‘Freiheit steht immer in Bezug zu etwas Gegebenem, 
das durch die Realisierung der Freiheit als Versuch, sich dem Sein zu entziehen, 
genichtet wird’.123 Indeed, this ‘Gegebene’ signifies human life in a particular 
historical situation, in this instance the protagonist’s decision to flee. Also 
significant is the protagonist’s insistence that this weighty momentary decision was 
philosophically consistent and based on rational insights: ‘Ich aber war stolz auf 
meinen die Unterscheidungen mit leidenschaftlicher Kälte treffenden Kopf’ (KDF: 
25); ‘ich hatte die bessere Einschätzung der Lage’ (KDF: 67), ‘ich zog also aus 
meiner politischen Situation die Konsequenzen’ (KDF: 73-4), and ‘ich, obwohl nur 
ein “einzelner Soldat”, besaß “solche hohe Einsicht” samt dazugehöriger 
metaphysischer als auch rationaler Verantwortung […]. Ich hatte beschlossen, 
davonzulaufen. Es war eine klare Sache’ (KDF: 74). The fact that Andersch offers a 
variety of reasons for his narrator’s decision to desert shows his awareness of the 
over-simplification involved in a purely philosophical argument. The motivating 
forces include residual allegiance to communism, political rejection of the concept 
of unconditional surrender, fear of dying a futile death, and a somewhat vague 
‘Anarchie-Gefühl’ (KF: 72). Yet the overwhelmingly Sartrean tone remains 
unmistakable, with its challenge to traditional values and concern for the freedom of 
the reader. Above all, the only genuine freedom recognised is that experienced in a 
Grenzsituation, an ‘Augenblick’ of completely autonomous decision, based on 
personally defined values. In keeping with Sartrean and Jasperian doctrine, the 
constant dialectic of the alternating forces of environmental circumstances and free 
will dictates that freedom is never more than a momentary experience.  
 
Yet while expounding such basic tenets of Sartrean and Jasperian existentialism, 
Andersch can nevertheless be seen to contravene them in practice. For instance, 
Andersch praises Sartre’s successful demonstration of his ‘situation’ theory 
concerning individual decisions, which Andersch locates in Les Mouches: ‘Sartre 
                                                        





lesend empfand ich das Gefühl von einer herannahenden Veränderung. Ihr Wesen 
konnte ich nicht erkennen. Aber wie habe ich, den dritten Akt der Fliegen lesend, 
darum gebangt, dass Sartre in ihm die Tat des Orest zurücknehmen würde, dass 
Orest überwältigt würde von den göttlichen Argumenten Jupiters’.124 Here the 
impression given is one of a situation in which the outcome is dependent entirely on 
individual choices which are in no way pre-determined. This, however, cannot be 
said for Die Kirschen der Freiheit, in which the very subheading ‘Der unsichtbare 
Kurs’ carries with it the implication of an inevitable causal chain of events. As 
Littler observes: ‘The decision to desert is shown to have infused not only his future, 
but also his past life with meaning, as suggested by the image of the hub in the 
wheel of existence’.125 
 
Developing this point of contravention of Sartrean thinking, let us look closer at the 
notions of predetermination and fate (Schicksal), which in Die Kirschen der Freiheit 
form an integral part of Andersch’s philosophical stance. Koberstein is in agreement 
that ‘“Schicksal” [ist] von zentraler Bedeutung’126 in the work, yet, in a Sartrean 
existentialist sense, it constitutes the very antithesis of the concept of freedom: ‘Man 
ist überhaupt niemals frei, außer in den Augenblicken, in denen man sich aus dem 
Schicksal herausfallen lässt’ (KDF: 126). This radically contradicts Sartre’s 
premise: ‘There is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom, […] man is 
condemned to be free’.127 Furthermore, the term ‘fate’ does not exist anywhere in 
Sartrean doctrine. For Andersch, fate constitutes the absolute determination of the 
individual, from which he can selectively free himself; thus he writes: ‘Aber es ist 
unmöglich, sich für länger als einen Tag aus dem Schicksal der Massen zu befreien’ 
(KDF: 123). For this reason, the ‘Kampf des Menschen gegen das Schicksal’ takes 
place ‘in Akten der absoluten Freiheit’ (KDF: 127) in which the individual ‘sich 
gegen das Schicksal wendet und neues Schicksal setzt’ (KDF: 126).  
 
It is at this juncture that subtle thematic parallels with the philosophical positions 
associated with the Catholic renewal movements in France and England can be 
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located. Circumnavigating Sartrean doctrine, Andersch’s treatment of the concept of 
Schicksal seems remarkably more akin to the theistic positions of French reformists 
Emmanuel Mounier and François Mauriac as well as the English Catholic novelist 
Graham Greene, for whom the notions of predermination and transcendent destiny 
are central concerns.  
 
In his philosophy of theistic personalism,128 Emmanuel Mounier contends that 
human beings have an innate responsibility to take an active role in history, even 
while their ultimate goal is beyond the temporal and beyond human history. 
Personalism, as a sort of spiritualised existentialism, revolted against both capitalism 
and communism, and advocates like Mounier, Maritain and Mauriac suggested that 
individuals have intrinsic value because they were created in God’s image; they 
were ends in themselves, fulfilled through community. Mounier in particular 
contends that each individual has a special destiny in the world related to the eternal, 
to the Kingdom of God, which begins here and now. His philosophical works have 
centred on the mystery of freedom and God’s grace, free will and personal 
responsibility, and the destiny of people in the world. His thinking furthermore 
sought to convince humanity that it deserved to be loved and sought by the divine, 
bound by a transcendent destiny that presupposed a transcendent God.  
 
Fate is also a predominant theme in the novels of fellow Catholic revivalist François 
Mauriac. Typically set in the rather desolate countryside of his native Bordeaux 
region, Mauriac’s works are chiefly concerned with the sins of the flesh and the 
torments of souls torn between good and evil, between the presence of temptation 
and the apparent absence of God. Mauriac’s style was much praised for its detached 
classicism even when dealing with passionate or tormented themes, as was his 
ability to recreate the brooding and claustrophobic atmosphere of the provinces 
which mirrors the spiritual entrapment and pattern of destiny of his characters. An 
exemplary case here is Mauriac’s best-known work Thérèse Desqueyroux of 
1927.129 Thérèse can be regarded as an existentialist heroin, some decades before 
this term became fashionable, anxiously trying to make sense of herself and her 
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actions in a world overwhelmingly alien to her. She is a young woman of passion 
and guilt, shackled by the social conventions of a respectable marriage. Much like 
Andersch’s protagonist prior to his escape, the despairing Thérèse finds herself in 
existentialist dilemma, a Jasperian Grenzsituation, in which she is driven, for 
reasons that are not wholly clear, to make an absolute choice poison her husband 
Bernard with the medicine he is prescribed for his illness. The attempt fails and she 
is condemned to a life of disgrace and humiliation from which there is no escape. 
After the trial, during which her husband lies to defend her innocence, she returns 
with him and her child to the remote town of Argelouse, a symbolic landscape of 
unrelieved pines emblematic of the protagonist’s isolation and loneliness. Branded 
by her external family and husband as a wicked woman, she is placed under house 
arrest, and not even allowed to tend to her own child. She is only free to attend 
Sunday mass, yet she remains troubled by the church’s impersonal sermons on 
issues of dogma and morality, and consequently decides to never return to 
confession or communion. It is only after her father’s negotiations with the family 
following her suffering an anorexic illness during her period of imposed solitary 
confinement that she is allowed to flee for Paris, the ‘Augenblick’ which confirms 
her freedom and, concurrently, harks back to the theme of existentialist flight as an 
autonomous, life-affirming act that epitomises Die Kirschen der Freiheit.  
 
The victim of a hostile fate, Thérèse, as Mauriac said of her, ‘belongs to that class of 
human beings […], for whom night can end only when life itself ends. All that is 
asked of them is that they should not resign themselves to night’s darkness’.130 
Mauriac’s characters are generally passive, allowing destiny to decide their fate for 
them. They rarely if ever actually ‘choose’ good or evil; rather, a transcendent force 
imposes these upon them. It was precisely this notion of fate that prompted later 
generations, most notably Jean-Paul Sartre, to criticise Mauriac’s characters of being 
trapped and predestined in a quasi-Calvinist universe with none of the authentic 
freedom of choice which was a pre-requisite of the existentialist view of the human 
condition. Sartre specifically berated Mauriac’s ambiguous use of third-person 
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narration, branding it a poor example of authorial omniscience; at times ‘she’ 
reveals her own thoughts, at others ‘she’ is judged and given a destiny. Sartre writes:  
 
Mauriac […] passes from Thérèse-subject to Thérèse-object within the same 
sentence. […] Who here is judging Thérèse to be a ‘careful but desperate 
woman?’ It cannot be she herself. No, it is M. Mauriac, it is myself. We have 
the Desqueyroux dossier in our hands, and we pronounce judgement upon 
her.131 
 
As John O’Neill observes: ‘Characters whose life is congealed in the gaze of the 
author are essentially reduced to things which have a destiny but no life that the 
reader can share from the inside’.132 Sartre regarded this portrayal of predestination 
and, by inference, entrapment of the protagonist as an unfit subject for a valid novel, 
since the protagonist is evidently unable to exercise free will. The implication of a 
predestined causal chain of events nevertheless has strong echoes in Andersch’s 
1952 novel. 
 
Another writer to explore this philosophical concept, for whom Andersch repeatedly 
expressed admiration in the Frankfurter Rundschau and Europäische Avantgarde, is 
English writer Graham Greene. Greene draws on the same narrative techniques as 
those employed by his French revivalist contemporaries in his four so-called 
Catholic novels Brighton Rock (1939), The Power and the Glory (1940), The Heart 
of the Matter (1948) and The End of the Affair (1951). All Greene’s Catholic novels 
have open endings; the characters are left in a state of uncertainty with regard to 
their salvation. Like his French contemporaries, Graham Greene does not use 
divinely omniscient narrators in these four novels. What is also striking in this 
regard is the decisively modern representation of God’s presence in Greene’s 
writing. In The Power and the Glory, God is effectively silent, a passive force, and 
the attention is rededicated to the human perspective of the individual believer. 
Greene’s non-omniscient narrative mode in internal focalisation means that God can 
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only be described from the human perspective, yet it nevertheless underscores an 
unambiguous communication between man and the Divine force, whose direct 
intervention in the world is palpable.  
 
The notion of predestination again forms the thematic backbone of Greene’s 1940 
novel The Power and the Glory, in which the protagonist and focaliser is a Catholic 
priest of the most disreputable and soiled character. Residing in the Southern 
Mexican state of Tabasco in the 1930s, Greene’s protagonist suffers at the hands of 
the Mexican government who seek to suppress the Catholic Church. Indeed the 
squalid priest is the only representative of his church left in the remote state from 
which ecclesiastical practices and persons have been banished on pain of death. 
Before the persecution the unnamed ‘whisky priest’ was full of ambition and pride, 
and during the years of oppression and moral disintegration, the mortal sins of 
despair and pitiful cravenness lead him to break the vow of celibacy and father an 
illegitimate child.  
 
Yet Greene’s Catholic antihero is still an ordained priest: ‘It doesn’t matter so much 
my being a coward—and all the rest. I can put God into a man’s mouth just the 
same—and I can give him God’s pardon’.133 In spite of his personal inadequacies, 
the priest sees himself as chosen by Divine grace to continue his clandestine 
sacramental service among the Catholics of the state. He repeatedly alludes to God’s 
will during the course of action. In a state of existential despair, the priest, again 
evocative of Andersch’s deserter in Die Kirschen, experiences a Jasperian 
Grenzsituation as an moment of absolute choice, and attempts to flee from his 
situation to Vera Cruz, but fails to catch the boat because he is asked to attend to an 
ailing woman. In hindsight the priest looks upon this interruption as God’s will: ‘I 
shall miss it, […]. I am meant to miss it’.134 He declares several times that it is his 
duty not to be caught until God decides otherwise.135 And when he is finally 
captured and incarcerated his reflections in free indirect speech express clearly his 
conviction that his destiny has always been in God’s hands: 
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If God intended him to escape He could snatch him away from in front of a 
firing squad. But God was merciful. There was only one reason, surely, 
which could make Him refuse His peace—if there was any peace—that he 
could still be of use in saving a soul, his own or another’s. But what good 
could he do now? […] He didn’t sleep again: he was striking yet another 
bargain with God. This time, if he escaped from the prison, he would escape 
altogether. He would go north, over the border. His escape was so 
improbable that, if it happened, it couldn’t be anything else but a sign—an 
indication that he was doing more harm by his example than good by his 
occasional confessions.136 
 
At a later juncture in the novel the priest is approached by a mestizo, an 
untrustworthy and deceitful man who is pursuing the reward money offered for the 
priest’s identification and arrest. The priest observes that ‘it seemed as if God were 
deciding’,137 and as the mestizo does not deceive him, the priest concludes that ‘God 
had decided. He had to go on with life’ (PG, 165). In keeping with his agreement 
with God the priest travels north and crosses the border, only to find that the same 
man has divulged his whereabouts to the police, an incident which the priest looks 
upon as being part of God’s divine plan: The mestizo is Judas and he was 
predestined to betray him. Thus the betrayal, his imprisonment and execution are all 
experienced by the priest as individual acts of fate.  
 
As mentioned above, one of the most unique aspects of Greene’s novel is the 
apparent silent nature of God. The priest is in reality left to his own judgement, and 
in the human perspective everything becomes complex and contradictory. He 
reflects, again in free indirect speech, on the inherent paradox of mortal sin: 
 
You only had to turn up the underside of any situation and out came scuttling these 
small absurd contradictory situations. He had given way to despair—and out of that 
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had emerged a human soul and love—not the best love, but love  just the same. (PG, 
118) 
Choice is inevitably accompanied by ambiguity and doubt. In another passage of 
free indirect speech the priest faces the insoluble dilemma, which again has echoes 
of the existential quandary experienced by Andersch’s narrator - Should he leave or 
stay?: 
 
Had it become his duty then to run away? […]. If he left them, they would be  
safe, and they would be free from his example […]. But it was from him too 
they took God – in their mouths. When he was gone it would be as if God in 
all the space between the sea and the mountains ceased to exist. Wasn’t it his 
duty to stay, […] even if they were murdered for his sake? Even if they were 
corrupted by his example? He was shaken with the enormity of the problem. 
(PG, 74) 
 
Like the novels of his French contemporaries, Greene’s does not end in pessimism. 
Rather, it portrays a character who senses his fate as inextricably linked to a fallen 
world, only to have this other fate break into the world’s fatality to create a new fate 
– a destiny.  
 
Whilst parallels can be drawn between Greene’s and Andersch’s thematic 
engagement with the theme of predestination, the novel also explores another facet 
of fate, namely individual fate, which determines the life of singular beings, i.e. 
social setting, parentage, etc.138 Andersch also speaks of a collective fate, which can 
be equated with the term ‘Geschichte’, to which all human individuals living in an 
era of pre-determined social requirements belong. Andersch’s concern that the 
individual should not be submerged in a collective is something that notably 
pervades the philosophy of Sartre’s partner, Simon de Beauvoir, in particular, as 
well as that of Mounier and French Christian philosopher Simone Weil.139 In Die 
Kirschen der Freiheit, Andersch describes this collective fate as powerlessness of 
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the individual in a totalitarian state who lies at the mercy of higher powers. The 
extent of this limitation of personal freedom by state oppression is elucidated in the 
following statement, where the protagonist describes the political situation shortly 
before he takes flight: 
 
Sie hatten meine revolutionäre Jugend erstickt. Sie hatten mich ins 
Konzentrationslager gesperrt, […] die Genossen meiner Jugend getötet. […] 
So haben sie die Kommunistische Partei verdorben. [...] Indem sie die Partei 
verdarben, haben die dem Kampf meiner Jugend den Sinn genommen und 
mich in die Introversion getrieben. [...] Ich hatte nur die Ästhetik der Kunst 
und mein Privatleben, und das zerstörten sie durch Gestellungsbefehle. 
(KDF: 72) 
 
The protagonist’s above description of his fully determined situation also has echoes 
of the basic tenets of Mounier’s personalism, in particular the notions of political 
commitment and freedom. As Mounier explains in his philosophical volume, the 
pure, capitalist ideal of the acquisitive, self-interested individual, struggling for 
survival in a world governed by abstract economic laws or profit and loss, can 
scarcely provide a context in which spiritual values and the idea of individual 
freedom can flourish,140 a position to which Andersch’s protagonist in the above 
citation readily testifies. Depicting himself as a victim of historical circumstances, 
Andersch’s narrator is seen in this regard to contradict the Sartrean premise that 
man, ‘from the moment that he is thrown into this world, […] is responsible for 
everything he does’.141 There are no excuses, and there can be no opportunity to 
blame it on circumstances being out of one’s favour,142 as Andersch’s protagonist 
does.  
 
The fear of the Staatsmechanismus that Andersch’s protagonist faces leads to, as 
Alfons Bühlmann explains, an ‘Entleerung des Daseins’ and to estrangement from 
one’s fellow beings.143 Early in the novel the young protagonist remarks: ‘immer 
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wieder wehrt sich etwas in mir gegen das Wort “Massen”’ (KDF: 33). Later he 
utters that comrades seem ‘wie Gebannte mit einem Trieb zum einfachen Aufgehen 
im Massenschicksal’ (KDF: 100-101). He regards their presence as a further 
constraint on his freedom: ‘Sie kotzen mich regelrecht an [...]. Kameradschaft, das 
bedeutete, dass man niemals allein war’ (KDF: 63). Appearing to confirm this 
hostile position, Sartre describes the function of the ‘other’ as follows: 
 
The other is indispensable to my existence, and equally so to any knowledge 
I can have of myself. The intimate discovery of myself is at the same time 
the revelation of the other as a freedom which confronts mine, and which 
cannot think or will without doing so either for or against me.144  
 
Simone de Beauvoir similarly notes in The Ethics of Ambiguity (Pour une morale de 
l’ambiguïté): 
 
It is not true that the recognition of the freedom of others limits my own 
freedom: to be free is not to have the power to do anything you like; it is to 
be able to surpass the given toward an open future; the existence of others as 
a freedom defines my situation and is even the condition of my own 
freedom.145 
 
What we can draw from this is that Andersch allows his narrator to be defined in 
opposition to the other. This is most clearly apparent in the scene in the novel where 
the protagonist encourages his comrades to go on without him under the pretence 
that he needs to repair his bicycle tire. In a state of moral uncertainty, the protagonist 
wonders whether he should convince his fellow soldiers to flee with him, yet this 
process of self-questioning is resolved by an ever-stronger appeal to the importance 
of making one’s own decision. In this way, Andersch, Sartre and de Beauvoir can all 
be seen to indissolubly link freedom with the ‘other.’ For these writers and 
philosophers, freedom is always lived, that is, embodied and expressed, within an 
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inter-subjective context. The significance of the ‘other’ also underscores a point of 
thematic crossover with the theistic existentialist thinking of Emmanuel Mounier, 
for whom reciprocity is a necessary part of individual freedom. The French Catholic 
revivalist is certainly critical of certain aspects of the Sartrean position, in particular 
his contention that individual freedom can only have a relationship of dominance or 
subservience to that of the ‘other’. Mounier rather views this version of 
individualised freedom, confronting a hostile world, as a self-defence mechanism 
and a block in communication leading to egocentricity and alienation. Yet Mounier 
is evidently aligned with Andersch, Sartre and de Beauvoir in the belief that the 
‘other’ remains an indispensible facet in individual freedom which, he contends, 
should lead to an opening out towards others and a concern for ‘general freedom’; 
Mounier writes that in an individual’s inner experience: 
 
the person is a presence directed towards the world and other persons, 
mingled among them in universal space. Other persons do not limit it, they 
enable it to be and to grow. The person only exists thus towards others, it 
only knows itself in knowing others, only finds itself in being known by 
them.146 
 
Far from leading to isolation, man’s freedom should unite him with other men, and 
because the existence of others has a positive effect on him, they enable him to 
transcend himself, as Mounier explains: ‘Thus the positive interpersonal relation is a 
reciprocal provocation, a mutual fertilisation’.147  
 
Andersch’s thematic preoccupation with the ‘other’ is upheld throughout the course 
of the novel. At a later juncture he presents the ‘other’ as a submissive mass, which 
follows a ‘Herdeninstinkt’ (KDF: 100). For Andersch, the ‘other’ ‘[ist] nicht nur der 
Mitmensch, […] sondern der ganz andere, den man niemals kennen kann’ (KDF: 
71). Indeed, it is precisely that which sets them and him off as ‘other’ against one 
another, again evoking the Sartrean position on inter-subjectivity: ‘he man who 
discovers himself directly in the cogito also discovers all the others, 
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and discovers them as the condition of his own existence. He recognises that he 
cannot be anything […] unless others recognise him as such. […] It is in this world 
that man has to decide what he is and others are’.148 Andersch’s protagonist can only 
experience freedom in juxtaposition to the mass: ‘Das Schicksal der Massen 
vollendete sich, als ich mich für die Dauer eines Tages von ihm löste’.149 
 
KIERKEGAARD AND DIE KIRSCHEN DER FREIHEIT 
 
Of course French existentialism is not the only existentialist influence on Andersch; 
Søren Kierkegaard is arguably no less important. With the exception of Anne 
Raabe’s 1999 momentous study Das Wort stammt von Kierkegaard: Alfred 
Andersch und Sören Kierkegaard, little has been written about the Dane’s influence 
on Andersch’s literary oeuvre. There are two possible reasons for this. Firstly, it is 
primarily Jean-Paul Sartre’s influence that has been the subject of interest, as 
aforementioned studies by Plessen (1983), Jendricke (1988), Littler (1991), 
Wehdeking (1994), Heidelberger-Leonhard (1986/1994), and Koberstein (1996) 
demonstrate. Secondly, Andersch’s allusions to Kierkegaard are both rare and 
sporadic. The Dane’s influence in Andersch’s writing is hence more ‘hidden and 
unassuming, surfacing in subtle allusions or permeating the work as a whole rather 
than consisting in direct references, quotations, or explicitly stated ideas’.150 In 
reference to this latter point, it is useful to begin by surveying precisely where some 
of these Kierkegaardian references appear. Whilst Raabe acknowledges in her study 
that ‘es von Andersch nur spärliche Hinweise auf Kierkegaard [gibt]’, she 
nevertheless identifies how Andersch ‘den [Kierkegaardischen] Begriff der 
ästhetischen Existenz als ein zu überwindendes Stadium begreift’.151 Indeed, in his 
essay ‘Thomas Mann als Politiker’, Andersch refers to Mann as ‘der Romancier’, 
for whom ‘die ästhetische Existenz sich nicht selbst genug [ist]’.152 In the same 
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essay Andersch employs the phrase ‘Sein zum Tode’,153 which evokes 
Kierkegaard’s 1849 text The Sickness Unto Death (Sygdommen til Døden). As 
Raabe observes, this allusion functions as ‘ein weiteres Indiz für die 
Selbstverständlichkeit, in der Andersch mit Kierkegaards Begriffen umgegangen 
ist’.154 Andersch explicitly references Kierkegaard in a 1946 article entitled ‘Die 
Leidenschaft der Unterscheidung’, in which he pronounces: ‘Das Wort stammt von 
Kierkegaard. Er meint damit jene Grundquälitat menschlichen Denkens, die in das 
Denken überhaupt erst Qualität bringt: die Fähigkeit Nuancen zu finden’.155 A 
profound indebtedness to the Danish philosopher is likewise traceable in Andersch’s 
essay series Europäische Avantgarde of 1948, in one essay of which he writes: 
‘Kierkegaards “Leidenschaft der Unterscheidung” ist eine alte europäische 
Leidenschaft – wir wollen sie üben’.156 
 
As the following section of this chapter shall attempt to illustrate, Kierkegaardian 
philosophy, most notably his concepts of the aesthetic and ethical stages of 
existence, forms a sturdy, if not the sturdiest existentialist backdrop against which to 
approach Andersch’s 1952 novel. This hypothesis is readily supported by Raabe 
who asserts that Kierkegaardianism ‘stellt, […], in unzähligen Fällen ein 
Erklärungsmodell dar für Anderschs Charaktere und Problemstellungen’.157 The 
Dane’s influence is of remarkable scope, and the changes that Andersch’s notion of 
escape into freedom undergoes – from the notion of freedom as the dream of 
absolute self-determination to a more socially grounded understanding of freedom – 
are better understood when mapped onto the development from the aesthetic to the 
ethical sphere as described by Kierkegaard. Retrospectively, the protagonist’s 
desertion on the Italian front in 1944 can be seen as the point of culmination of a 
string of dreams, visions and short episodes of freedom and escape experienced in 
childhood and youth. His decision to desert, to break away from one’s old way of 
life and to leap into the new thereby becomes the moment of precipitation of an 
individual self.  
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We might begin this discussion by noting how the act of desertion comes to define 
the soldier, both who he was in the past and who he will be in the future. A decision 
innately reveals the kind of person that one is to become. As Alina Vaisfeld 
observes, it becomes ‘the litmus test for designating the kind of person that is also 
only formed in the very act of deciding’.158 By emphasising the revelatory function 
of the act of decision, Andersch espouses a viewpoint that comes close to that 
expressed by Kierkegaard’s Judge Vilhelm, who in Either/Or raises the question: 
‘Are you not aware that there comes a midnight hour when everyone must unmask; 
do you believe that life will always allow itself to be trifled with; do you believe that 
one can sneak away just before midnight in order to avoid it?’159 In this regard, the 
decision to desert becomes the ‘Achse […], um die sich das Rad 
[s]eines Seins dreht’ (KDF: 71), and ultimately the measure of the ‘private und 
subjektive Wahrheit’ of his existence (KDF: 71). 
 
Such a decision, however, has to be taken and carried out in solitude. Andersch’s 
protagonist knows of the togetherness of decision and solitude. Thus he ponders: 
 
Eine Nacht wird kommen, dachte ich, in der ich allein sein werde, ohne auf 
jemanden warten zu brauchen. Endgültig allein. Allein und frei. Außer 
Gesetz und Befehl. Aufgenommen von der Nacht und der Wildnis der 
Freiheit. Vorsichtig mich bewegend, durchs Gras, unter Bäumen und Felsen. 
Indianerspiel. Wolken über mir. Stimmen in der Ferne. (KDF: 60) 
 
Only when he is alone is he able to decide on a course of action and to carry out his 
plan of escape. Only when in solitude, after his comrades leave him alone believing 
that he needs to repair his bicycle tire, is Andersch’s protagonist confronted with 
this challenge. He wonders whether he should have persuaded his fellow soldiers to 
flee with him, yet this process of self-questioning is resolved by an ever-stronger 
appeal to the importance of making his own decision. He would otherwise have 
been encouraging his comrade to making a choice that was not his own, but rather 
borrowed from someone else. No one but the individual him- or herself can make a 
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decision regarding his or her existence. As the protagonist puts forth: ‘Man kann nur 
versuchen, ihnen die Möglichkeiten zu zeigen, aus denen sie wählen können’ (KDF: 
71). It is nevertheless important to note the underlying sense of cowardice that 
quietly pervades this scene. The protagonist rationalises his thought process by 
emphasising the need for individuals to make individual choices, yet had he tried to 
convince his comrades in the form of ‘others’ they might have stopped him and 
apprehended him as a deserter. In this regard it appears somewhat remiss to 
impulsively glorify the protagonist’s actions, for what his attempt at freedom 
signifies is an implicit sense of egoism and self-interest in the face of the ‘other.’ To 
reiterate a point made earlier, his comrades remain an integral part in his freedom, 
yet Andersch’s narrator can only experience freedom in juxtaposition to the ‘other.’ 
 
Essentially, the freedom that the individual strives for is something to be achieved 
and not to be granted. It is also something that essentially belongs to the individual 
because the individual is essentially free. Freeing himself is, for Andersch’s 
protagonist, the act of laying claim to a fundamentally human entitlement. ‘Ich 
wollte ‘rüber’, he says, ‘weil ich mir damit aufs neue das Recht 
erwarb, Bedingungen stellen zu können, auf die ich mir schon in der Vergangenheit 
einen Anspruch erworben hatte’ (KDF: 81).  In his voice, one can hear resonate also 
the voice of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous Anti-Climacus whose explorations of the 
notion of ‘self’ in The Sickness Unto Death are legendary in their opacity. The self, 
according to Anti-Climacus, is freedom,160 and what one is to understand by this is 
that each individual ‘is destined to become himself, and as such every self certainly 
is angular, but that only means that it is to be ground into shape’.161 What Anti-
Climacus means by this is that the self is both discovered and constructed, and that 
the individual’s proper role is a sort of ethical editor, or an artist who works with the 
materials and their limitations to create a work, a self.162 In this same way, achieving 
freedom is of paramount importance for the protagonist of Die Kirschen der Freiheit 
because it constitutes, in this regard, the fullest actualisation of his potential to be.  
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Yet, as Andersch acknowledges, freedom is rare, it is a fragile and fleeting good: ‘In 
jenem winzigen Bruchteil einer Sekunde, welcher der Sekunde der Entscheidung 
vorausgeht,’ he writes, ‘verwirklicht sich die Möglichkeit der absoluten Freiheit, die 
der Mensch besitzt. [...] Frei sind wir nur in Augenblicken. In Augenblicken, die 
kostbar sind (KDF: 84). Although similarly located in Sartrean doctrine, Andersch’s 
emphasis on the momentary character of freedom and the preciousness of the instant 
also has Kierkegaardian overtones; these manifest themselves in particular in the 
concept of the ‘moment’ (øjeblik), which Kierkegaard discusses in his 1844 work 
Philosophical Fragments and similarly in the Concept of Anxiety, in which 
Kierkegaard has Vigilius Haufniensis explain how ‘the moment is not properly an 
atom of time but an atom of eternity’.163 Freedom dwells in decision, or rather, 
freedom is decision, because the latter is taking possession of man’s potential to be 
absolutely free. In Die Kirschen der Freiheit, freedom can be seen to be a hasty gap 
between two extended periods of un-freedom: life as a German soldier and life as 
the American war prisoner that Andersch’s protagonist is destined to become. Even 
if freedom is but the no-man’s-land ‘zwischen der Gefangenschaft, aus der [er] kam, 
und derjenigen, in die [er] ging’ (KDF: 81), it remains a precious instant worth 
striving for: the redemption of the fundamental human entitlement is to become the 
free individual that one has the potential to be,164 even if only for a given but crucial 
moment in one’s life. 
 
As I relayed earlier in this study, the notion of anxiety or angst also commands a 
central place in the Danish philosopher’s existentialist thinking, which refers us to a 
generalised anticipation of the future. Of particular significance is the differentiation 
between the notions of ‘fear’ and ‘angst’, in the sense that fears have specific 
objects, whereas angst or anxiety can be defined as a natural emotion that stems 
from contemplating the eternal dilemmas of human existence. This distinction 
corresponds to the grammatically distinct notion that people have fears, as 
something one possesses, whereas they are anxious, indicating a condition of being. 
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This grammatical distinction is less evident in the German, however (Angst haben). 
In his 1952 work Andersch also reflects on the Kierkegaardian concept of angst. In 
his autobiographical novel the narrator outlines four collective components of 
human individuals: Angst, Mut, Vernunft and Leidenschaft. The protagonist 
explains: ‘Zwischen Angst und Mut treten die beiden anderen natürlichen 
Eigenschaften des Menschen, Vernunft und Leidenschaft. Sie führen die 
Entscheidung, die er zwischen Mut und Angst zu treffen hat, herbei’ (KDF: 84). The 
narrator comprehends the concept of ‘Leidenschaft’ as the antithesis of ‘Vernunft’, 
yet not necessarily ‘im “feindlichen” (KDF: 84) Sinn’, as Raabe observes, but rather 
‘als notwendige Ergänzung’.165 Kierkegaard similarly perceives human reason and 
abstract thinking to be extended through passion: ‘Give a person energy, passion, 
and he is everything’,166  he writes. The human being is comprised of these four 
characteristics which are fundamentally indispensible; thus the protagonist of Die 
Kirschen der Freiheit reflects: ‘Denn wie kann bis zum Mord entschlossene Freiheit 
herrschen zwischen Eigenschaften, die so offensichtlich zur menschlichen Natur 
gehören, daß, wollte man auch nur eine von ihnen amputieren, die Seele sterben 
müsste?’ (KDF: 84-85). 
 
Of these four characteristics, angst is attributed as having the greatest significance; 
the narrator relates: ‘Beschrieb den Menschen, weil ich meine Angst zu beschreiben 
habe. Unsere Angst’ (KDF: 88). In doing so the narrator, like Kierkegaard, 
differentiates between Furcht, i.e. fear, on the one hand, and Angst on the other. 
Andersch similarly applies the term as coined by Kierkegaard, which has since and 
through him been admitted into modern existentialist thinking: ‘Die Furcht und ihre 
höchste Steigerung, der Schrecken, kommen von außen auf den Menschen zu, 
während die Angst bereits von Anfang an in ihn eingeschlossen ist’ (KDF: 83-84). 
Looking retrospectively at this explanation, Raabe observes: ‘die Gefühlslage [war] 
während der zweiten Verhaftung des Erzählers von diesem selbst nicht zutreffend 
bezeichnet’.167 Indeed, he speaks in this context predominantly about his acute 
feelings of angst: 
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Als ich in den Stunden, die meiner zweiten Verhaftung folgten, auf der 
Holzpritsche in einer großen, überfüllten und stinkenden Zelle der Münchner 
Polizeidirektion lag, packte mich die Angst, die mich in der Haft-Zeit vorher, 
im Lager, niemals hatte antasten können. (KDF: 40) 
 
Later he appears to correct himself, referring to his current situation as fear-ridden, 
as opposed to angst-ridden, evoking the Kierkegaardian differentiation: ‘Kopflose 
Furcht hat mich nur einmal in meinem Leben ergriffen, im Herbst 1933, in jener 
Zelle des Münchner Gestapo-Gefängnisses, als ich zum zweiten Mal verhaftet 
worden war’ (KDF: 83). As Raabe notes: ‘Aus dem Gedanken, dass die Angst dem 
Menschen wesentlich angehört, folgt, dass ihre Bestimmung nicht durch das 
gegeben werden kann, auf das sie sich richtet’.168 Indeed, the essence of angst is not 
a definite course, but rather its all-encompassing nature. The protagonist gives 
utterance to it when depicting the anxiety he experienced when at the theatre: 
‘Und noch heute denke ich, wenn ich im Theater sitze, in den Sekunden, ehe sich 
der Vorhang hebt, daran, dass ich eines Tages werde sterben müssen’ (KDF: 49). He 
similarly speaks of a ‘tiefe[s], angstvolle[s] Lebensgefühl’ (KDF: 49), a state of 
angst that centres on the perceived threat of everyday reality. The inexplicable 
nature of angst also finds expression at the beginning of the chapter entitled ‘Die 
Angst’. Following an exchange between the protagonist and Lieutenant Meske, the 
narrator describes a part of the surrounding landscape and proclaims: ‘Diese Gegend 
legte einem das Gefühl der Angst nahe’. A view of the sea stimulates similar 
feelings of dread. Previously in the novel the sea is depicted as a longed-for 
destination, a ‘Chiffre für Freiheit’169 (see KDF: 32, 56, 62, 75). Yet at this juncture 
it is portrayed as threatening, lonely, ‘ein schieferfarbenes und tückisches Weltende-
Meer’ (KDF: 79), and, by implication, a force of rivalry. The protagonist feels 
anxious at the sight of the landscape, and consumed by its enormity. Andersch 
personifies parts of the landscapes, which appear to be physically covered in angst; 
thus he speaks of ‘[die] von Weltangst erfassten Pinien’ (KDF: 79). Yet it is 
precisely the interconnection between the narrator’s experienced angst and the 
attainment of freedom that places us firmly back in Kierkegaardian territory. 
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Kierkegaard asserts that angst is not a determinant of freedom, but rather is a dual 
sense of enticement and alarm produced in the consciousness of innocence by the 
‘nothing’ or ‘indeterminateness’ both of the possible self and of the ‘being able’ 
(freedom’s possibility). Angst is essentially a troubled awareness of freedom and 
precedes the leap from one stage of life to the next. For the protagonist in Die 
Kirschen der Freiheit, angst is a crucial state which drives him towards courage at 
the decisive moment: ‘Niemals hätte ich den Mut zur Flucht aufgebracht, wenn ich 
nicht im gleichen Maß, in dem ich mutig war, feige gewesen wäre’ (KDF: 90), he 
admits. His feelings hence reveal ‘ein ähnliches komplementäres Verhältnis [...] wie 
bei Kierkegaard’; as Raabe notes: ‘Bei diesem schafft die Angst vor der Möglichkeit 
den Mut zur Wirklichkeit’.170 In short, through the experience of angst the 
protagonist ultimately realises – in the double sense of the word – his right to 
choose, which in turn lends his future life meaning and significance.   
 
*    *    * 
 
What my discussion makes manifest is both the scope and eclecticism that underlie 
Alfred Andersch’s unique existentialist standpoint. Hans Magnus Enzensberger 
perceived in Andersch’s thinking ‘ein antizyklisches Denken,’ an essential 
oppositional attitude to the prevailing Zeitgeist,171 and the inferences drawn from 
this appraisal of Andersch’s work serve to further reinforce this study’s overarching 
premise regarding the inherent contradictions and inconsistences arising from the 
multitude of theological, anthropological and literary positions that colour 
Andersch’s literary oeuvre. What an analysis of scholarship reveals is how 
researchers have tended to focus by and large on Andersch’s preoccupation with and 
adherence to Sartrean existentialism. Andersch’s protagonist’s act of desertion was 
‘gefärbt […] von Sartres existenziellem Akt’, as Wehdeking asserts;172 Ulrich Fries 
and Günter Peters have labelled Sartre as Andersch’s ‘existentialistischen 
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Ziehvater’;173 Gerhard Hay similarly upholds in his essay from 1994 that Andersch’s 
anthropology was defined ‘in großen Maße von Sartre’;174 and there is 
unquestionably a considerable degree of truth to these claims. As a key figure in the 
post-war Junge Generation movement, co-editor of Der Ruf, and as someone 
involved in the founding of the Gruppe 47, the intellectually curious Andersch 
embraced the Sartrean post-war notion of littérature engagée: to bolster the freedom 
of the reader whilst renouncing any attempt to influence his or her choices, to 
thematise the subversive nature of literature, and to underscore the overarching 
premise that art embodies freedom and stands in opposition to power. Literature 
was, for both Sartre and Andersch, a vehicle through which individuals could 
extricate themselves from falsity and suppression and strive towards change. Such 
notions are particularly discernable in his 1952 novel Die Kirschen der Freiheit, 
most palpably in his assertion that the only genuine freedom recognised is that 
experienced in the ‘Augenblick’ of a completely autonomous decision based on 
personally defined values. In keeping with Sartre’s ‘situation’ theory, the constant 
dialectic of the alternating forces of environmental circumstances and free will 
dictates that freedom can never be more than a momentary experience.  
 
Yet a contrastive examination of Andersch’s writing uncovers both reservation in 
his reception of Sartre and, simultaneously, a profound engagement with 
Kierkegaardian as well as French and English Catholic revival theistic existentialist 
ideas. Indeed, what his 1952 novel also illustrates is Andersch’s clear preoccupation 
with the theme of fate, or ‘Schicksal’. ‘Der unsichtbare Kurs’ in Die Kirschen der 
Freiheit likewise serves to refocus, if not altogether rebuff, the Sartrean notion of a 
‘situation’ in which the outcome is dependent entirely on individual choices which 
are in no way pre-determined. Andersch’s notion of an inevitable causal chain of 
events sharply contradicts the fundamental Sartrean premise that ‘There is no 
determinism, man is free, man is freedom, […] man is condemned to be free’.175 
Whilst some scholars acknowledge the discrepancies in Andersch’s application of 
Sartrean doctrine, most notably Koberstein, Raabe and Littler, they have failed to 
                                                        
173 Ulrich Fries & Günter Peters, ‘Zum Verhältnis von Kunsttheorie und ästhetischer Praxis bei 
Alfred Andersch’, in Alfred Andersch: Text und Kritik 61/62 (Munich: Richard-Boorberg, 1979), pp. 
27-53, p. 32. 
174 Gerhard Kay, ‘Die Kirschen Etruriens’, p. 20. 




explore in sufficient depth the potential for a Catholic revivalist reading of Die 
Kirschen der Freiheit. What lies at the heart of Mauriac’s Thérèse Desqueyroux and 
Greene’s Power and The Glory, as two cases in point, is not only a concern for the 
theme of existentialist flight into self-fulfilment, but also, and perhaps more 
significantly, the spiritualist notion of pre-destination. For Andersch similarly, fate 
appears to constitute the absolute determination of the individual, from which he can 
only momentarily free himself: ‘Aber es ist unmöglich,’ Andersch has his 
protagonist state, ‘sich für länger als einen Tag aus dem Schicksal der Massen zu 
befreien’ (KDF: 123). 
 
Andersch’s existentialist eclecticism is of course, as we noted, further reinforced by 
his concern for Kierkegaard’s theistic existentialism. With the exception of Anne 
Raabe’s publication from 1999, studies on Kierkegaard’s influence on Andersch are, 
compared to the interest invested in the impact of Sartrean existentialism, negligible. 
Andersch is considerably indebted to the Danish father of existentialism, and my 
study has sought to remind us of the degree to which Kierkegaard’s Either/Or, The 
Sickness Unto Death and his Repetition constitute a no less crucial existentialist 
philosophical backdrop against which to read and interpret Andersch’s literary 
oeuvre than Sartre’s brand of existentialism. The self, according to Kierkegaard’s 
Anti-Climacus, is freedom;176 each individual ‘is destined to become himself, and as 
such every self certainly is angular, but that only means that it is to be ground into 
shape’.177 Kierkegaard explains that the self is both discovered and constructed, and 
that the individual’s proper role as a sort of ethical editor, or as an artist who works 
with the materials of life and their limitations to create a work, a self.178 In this way, 
achieving freedom is of paramount importance for the protagonist of Die Kirschen 
der Freiheit because it represents, in this regard, the fullest actualisation of his 
potential to be. The Kierkegaardian notion of angst similarly establishes a key 
thematic backdrop to the work. Angst essentially stands for a troubled awareness of 
freedom and precedes the leap from one stage of life to the next. For the protagonist 
                                                        
176 Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, p. 29. 
177 Ibid., p. 33. 
178 This is evocative of Judge Vilhelm’s words in Either/Or: it is the individual’s task to take his or 
her concretion as he or she finds it and ‘order, shape, temper, inflame, control – in short, to produce 





in Die Kirschen der Freiheit, angst constitutes a crucial state of mind which drives 
him towards courage at the decisive moment; he concedes: ‘Niemals hätte ich den 
Mut zur Flucht aufgebracht, wenn ich nicht im gleichen Maß, in dem ich mutig war, 
feige gewesen wäre’ (KDF: 90). 
 
Our findings lead us conclude that what can essentially be located in Andersch’s 
writing is an eclectic blend of philosophical positions from which a distinctive 
metaphysical standpoint amalgamating theistic and atheistic existentialist aspects 
has come into fruition. Andersch’s captivation with Sartrean existentialism is 
unarguable, as are his political engagement in the résistance and his fascination with 
Sartre’s literary theory, as articles in Der Ruf, Europäische Avantgarde and Merkur 
demonstrate. Also indisputable is his commitment to ‘engaged’ literature, an 
indebtedness to which his poem andererseits readily testifies. The characteristically 
Sartrean concepts of the flight into freedom, situational freedom in the form of 
‘Augenblick,’ and bad faith similarly form a decisive existential backdrop against 
which to read his 1952 novel Die Kirschen der Freiheit. Studies by Ingeborg 
Drewitz, Wolfgang Rath, Rhys Williams, Anja Koberstein, Margaret Littler, Irène 
Heidelberger-Leonhard and Volker Wehdeking serve testament to the abundance of 
scholarly attention to the impact of Sartrean existentialism on Andersch’s literary 
production in the post-war years; yet their findings cover only one dimension of this 
author’s existentialist interests. 
 
Using these studies as a springboard, the overarching intention of this chapter has 
been to provide a broadened philosophical reassessment of the genesis of 
Andersch’s unique brand of existentialism. Whilst Sartrean concepts such as 
freedom, decision and choice have been productively employed by Andersch in his 
literary works, they appear in a new context, often with a new purpose. His re-
framing of the Freiheitsbegriff by way of his belief in ‘eine von Gott verliehene 
existentielle Freiheit’,179 as a case in point, not only supports the above hypothesis, 
but it simultaneously alludes to an Annäherung an Christentum and, by inference, a 
counter-position to Sartrean atheism. This position is further explored in Die 
Kirschen der Freiheit, where the protagonist ruminates over God’s existence:  
                                                        





Gäbe es ihn [Gott] nicht, so wäre an seiner Stelle das Nichts. [...] Es wäre ein 
genauso Großes, Heiliges wie Gott. Es wäre so ungeheuer und so ungeheuer 
verpflichtend wie Gott.  Gott würde in das Nichts eintreten und es göttlich 
machen. Das Nichts wäre Gott! Schon heute sind, im Denken der Menschen, 
die das Nichts denken, Gott und das Nichts identisch. Alle Denker des 
Nichts sind religiöser Denker. (KDF: 113) 
 
Drawing on Andersch’s Gottesverständnis, this investigation has located in Die 
Kirschen der Freiheit a programmatic exploration of such themes as fate and 
causality, themes which form the very core of the French and English reformist 
Catholic works of François Mauriac, Emmanuel Mounier, Jacques Maritain and 
Graham Greene. Probing these religious influences further, this chapter has 
examined Kierkegaard’s concept of angst as well as his notion of the aesthetic and 
the ethical stages of existence, all of which form an additional existentialist 
philosophical backdrop against which to interpret the characters populating 
Andersch’s literary oeuvre. In particular Kierkegaard’s consideration for the 
distinctive existential stages of human life as explained, for example, in Either/Or, 
serves as an edifying model for various characters in Andersch’s prose.  
 
This chapter shall conclude by reinforcing the scope and diversity of Andersch’s 
existentialist influences, which can be seen to have relativised the overarching 
significance of Sartrean existentialism in Die Kirschen der Freiheit. Sartre was 
nevertheless of profound philosophical importance for Andersch personally, whose 
doctrine facilitated, if not prompted, the compiling of Andersch’s memoirs, as well 
as his public defence and philosophical rationalisation of his desertion from the 
German Army in 1944. Anja Koberstein’s concluding remarks have particular 
resonance in this regard: 
 
Auch wenn Andersch die Sartresche Philosophie so sehr umdeutet, dass man 
ihn [Sartre] nicht mehr als Existentialisten bezeichnen kann, [...] sind Sartres 




häufig missverstanden bzw. umgedeutet, in der Nachkriegssituation neue 
Handlungsmöglichkeiten eröffnen.180  
 
It nevertheless remains evident that if any philosophical doctrine were to function as 
an existentialist interpretative foil for Andersch’s 1952 novel, it would have to be, at 
least as much, the twentieth-century Catholic revivalism of Emmanuel Mounier, 
Jacques Maritain, François Mauriac and Graham Greene as well as the theistic 
existentialism of Søren Kierkegaard, rather than a purely Sartrean straightjacket. 
                                                        
















Mit Heinrich Böll ist einer der Großen der deutschen Literatur von uns 
gegangen. [...] Er war ein Anwalt der Schwachen und ein Feind der 
Selbstgerechtigkeit. Er trat für die Freiheit des Geistes ein, wo immer sie in 
Gefahr war. Er war unbequem und streitbar, er erregte Anstoß und erzeugte 
Achtung. Seine mutige, engagierte Wache und immer wieder mahnende 
Stimme wird uns fehlen. Sein Werk bleibt.1 
 
These words of condolence sent to Heinrich Böll’s widow by Richard von 
Weizsäcker, the sixth German Bundespräsident, upon her husband’s passing on 16 
July 1985, draw attention to an intriguing paradox with regards to Heinrich Böll’s 
literary legacy. The first president of the Bundesrepublik Deutschlands was 
honouring one of the Republic’s most critical adversaries. Over ten years previously, 
at the height of the public hysteria over radical left-wing urban terrorism, Böll had 
been branded a dissenter after vehemently criticising the problem of right-wing 
demagogy in the Springer press and the crypto-fascism of the Bild-Zeitung.2 He was 
vilified as ‘nicht einen Deut besser als die geistigen Schrittmacher der Nazis’, and 
                                                        
1 Cf. Franz Josef Görtz (ed.), Heinrich Boll. Zu seinem Tode. Ausgewählte Nachrufe und das letzte 
Interview (Bonn: Inter Nationes, 1985), p. 56. 
2 ‘Will Ulrike Gnade oder freies Geleit?’, Spiegel, 10 January 1972. According to Böll this was not a 
defense of Ulrike Meinhof or the Baader-Meinhof Group, but was an attempt to bring reason to an 
emotional political issue and suggest mercy and restraint as the basis for a solution to a national crisis; 
cf. Heinrich Böll, Werke: Essayistische Schriften und Reden, vol. 2: 1964-1972, ed. Bernd Balzer 
(Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1978), p. 543ff. 
‘Man has places in his heart that do not yet  
exist, and into them enters suffering in order  
that they may have existence’ 
                                - Léon Bloy 
                                             (quoted by Graham Greene 
                                                          in the frontispiece of The 




‘gefährlicher als Baader-Meinhof’.3 His condemnations similarly provoked 
opprobrium in the political sphere, as is evident in the 1974 public address from then 
chairman of the parliamentary CDU/CSU and subsequent Federal President, Karl 
Carstens:  
 
Ich fordere die ganze Bevölkerung auf, sich von der Terrortätigkeit zu 
distanzieren, insbesondere auch den Dichter Heinrich Böll, der noch vor 
wenigen Monaten unter dem Pseudonym Katharina Blüm [sic.] ein Buch 
geschrieben hat, das eine Rechtfertigung von Gewalt darstellt.4  
 
Weizsäcker’s words of condolence, which were written in a private capacity, 
nevertheless point to a different appraisal of Heinrich Böll: that of a writer, 
committed intellectual, and so-called ‘conscience’ of the German nation.  
 
The label Gewissen der Nation is commonly attributed to the 1917 Cologne born 
German writer and can be traced as far back as Der Spiegel’s title story from 6 
December 1961, which deliberated the role of German writers confronted with the 
challenges of the recently erected Berlin Wall. It became particularly synonymous 
with Böll throughout the 1960s. Adorno echoed these sentiments in an essay from 
1967 which he wrote to commemorate Böll’s fiftieth birthday: ‘So ist er wirklich 
zum geistigen Repräsentanten des Volkes geworden, in dessen Sprache er schreibt’.5 
Böll’s fiction expresses, generally speaking, a preoccupation with human affairs in 
the broadest sense and on all levels, be it ministering to the most basic of human 
needs such as warmth, food, a place to rest one’s head, or through demonstrating 
man’s desire for love, friendship and comradeship. It is this unostentatious and 
                                                        
3 For a detailed anthology of the condemnations made in the wake of Böll’s persistence on nonviolent 
conduct and a fair trial for the Rote Armee Faktion, see Frank Grützbach (ed.), Heinrich Böll: Freies 
Geleit für Ulrike Meinhof: Ein Artikel und seine Folgen (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1972), p. 
104/p.147. 
4 Cf. Klaus Schröter, Böll mit Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: 
Rowohlt, 1992), p. 119. See also Heinrich Böll, Die verlorene Ehre der Katharina Blum oder Wie 
Gewalt entstehen und wohin sie führen kann (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1974); the novel 
recounts the tale of an innocent woman whose life is turned upside down by a ruthless police 
investigation and an intrusive tabloid reporter. The preface of the novel states: ‘Sollten sich bei der 
Schilderung gewisser journalistischer Praktiken Ähnlichkeiten mit den Praktiken der Bild-Zeitung 
ergeben haben, so sind diese Ähnlichkeiten weder beabsichtigt noch zufällig, sondern unvermeidlich.’   
5 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Keine Würdigung’, in In Sachen Böll: Ansichten und Einsichten, ed. by 




plainspoken quality of Böll’s fiction that accounts for the critical recognition and 
acclaim that his works generated in the Federal Republic, not just within literary 
scholarship or politics, but also on a more popular level by appealing to everyday 
people.  
 
Yet such laudatory designations were not always valued by Böll, who avowed: 
 
Ich will nicht Deutschlands Heinrich sein, [...] Deutschland braucht keine 
Präzeptoren, deren hat es genug gehabt, es braucht kritische, aufmerksame 
Bürger, die nicht immer und unbedingt Autoren sein müssen [...]. Ich bin 
gegen Helden-Verehrung, Denkmäler, Images und Ikonen.6 
 
For the 1972 Nobel laureate, an unwanted label of this nature was 
‘lebensgefährliche[r] Wahnsinn’,7 for it implied a culpable avoidance of individual 
responsibility; if the term Gewissen der Nation were to have any validity, it could 
only properly be attached to the people’s ‘Parlament, ihr Gesetzbuch, ihre 
Gesetzgebung und ihre Rechtsprechung’.8 Of greater importance for Böll was the 
inherent responsibility involved in the task of writing, and the ethical imperative in 
one’s perception of reality. When asked in 1949 ‘Worin besteht Ihrer Meinung nach 
heute die Aufgabe und die Bedeutung des künstlerischen Schaffens?’, Böll replied: 
 
Den Dingen ihren Namen zu geben. Die Wirklichkeit einzuordnen in eine   
Symbolik, die der Welt innewohnt. [...] Alle ‘Zeiterscheinungen’ transparent 
zu machen, so dass das Gültige sichtbar wird.9 
 
For Böll, the duty of the author is to represent the reality of the individual, which 
cannot be located in statistical records of historical occurrences. To illustrate this 
point more lucidly: a historian may write about two battles and detail the fates of the 
defeated and triumphant, the writer of literature, however, must portray the 
                                                        
6 Cf. Heinrich Böll, Heinrich Böll 1917-1985: Zum 75. Geburtstag, ed. Bernd Balzer (Berlin: Lang, 
1992), p. 300. 
7 Interview Heinrich Böll und Hans-Peter Riese, ‘Gespräch über Selbstverständlichkeiten’, in L’76 6 
(1977), pp. 5-37, p. 7. 
8 Ibid. 




resounding significance and impact of these events on the common individual: ‘Die 
Wahrheit des Dichters ... ist, dass beide Schlachten […] Gemetzel waren, dass für die 
Toten die Blumen nicht mehr blühen, kein Brot mehr für sie gebacken wird, der 
Wind nicht mehr für sie weht’.10 
It is nevertheless evident when looking back over Böll’s literary career that a 
remarkable thematic and ideological consistency informs his work – themes such as 
humility, love, truth, charity, suffering, responsibility, faith are a common theme 
throughout – to the degree that a concise label such as ‘national conscience’ to frame 
Böll’s essential achievements may be justifiable, his nagging self-doubt 
notwithstanding. If Gewissen der Nation is too grandiose a term, he could perhaps be 
more accurately defined, as Michael Butler reasons, as a ‘conservative moralist’. 
Böll, according to Butler, 
 
perceives and describes a society whose political, social and religious 
institutions are in drastic need of correction; he is conservative in that the 
values he seeks to defend and to inculcate are rooted in […] the Gospel 
narratives of the New Testament and, in secular terms, in the humane tenets 
of the European Enlightenment.11  
 
Reflecting on the various labels that have become synonymous with Böll in recent 
decades, the main thrust of this study will be to consider the aptness and suitability of 
a new label, namely an existentialist label, against which to read and interpret Böll’s 
writing. Whilst it is not the intention of this dissertation to categorize Böll as a fully 
fledged existentialist, if such a task were even possible, what this chapter will seek to 
investigate are the various strands and strains of nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
existentialist thinking that have both informed and transformed the fundamental 
axioms of Böll’s aesthetic credo. In this study, select pieces from his literary oeuvre, 
beginning with Der Engel schwieg (1949/50) through to Ansichten eines Clowns 
(1963), will serve to document the German writer’s attempts throughout his literary 
                                                        
10 Heinrich Böll, ‘Die Stimme Wolfgang Borcherts’, in Werke: Essayistische Schriften und Reden 
1952-1963 (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1979), pp. 161-165, p. 161. 
11 Michael Butler, ‘The Conservative Moralist’, in The Narrative Fiction of Heinrich Böll, ed. 




career to cultivate, refine and develop his thinking on existentialist matters, including 




Approaching this task will be no simple feat. Heinrich Böll was not a man of narrow 
interests; his life’s work addresses the political, social, moral and religious concerns 
of his epoch and he remained a dominant force in German intellectual public life 
until his death in 1985. As a result, the secondary literature on Böll is both 
thematically broad and vast in quantity.12 Since the publication of Rainer Nägele’s 
Heinrich Böll: Einführung in das Werk und in die Forschung in 1976,13 the number 
of studies dealing with the life and work of Böll has continued to rise. Although 
Nägele in 1976 judged this body of work to be ‘immerhin noch übersehbar’, his 
bibliography already comprised over two hundred entries. Later German and English 
language studies which serve testament to the sustained interest in Böll’s literary 
legacy include Hans Joachim Bernhard’s Die Romane Heinrich Bölls (1971)14, 
Jochen Vogt’s Heinrich Böll (1978),15 Robert C. Conard’s Understanding Heinrich 
Böll (1992),16 Bernhard Sowinski’s Heinrich Böll (1993),17 Werner Bellmann’s (ed.) 
Das Werk Heinrich Bölls (1995),18 Frank Finlay’s On the Rationality of Poetry: 
Heinrich Böll's Aesthetic Thinking (1996),19 Bernd Balzer’s Das literarische Werk 
Heinrich Bölls (1997),20 Christine Hummel’s Intertextualität im Werk Heinrich Bölls 
(2002),21 Melanie Helm’s Spes contra spem: Ansätze zu einem Kirchenbild der 
                                                        
12 The database in the Heinrich Böll Archives located in Cologne today records over 2,000 titles. 
These stem largely from German-speaking countries. It also lists Master and doctoral theses, thus 
further underscoring the ongoing interest in Heinrich Böll’s fiction at academic institutions throughout 
the world. 
13 Rainer Nägele, Heinrich Böll: Einführung in das Werk und in die Forschung (Frankfurt a/M: 
Athenäum, 1976).  
14 Hans Joachim Bernhard, Die Romane Heinrich Bölls: Gesellschaftskritik und Gemeinschaftsutopie 
(Berlin: Rütten und Loening, 1971). 
15 Vochen Vogt, Heinrich Böll (Munich: C.H Beck, 1978). 
16 Robert C. Conard, Understanding Heinrich Böll (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1992). 
17 Bernhard Sowinski, Heinrich Böll (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1993). 
18 Werner Bellmann, Das Werk Heinrich Bölls. Bibliographie mit Studien zum Frühwerk (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher, 1995). 
19 Frank Finlay, On the Rationality of Poetry: Heinrich Böll's Aesthetic Thinking (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 1996). 
20 Bernd Balzer, Das literarische Werk Heinrich Bölls. Einführung und Kommentare (Munich: 
Deutscher Taschenbuch, 1997). 




Zukunft bei Heinrich Böll (2005),22 as well as Werner Jung and Jochen Schubert’s 
(ed.) ‘Ich sammle Augenblicke’: Heinrich Böll 1917-1985 (2008).23 
 
The focal interests of these studies are unsurprisingly diverse; the latter publication 
includes a range of essays exploring themes such as Humor und Wirklichkeit in 
Böll’s fiction (Jost Keller), Böll’s travels in Ireland and his fascination with Irish 
literature (Gisela Holfter), as well as the Gesellschaftkonzept in Böll’s early stories 
and novels (Walter Delabar). The volume edited by Bellmann similarly provide a 
comprehensive overview of some of the thematic and ideological components 
fundamental to Böll’s thinking, the most valuable of which for our purpose is Beate 
Schnepp’s study of the literarische Strömungen that shaped Böll’s creative thinking, 
including Andersch, Sartre and Bloy.24 Another key essay from this edited collection 
is Gabriele Sander’s ‘Die Last des Ungelesen’ which, by reference to a number of 
first-hand sources including letters and interviews, details Böll’s early literary and 
philosophical influences (Hölderin, Kleist, Kierkegaard, Bloy, among others) and 
their prevalence in his literary productions.25 Hans Joachim Bernhard’ study is 
centred on his analyses of the early narratives Wo warst Du, Adam? and Der Zug war 
pünktlich. His focal concern is the ‘Problem der Tradition’ and the degree to which 
‘es Böll gelingt, an Traditionen einer realistischen, in der Tendenz plebejisch-
demokratischen Literatur festzuhalten’. Bernhard also asserts the need for a 
‘genauere Bestimmung der ästhetischen Auffassungen des Autors’, a need which is 
to some degree remedied by Frank Finlay’s 1996 study, which provides a detailed 
exploration of the central concerns of Böll’s aesthetic credo. These include the 
literary restoration of the junge Generation, retreat from literary realism, the social 
and moral duty of the writer (engagement), Moral der Sprache as well as his search 
for Heimat; Finlay also investigates the relationship between form and content in 
Böll’s works. Christine Hummel’s comprehensive and illuminating study of 
intertextuality in Böll’s oeuvre surveys the explicit and implicit references to artistic 
                                                        
22 Melanie Helm, Spes contra spem: Ansätze zu einem Kirchenbild der Zukunft bei Heinrich Böll 
(Münster: LIT Verlag, 2005). 
23 Werner Jung and Jochen Schubert (eds.): 'Ich sammle Augenblicke' - Heinrich Böll 1917-1985 
(Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 2008). 
24 Beate Schnepp, ‘Die Aufgabe des Schriftstellers: Bölls künstlerisches Selbstverständnis im Spiegel 
unbekannter Zeugnisse’, in Das Werk Heinrich Bölls: Bibliographie mit Studien zum Frühwerk, ed. 
Werner Bellmann (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995), pp. 45-60. 




works and their creators; Hummel’s findings are presented predominantly through 
reference to autobiographical impartations, interviews, essays and speeches from 
Böll, and her tracing of intertextual references is plotted from Böll’s early works 
through to his later creations.  
 
What is of particular interest for the purpose of my own investigation is the degree to 
which Böll’s literature and thinking has been discussed within a philosophical 
existentialist context. In short, aside from a few sporadic publications, this subject 
has received only cursory attention in the secondary literature. The earliest notable 
publication is Theodore Ziolkowski’s 1962 essay ‘Albert Camus and Heinrich 
Böll’,26 which seeks to uncover areas of thematic crossover between these ostensibly 
diverse writers. Ziolkowski explains how Böll and Camus are united in their 
existentialist concern for the individual, who is an exile in this world, and strives to 
accentuate the spirit of metaphysical revolt that constitutes a driving thematic force 
in a number of Böll’s and Camus’s fictional works, specifically Billard um halbzehn 
and La Chute and La Peste, respectively.  
 
Surprisingly, the following decades saw little scholarly interest in Böll and 
existentialism, yet a handful of studies from the mid to late 1990s and early 2000s 
sought to reassess this issue. In his 2005 publication Choices and Conflicts: Essays 
on Literature and Existentialism,27 Hans van Stralen dedicates an entire chapter to an 
‘ethical-literary existentialist’ reading of Böll’s Der Engel schwieg. The essay begins 
promisingly and outlines its intention to discuss Böll’s 1949/50 novel against a 
backdrop of existentialist topoi, in particular the limit situation, the other and 
commitment. A lack of focussed methodological engagement, however, renders 
these discussions somewhat meandering and superficial. Van Stralen’s treatment of 
the term ‘authenticity’ for instance is problematic, as it is presented with no concrete 
philosophical explanation or justification. Sweeping references are similarly made to 
Heidegger’s ‘das Man’ without sufficiently thoughtful reasoning. The study similarly 
                                                        
26 Theodore Ziolkowsi, ‘Albert Camus and Heinrich Böll’, in Modern Language Notes 77.3 (May 
1962), pp. 282-291. 
27 Hans van Stralen, ‘An Unwelcome Book: About Heinrich Böll’s Der Engel schwieg’, in H. van 






fails to confront the positioning of either theistic or atheistic existentialist philosophy 
in Böll’s work at large, a subject which this dissertation shall treat as both necessary 
and fundamental. 
 
By contrast, Beate Schnepp’s ‘Die Aufgabe des Schriftstellers: Bölls künstlerisches 
Selbstverständnis im Spiegel unbekannter Zeugnisse’ is arguably the most significant 
publication to discuss Böll’s writings within a metaphysical framework. Crucially, 
though, Schnepp’s predominant scholarly concern is not existentialism, but rather the 
development of Böll’s literarische Tätigkeit and artistic ambitions. The essay offers a 
thorough examination of the multitude of aesthetic positions, styles and movements 
that informed Böll’s creative output, including discussions of Hans Werner Richter’s 
Realismuskonzept, theistic and atheistic existentialism, Catholicism as a literary basis 
(Bloy, Greene, Bernanos, Kierkegaard), wealth and poverty as integral themes, to 
name a representative selection. Included within Schnepp’s illuminating 
deliberations are valuable references to first-hand sources, including excerpts from 
interviews and letter correspondences, in which themes such as existentialism or the 
artistic duty of the writer are explicitly discussed. This essay will serve as a principal 
point of reference in my own upcoming discussions.   
 
An essay by Gerhard Sauder in Jung and Schubert’s ‘Ich sammle Augenblicke’ takes 
as its focal point the role of Léon Bloy as a ‘stilistische[s] Vorbild’ in the 
development of Böll’s radical Catholicism.28 Sauder seeks to reveal how Bloy’s 
‘Mystik der Armut’ constitutes a central thematic influence on Böll’s oeuvre. But 
like van Stralen’s chapter, this study too fails to broach the specifically existentialist 
backdrop against which to interpret the theme of suffering in the works of these two 
deeply Christian writers. Gabriele Sander’s 1995 essay ‘Die Last des Ungelesen’ is 
more developed in this regard in how it illuminates in chronological order the 
lineages of a multitude of Böll’s ideological affinities, including such existentialist 
figures as Kierkegaard, Bloy, Hemingway, Greene, Sartre and Camus. Sander offers 
an exhaustive overview of the various changes and developments in Böll’s aesthetic 
thinking, yet at no point does she expand these suppositions on a specifically 
                                                        
28 Gerhard Sauder, ‘Heinrich Bölls Léon-Bloy-Lektüre: Ursprünge eines radikalen Katholizismus’, 
in 'Ich sammle Augenblicke' - Heinrich Böll 1917-1985, ed. Werner Jung and Jochen Schubert 




interpretative textual level to engage with their concrete traces in or ramifications for 
Böll’s novels; in essence, the study, for all its potential, does not progress beyond a 
first albeit helpful overview. 
 
Whilst these studies evidently recognise the potential for an existentialist reading of 
Böll’s fictional oeuvre, the results are often either too narrow in scope, or lacking a 
sufficiently rigorous methodological framework. As such, it is among the aims of 
this chapter to make amends for these deficits in the secondary literature. Indeed, 
what this study will seek to reveal are the variegated theistic and atheistic strands of 
existentialist thinking that colour Böll’s theistic and philosophical vision and give 
rise to the sense of affinity with the existentialist outlook that many of Böll’s works 
generate for his readers. Included in this vision are key aspects of Sartrean, 
Camusean, Kierkegaardian, and both French revivalist and personalist doctrine.  
 
As a first step we need to contemplate the development of Böll’s aesthetic credo. I 
will use his theoretical and essayistic writings to focus attention on Böll’s literary 
philosophy, his views on ‘engagement’ and literary commitment, the task of the 
writer and, above all, the compatibility of Böll’s theoretical standpoint with that of 
French écrivain engagé, Jean-Paul Sartre and his theoretical predecessor, the 
personalist Christian thinker Emmanuel Mounier. 
We will then move on to explore the tangible links between Böll’s early fictional 
works with the theistic existentialist doctrines of Søren Kierkegaardian Léon and 
Bloy. Kierkegaard, Bloy and Böll can all be seen to regard suffering as a path to 
individual and authentic self-affirmation. Suffering establishes the individual’s 
vitality, combative spirit, morality, fears, ideas and acts, as well as that which the 
individual has neglected or failed to do in his or her life. In a metaphysical sense, a 
successful and meaningful human life is not, for these thinkers, characterised through 
having overcome suffering; ‘vielmehr geht es einem gelungenen Leben darum,’ as 
Alexander Pschera explains in his study of Bloy’s work, ‘im Schmerz zu bestehen’.29 
It is through pain that the individual is able to fully individualise his or her worldly 
mission and purpose. Precisely these themes will be taken up and explored in Böll’s 
                                                        




novels Der Engel schwieg and Und sagte kein einziges Wort as well as in a selection 
of his short stories. 
 
In Böll’s later publications, specifically his writing from the 1960s, the influence of 
Albert Camus becomes more prevalent in his literary oeuvre. This will constitute the 
third focus of my study. In Ansichten eines Clowns, the incongruity and irrationality 
of human existence, apathetic protagonists, and the flight into an objective order of 
ready-made, institutionalised values can be seen to constitute dominant metaphysical 
themes. Coloured with Christian values and iconography as they are, Böll’s 
narratives, his earlier works in particular, do not immediately lend themselves to a 
comparison with the atheistic existentialist doctrine that was current in post-war 
France; what a closer reading of Ansichten eines Clowns reveals, however, is a 
gradual moving towards the existentialist ideology of French-Algerian thinker Albert 
Camus. 
 
BÖLL AND EXISTENTIALISM 
 
What do we know of Böll’s engagement with existentialists and existentialist 
thought? In a letter to Axel Kaun written in Mai 1948 Böll seeks to outline his 
theoretical standpoint; in doing so, he references the literary and philosophical 
Strömungen of the era to which he can be seen to articulate a certain, albeit at that 
time imprecise affinity. He admits: ‘Ich weiß nicht genau, was die sogenannten 
Existentialisten [!] wollen, aber ich habe die dunkle Ahnung, dass ich etwas 
Ähnliches möchte’.30 The uncertainty and vagueness of Böll’s position is compacted 
into his sensing a ‘dunkle Ahnung’; clearly, the German writer felt a particular 
sensitivity to the existentialist agenda and was aware of thematic commonalities that 
interlinked with his own developing aesthetic ideology, yet at this juncture in time 
Böll was not able to substantiate or put this ‘dark intuition’ into more concrete terms. 
Other letters that follow in this period reveal how the term ‘Existentialismus’ 
remained prevalent in Böll’s correspondence, yet continued to be nebulous in its 
application. Thus in July 1948 Böll wrote to Moritz Hauptmann, editor of the post-
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war literary magazine Karussell, that he ‘ohne je etwas “Existentialistisches” gelesen 
zu haben – auf dieser ebenso dunklen wie reizvollen Linie angelangt [ist]’.31  
 
Of course, Böll was not alone among his contemporaries; he was engaging with and 
responding to ‘ein geradezu zeittypisches Phänomen’32 that found widespread 
resonance in a time of political upheaval and cultural disorientation. According to 
Beate Schnepp, existentialism offered ‘ein theoretisches Erklärungsangebot für das 
die Zeit prägende Lebensgefühl’.33 Some years later, in a 1953 interview with Paul 
Schallück, Böll was able to more coherently outline his ideas about existentialism, in 
which he appeared to merge that movement’s philosophical deliberations with his 
own ‘literarisches Programm’; he now writes:  
  
Ich möchte mir und meinen Lesern Klarheit verschaffen über die    
Grundthemen der menschlichen Existenz. Denn ich glaube, dass die 
Mehrzahl der Menschen heute von sich aus nicht die Bedingungen des 
Lebens durchschaut. Viele Menschen leben im Unwichtigen, denken, reden, 
tun Unwichtiges, leben an ihrem Wesen vorbei. Ich möchte sie davon 
ablenken, [...] und aufmerksam machen auf das Wesentliche. Für mich ist das 
Wesentliche in diesem wie in anderen Fällen das Existenzielle [!], das 
Gesetzte, allen Menschen Vorgegebene, das Urphänomen des menschlichen 
Lebens.34  
 
Yet whilst these remarks might suggest Böll’s embracing existentialist philosophy, 
the rest of the interview is dedicated to his defining his position in contrast to that of 
existentialism, the atheistic existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre in particular; he 
asserts:  
 
Sartre sieht nur den Menschen, ausgesetzt ins Nichts, in dem er sich selbst 
begründen und bewähren soll. Ich sehe und erlebe den Menschen und auch 
                                                        
31 Letter from Böll to Moritz Hauptmann, July 1948, cited in Beate Schnepp, ‘Die Aufgabe des 
Schriftstellers’, p. 50. 
32 Schnepp, ‘Die Aufgabe des Schriftstellers’, p. 50. 
33 Ibid. 




seine Existenz in Ableitung von und in der Hinwendung zu Gott, der für mich 
nur der christliche Gott ist.35 
 
Already in 1948 Böll explained in another letter to Axel Kaun what he perceived to 
be the inextricable unity of his literary agenda and his fundamentally religious 
worldview: ‘Ich kann nicht lassen, daran zu glauben,’ he explains, ‘dass es einen 
“christlichen Existentialismus” geben muss, der entgegen aller Romantik und aller 
substanzlos gewordenen Tradition für uns Junge die religiöse Bindung wirklich 
wieder zu einem Erlebnis machen kann’.36 Significant here of course is the 
widespread disinterest in and rejection of Böll’s literary output in the post-war years 
that both economically and emotionally beleaguered the German writer. A few 
weeks before writing the above letter, a newspaper had rejected his text Das 
Vermächtnis: ‘die Brüder wollen nichts so scharf Antimilitaristisches’, he complains; 
‘drei Jahre nach dem Krieg muss man sich schon wieder vor dem Publikum 
fürchten’.37 It was predominantly Böll’s ‘christlicher Inhalt’38 that proved to be 
particularly detrimental, and his subsequent inability to find his ‘literarische Heimat’ 
was a distressing experience for the writer. Böll’s ‘künstlerische Heimatlosigkeit’ 
was further reinforced by the repeated rejections from newspapers and editorial 
offices in the late 1940s. As Böll bemoans in a letter to the editor of the Kölnische 
Rundschau, Wilhelm Mogge, even the Catholic press were reluctant to accept his 
work. It seemed impossible, wrote Böll, 
 
für einen jungen Schriftsteller, der weder auf der devotionalistischen noch auf 
der sentimentalen Ebene sich bewegt, andererseits natürlich keinen ‘Namen’ 
hat, so dass er aus konventionellen Gründen hin und wieder gedruckt werden 
muss; unmöglich also scheint es, eine Chance zu bekommen, die sich unter 
dem Motto ‘Christentum und Demokratie’ verantworten ließe. 
 
In the process of developing his künstlerisches Selbstverständnis Böll remained 
steadfast in the belief, as Beate Schnepp elucidates in her essay, that ‘der “richtige 
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Weg”, […] bestand in der Verbindung seiner religiös-weltanschaulichen 
Überzeugung mit der literarischen Art, einer Synthese von Christentum und 
Schriftstellerei’.39 As Schnepp rightly observes, Christian faith was and would 
remain a fundamental and immovable facet of Böll’s artistic production. Böll was 
nevertheless aware of the difficulty in juggling Catholic belief and literary 
possibilities, and he explains this imminent disparity in his 1959 essay ‘Kunst und 
Religion’:  
 
[...] er [der Christ] hat ein Gewissen als Christ und eins als Künstler, und 
diese beiden Gewissen sind nicht immer in Übereinstimmung. [...] So bleibt 
das Dilemma, Christ zu sein und zugleich Künstler und doch nicht 
christlicher Künstler.40  
 
This quandary also informs a letter sent by Böll to Father Alois Serwe in 1952, in 
which he writes: ‘ein Katholik und zugleich ein Schriftsteller zu sein. [...] Worüber 
soll ein Katholik, der Schriftsteller ist, schreiben? Warum soll er nicht ein zentral 
religiöses Thema, wie es die Beichte ist, schriftstellerisch zu gestalten versuchen 
[...]?’.41  
 
It is thus reasonable to assert that, in addition to responsibility, ‘das Wesentliche’ and 
the human condition, faith and religious creed constitute equally important thematic 
underpinnings to Böll’s aesthetic programme. Indeed, it is at this juncture in time in 
his budding career that certain strains of the theistic branches of the arbre 
existentialiste, specifically those of Søren Kierkegaard and Léon Bloy, become 
discernable in Böll’s thinking. 
 
Böll had accorded a particular status to the Danish existentialist thinker ever since he 
first became acquainted with Kierkegaard’s philosophical doctrine prior to the 
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outbreak of the war; talking in an interview in 1977, Böll described this somewhat 
haphazard encounter as follows: 
 
Ein Freund meines Bruders war ein Maler, und der hatte mir mal so ein 
kleines Bändchen Kierkegaard geschenkt, da war ich siebzehn, so 1934, und 
ich dachte, mein Gott, das ist ja wahr, nicht? So wie man als Junge ein Buch 
liest, und hab mir dann später diese Tagebücher besorgt, die hatt [sic.] ich 
immer bei mir.42 
 
In a letter written to his future wife Annemarie Cech in July 1941, Böll again 
expresses his admiration for Kierkegaard’s writing: 
 
Ach, ich habe jetzt noch ein schönes Buch von Alois zum Namenstag 
bekommen: die Tagebücher Kierkegaards; er ist einer der Männer, die ich am 
meisten verehre, von allen modernen Christen wie Bloy und Dostojewski und 
Chesterton.43 
 
Kierkegaardian philosophy was evidently of great importance for the young Böll. A 
letter to Wolfgang Stemmler from 1966 reveals how Böll carried ‘die Tagebücher 
und einige kleine Schriften’ around in his rucksack; he continues: ‘Ich habe schon als 
siebzehn-achtzehnjähriger Schüler Kierkegaard gelesen, erst in einer billigen, also 
für einen Schüler erschwinglichen Anthologie, dann später die Tagebücher in der 
Haeckerschen Übersetzung’.44 Kierkegaard’s reflections on Christianity and the 
church, guilt and original sin, angst and despair, as well as poetry and duty resonated 
strongly with the adolescent and young adult in the 1930s and early 1940s. Indeed, 
Kierkegaardian themes and motifs found what Gabriele Sander describes as ‘ein 
starkes Echo’,45 which would later resound in the German writer’s own literary 
creations. Evidence of this fascination can be located in his 1948 story Das 
                                                        
42 ‘Ich habe nichts über den Krieg aufgeschrieben’: Ein Interview mit Heinrich Böll und Hermann 
Lenz, in Literaturmagazin 7: Nachkriegsliteratur, ed. Nicolas Born and Jürgen Manthey (Reinbek bei 
Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1977), pp. 30-74, p. 42. 
43 Heinrich Böll an Annemarie Cech, 30. July 1941, in Jochen Schubert (ed.), Heinrich Böll: Briefe 
aus dem Krieg: 1939-1945, vol. 1 (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2001), p. 231. 
44 Heinrich Böll an Wolfgang Stemmler, 29. October 1966, cf. Stemmler, Max Frisch, Heinrich Böll 
und Sören Kierkegaard, PhD Dissertation, Munich 1972, p. 112. 




Vermächtnis (first published in September 1982 owing to its rejection in the 
1940s),46 in which Böll explicitly mentions Kierkegaard’s diaries. This captivation is 
also evident in Böll’s 1963 Ansichten seines Clowns, in which the protagonist Hans 
Schnier claims to have read Kierkegaard: ‘Ich habe später sogar Kierkegaard 
gelesen (eine nützliche Lektüre für einen werdenden Clown), es war schwer, aber 
nicht anstrengend’ [AC: 8], he tells us. 
 
This citation is taken from the opening pages of Böll’s novel, in which Hans Schnier, 
in his disjointed deliberations on his depressed state, his failed relationship with 
Marie and his reading Kierkegaard, berates the hypocrisy and tedium of 
institutionalised Christianity, and chastises the political orientation of the Church: 
 
Nicht nur anstrengend, sondern auf eine überflüssige und unnatürliche Weise 
anstrengend. Zuerst beteten sie miteinander, und ich wusste die ganze Zeit 
über nicht, wohin mit meinen Händen und meinem Gesicht; ich denke, in 
eine solche Situation sollte man einen Ungläubigen nicht bringen. […] Es 
wurde einer der peinlichsten Abende meines Lebens. Ich kann einfach nicht 
glauben, dass religiöse Gespräche so anstrengend sein müssen. Ich weiß: an 
diese Religion zu glauben ist schwer. [AC: 7-8] 
 
One way to approach Ansichten eines Clowns is to see its basic theme as the conflict 
between abstract rules and concrete behaviour, principle (Christendom) and practise 
(Christianity), between the force of order and the desire for freedom. Seen from this 
vantage point, one can discern Böll’s own tempered resentment regarding the failings 
of the Catholic Church in twentieth-century Germany. These sentiments are 
elsewhere evinced in his 1958 essay ‘Brief an einen jungen Katholiken’, in which 
Böll bemoans: ‘es gibt ja keine religiösen Auseinandersetzungen mehr, nur noch 
politische, wie die des Gewissens, werden zu politischen gestempelt: Magere Jahre 
stehen bevor, [...] Wir werden gezwungen, von Politik zu leben’.47 In the 1960s Böll 
also criticised the so-called ‘progressive’ Catholic movement, which, in his view, 
had abandoned its spiritual purpose. One consequence was that Böll left the Church 
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in the 1970s after refusing to pay his Kirchensteuer. He died a Catholic yet never 
reclaimed official membership within the institution.48   
 
One hundred years earlier, Kierkegaard had, during his lifetime, also vocalised a 
similar dissatisfaction with the Lutheran Church in Denmark. His final philosophical 
output before his death can be seen as one of the most vilifying attacks on the 
institutionalised Church ever published. These confrontations were made in a series 
of articles published between 1854 and 1859,49 which have been compiled in the 
book Attack upon ‘Christendom’.50 Kierkegaard and Böll are united in their concerns 
regarding the discrepancy between ‘true’ Christianity and the pseudo-Christianity 
practised by the ‘modern’ institutionalised Church. Furthermore, both Kierkegaard 
and Böll observe a radical dilution of Christian values in their respective epochs and 
a fundamental distortion of the understanding and practise of ministry. For 
Kierkegaard, Church ministers prioritised a comfortable living over the preaching of 
the Gospel, and they were thus ‘making a fool out of God’ by proclaiming something 
so far removed from the New Testament.51 He goes on to incite his reader to visit 
any Church on Sunday and make this assessment for him- or herself. ‘Christendom’, 
he remarks, ‘is not the Church of Christ […] Not by any means. No, I say that 
“Christendom” is twaddle which has clung to Christianity like a cobweb to a fruit.52 
 
Kierkegaard’s 1850 publication Practise in Christianity (Indøvelse i Christendom) is 
also a veritable diatribe against the ‘calamity’ that has occurred in contemporary 
religious practise.53 Through the pseudonym Anti-Climacus, Kierkegaard laments 
how Christendom ‘has abolished Christanity without really knowing it itself’.54 
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Furthermore, to call oneself Christian has become ‘a nothing, a silly game’,55 a mere 
matter of course. Sixth months before his death in 1855, Kierkegaard published the 
article ‘This Must be Said; So let it be Said’ (‘Dette skal siges; saa være det da sagt’) 
in an issue of Fatherland; in it he scalds: 
 
Yes, this is the way it is, the official divine worship (professing to be the 
Christianity of the New Testament) is, Christianly speaking, a forgery, a 
falsification. But you, you ordinary Christian, you are entirely bona fide 
credulous in the conviction that everything is quite in order, is Christianity of 
the New Testament. This falsification is so entrenched that there may be even 
pastors who entirely bona fide go on living in the delusion that everything is 
quite in order, is the Christianity of the New Testament.56 
 
Yet Kierkegaard is not the only theistic existentialist ‘geistige Verwandtschaft’57 to 
stand behind Böll’s writings. Indeed, Böll’s condemnation of the institutionalised 
Catholic Church evident in both his essayistic and fictional works reveals parallels 
with another theistic existentialist thinker, namely Léon Bloy. The life of this zealous 
polemicist and apologist is crowded with contradictions and extremes. In his 
commitment to poverty, Bloy refused to work and demanded the financial support of 
his friends and family. He and his wife Jeanne, along with their two children, lived in 
abject poverty in Montmartre. Their two sons, André and Pierre, died of starvation in 
1885. The family’s experience of suffering was authentic, continuous and concrete 
beyond what most people can imagine.58  
 
Bloy’s radical Christian Lebensphilosophie led him to the steadfast conviction that 
poverty is ‘die einzige wahre, dem Christen gemäße Existenzform’.59 Bloy also 
viewed society, with its aspirations for wealth and abundance, as fundamentally 
unchristian and demonised. The French thinker’s disparagement was directed 
towards those responsible for exercising determining influence on the acquisitive 
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development of society, including the wealthy, as well as the Catholic Church, both 
of whom, in Bloy’s opinion, dismissed the distress and suffering of the poor and 
needy. In the interview ‘Eine deutsche Erinnerung’, Böll can be seen to voice similar 
concerns; he observes:      
 
Die Entwicklung der abendländischen Kultur ist geprägt von zwei 
Hierarchien, die uns beherrschen, dem Staat und der Kirche, die immer sehr 
gut miteinander arbeiten, auch wenn sie sich gelegentlich bekämpfen, weil 
natürlich die Unterordnung und Unterwerfung unter die oder jene Hierarchie 
der jeweils anderen dient. […] Die Kirchen dienen immer noch als 
Domestizierungs-Institutionen, das kann ein Staat immer gut gebrauchen.60 
 
Direct references to Bloy in his essayistic writing evince Böll’s early literary 
encounter with the French revivalist thinker; in his 1981 autobiographical reflection 
Was soll aus dem Jungen bloß werden?, Böll thus writes: ‘und so schlug denn kurz 
vor dem Ende des Jahres 1936 Léon Bloy’s Blut der Armen wie eine Bombe ein, 
weit entfernt von der Bombe Dostojewski und doch in ihrer Wirkung dieser 
gleich’.61 In earlier fictional texts Böll can be seen to assertively embrace and 
objectify Bloyian maxims, in particular le sang du pauvre c’est l’argent. In an 
unpublished draft from August 1948 with the heading ‘Besuch bei Sperling’, Böll 
develops the poverty / blood / money theme by introducing a first-person narrator 
whose only means of income is selling his own blood. ‘Blut’, he says, ‘sind sie so 
weit, dass sie schon Blut von den Armen kaufen’. This literal re-rendering of the 
Bloyian dictum also surfaces in his 1949/50 novel Der Engel schwieg, in which 
Regina Unger donates blood in exchange for money that is imperative for her 
existence.   
 
Ostensibly one might conclude that such novels and short stories are merely an 
attempt to objectify and re-articulate the themes of piety, responsibility, 
condemnation of institutionalised religion, sin and poverty which form the core of a 
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considerable proportion of nineteenth- and twentieth-century century theistic 
literature. Yet Böll’s engagement should not be read as superficial or merely second-
hand. What is of particular interest here is the existentialist backdrop against which 
to read and interpret this chain of influences, for what underpins each of these 
writer’s works is a profound probing of the themes of suffering as a metaphysical 
concern, individual self-determination, as well as authenticity, freedom of choice and 
existential angst. The following section seeks to juxtapose Kierkegaard’s and Bloy’s 
theistic existentialist treatment of suffering on the one hand and two of Böll’s early 
novels on the other, Der Engel schwieg (1949/50) and Und sagte kein einziges Wort 
(1953). 
 
THE METAPHYSICS OF SUFFERING 
 
One of the greatest merits of the existentialist attitude lies in the fact that 
existentialist thinkers, broadly speaking, do not attempt to brush aside or neglect the 
stark truth that permeates man and society, namely that mankind’s existence is 
suffused with pain and suffering. They believe we would be remiss to veil these 
matters or gloss over them as merely fatalistic or providentialistic. Existentialism 
involves an attempt to probe into even the most subjective and minor recesses of the 
human personality for the purpose of philosophical reflection. As such, it is only 
natural that existentialist thinkers should recognise the reality and significance of 
suffering. Existentialism is thus exceptional within the philosophical realm in that it 
approaches the problem of suffering not objectively, but rather subjectively, i.e. as 
something that has its grounding in the subjective existence of the individual. 
Existentialism can be seen philosophically to break away from the shackles of an 
objectively systematic world of facts and phenomena and seeks instead to enter into 
the immediacy of personal experience, and especially the individual’s experience of 
pain and anguish. In doing so, existentialism claims that we have for too long been 
living an inauthentic life, a life which has been bureaucratically governed and 
standardised, and the consequence of which is that Man has come to forget his 
deeper authentic self in our in many ways superficial and fabricated reality. It is due 
to such fabrication that our understanding also of suffering has become distorted. 




forefathers in terms of social custom rather than authentically in terms of genuine 
self-reflection, self-exploration and self-judgement.  
 
Søren Kierkegaard and Léon Bloy are among those who respond to this vacancy in 
philosophy and theology by placing the themes of suffering and authenticity at the 
centre of their metaphysical concerns. To some extent this can be explained by their 
shared theistic perspective. Man has a Creator who gave him liberty within His 
order, and within His order alone; the individual suffers because God, in his moment 
of human liberty, chose to suffer on the Cross. For both thinkers, suffering – the 
suffering of Christ no less than the suffering of each individual – constitutes an 
inexorable facet of human existence and must be accepted and endured when it 
presents itself; it should not be turned away from. Within the vast labyrinth of 
Kierkegaard’s musings on suffering as an existential experience we are reminded 
how Man, endowed with freedom by his Creator, has made a choice, effectively a 
choice to misuse his freedom. Adam committed the original sin as an act of free will, 
and his ‘leap’ from innocence into sinfulness was to encumber all of humankind. As 
descendants of Adam, sin – so goes the Christian perspective – weighs down on the 
entire human race. As such, Kierkegaard proposes, suffering, conditioned by 
mankind’s innate sinfulness, becomes an essential and inevitable experience that 
cannot be removed or eliminated; it deepens human woe. In this regard guilt, as the 
basis of suffering, becomes ‘the decisive expression of the existential pathos’.62 
Whilst some strands of philosophical doctrine treat suffering as an obstacle to 
religious belief, or even as an argument against the existence of a benign all-
powerful God, suffering for Kierkegaard poses a different problem, namely how an 
individual should relate to God in the face of suffering. In order to love God, one 
must accept suffering and sacrifice one’s expectation of happiness for the sake of a 
higher spiritual life. As Kierkegaard outlines in Repetition (Gjentagelsen), the 
Biblical myth of long-suffering Job is the paradigm of such love.63 Job earns his 
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tragic status for his refusal to suffer in silence. To rest in his own suffering would be 
an avoidance of suffering. He must learn to suffer more. Job, the exemplary sufferer, 
has experienced it all; loss after loss, pain after pain is imposed upon him. Job, 
Kierkegaard writes, is ‘the voice of suffering, the cry of the grief-stricken, the shriek 
of the terrified,’ and thus he is ‘a relief to all who bore their torment in silence, a 
faithful witness to all the affliction and laceration there can be in a heart, an unfailing 
spokesman who dared to lament in bitterness of soul and to strive with God’.64 He is 
everyman who grieves for all human misery. As Stephen Mitchell writes, ‘he suffers 
not only his personal pain but the pain of all the poor and the despised’.65  
 
Yet in endowing Man with freedom of choice and self-determination (and therewith 
of choice of his attitude towards suffering), God endowed him with the most sacred 
of gifts: ‘The entire question of the relation of the divine goodness and omnipotence 
to evil can be solved quite simply, if you will’, Kierkegaard writes’; ‘the highest 
thing that can in general be done for any being is to make him free.’ And once that 
being is free, i.e. free to live as he pleases, no claims against his Creator can be 
allowed. For with correct choice, suffering itself becomes the source also of good 
and bliss. It becomes a route towards authenticity, meaning and significance. From 
this kind of theistic existentialist perspective, it is a life-affirming gift, a leap towards 
truth and liberating in the profoundest philosophical sense; Kierkegaard continues: 
 
Yes, if my suffering, my weakness were not the basis for my intellectual 
activity, I would of course make another attempt to deal with it quite simply 
as a medical matter. After all, if one’s life is absolutely without significance 
anyway, it just isn’t right to suffer as I suffer and simply do nothing. But here 
is the secret: The significance of my life corresponds exactly to my 
suffering.66 
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In his delineation of suffering in The Gospel of Suffering (1847) Kierkegaard 
envisions human existence as a sort of ‘school of suffering’; in teaching man to obey 
God and by following his command Kierkegaard prepares the individual for eternal 
life: ‘If then the school of suffering lasts a whole lifetime,’ writes Kierkegaard, ‘it is 
the very evidence that this school must be fitting us for what is highest. […] The 
school for life shows its results in time, but the lifelong school of suffering fits us for 
eternity’.67 Lars van der Grinten insists that Kierkegaardian suffering (Lidelse) ‘führt 
den Menschen aus der Verbundenheit mit der Welt, aus der Verfallenheit an die Zeit, 
aus der Vergänglichkeit heraus und richtet ihn auf Gott und die Ewigkeit’.68 
Expanding upon this notion, Almut Furchert asserts: ‘Im Leiden kommt dem 
Menschen seine Wirklichkeit schmerzhaft zu Bewusstsein, es lässt nicht zu, dass er 
sich in ein ideales Dasein flüchtet. Das Leiden selbst zwingt und hält ihn in der 
Wirklichkeit. Sich selbst in Wirklichkeit zu verstehen, bedeutet ja gerade, sich im 
Spannungsverhältnis von Idealität und Wirklichkeit zu verstehen’.69 
 
That suffering symbolises a decisive expression of the theistic existential struggle for 
individual freedom and authenticity to fully actualise itself is one shared by fellow 
Christian thinker, Léon Bloy, whose works translate Kierkegaard’s thinking into 
literary form. As Gabriele Kieser affirms in her study of Bloy’s work: ‘Es gibt kein 
Leben mit Gott ohne den Schmerz’.70 Indeed, Bloy understood suffering as a call 
from God to ‘conquer the world,’ to defeat worldliness. Bloy’s Christian devotion 
was of the militant sort; nothing could be further removed from Bloy than a 
spirituality of submission in the face of a cruel and ruthless world, as advocated in 
the spiritual artistry of Paul Claudel or François Mauriac. It is in Léon Bloy that we 
find ‘the prophetic thunder of Judgement Day’.71 Bloy published two 
autobiographical novels, Despairing (Le Désespéré, 1887) and The Woman who was 
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Poor (La Femme Pauvre, 1897)72, featuring its protagonist Caïn Marchenoir (Bloy 
himself) as the mystic beggar who vilifies contemporary French society. These two 
novels clearly illustrate how Bloy, like Böll will do following him, sides with the 
despairing social underdog. Indeed, Bloy’s preoccupation with the mythology of 
metaphysical suffering is unambiguously present from the first pages of Le 
Désespéré. 
 
The novel opens with the protagonist Caïn Marchenoir writing a letter to Alexis 
Dulaurier to ask for money with which to bury his father who is just about to die of 
horror at his son’s violent and improvident ways. Part one of the novel proceeds to 
narrate Dulaurier’s financially successful but unedifying literary career and his 
condescending ill treatment of Marchenoir. Part two covers Marchenoir’s period of 
spiritual retreat at the Grande Chartreuse. He exchanges letters with a prostitute, 
Véronique, which reveals how Marchenoir, having failed to establish a vocation for 
religious life, is falling in love with her. This is nevertheless a process that torments 
him. Upon his return to Paris, Marchenoir is confronted with one of the most 
ludicrous situations in world fiction. In order to avert Marchenoir’s declaration of 
love, Véronique has cut off all her hair, sold the hair, presumably to a taxidermist, 
and asked a Jew of suspicious occupation to put out all of her teeth. Towards the end 
of the novel, Marchenoir concludes that the hairless and toothless Véronique is just 
as beautiful as ever. Véronique is later sent to a mental hospital, and Marchenoir is 
fatally wounded in an accident on his way from the asylum. Marchenoir dies without 
a priest and in abject poverty, the superlative crime. This synopsis seeks neither to 
simplify facetiously nor to accentuate the shortcomings of Bloy’s first novel, but 
rather to draw attention to the flow of metaphysical fantasy and Bloy’s manner of 
preoccupation with the themes of anguish, misfortune, religious faith and love that 
drive the work forward.  
 
Bloy’s existentialist ‘Verherrlichung der Armut’73 is no less discernable in his novel 
La Femme Pauvre. Its noble heroine, Clotilde Maréchal, also endures a life of 
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extreme metaphysical poverty and hardship. Clotilde’s stepfather Chapuis finds 
Clotilde working as an artist’s model and sends her to Pélopidas Gacougnol. Clotilde 
weeps behind the screen, unable to bring herself to remove her clothes. Gacougnol is 
sympathetic to the young Clotilde and, as an act of kindness, he makes it his mission 
to save her from the physical and moral squalor to which she is subject. He buys her 
new clothes and finds her a new dwelling, but it is the intellectual and social 
rehabilitation of the young woman upon which Gacougnol is most intent. He 
introduces Clotilde to a circle of young artists, including Caïn Marchenoir, the 
protagonist of Le Désespéré whom he resuscitates for La Femme Pauvre. A 
revolutionary and independent thinker, Caïn takes an active role in Clotilde’s 
transformation into an educated and self-assured Parisienne. Her gathering resources, 
emotional, spiritual and physical, sustain her throughout the story. Clotilde and 
Gacougnol later marry and have a son, Lazare, but Gacougnol’s deteriorating 
eyesight resulting from an accident means that he struggles to work and provide for 
his family. The couple is eventually forced to move into squalid living quarters, 
whereupon Lazare becomes gravely ill and dies. Shortly after the death of his son, 
Gacougnol is fatally injured after entering the burning Paris Opera House in an 
attempt to rescue a group of patrons trapped inside. As the story closes, Clotilde 
appears on the street in Paris. She is approached by some children who ask her to tell 
them the story of her young son: ‘He was so poor. Was he often sad?’ one child asks 
her. ‘No, he was very good and never ever sad,’ she replies. ‘For there is only one 
reason for us to be sad,’ says Clotilde, ‘And that is that we are not saints.’ 
 
It is this theme of metaphysical suffering that Böll had become acquainted with 
through his reading of Kierkegaard and Bloy that also comes to lie at the heart of the 
German writer’s fiction. Whilst Böll’s empathy for his protagonists’ impoverished 
plight is evident, his novels can nevertheless also be seen to glorify poverty; 
suffering may be a wretched experience, but it is nonetheless an ennobling one. A 
prime case in point is the early novel Und sagte kein einziges Wort,74 which tells the 
story of Fred Bogner, a telephone operator in the ecclesiastical chancery of an 
unnamed city, presumably Cologne. The Wirtschaftswunder is in its early phases, 
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shop windows are full, advertising posters omnipresent. The visually forceful 
exhortations to ‘VERTRAU DICH DEINEM DROGISTEN AN’ or ‘NIMM 
DOULORIN’ to cure hangovers and avert undesired pregnancy by using the quality 
prophylactics of ‘Gummi Griss’ function throughout the novel as motifs 
symptomatic of an increasingly commercial, secular postwar West German society. 
In contrast to this dynamic depiction of buying, trading and consuming, Fred and his 
wife Käte Bogner struggle over the essentials of dignity in the midst of humiliating 
poverty and suffering. The beginning of the novel details how Fred has fled from the 
insufferable conditions of his family’s one-room apartment, the frustration and 
tedium of which causes him to beat his children. He feels he cannot stay at home and 
sustains his marriage by meeting Käte in cheap hotels and sending money home to 
support his family. While the novel ostensibly deals with the themes of love and 
family, there are also more complex socio-critical themes and agendas at play. What 
ultimately prompts Fred Bogner to return home is the power of grace as the ultimate 
solution to existential suffering and despair; Käte speaks of the power of prayer at 
various stages in the novel: ‘Du solltest beten, […] wirklich. Es ist das einzige, was 
nicht langweilig sein kann’ and ‘das einzige [...], was helfen könnte’. She consoles 
her angst-ridden husband that God is not far away. Through religion the novel 
reveals a profoundly social agenda. Böll is critical of the protagonists’ misery in how 
he emphasises that their poverty is not attributable to lack of intelligence, education 
or hard work, but the failure of the social system itself. Whilst it may be true that 
Fred abuses alcohol and squanders the money intended for his family playing pinball 
machines, he is employed full-time and seeks extra work to provide for himself and 
his family. Käte does not hesitate in blaming society: ‘Das ist doch der Grund, nicht 
wahr, du schlägst die Kinder, weil wir arm sind?’ to which he responds: ‘die 
Armut hat mich krank gemacht’ [US: 140].  
 
Under the umbrella theme of suffering, a multitude of leitmotifs typifying the 
existence of Fred Bogner can be observed; these include hatred, lethargy, de-
centering of the individual and Gleichgültigkeit. Fred Bogner is an archetypal Böllian 
un-hero, one might say, who has been oppressed by forces beyond his control and 
comprehension. He can find no meaning in what has happened to him and his 
country, nothing in his present seems to him concrete or tangible. All hope of 




machines and acting with brutality towards his family are representative of a suicidal 
fascination with defeatism. This defeatism is particularly visible in his fixation with 
particular slot machines which virtually never produce a winning combination, and 
even when they do, no money is dispensed. Every win is a loss. It is at this climax of 
indolence, anger and self-destruction which Fred has reached that his wife demands 
that he face up to his responsibility as a husband. This also perhaps the decisive 
Grenzsituation in the novel, the liminal moment which Fred is presented with the 
opportunity to overcome his empirical surface nature and experience a moment of 
genuine freedom of choice.  
 
The theme of suffering also resides at the core of Böll’s 1954 work Der Geschmack 
des Brotes, a short, yet humbling text dedicated entirely to the plight of hunger.75 It 
recounts the tale of an unnamed male protagonist who, in a state of starvation and 
disorientation, is led by candlelight to a nun. Her innocent gaze is one of deep 
concern [GB: 116]. ‘Ich habe Hunger’, he tells her [GB: 115].  Observing a pile of 
stale bread rolls, ‘das Wasser schoß ihm ganz schnell in den Mund’ [GB: 116]: ‘Brot 
[…], bitte Brot’ [GB: 116], he pleads. As the nun hands him a roll, his chin trembles: 
‘er spürte, wie die Muskeln seines Mundes und seine Kiefer zuckten’ [GB: 116]. The 
description of the plight of suffering exemplified through the treasured taste of 
bread76 is taken up once more in Der Engel schwieg,77 in which a ‘eine Nonne in 
dunkelblauem Habit’ [ES: 7] offers the weary protagonist Hans Schnitzler a morsel 
of bread: ‘Wieder lief ihm das Wasser flink und lau im Munde zusammen, er 
schluckte es herunter und sagte noch einmal leise: “Brot”’ [ES: 9]. Later in the novel 
Böll describes the fervour with which Schnitzler eats the piece of bread: 
 
Er brach schnell eine große Kante von dem Brot ab. Sein Kinn zitterte und er 
spürte, dass die Muskeln seines Mundes und seine Kiefer zuckten. Dann grub 
er die Zähne in die unebene weiche Bruchstelle und aß. Das Brot war alt, 
[…]; aber es schmeckte so süß. Er grub immer weiter mit seinen Zähnen, 
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nahm auch die lederne bräunliche Kruste, packte dann den Laib in seine 
Hände und brach ein neues Stück ab. [ES: 9-10] 
 
The power of these descriptions lies not just in their physicality; the act of 
consumption becomes almost an out-of-body experience. Every detail of movement 
is comprehended and cherished: ‘dann spürte er rings um seinen Mund die 
Berührung des Brotes wie eine trockene Zärtlichkeit’ [GB: 116]. Standing 
symbolically fort he body of Christ, the eating of bread becomes a moment of 
mystical union. Eating the simplest things of life is an archetypally Böllian motif 
which amalgamates human pain and joy, yet crucially emphasises the non-mutually 
exclusive nature of these conditions. It is only in experiencing true Leiden that joy 
can have any authentic significance. To reiterate the Kierkegaardian maxim, the 
significance of one’s life corresponds exactly to one’s suffering. 
 
The 1954 novel Haus ohne Hüter78 likewise probes the metaphysics of poverty and 
hardship. Martin Bach and Heinrich Brielach are two eleven-year-olds in the same 
class at school. The former knows no material needs, but is emotionally under-
nourished; his widowed mother has since retreated into an illusory world where she 
lives out her life with her late husband, the now famous anti-fascist soldier-poet, 
Raimund Bach. Heinrich, by way of stark contrast, is burdened with responsibility. 
Destitution has taught him early economic maturity and forces him to learn 
arithmetic on the black market. Böll also explores the plight of Heinrich’s mother, 
who is compelled to deal with egoistic lovers and coerced into a so-called ‘Onkel-
Ehe’. Within the thematic framework of orphans, widows, friendship and social 
hierarchy, Böll we find once again exploring the notions of human suffering, social 
justice and personal responsibility.  
 
The theme of suffering finds its most powerful expression, however, in Böll’s early 
novel draft Der Engel schwieg. It tells the story of the thirty-one year old 
Heimkehrer Hans Schnitzler who worked as a bookseller before the war. On May 8, 
1945, he returns home, where he finds himself immediately confronted with the 
                                                        




overwhelming material and spiritual chaos of his native city in which the ruins stand 
as a symbol for Germany, as in the following passage: 
 
Die Haustür war vom Luftdruck herausgeschleudert worden; ein Teil hing 
noch an den Angeln, schwere Scharniere mit Holzfetzen. […] Der Haufen 
Dreck, der sich über ihr türmte, brach zusammen, als er daran stieß. […] Es 
war ein schönes, herrschaftliches Haus gewesen. [ES:25] 
 
During the war, Schnitzler had been condemned to death after attempting to desert, 
but with the help of Sergeant Gompertz he managed to escape. Shortly afterwards, 
Gompertz is shot and killed by his countrymen and Schnitzler adopts the latter’s 
identity by taking his identification tag. After his return home, Schnitzler decides to 
tell his story to Gompertz’s widow. His experience is one of suffering and plight: he 
is forced to eat whatever he can find. At one point we read: ‘Obwohl er Hunger hatte, 
spürte er eine leichte Übelkeit, als das Zeug im Topf heiß wurde und sein Geruch 
sich verstärkte, […] künstlich und ekelhaft roch es’ [ES:74]; he struggles for shelter 
and warmth, and he encounters great difficulty obtaining false identity papers with 
which to evade imprisonment, not realising that the Allies have been occupying the 
city for several days already. His efforts are ultimately rewarded when Schnitzler 
meets Regina Unger, who not only takes care of his papers, but also helps him to 
obtain living quarters and food. Hans and she soon start an intimate relationship, 
although their mutual love is hampered by the deprivations that so widely 
characterised the aftermath of World War Two and the circumstances dominating 
widespread destruction of Germany’s inner cities.  
 
The reader eventually learns that Schnitzler und Regina are both as damaged as the 
city they live in: Schnitzler’s wife was killed during a bombardment and Regina’s 
baby, conceived after an encounter with a stranger, died shortly after birth. Regina is 
still numbed by the recent loss of her child, yet the couple manage to find peace and 
solace in Regina’s half-demolished house. Their love is symbolic of safety and 
Heimat, and is representative of the simple joy that derives from ein menschliches 
Zusammenleben. Their companionship is the epitome of authenticity in a time of loss 
and privation, but also a sign of revolt against conventional morals. Thus Hans refers 




defined as authentic inasmuch as it defies such externalities as moral codes or the 
expectations of others. Lying in bed with Regina, Hans at one point painfully 
recollects ‘ich war weit weg gewesen, sehr weit weg und hatte viel Schmerz gesehen, 
Tod und Blut, ich hatte Angst gehabt’ [ES: 132], yet Regina’s soft voice soothes 
him. Feeling her warm breath, Hans speaks of a happiness that he had never known 
or experienced before [ES: 133]. Authenticity is portrayed in the novel as a process 
of self-realisation, and Böll shows us that this self-realisation is as dependent on ‘the 
other’ as it is in ourselves. It is such values as self-realisation, community and 
sharing that, for Böll, contribute to the authentic sense of what truly matters in life.   
 
There are two other characters in the novel who also exhibit a capacity to live in 
freedom and authenticity amidst the rubble: the chaplain from Hans’s parish and 
Gompertz’s widow. The former proves to be a confidant of Schnitzler, as well as a 
man who knows how to practise Christian brotherly love. Hans receives food and 
cigarettes from this chaplain at regular intervals. Elisabeth Gompertz shares her late 
husband’s inheritance with the poor people of the city; on her deathbed she gives her 
last money to the priest. The great inauthentic counterexample – the symbol of the 
‘inhumane Gegenwelt’ – is Dr. Fischer, who has the same father-in-law as the 
altruistic Elisabeth Gompertz. He considers giving Willy Gompertz’s money to the 
poor an act of pure folly. Fischer was the former advisor to the powerful archbishop 
and after the war he – in an example of Böll’s cynicism as regards institutionalised 
religion – became editor of the Christian magazine Das Gotteslamm. He, like Frau 
Schnier in Ansichten eines Clowns, stands for the refined and ecocentric aesthete 
who suffers from boredom and for the opportunistic money-grubber. He also, in this 
novel, epitomises the Bloyian maxim le sang du pauvre c’est l’argent, a motif that 
resounds throughout Der Engel schwieg. Just as during the war Fischer sympathized 
with the Nazis, he now, after 1945, knows how to exploit the new postwar reality. 
Yet the smell of blood clings to his ever-increasing fortune. In the following 
quotation allusions to Judas’ betrayal are purposefully implied: ‘Wenn er die Tür [of 
his safe] öffnete, kam ihm eine heftige süßliche Wolke entgegen, süßlicher Dreck, 
der den Begriff Bordell in ihm auslöste – aber es fiel ihm ein, dass es Blutgeruch 
war, der sehr verdünnte, verfeinerte Geruch von Blut’ [ES: 122]. At this juncture, the 





Through this novel – which sadly remained unpublished during the author’s lifetime 
– Böll encourages his reader to envisage hope for the future by revealing the 
possibilities for authenticity amidst the total disorganization of the here and now. His 
novel begins and ends with the title’s symbol: the stone angel which has been 
besmirched and damaged by the violence of war: 
 
Er ging noch näher und erkannte im schwachen Licht einen steinernen Engel 
mit wallenden Locken, der eine Lilie in der Hand hielt; er beugte sich vor, bis 
sein Kinn fast die Brust der Figur berührte, und blickte lange mit einer 
seltsamen Freude in dieses Gesicht […]. [ES:7] 
 
At the end of the novel, following the burial of Elisabeth Gompertz, the image of the 
fallen angel once more comes back into focus; it is now described thus: 
 
[....] er hatte sein Profil im schwarzen Schlamm verborgen, und die 
Abflachung an der Stelle seines Hinterkopfes, wo er sich von der Säule gelöst 
hatte, erweckte den Eindruck, als sei er niedergeschlagen worden, sei nun an 
die Erde geschmiegt, um zu weinen oder zu trinken, sein Gesicht lag in einer 
Schlammpfütze, seine schwarzen Locken waren mit Dreck bespritzt und 
seine runde Wange trug einen Lehmflecken; nur sein bläuliches Ohr war 
makellos, und ein Stück seines zerbrochenen Schwertes lag neben ihm; ein 
längliches Stück Marmor, das er weggeworfen hatte. [ES:188] 
 
Yet in the midst of debris and rubble, and despite its physical destruction and 
metaphysical suffering, this symbol of hope and angelic beauty remains, as the 
‘seltsame Freude’ of the opening scene shows, a portent of piety, comfort and hope 
for the protagonist. What essentially unites Kierkegaard, Bloy and Böll as three 
Christian writers and thinkers within a metaphysical framework is how they all 
describe the experience of suffering as both a transcendental and life-affirming one. 
The individual’s pain and anguish become a thorny path to freedom and authenticity 
through which Man can realise his true essence. Pschera explains this existential 





Wenn Gott, der das Böse vorhersah, als er die Welt schuf, diese Welt 
dennoch zuließ, dann deshalb, weil dieses Böse die Möglichkeit in sich birgt, 
den Menschen zum Höheren zu führen, ihn zu sublimieren. Durch den 
Schmerz – und [...] durch die Liebe – wird es dem Menschen erst möglich, 
sich vor Gott zu rehabilitieren. Der Schmerz erst bringt den Menschen zu 
sich.79 
 
Kierkegaard, Bloy and Böll all regard suffering as a path to individual and authentic 
self-affirmation. As suggested earlier, suffering establishes the individual’s vitality, 
combative spirit, morality, fears, ideas and acts, as well as that which the individual 
has neglected or failed to do. In a metaphysical sense, a successful and meaningful 
human life is not characterised through having overcome suffering; ‘vielmehr geht es 
einem gelungenen Leben darum,’ Pschera explains, ‘im Schmerz zu bestehen’.80 A 
life without hardship ‘endet in sich selbst’;81 it is a life in which the possibilities des 
eigentlichen Menschseins are essentially never revealed. Ernst Jünger later echoed 
these notions in his essay ‘Über den Schmerz’ of 1934, which opens with the 
proclamation: ‘Nenne mir Dein Verhältnis zum Schmerz, und ich will Dir sagen, wer 
Du bist!’ Jünger too argues that ‘pain’ (as opposed to Leiden, which is a 
predominantly psychological concern) constitutes an Ausgangspunkt from which 
human beings, individual circumstances and society as a whole can be determined, 
since it is the last ‘Wert’ capable of withstanding the disintegration of all values’.82 
These metaphysical sentiments also evoke Blanc de Saint-Bonnet’s maxim: ‘tout 
homme se fait comme sa douleur’ – every man is shaped by his own suffering.83 
 
It is specifically, and tellingly, this aspect of theistic existentialist thinking that 
defines itself in stark contrast to aspects of Nietzschean doctrine. Nietzsche looked 
upon suffering and empathy, passion and compassion, as prime contributory factors 
in Christianity’s enfeeblement of the menschlicher Substanz. Suffering for Nietzsche 
is a negation of human life: ‘dieser depressive und contagiöse Instinkt,’ he writes, 
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‘kreuzt jene Instinkte, welche auf Erhaltung und Werterhöhung des Lebens aus sind: 
er ist ebenso als Multiplikator des Elends wie als Conservator alles Elenden ein 
Hauptwerkzeug der décadence – Mitleiden überredet zum Nichts!’84 For this reason 
Nietzsche portrays Christianity as a form of nihilism. For Nietzsche, suffering can 
never be life-affirming; it renders the individual weak and helpless, constituting a 
‘Kennzeichen des Untergangs’.85 Conversely, suffering for Kierkegaard, Bloy and 
Böll can only serve to lead mankind towards life, not away from it. It is through pain 
that the individual is able to fully individualise his or her worldly mission and 
purpose. 
 
BÖLL AND FRENCH EXISTENTIALISM  
 
Whilst parallels can be drawn between Kierkegaard’s, Bloy’s and Böll’s thematic 
engagement with the existentialist themes of suffering, freedom, authenticity and 
angst, Böll’s thinking, in the course of its development and maturation in the mid-to-
late 1950s and 1960s, can also be seen to take increasing influence from diverse 
aspects of more secular twentieth-century French existentialism. As I shall illustrate, 
these traces are most evident in Böll’s 1963 novel Ansichten eines Clowns, as well as 
his Billard um halb zehn (1959) and Dr. Murkes gesammeltes Schweigen (1955). 
Before exploring these works in greater detail, I will begin by surveying the shades 
of Sartrean existentialism that colour some of Böll’s theoretical writing throughout 
the 1950s and 60s.  
 
An obvious starting point of any such analysis must be the concept of ‘littérature 
engagée’, a term virtually synonymous with French existentialism and the writings of 
Jean-Paul Sartre, but also, to some degree, with Heinrich Böll. In 1944 Sartre 
published the essay ‘La République du Silence’ in which he portrays the Occupation 
through the prism of his existentialist ideas. He begins challengingly with words that 
would incite painful and difficult memories of Vichy France’s four-year long 
subservience to German occupying forces:  
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An all-powerful police sought to force us into silence, every word became as 
precious as a declaration of principle; because we were persecuted, each of 
our gestures carried the weight of a commitment. The often frightful 
circumstances of our struggle enabled us finally to live, undisguised and fully 
revealed, that awful, unbearable situation we call the human condition.86  
 
What Sartre describes here is his period of occupation working with the résistance,87 
and his application of the term ‘commitment’ refers to a philosophical and moral 
conflict in which each individual finds himself: freedom can only be realised through 
engagement, in counteraction to worldly circumstances. Shortly following the end of 
the period of German occupation Sartre moulded his general concept of engagement 
into a corresponding literary theory and after 1945 posited his theory of 
‘engagement’ as a necessary intervention of the writer into the political sphere. In 
essence, Sartre’s notion was wholly a question of human liberation. For the postwar 
avant-garde the résistance had become an educational process; it taught them that the 
freedom to observe, to imagine and to write, like freedom itself, must be defended at 
all costs. Every letter and every word was a deed. The task of the résistance, and 
indeed any political or idealistic act of defiance, was ultimately to enforce the 
necessity and obligation of writers to address their historical epoch and therein define 
the condition of freedom for the individual.  
 
The experience of war thus shaped Sartre’s understanding of individual freedom, a 
process which involved moving away from individualistic philosophy and towards a 
philosophy of action and political engagement. What is also distinctly existentialist 
about the French philosopher’s reflections on the résistance, most palpable in his 
essay ‘Paris sous l’occupation’ (1945), is his treatment of this period as an 
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existentialist boundary situation; the Resistance, as a solitary historical moment, 
came to constitute a departure point for transcendent thinking, for individual self-
awareness, and the enabling of the individual to realise his or her potentialities and 
self-being. The Occupation, dehumanisation and petrification of human beings, 
Sartre writes, 
 
was so intolerable that many people, in order to escape from it and to recover 
their future, threw themselves into the Resistance. Strange future, barred by 
suffering, prison, death, but at least we procured it by our own hands. […] 
The Resistance was nothing more than an individual solution. […] In our 
eyes it had above all a symbolic value.88 
 
When confronted with a tyrannical, oppressive, angst-inducing situation of such 
magnitude, the individual finds himself at a metaphysical boundary, free to choose 
his course of action, to passively accept his lot or to rebel against the afflictions that 
plague him. The act of resistance is freedom in that it offers the permanent ability to 
each individual to transcend his or her present state and situation. In this way, 
subjugation enables the absolute freedom of the individual, it renders the 
‘dehumanised’ humanised, the disguised ‘undisguised’,89 a notion which Sartre 
encapsulates in the ostensibly paradoxical yet archetypally existentialist declaration: 
‘We were never freer than during German Occupation’.90 
 
Böll’s notion of literary commitment, as it comes into fruition in his momentous 
1952 essay ‘Bekenntnis zur Trümmerliteratur’, spawned, much like Sartre’s 
‘littérature engagée’, from the social, political, and cultural upheaval of his ravaged, 
war-ridden homeland. Böll can essentially be seen to sympathise with Sartre’s 
insistence that individual acts and gestures are laden with individual responsibility 
and commitment. Böll similarly concedes that the role of the writer is unique in that 
he is obliged to intervene in the political sphere in order to bring out the deeper 
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reality of a situation. Böll elucidates this concept in his 1952 essay, in which he 
insists that writers should not play ‘Blindekuh’91:  
 
Merkwürdig, fast verdächtig war nur der vorwurfsvolle, fast gekränkte Ton, 
mit dem man sich dieser Bezeichnung bediente: man schien uns zwar nicht 
verantwortlich zu machen dafür, dass Krieg gewesen, dass alles in Trümmern 
lag, nur nahm man uns offenbar übel, dass wir es gesehen hatten und sahen, 
aber wir hatten keine Binde vor den Augen und sahen es: ein gutes 
Auge gehört zum Handwerkszeug des Schriftstellers.92 
 
In the same essay, Böll develops the theory of literary commitment by describing a 
scenario in which a writer looks into a cellar to see a baker kneading dough. Much as 
in Sartrean thinking, every word is an act laden with responsibility. The writer’s eye 
perforates the superficial reality of the situation, and he employs the power of his 
imagination to detail the aspects of that man’s existence that are not ostensibly 
visible: ‘er raucht Zigaretten, er geht ins Kino, sein Sohn ist in Russland gefallen, 
dreitausend Kilometer weit liegt er begraben am Rande eines Dorfes’.93 As Frank 
Finlay explains in his study on Böll’s aesthetic thinking, Böll is acting out his duty as 
a writer ‘to preserve, or to reconstruct’ reality as he witnesses it.94  
 
Like Sartre, Böll too approaches the task of writing as a necessary intervention into 
the ‘greater sphere’, be it political, religious, economic or social. It is the writer’s 
obligation to take action and address the ills of his or her historical epoch. Some 
examples of Böll’s creative writing can be used to illustrate aspects of this 
discussion, in this particular case, Böll’s critical stance towards institutionalised 
Catholicism. In the first episode of his Irisches Tagebuch of 1957, Böll details how, 
after failing to secure a place to sleep for the night on a ship travelling to Ireland, he 
is offered a seat next to a priest. They begin a conversation with a young Irish émigré 
who is travelling home to visit her family. The woman has become disillusioned by 
the experiences away from her native Ireland, not least in the painful recognition that 
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Catholic doctrine offers no refuge or sanctuary against the harsh realities of the 
modern world. The priest attempts to comfort her, yet his insistence that religious 
devotion is the solution to her distress is ultimately futile. The discussion ends 
abruptly, and Böll, with his ‘gutes Auge’, adds the following observation: 
 
Er lehnte sich seufzend zurück, klappte den Mantelkragen hoch; vier 
Sicherheitsnadeln hatte er als Reserve innen auf dem Revers stecken: vier, die 
an einer fünften, quergesteckten, hin und her schaukelten unter den 
leisen Stößen des Dampfers, der in die graue Dunkelheit hinein auf die Insel 
der Heiligen zufuhr.95 
 
The skilful eye of the writer enables him to see the safety pins behind the cleric’s 
collar, a seemingly insignificant observation yet one creatively employed by Böll to 
put the priest’s conversation with the young Irish woman into a larger context. The 
pins are a device through which Böll thematises the Church’s attempt to safeguard an 
image of decency and formality. Yet the ‘safety pin’, as it features at various stages 
throughout Böll’s narrative, always constitutes a mode of fabrication, a ‘Zeichen der 
Improvisation’. The safety pin becomes a metaphor for the individual’s concealment 
of reality, be it financial hardship, deteriorating health or a position of spiritual 
authority. The pin also symbolises the transitory repair of ruptures, separations and 
breakages. One can accordingly interpret the priest’s reserve of pins as Böll directing 
his reader’s attention to the fundamental fabrications, superficialities and failings of 
the Catholic Church when asked to account for the disquieting realities of 
contemporary society. Like Sartre, Böll is a writer unfailingly committed to his own 
times and who believes it to be the author’s mission, be it in whatever sphere, to 
observe, to write, to question, to confront and, if necessary, to oppose.   
  
There are nevertheless clear lines of demarcation between Böll’s and Sartre’s 
existentialist aesthetic credo. Whilst Böll upholds the author’s obligation to 
safeguard the depiction of reality, what is unique about Böll’s ideology is its 
profoundly humanistic nature. Böll always sides with ‘the seemingly insignificant 
                                                        




people who do not find their way into the history books’.96 For Böll, literary 
commitment implies, if not even revolves around, ‘the portrayal of the fate of lowly 
individuals who are the casualities and refuse of history’.97 This preoccupation with 
and concern for the freedom and rights of society’s ‘Abfall’,98 outsiders, pariahs, 
underdogs, those who have been marginalised by a hostile world, will be revisited 
again later when we look at the Camusean underpinnings of existentialism in Böll’s 
writing.    
    
Böll’s commitment to engaged, realistic and critical writing has resulted in the 
popular application of the epithet ‘engagierter Schriftsteller’ in Böll scholarship from 
an early date, as Reich-Ranicki observed when he defined engagement as the word 
which dominated the critical reception of Böll’s work: ‘Hier haben wir das 
entscheidende Stichwort’, he writes, continuing: ‘Denn der Streit der deutschen 
Kritik um Böll ist zum großen Teil nichts anderes als ein Streit um die engagierte 
Literatur schlechthin’.99 Indeed, a close reading of Böll’s critical writings reveals a 
myriad of pronouncements concerning ‘engagierte Literatur’, yet despite the points 
of commonality with Sartrean commitment, Böll repeatedly questions the validity of 
the term. In an interview with Le Monde, for instance, he confesses his unease with 
the expression écrivain engagé; when asked if he considers his writing to represent a 
new form of committed literature, and if, in this regard, he views himself as a 
descendant of Sartrean aestheticism, Böll responds by first reminding his interviewer 
that he, unlike Sartre, had been only too happy to accept his Nobel prize for 
literature, before proceeding to put in question the literary category: ‘Was ist ein 
engagierter Schriftsteller? Ich habe diesen Ausdruck nicht sehr gern. Er wirkt so, als 
ob man eine Fahne vor sich her trüge. Sie haben in Frankreich den Ausdruck homme 
de lettres. Er sagt mir viel mehr zu’.100 Böll also rejects the differentiation between 
committed and pure literature; in 1960 he published the essay ‘Bücher verändern die 
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Welt’, the subtitle of which, – ‘Der Streit um die engagierte Literatur ist müßig’ – 
infers how the differentiation between ‘committed’ and ‘pure’ writing was a waste of 
time.101 The reason for this lies in Böll’s belief that all literature is capable of 
exercising social influence, whether it be the mid-nineteenth-century socially critical 
fiction of Charlotte Brontë, or the twentieth-century l’art pour l’art of Gottfried 
Benn. Böll maintains that one of the ironies of writing lies in the phenomenon that a 
book seemingly lacking in any underlying political intention may contribute more to 
changing consciousness than one which seeks direct political influence. This 
conviction is most clearly articulated in Böll’s ‘Zweite Wuppertaler Rede’ in which 
he quotes extensively from Benn’s speech ‘Soll die Dichtung das Leben bessern?’102 
In his own speech, Böll approves of Benn’s strict distinction between Kunstträger, 
artist, and the Kulturträger, the aesthete or, so to speak, ‘guardian of culture’. Böll 
concludes in the Frankfurter Vorlesungen that he ultimately cannot influence the 
manner in which his own literary products are received by society: 
 
Doch selbst den großen Verkündern der Solitude des Dichters  — George, 
Benn, Jünger — sind die Gesellschaft und das Publikum nicht erspart 
geblieben, und es ist nicht Ironie, sondern Tragik, dass auch Musil nicht 
davon verschont geblieben ist. Das geschriebene Wort, erst recht das 
gedruckte, ist in dem Augenblick, wo es geschrieben, gedruckt wird, sozial 
vorhanden, es ist da — mag einer Publikum, Gesellschaft, Veränderung der 
Welt wollen oder nicht.103 
 
That is to say, ‘engagierte Literatur’ is perhaps less a function of authorial 
interpretation than readerly reception. Sarte’s is of course not the only French 
existentialist influence on Böll’s artistic creed. The ideas of earlier French thinker, 
the Catholist personalist thinker Emmanuel Mounier, are arguably no less important. 
In fact, in his writings from the 1930s that predate Sartre’s ‘What is Literature?’, 
Mounier was the first to introduce the term ‘engagement’ into the French cultural 
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sphere.104 The overarching affinity which, on a general level, unites Böll and Sartre 
with Mounier are the interlinking notions of authorship and commitment. Mounier’s 
‘engagement’ was crucially accompanied by the term ‘action’ which entailed a sense 
of artistic duty, namely a need to move away from capitalistic maxims towards a 
socialist, specifically Christian commonwealth. Indeed, his trust in the potency of the 
written word is one which is ultimately derived from the shared Christian belief in 
the absolute truth of God’s word, of the logos. It was the French literary magazine 
Esprit which provided Mounier’s personnalisme105 with a spiritual and literary 
platform, the primary tenets of which are distinctly existentialist in nature: be an 
active force, embrace commitment and autonomous participation, for this is the 
‘action’ of ‘engagement’.106 Haunted, as were many other non-conformistes by the 
magnitude of what they saw as a crisis of civilisation, Mounier became convinced 
that ‘pure intellect’ would ultimately reveal its insufficiency. It is ultimately, 
according to Mounier, impartiality, passivity and inactivity that result in abstention 
when the great issues of the day are being decided. ‘L’Esprit,’ Mounier wrote in 
1933, ‘is an engagement, and one engages oneself with all one’s soul and all of one’s 
days’.107 Yet, as with many other later ‘engaged’ individuals, this did not imply for 
Mounier a simple descent into the political realm. As Schalk observes in his study of 
‘engagement’, Mounier felt urged to ‘calm down and be realistic about possibilities 
for success’ before taking drastic action.108 The writer, after all, was still part of an 
elite of intellectuals with an ultimate final responsibility for critical judgement, 
regardless of what in the end the judgement may be. Such intellectuals are essentially 
unified in the belief that the severity of social crisis demands that they reconsider 
their hitherto detached and secondary roles.109 
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This brief overview already implies various points of divergence between Mounier’s 
and Sartre’s doctrines. This conflict becomes particularly acute where the themes of 
freedom and Man’s relationship with Man are concerned. Absolute freedom, the 
concept of which Mounier attributes to Sartre, does not exist in Mounier’s 
existentialist view. Firstly, there is such a thing as human nature, otherwise there 
would be no history and no community, that is no unity of humanity in space and 
time. This is crucial for Mounier as this unity implies the equality of all members of 
the human race and the absence of any differences of civilisation, race or caste. 
Secondly, existence is given as well as created, that is, there are given situations and 
circumstances which inevitably put constraints on Man’s freedom. Mounier claims 
that Sartre is wrong in his assertions that freedom is a necessity, because if it were, 
the individual would not be able to make it his own, but would use it blindly. Every 
situation, according to Mounier, leads to a range of various potential options and 
outcomes, and Man uses his freedom to decide among them. Freedom is ultimately a 
gift to be accepted or refused. Indeed, it is not ‘welded [rivée] to a personal being as 
a condemnation, it is offered to him as a gift’.110 As a Christian thinker, this 
possibility of refusal explains the existence of sin: the individual cannot choose what 
Mounier calls  ‘la valeur’ (value) if ‘la non-valuer’ (non-value) does not exist. God 
has not made a perfect creature, but has allowed man to choose whether he wishes to 
transcend his condition or not. 
 
Yet the aspect of Sartrean existentialism that Mounier seems most keen to criticise is 
the one that overlaps most closely with Böll’s aesthetic thinking, namely, the 
individual’s relationship with ‘the other’. Sartre contends that each person’s freedom 
can only have a relationship of dominance or subservience to that of other people. 
Mounier, by contrast, sees this individualised freedom, confronting a hostile world, 
as a self-preservation mechanism and a jarring in communication that results in 
narcissism and estrangement. From his Christian viewpoint, individual freedom 
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should lead to an opening out towards others and a concern for the general freedom 
of the other. The well-being and security of others is also a central value within 
Böll’s Christian treatment of freedom, as we saw already in our treatment of Der 
Engel schwieg. Freedom is for him the encountering of that which is other to me, and 
this should unite men with other men, be they strangers, pariahs, or society’s ‘little 
men’ who have been ostracised by a hostile world. To see oneself from the point of 
view of others, taking responsibility for others, identifying with their destiny, 
showing sympathy for and generosity towards them, and forever expressing one’s 
devotion to them are all facets of Mounier’s existentialist credo which readily echo 
throughout Böll’s fictional universe. Indeed, Fred Bogner’s human failure in Und 
sagte kein einziges Wort may be that he is unable to properly express his devotion to 
and responsibility for his family. This particular thematic concern will be dealt with 
more extensively in the subsequent discussion of Böll and Albert Camus. 
 
Reflecting on these three key existentialist concepts, engagement, freedom and ‘the 
other’, one final point needs to be raised, namely the question of authorship and 
intentionality; is it the aim of the engaged writer to simply bear witness or is he 
striving for action in the form of concrete temporal success?  For Sartre, engagement 
and action are by no means passive terms; he remarks:  
 
The ‘engaged’ writer knows that words are action. He knows that to reveal is 
to change and that one can only reveal by planning to change. He has given 
up the impossible dream of giving an impartial picture of society and the 
human condition. […] He knows that his words are […] ‘loaded pistols’.111 
 
For Mounier, on the other hand, action is ‘not essentially directed towards success, 
but toward bearing witness (témoignage)’.112 Despite Mounier’s insistence in 
Personalism (Le Personnalisme) that impartiality, passivity and inactivity lead to 
abstention, his position appears to gradually shift focus. For Mounier, it is the 
detached critical judgement of the writer that will triumph over his physical action. 
As Schalk observes, for Mounier true engagement is not defined through ‘the violent 
                                                        
111 Jean-Paul Sartre, What is Literature?, p. 17. 
112 Cf. R. William Rauch, Politics and Belief in Contemporary France: Emmanuel Mounier and 




action of that archetypal figure in twentieth-century fact and fiction usually known as 
the “adventurer”’.113 Mounier’s témoignage was readily criticised and the Esprit 
movement was charged with political impotence. Kenneth Douglas, for instance, 
accepts that Mounier ‘may be sowing seeds for the future’, but he condemns 
Mounier’s failure to take ‘an effective political stand at this hour’.114 The strengths 
and deficiencies of these divergent positions are not the main focus here, however; of 
more relevance is the degree to which Böll, as a fellow committed writer and 
sympathiser of both Sartre’s and Mounier’s existentialist writing, aligns himself with 
either of these competing theoretical standpoints. 
 
Remarkably it can be shown that Böll thematises and objectifies both concepts of 
active engagement and témoignage in his literary works. These themes are perhaps 
most acutely explored in the novel Billard um halbzehn, 115 which tells the tale of 
three generations of a Cologne family from the perspective of a single day, the 
eightieth birthday of the esteemed architect Heinrich Fähmel, who in 1907 built the 
Abbey of St. Anton. The events of the day culminate in a single firing of a gunshot 
by Heinrich’s wife, Johanna Fähmel, who has been held in a sanatorium since 1942 
due to her ‘insane’ resistance to Nazism. Over the course of the novel, the reader 
learns that the central figure, Robert Fähmel, blew up the Abbey designed by his 
father during the Second World War. While he was under military order to obliterate 
the Abbey in order to clear a path for artillery fire, his authentic reason was to 
demolish Nazi structures, since the Abbey’s Monks had been followers of National 
Socialism. After the war Robert Fähmel seeks to eradicate all traces of the past and 
thus becomes caught in a web of withdrawal and inactivity. He now spends his well-
regulated days in nearly complete seclusion playing billiards, comforted only by a 
tender concern for the hotel boy, Hugo. Robert’s son Joseph has since rebuilt the 
Abbey without any knowledge of the truth regarding its destruction. When he does 
find out he is outraged; he cannot fathom his father’s reasoning, and he believes that 
a building of such cultural stature and significance should have been better 
safeguarded. Joseph’s reaction is meant to illustrate the passive, inactive attitude 
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toward the past that permeated postwar German society. Objectifying Mounier’s 
témoignage, Joseph refuses to accept destruction as a permissible act of defiance, for 
he cannot comprehend the interrelation between the building’s obliteration and the 
atrocities committed in the name of Hitler. His father Robert, on the other hand, once 
an apparent disciple of Sartrean action, freedom and authenticity, has since reverted 
into an inert state of inactivity and withdrawal. Under pressure from societal forces 
we can assume that he has disowned his innate freedom and become a true advocate 
of Sartrean mauvaise foi. 
   
In exploring these existentialist categories of activity and témoignage, Böll divides 
the large ensemble of characters into metaphorical groupings of varying complicity; 
the Büffel, who believe in, oversee and practise violence in the name of engagement, 
activity and power, and the Lämmer, who remain pacifistic, inactive victims. By the 
end of the novel, Johanna Fähmel decides after sixteen years of imprisonment to 
break free from the shackles of institutional control that have for so long restricted 
both her physical and intellectual freedom and to strike out against one such Büffel 
by attempting to assassinate a postwar minister who has managed to effortlessly ease 
back into society despite his Nazi past. The complex structure of the novel as it 
moves from past to present, from stasis to activity demonstrates how the Fähmels 
each confront boundary situations, albeit at different junctures and under diverse 
circumstances, where they can make the choice to break out of their shell of memory 
and become subjects of history, or remain inactive observers who passively cling to 
the hope of change. As Robert C. Conard observes: ‘This single day is the day on 
which they transcend the barrier of recollective inactivity and begin to apply their 
morality, derived from contemplation, to a more responsible, active life’.116 In doing 
so, Böll seeks to lay bare the submerged truths about the relationship between 
Germany’s Nazi past and its postwar present. Here, against an existentialist 
backdrop, the Fähmels are forced to accept or reject the gift of individual freedom. 
Will they choose to leap and transcend their situation? Will they choose to be lambs 
or buffalos? And if they leap what course of action will they take? 
 
                                                        




The actions of the Fähmels, be it seeking to eradicate a former Nazi or adopting the 
‘lamb’ hotel boy, Hugo, are seen as new choices, directions and beginnings; they 
become the psychological prerequisites for future action. Even if one believes that 
such acts are unlikely to change or liberate society at large, since society can only be 
transformed through political organisations and consistent and insistent pressure, one 
should not conclude that such acts are without consequence, or that they cannot 
impact individual freedom. On the contrary, Böll’s novel seems to say, they serve to 
make a powerful statement and can be highly liberating. The ending of the novel thus 
raises the question introduced at the beginning of this section: does Böll’s novel 
perpetuate the attitude that the individual is a mere observer who lacks faith in the 
potency of his actions (Mounier’s position)?, or is the individual a dynamic force 
capable of securing freedom and determining history (Sartrean position)? Ultimately, 
the work does not appear to unequivocally advocate either position. It is important to 
reiterate at this juncture that the world of the novel does not necessarily reflect the 
world of the author, and it would be highly remiss, if not ‘[der] dümmste aller 
Fehler’,117 to assume that, in publishing such a work, Böll wishes to condone 
brutality and violence as the ultimate means to effect political change and 
existentialist freedom. Essentially, Billard um halbzehn seeks to capitalise on both 
Sartre’s and Mounier’s perspectives by exploring the inevitable consequences that 
arise in a situation when individuals believe that no societal solution to injustice 
exists. The degree to which one understands or interprets engagement is thus left for 
the reader to decide. Böll, unlike his existentialist counterparts Sartre and Mounier, is 
not seeking to be a rigorous theorist. Like in his later publication Ansichten eines 
Clowns, which in the closing scene can be seen to presage the student street protests 
of 1968, or in the 1974 novel Die verlorene Ehre der Katharina Blum, which 
thematises the individual’s right and responsibility to counter systemic state 
oppression through brute violence, Billard um halbzehn epitomises the maturation of 
Böll’s aesthetic position in how it constitutes the writer’s first attempt to offer a 
multi-faceted impartial public argument whose thoughts, ideas, and social points of 
view of the characters reach the reader and have their (albeit unknown) effect in the 
real world. 
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The maturation of Böll’s aesthetic thinking can thus be said to be founded on several 
strands of at times conflicting existentialist positions. Regardless of the degree to 
which Böll accepted or rejected the label ‘engagierter Schriftsteller’, there remains 
little doubt that Böll was intrigued by the Sartrean concept of literary commitment, 
the writer’s purported obligation to look beyond the superficial reality of the 
situation, to preserve and reconstruct detail and, when and as necessary, to intervene 
in the public sphere. Mounier’s personalist doctrine is arguably no less important for 
Böll; his concept of literary engagement is similarly accompanied by the notion of 
‘action’ which entails a sense of artistic duty and responsibility towards civil society. 
Mounier and Böll are likewise united in their concern for ‘the other’ in the realisation 
of individual freedom, which involves empathy and understanding for the rest of 
humankind. Böll can nevertheless be seen to suspend his personal opinions in his 
novel Billard um halbzehn, a novel which impartially fuses both Sartre’s and 
Mounier’s positions on action and intentionality. The questions he poses about the 
individual’s responsibility in the modern world are thereby ultimately redirected 
back towards his audience, putting the issue whether to act or not squarely in the 
reader’s court.   
 
CAMUS AND ABSURDITY 
 
Of course, Sartre and Mounier are not the only French existentialist influences on 
Böll; Albert Camus (1913-1960) is arguably no less significant. In Böll’s literary 
oeuvre, the incongruity and irrationality of human existence, apathetic protagonists, 
and the flight into an objective order of ready-made, institutionalised values can be 
seen to constitute prevailing metaphysical themes that his works have in common 
with Camus’s. Coloured with Christian values and iconography as they are, Böll’s 
narratives do not immediately lend themselves to a comparison with the atheistic 
existentialist doctrine that was current in post-war France. What a closer reading 
reveals, however, are clear points of thematic and ideological crossover between 
Böll’s writing and that of the French-Algerian thinker. 
 
Camus’s writing was a source of great fascination for Böll, perhaps even more so 




one is nevertheless aware of a certain ‘unüberbrückbare ideologische Distanz’,118 as 
Sander has put it. Camus, on the other hand, remains a resounding literary authority 
for the German writer; speaking with Ekkehart Rudolph in 1971, Böll remarked: ‘Ich 
glaube, für mich was das wichtigste Buch nach 1945 Der Fremde von Camus – 
Sartre, Hemingway, Faulkner: Alles kam auf uns zu, und es war ein ungeheures 
Erlebnis’.119 In 1964, Böll even went so far as to accord Camus the label of ‘religious 
author’: ‘[…] ich betrachte sie [Kafka, Faulkner, Bernanos] als religiöse Autoren, 
sogar Camus’.120 In her essay on Böll and literary Modernism, Sander observes: 
‘[Böll] nahm [...] gewissermaßen Zuflucht zu Autoren, die sein christliches 
Menschenbild mit ihm teilten und ihn in seinem Beharren auf einem konservativen 
Wertekanon stützten’.121 This assertion would certainly account for Böll’s 
engagement with renouveau catholique thinkers such as Mounier and Bloy, but 
Sander’s contention simultaneously triggers a need to re-examine the precise nature 
of the ideological relationship, or what Theodore Ziolkowsi calls the ‘delicate 
spiritual affinity’,122 between the theistic writings of Böll and what are generally seen 
as the atheistic writings of Camus. 
 
Before doing so, it is necessary for the purposes of this chapter to briefly consider the 
degree to which Camus can be classified as an existentialist thinker. This remains a 
point of some contention in philosophical scholarship. Indeed, many Camus scholars 
have opted for other labels through which to define the French Algerian’s aesthetic 
thinking; Jacques Ehrmann for instance recognised early in 1960 that Camus ‘has 
become a moralist’, at least with his publication of The Rebel (L’Homme révolté). 
According to Lawrence D. Kritzman, Camus is an ‘intuitive moralist’ because, in 
confronting the irrationality of Marxist revolt, Camus tackles the absurdity of murder 
and terror. In espousing the inherent goodness of humankind in L’Homme révolté, 
Camus’s politics of love and his ethos of reflective action and understanding create, 
as Kritzman continues, a moral imperative where human choices have a moral 
dimension. Others, like Peter Royal, tackle the existentialist question head on; Royal 
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recognises that conflating aspects of Camus’s philosophy with Sartre’s is a 
problematic approach, and thus concludes that Sartre is an ‘existentialist 
phenomenologist in the grand European philosophical tradition’, whereas Camus is a 
‘disabused heir of the Enlightenment’.123 Debarati Sanyal by contrast purports that 
Camus is ‘the idealist esthete whose luminous landscapes and classical forms so 
sharply contrast with the viscosity of Sartrean phenomenology’.124 
Camus also sought to delineate his intellectual credo precisely in contrast with 
existentialism. In 1943 he declared that the purpose of The Myth of Sisyphus (Le 
Mythe de Sisyphe) was to define une pensée absurde, that is, ‘one delivered of 
metaphysical hope, by way of a criticism of several themes of existential 
philosophy’.125 In 1944 he stated that, although existentialism constitutes ‘great 
philosophical adventure’, he believes its conclusions to be fundamentally flawed. 
Sartre for his part characterises Camus as a proponent not of existentialism, but of a 
‘coherent and profound […] philosophy of the absurd’.126 In November 1945, a 
month after the publication of the first issue of Les Temps Modernes, Camus 
famously exclaimed: ‘No I am not an existentialist. […] Sartre is an existentialist, 
and the only book of ideas I’ve written, The Myth of Sisyphus, is directed against the 
so-called existentialist philosophers’.127 For the present purpose, however, the merits 
of Camus’s criticism of existentialism are not the main concern – the point is simply 
that Camus went to considerable lengths to define himself in contrast to that 
movement, and within it specifically Sartrean existentialism, and that any attempt to 
discuss Camus within a philosophical framework should take this into account. There 
is of course a less methodological way in which the term ‘existentialist’ can be 
deployed, and identifying Camus with this grouping would hardly be problematic. 
However one might describe this broad group of writers, one can credibly catalogue 
Camus’s writing as literature concerned with ‘the problematic nature of human 
existence’. In any event, classifying Camus narrowly as an existentialist constitutes a 
singularly unhelpful way of assessing the merits of his thought, especially since he 
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was more a critic than an exponent of existentialism. Reading him as a ‘moralist’ or, 
to use his own term, as ‘an existential writer’ will go some way to help determine the 
values behind his philosophical writing.  
 
For Sartre, since God does not exist, humankind is the only entity whose existence 
comes before its essence. As Sartre explains in ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’, 
‘Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself’. Camus, like other 
existentialists, may argue that life has no inherent meaning, but unlike in Sartrean 
thinking, life for him is not made meaningful through experience or actions that 
affirm and define existence (the central tenet of existentialism where existence 
precedes essence), but through the use of human reason (where reason justifies the 
maxim essence precedes experience). Camus plays off the rationalist par excellence, 
Descartes, in forming a creed of rebellion and ethical revolt: ‘I rebel, therefore we 
exist’, he states categorically. In other words, one’s suffering proves that we are all 
human, for we all suffer, a notion that also evokes the aforementioned aspects of 
Kierkegaard’s and Bloy’s thinking on the ennobling capacity of metaphysical 
suffering. Essentially, Camus can be seen to be primarily concerned with the 
meaning of existence, whereas Sartre focuses on the philosophical sense of being and 
the existentiality of existence. This question of meaning is explored in Camus’s The 
Myth of Sisyphus, where futility is depicted as the ultimate source of human anguish. 
The individual longs for meaning in the universe but sees only a stifling, empty sky. 
Camus offers an existentialist interpretation of the Greek myth of Sisyphus, who is 
given the absurd task of forever rolling his rock up a hill, only to see it roll back 
down again. Sisyphus nevertheless finds pleasure in his task. Through absurd 
reasoning he has made the rock his own. He has risen above his fate, not simply 
through dull resignation but through deliberate choice, something which Fred 
Bogner in Und sagte kein einziges Wort is precisely unable to do. In exercising 
freedom to choose, Sisyphus’s decision is both liberating and life affirming. This 
‘absurd hero’128 has contemplated his torments and has reasoned that the rock and his 
continued defiance of the gods is his purpose in life. In reconciling oneself with 
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absurdity and futility, man is capable of rediscovering meaning, freedom and 
gratification in even the most bleak of situations.  
 
Using this notion as an aesthetic springboard, one could argue that the writings of 
Camus embody the themes of absurdity, futility, existence, freedom, choice and 
meaning, and thus express the archetypal insights we associate with an existentialist 
thinker. Camus was a central figure in the intellectual life of post-war France and, 
along with Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, the French-Algerian essayist, novelist, 
dramatist and journalist played a pivotal role in the progression and philosophical 
maturation of twentieth-century European literature. The world of Camus can be 
summarised as that of a concrete man living between imminent commitment and a 
yearning for a transcendent eternity. Concealed within this existential tension is a 
deep despair. The problem entailed by a life of questionable meaning is made doubly 
harder: primarily because a life within absolute immanence appears pointless, and 
secondly because if we also assume an insatiable yearning for transcendence, the 
meaninglessness of immanent existence becomes even harder to endure.  
 
By developing the notion of absurdity, the French-Algerian thinker underscores the 
immeasurable gap between what one thinks one knows and what one knows in 
reality. That is to say, even when the utter absurdity of existence stares humankind in 
the face, the individual pretends not to see it and continues living as though life had 
another purpose. This particular trait of human nature stems, according to Camus, 
from an irrepressible aspiration for clarity, rationality and comprehension, by virtue 
of which the individual searches for meaningfulness. Thus individuals are driven by 
an appetite for the absolute and the need to solve existential conundrums. But this 
human need for meaning and clarity, reasons Camus, is undermined by a dense 
impenetrability of the outer world. Indeed, the absolute knowledge of inner and outer 
reality remains, at least within the coordinates of this world, impossible. Every desire 
to know, every attempt to overcome the inchoate alienation, into which man has been 
thrown without reason, continually smashes against what Camus describes as the 
‘absurd walls’ of unintelligibility, silence, and perishability.129  
 
                                                        




Such themes also lie at the heart of Böll’s early fiction. Central to the novel Und 
sagte kein einziges Wort is the estrangement experienced by Fred Bogner which has 
not ceased with the end of the war, but has in fact worsened in times of revival and 
prosperity. Fred’s speaking with his wife on the telephone or meeting her in secluded 
locations is symptomatic of the couple’s profound alienation from themselves, from 
each other, as well as from the vast, impassive society that engulfs them. Hans 
Schnitzler in Der Engel schwieg is likewise estranged from his immediate 
environment. Walking the streets, Schnitzler listlessly observes the rubble, debris, 
burned-out facades, the heavy fumes of smoke and the roar of heavy vehicles. A 
stranger in his once beloved native city, Schnitzler can similarly be seen to retreat 
into a mental state of remote isolation; we are thus told how ‘jede Minute, die 
verstrich, wunderte er sich, dass er noch lebte’ [ES: 59].  
 
According to Camus, the self is never at peace either with its concrete interior or its 
external surroundings. The only certainty one is thus left with concerns one’s 
estrangement from the world and oneself, together with the palpable verities with 
which life enchants us. Overall, the path mankind treads is dire in its ruthless 
implacability. Camus’s humanity is condemned to endure a constant ‘ridiculous 
divorce separating [its] spiritual excess and the ephemeral joys of the body,’ or the 
‘urge toward unity’ and the unfaltering awareness of fragmentation,130 a term which 
unarguably evokes the de-centred and volatile existences of Böll’s protagonists. As a 
result, Camus asserts, the lucid individual cannot but oscillate between suicide (be it 
physical, spiritual or philosophical) and head-on confrontation with the monstrosity 
of existence via consciousness, revolt and solitary action. In Böll’s work, the 
Catholic figure of Fred Bogner does not believe in suicide. For him, as with Hans 
Schnitzler, life thus deteriorates into an unyielding vacillation between apathy and 
withdrawal.  
 
Absurdity constitutes, as Camus explains, a ‘feeling’ born of the ‘confrontation 
between the human need [for reason] and the unreasonable silence of the world’.131 
‘Absurdity’, Camus contends, ‘springs from a comparison’, or more accurately from 
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a ‘confrontation’ between the ‘irrational [world] and the wild longing for clarity 
whose call echoes in the human heart’.132 As Camus makes clear, absurdity ‘depends 
as much on man as on the world’.133 Without a human consciousness to contemplate 
‘the absence of any profound reason for living’,134 the world merely is. However, for 
individuals that possess a longing for rationality in an environment they perceive as 
indifferent, the world educes the feeling of absurdity or, reductively speaking, 
existentialist angst. When absurdity reveals itself and existence is robbed of the 
illusion of meaning, the individual can, according to Camus, feel angst-ridden and 
estranged.  
 
This experience of existential angst is particularly acute in Und sagte kein einziges 
Wort, in which Käte Bogner’s repetition of the word ‘Angst’ is emblematic of her 
fraught and fragmented existence: ‘Mich hat […] ein Schrecken ergriffen’, she 
begins, ‘und ich habe Angst, den Leib Christi zu essen’ [US: 145]. At a later juncture 
she confesses to her husband ‘Ich habe Angst vor dir, wirklich’ [US: 171] and 
shortly after ‘Ich hatte Angst, dich zu fragen’. Käte’s fractured existence has resulted 
in her every choice and action being plagued by fear and dread. The source of 
Käte’s, and indeed Fred’s existential angst is ultimately their vivid awareness of their 
deplorable state, namely their unhappy marriage and abject poverty, and their need to 
confront the difficult possibilities in relation to it.  
 
Regardless of the cause, what distinguishes Camus’s understanding of existential 
anxiety, and what separates it from Kierkegaardian doctrine for instance, is its 
tendency to elicit a profound world-weariness, whereby, for Camus, suicide is the 
only ‘rational’ outcome: ‘Dying voluntarily implies that you have recognised, even 
instinctively, the ridiculous character of that habit, the absence of any profound 
reason for living, the insane character of that daily agitation and the uselessness of 
suffering’.135 That such an encounter will inevitably end in suicide or recovery is a 
premise to which also Nietzsche subscribes in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, where the 
German philosopher declares that ‘die Redlichkeit den Ekel und den Selbstmord im 
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Gefolge haben würde’.136 Whilst existentialists do not necessarily favour this 
outcome, and indeed Böll as a Catholic does not adopt the theme of suicide as a 
resolution to existential despair in his own fiction, Nietzsche, Camus and also Sartre 
nevertheless regard it as a possible ‘solution’ to the absurd; if human consciousness, 
particularly the human need for reason, is a prerequisite for absurdity, then the death 
of the human ultimately serves to eradicate the absurd. 
 
Feelings of absurdity, according to Camus, stem from several sources. The first is the 
collapse of the chain of meaning in everyday life: ‘the chain of daily gestures is 
broken’, Camus observes ‘in which the heart vainly seeks the link that will connect it 
again’.137 Man becomes alienated and disorientated, experiencing a divorce between 
himself and his life, between the actor and his scenery. This can again be observed in 
Fred Bogner’s decision to withdraw from his wife and children. Their affinity is 
severed, and an impenetrable wall of separation has been erected between them. 
Existence becomes a sequence of moments lacking a context of meaning that unites 
them and endows them with coherence, reducing those moments to a meaningless, 
disjointed routine. This oppressive sense draws its power from the yearning for a lost 
unity. At least implicitly, Camus assumes that only a unified context can confer 
meaning on the random sequence of events and isolated details. Through his 
approach Camus is purporting that a negative experience of an existence broken up 
into disjointed moments assumes meaning only through the longing for a 
comprehensive unity. 
If Le Mythe de Sisyphe explores the abstract landscape of Camus’s philosophical 
thought and the metaphysical implications of the absurd, his 1942 novel The 
Stranger (L’Etranger) reveals the concrete landscape of this world and the social 
definition of this existentialist concept. The novel explores the triviality of a world in 
which there is no awareness of the absurd and examines the senseless way people 
live (except as it is sensed by the narrator, Meursault). This is a world in which 
absurdity prevails, since an inability to discard convention prevents authentic feeling 
and creative thought. Camus establishes Meursault as the central figure, a negative 
energy who brings out the absurdity of prevailing viewpoints and actions. The 
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actions of the protagonist are presented as meaningless and inconsequential, relayed 
in a flat, emphasised sequence so that no deed is of greater significance than any 
other. The opening lines of the novel capture the protagonist’s apathy and 
detachment: ‘Mother died today. Or, maybe, yesterday; I can’t be sure. The telegram 
from the Home says: YOUR MOTHER PASSED AWAY. FUNERAL 
TOMORROW. DEEP SYMPATHY. Which leaves the matter doubtful; it could have 
been yesterday’.138 Meursault attends his mother’s funeral not out of love or sorrow, 
but out of social convention. The following day he meets Marie by chance, and the 
two have sex. Meursault reads an old newspaper, sees spectators returning from a 
football game, decides to eat his supper, and listlessly agrees to Marie’s suggestion 
of marriage only because he thinks it would give her pleasure: ‘I said I didn’t mind 
[…]. It had no importance really’.139 Meursault later finds himself walking alone on 
a beach and observing a man sleeping in a patch of shade. Driven by the oppressive 
mid-day heat and sun, he fires five shots into the man’s body for no particular 
reason, the first of which kills him instantly, the remaining four of which appear 
arbitrary, inconsequential and pointless. Propelled by an overwhelming pressure 
exerted upon him from within Meursault becomes responsible for the death of a 
human being, but it is only this – cold-hearted murder – that shakes him out of the 
habitual and mundane routine of life and places him face-to-face with the absurd. 
This obviously constitutes a crucial point of contrast with Böll’s Und sagte kein 
einziges Wort, since Meursault actually does something of consequence, namely 
murder. Fred Bogner by way of comparison lethargically succumbs to the mundane 
routine of life without ever committing acts of consequence. When Meursault is put 
on trial after his arrest, he apathetically declares ‘I did not intend to kill the Arab’ 
and that ‘it was because of the sun’.140 Meursault is eventually condemned to death 
as much because he killed the Arab as because he was incapable of living within the 
strict confines of societal norms and expectations: because he doesn’t mourn the 
death of his mother, because he smokes a cigarette and drinks coffee at her wake, 
because he doesn’t believe in God, because he doesn’t have ‘those moral qualities 
which normal men possess’.141 Isolated from a human sense of order and routine, be 
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it familial, societal, judicial, ethical or religious, Camus’s protagonist Meursault can 
be seen to constitute a true existentialist anti-hero who represents an affiliation with 
the benign indifference of the universe as well as its incongruities.  
 
His 1956 novel The Fall (La Chute) can likewise be read as a discomforting, 
savagely satirical indictment of contemporary man. Ostensibly the novel centres on 
the confession of the disenchanted former lawyer Jean-Baptiste Clamence who has 
exiled himself from the Parisian scene and established his underground headquarters 
in a downtrodden bar in Amsterdam. Yet through the bitter gaze of the omniscient 
narrator the novel divulges a more complex agenda: to thematise the protagonist’s 
pervasive sense of guilt, his profound moral anguish, his egotism and neuroses which 
border on insanity, – ‘Oh, sun, beaches, and the islands in the path of the trade 
winds,’ he explains at one point, ‘youth whose memory drives one to despair!’142 – 
all of which serve to emphasis the profoundly fraught nature of his existence. One 
might suppose that Clamence’s confessing to strangers in bars is not a particularly 
successful stratagem to help him evade personal responsibility, as he so claims, but 
rather the result of an impulsive need to understand his angst-ridden, fractured life. 
 
BÖLL AND ABSURDITY 
 
Several German critics have felt prompted to label Heinrich Böll as ‘der deutsche 
Camus’.143 Anyone familiar with the values underlying the works of these quite 
distinct writers would be quick to call attention to the marked differences between 
them, yet what can be located here, beyond or behind their obvious differential, is a 
delicate and subtle spiritual and existential affinity, an affinity that shows in Böll’s 
and Camus’s consciences as writers, in the texture of their fiction, their 
craftsmanship as artists, and their musings on the themes of existence and absurdity. 
Both Böll and Camus can be regarded as moralists. Their works are characterised by 
an ideal that permeates most every sentence, fictitious or expository, that they have 
written, and this implicit ideal is the measuring stick for their moral judgements. 
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Camus’s ideal is a society ruled by moral rigour and human justice, whilst Böll’s is a 
state of conscious Christianity. These are not attitudes, of course, that are shared by 
Camus and Böll alone. They have particular philosophical affinities, for instance, 
with the moral values of Søren Kierkegaard, Léon Bloy, Jean-Paul Sartre and 
Emmanuel Mounier, albeit to varying degrees, as I have already outlined in the case 
of Böll. But the precipitation of these distinctly existentialist topoi that colour their 
writing is nonetheless characteristic of their attitudes towards the world and marks 
their works as unmistakeably unique.  
 
The first and perhaps most obvious similarity is the mocking, tempered satire that 
pervades both Camus’s and Böll’s worlds and their portrayals of human existence. 
Like La Chute, Böll’s Der Engel schwieg (1949/50) and also his Und sagte kein 
einziges Wort (1953) can be seen as savagely critical indictments of the desperate 
plight of those who found themselves adrift in the disarray of postwar Germany. 
Both texts underline the vacuity and absurdity of the clerical, political and economic 
institutions which shaped the lives of the exploited, hopeless and somehow enduring 
‘kleiner Mann’. In his quest for realism Böll, as a self-professed ‘Realist, ohne jede 
Einschränkung’,144 seizes hold of details which prompt his readers to take note of the 
existential significance of particular, seemingly inconsequential moments, for 
instance Marie Derkum screwing the cap back on a tube of toothpaste in Ansichten 
eines Clowns, or Hans Schnitzler savouring the sweet taste of stale bread in Der 
Engel schwieg, or Fred Bogner aimlessly meandering the northern districts of his 
native Cologne in Und sagte kein einziges Wort, or lieutenant Greck observing with 
languid fascination an old lady selling apricots from her fruit cart on a Hungarian 
market square in Wo warst du, Adam?.145 In such moments Böll appears to be 
echoing the words of his own protagonist Hans Schnier: ‘Am besten gelingt mir die 
Darstellung alltäglicher Absurditäten: ich beobachte, addiere diese Beobachtungen, 
potenziere sie und ziehe aus ihnen die Wurzel, aber mit einem anderen Faktor, als 
mit dem ich sie potenziert habe’ [AC: 98]. 
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What Böll and Camus have in common is their focus on and preoccupation with the 
discrepancy between existential absurdity and reality. As moralists they offer 
implicit solutions to the enigmas that surface in their works. What makes their novels 
contemporary and, crucially, existentialist is their reaction to the absurd: they both 
diagnose their time as an era of emptiness, apathy, emptiness and angst. Their 
explorations of this existential discrepancy becomes manifest in an array of 
characters that populate both writers’ fiction. Böll’s novels are a veritable catalogue 
of the mundane preoccupations of despondent protagonists and unsung heroes, all of 
whom are lacking as much as looking for ideals to lend their lives purpose, be it 
putting on a clown costume or perpetually rolling a rock up a hill. One might recall 
Böll’s short story from 1948 Der Mann mit den Messern, whose lowly and apathetic 
protagonist finds his function in life in a variety show: ‘Ich war der Mann, auf den 
man mit Messern wirft…’,146 he boasts in the final sentence, delighted to have found 
a job in which he can finally make a useful contribution. Or the main figure in Böll’s 
Dr. Murkes gesammeltes Schweigen, whose recourse from days spent editing cultural 
lectures taped for a radio programme is to spend his evenings listening to the silence 
snipped out from these same recordings: ‘Wenn du wüsstest, wie kostbar mir dein 
Schweigen ist. Abends, wenn ich müde bin, wenn ich hier sitzen muss, lass ich mir 
dein Schweigen ablaufen’;147 this short story from 1955 is laden with existentialist 
angst, apathy and absurdity, as the following excerpt illustrates: 
   
Jeden Morgen, wenn er das Funkhaus betreten hatte, unterzog sich Murke 
einer existentiellen Turnübung: er sprang in den Paternosteraufzug, stieg aber 
nicht im zweiten Stockwerk, wo sein Büro lag, aus, sondern ließ sich höher 
tragen, am dritten, am vierten, am fünften Stockwerk vorbei, und jedes Mal 
befiel ihn Angst, wenn die Plattform der Aufzugskabine sich über den Flur 
des fünften Stockwerks hinweg erhob [...]. Murke wusste, dass seine Angst 
unbegründet war: Selbstverständlich würde nie etwas passieren, es konnte gar 
nichts passieren, und wenn etwas passierte, würde er im schlimmsten Falle 
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gerade oben sein, wenn der Aufzug zum Stillstand kam, und würde eine 
Stunde, höchstens zwei dort oben eingesperrt sein.148 
 
This tedium and flatness is particularly reminiscent of a passage in ‘Absurd Walls’ in 
Le Mythe de Sisyphe: ‘Rising, tram, four hours in the office or factory, meal, tram, 
four hours of work, meal, sleep and Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, 
Friday and Saturday, according to the same rhythm – this path is easily followed 
most of the time. But one day the “why” arises […]’.149 Are we not also reminded of 
the character Glum in Haus ohne Hüter who works faithfully in a factory but finds 
the greatest solace in painting the gigantic scale-map of the world on his bedroom 
wall?  
 
These products of Böll’s – and indeed Camus’s – creative imagination must not be 
construed merely as the novelist’s quest for unconventionality – more often than not, 
these seemingly mundane occupations and pastimes satisfy a distinct inner need in 
the characters; they represent precisely what Camus refers to in his 1947 novel La 
Peste as un idéal apparemment ridicule that makes life tolerable. Like Böll, Camus 
too is concerned with the so-called ‘kleiner Mann’ who wakes every day to the same 
existentielle Turnübung whilst trying to avoid exposure to life’s inherent absurdity; 
but unlike in Böll’s fiction, these figures are often secondary in Camus’s works. In 
La Peste, Camus insists that contemporary heroism often characterises those least 
likely to be associated with it: 
 
Yes, if men really do have to offer themselves models and examples whom 
they call heroes, and if there really has to be one in this story, the narrator 
would like to offer this insignificant and self-effacing hero who had nothing 
to recommend him but a little goodness in his heart and an apparently 
ridiculous ideal.150 
 
This ‘héros insignifiant et effacé’ is an archetype for the ‘little man’ that pervades the 
novels of both writers; he is the ironically named Joseph Grand, a civil servant who 
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does his part to fight the plague by rigorously keeping track of the statistical records 
and spends his evenings polishing up his Latin and working on his novel: a single 
elaborate sentence that he has been reworking and refining over the years. In the 
same novel Camus depicts an old man whose existence centres around his daily 
ritual of stepping onto his balcony and, after luring the local alley cats, spitting down 
on them. We also recall Camus’s bed-ridden asthmatic Tarrou who, having rid his 
home of all clocks and timekeeping devices, ceaselessly transfers dried peas from 
one receptacle to another in order to count the hours, a strategy as good as any other 
for ‘killing time’; ‘He filled the other [saucepan], pea by pea’, we read, ‘with a 
single, regular and assiduous movement. In this way he found his bearings through a 
day measured saucepan by saucepan. “Every fifteen pans,” he said, “I need a snack. 
It’s quite simple”’.151 
 
On a higher level of awareness we encounter the man who, conscious of life’s 
absurdity, seeks his solace in metaphysical rebellion. Unlike the afore-mentioned 
despondent, ideal-seeking figures, these characters, which populate both Camus’s 
and Böll’s novels, strive for candidness, honesty, and non-conformism in the face of 
the absurd. Doctor Rieux, the narrator of La Peste, explains to the Jesuit priest Father 
Paneloux: ‘We are working together for something that reunites us beyond 
blasphemies and prayers. That is the only important thing’.152 Paneloux puts it to 
Rieux that they are both working for the salvation (‘salut’) of man, but this is too 
grand a concept for Rieux: ‘Salvation’s much too big a word for me,’ he responds, ‘I 
don’t aim so high. I’m concerned with man’s health; and for me his health comes 
first’.153 For Rieux, the aim of resistance is not salvation or eternal justification; 
absurdity, as an immanent phenomenon, has levelled out such options. Rather, the 
only realistic form of action, Rieux concedes, is ‘fighting against creation as he 
found it’.154 Stripped of any metaphysical meaning for his actions, the doctor revolts 
against nature’s inherent absurdity and its imposition of a fickle and arbitrary system. 
Rieux’s painstaking efforts to fight the plague are not grounded in any transcendent 
meaning, but, as he reflects, is one aimed at a more humble and immanent purpose – 
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the health and wellbeing of the individual, something he ultimately cannot guarantee. 
Rieux is a rebel in a Camusian sense as he refuses to accept the incongruity and 
irrationality of life as it is. He revolts against la peste – that is, against the symbol of 
the absurd that afflicts civilisation – by endeavouring to help to alleviate human 
anguish. Like Sisyphus from Camus’s 1942 philosophical essay, Rieux concedes that 
his work will never be done – the plague, whose microbes are embedded in the walls 
and furniture, will repeat its reign of torment and suffering – but the fulfilment lies in 
the effort and refusal to submissively accept any violation of man’s self-worth. 
 
The same can be said of many of Böll’s protagonists. Such is Albert Muchow in 
Haus ohne Hüter, the only figure in the novel whose sympathies seem to transcend 
or cut through the numerous social or other barriers that divide the characters in this 
chronicle of post-war Germany. Albert’s strength derives from his remembrance of 
the past; he is secure in the present because his undistorted knowledge of the past is 
the basis of his sure vision of the future. As Robert Conard explains, Albert is ‘the 
embodiment of Böll’s concept of a moral man’;155 as an act of kindness for the 
victims of fascism, he takes up his responsibility for the tragedy of the war. He 
ensures that children are taught the truth, and that adults do not attempt to pervert the 
course of history. He is not impaired by grief or self-pity. His moral position is akin 
to that of Rieux in how he considers social responsibility and action against absurdity 
to be achieved through confronting injustice and helping others. Yet these virtues 
emerge most clearly in such characters as Johanna Fähmel from Böll’s Billard um 
halbzehn. Her entire life is dedicated to opposing National Socialism. She attempts to 
expose the fate of the Jews who are being transported to extermination camps, she 
shows empathy for political victims, and she breaks with the Church which had 
supported the Hitler regime. When she can tolerate the political horrors no more, she 
is forced to withdraw into a sanatorium; a spiritual retreat, yet also a sort of innere 
Emigration. Hermetically sealed off from the external ‘insanity’ of the world 
surrounding her, she is free to express her political eccentricities. Yet she remains 
unreconciled with the world. Immediately upon her release, she attempts to 
assassinate an ex-Nazi criminal now serving as a high political official. Her shot is 
not simply a protest against the atrocities committed in the name of Nazism, but an 
                                                        




existentialist uprising against the inauthenticity and absurdity of a deeply flawed and 
superficial society. As a seeker of truth and an unmasker of hypocrisy, Johanna 
Fähmel’s actions become the epitome of metaphysical rebellion. 
 
The theme of metaphysical rebellion also resides at the heart of Böll’s Ansichten 
eines Clowns. In the novel, Hans Schnier, the son of an affluent industrialist father 
and socially dominating mother, emerges as the unique and endangered protagonist, 
artistic, erratic, at times irrational, yet fundamentally admirable in his rebelling 
against the superficiality of the West German Wirtschaftswunder. Hans Schnier is a 
representative existentialist Böllian hero who rejects everything his society expects 
him to accept. When asked by his brother ‘Was bist du eigentlich für ein Mensch?’, 
he resolutely replies, ‘Ich bin ein Clown’. Hans is a seeker of truth and an unmasker 
of hypocrisy. As a child, his devout Protestant parents subscribed to the postwar 
trend of denominational tolerance and enrolled him at a Catholic school. Yet as an 
adult Hans, who has renounced his church affiliation, prescribes to a moral code 
which challenges and reverses superficial and insincere values. He remarks, ‘Ich 
glaube, dass die Lebenden tot sind, und die Toten leben’.156 
 
The most decisive existential moment in the novel comes during one of Hans’s 
performances. The metaphorical thread snaps and he falls badly and injures his knee. 
The cause of this accident is Hans’s alcoholism, which he has battled since the 
breakdown of his relationship with Marie. Hans readily acknowledges that the perils 
of alcohol are catastrophic for a clown, as it results in a loss of precision, which 
constitutes the very basis of his work. The damaged knee denotes a moment of 
existentialist crisis in the novel. Having lost the grace of Marie’s love, his art has 
also now deserted him. He is forced to cancel his tour and return to Bonn, yet he is 
nevertheless fully aware of his fallen condition and shows acute self-awareness. 
Indeed, we discover that the swollen knee has a particular metaphysical meaning for 
Hans. As the novel develops, we come to realise the sincerity and authenticity that 
characterises Hans’s commitment to his art. For Hans being a clown is not a mask 
that one removes between performances. Even in the aftermath of his fall he finds it 
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impossible to resist the clownish behaviour that his family have always detested. 
When his father visits Hans’s apartment, he is troubled by the ludicrous, if not 
comical aspect lent by his son’s appearance; he is dressed ‘in klatschnassen 
Pantoffeln und einem viel zu langen, feuerroten Bademantel’ [AC: 174]. Even 
Hans’s response elicits an air of frivolity: ‘“Es ist keine Schlamperei’, sagte ich, “nur 
eine Erscheinungsform der Entspannung”’ [AC: 176]. Hans’s ability to converse 
sensibly also has something of a meandering, clownish quality. When asked by his 
father if he requires more money, Hans appears distracted by other matters: 
 
‘Sieh hier.’ Ich zog das Hosenbein hoch und zeigte ihm mein geschwollenes 
Knie, ich ließ die Hose wieder runter und zeigte mit dem Zeigefinger der 
rechten Hand auf meine linke Brust. ‘Und hier’, sagte ich.  
‘Mein Gott’, sagte er, ‘Herz?’ 
‘Ja’, sagte ich, ‘Herz’.  
‘Ich werde Drohmert anrufen und ihn bitten, dich zu empfangen. Er ist der 
beste Herzspezialist, den wir haben.’  
‘Mißverständnis’, sagte ich, ‘ich brauche Drohmert nicht zu konsultieren.’  
‘Du sagtest doch: Herz.’ 
‘Vielleicht hätte ich Seele, Gemüt, Inneres sagen sollen— mir schien Herz 
angebracht’. [AC: 180] 
 
In his role as a clown, Hans, much like Günter Grass’s Oskar Matzerath with his 
dwarfish stature and tin drum, is a Sonderling alienated from his surroundings and 
lives on the margins. Yet this is something he embraces wholeheartedly and does not 
shy away from. As a result, we can see how closely his pantomime vocation mirrors 
the ethical stance of rebellion and authenticity. Hans does not just become a clown, 
nor is clowing an incidental profession; his work arises intuitively from his plight as 
an eccentric outsider, a position he has consciously adopted. Much like Camus’s 
Tarrou, or Böll’s Albert Muchow and Johanna Fähmel, Hans is driven to closely 
observe and dramatise the myriad ills of his world. For him, caricature, both as a 
profession and way of life, provides the sole means of dealing with the absurdities 





Hans’s mother, Frau Schnier, by contrast belongs to that group of individuals who, in 
metaphysical terms, have denied their subjectivity, becoming what can be viewed in 
Anderschian existentialist terms as sub-men, or sub-women, who have succumbed to 
the ‘Herdeninstinkt’.157 Whether motivated through fear or ignorance, they have 
surrendered their interior freedom and fled into a supposedly objective order of 
ready-made, institutionalised values. The herd-man, to pick up on Andersch’s 
coinage, is a potentially dangerous creature, however. Having denied his or her own 
freedom and having withdrawn into an imaginary objective order, their foremost 
concern becomes to try at all costs to prevent this order from descending into chaos. 
The herd-man also evokes what Simone de Beauvoir calls ‘l’homme sérieux’, as 
articulated in her 1947 Ethics of Ambiguity (Pour une moral de l’ambiguïté). De 
Beauvoir claims that the individual who nonetheless identifies with a given essence 
has succumbed to the ‘spirit of seriousness,’ and, like Sartre, she finds such 
individuals culpable their abdication of personal responsibility in a given situation. 
The serious man, she tells us, ‘forces himself to submerge his freedom in the content 
which the latter accepts from society. He loses himself in the object in order to 
annihilate his subjectivity’. Invoking the existentialism of Hegel, Kierkegaard, and 
Nietzsche she rails ‘at the deceitful stupidity of the serious man and his universe’; 
Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, she continues: 
 
is in large part a description of the serious man and his universe. The serious 
man gets rid of his freedom by claiming to subordinate it to values which 
would be unconditioned. He imagines that the accession to these values 
likewise permanently confers value upon himself. Shielded with ‘rights,’ he 
fulfils himself as a being who is capable of escaping from the stress of 
existence. The seriousness is not defined by the nature of the ends pursued. A 
frivolous lady of fashion can have this mentality of the serious as well as an 
engineer. There is the serious from the moment that freedom denies itself to 
the advantage of ends which one claims are absolute.158 
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Frau Schnier, as a ‘frivolous lady of fashion’, reacts to every datum of experience in 
terms of abstract principles and acceptable categories. Hans reiterates that his mother 
is not at all malicious, but merely ‘auf eine unbegreifliche Weise dumm’. For Hans, 
however, idiocy is both a complicated and important phenomenon, one that is 
indicative of a mode of existence in stark contrast to his own. Frau Schnier has 
constructed for herself an illusory, padded-wall realm of being which has nothing to 
do with reality that can be perceived through uninhibited experience. It is not 
altogether a question of hypocrisy. She truly cannot fathom, for instance, the tragic 
irony of her inane repetition of the phrase ‘die heilige deutsche Erde’ [AC: 24]. Nor 
can she comprehend that no human beings correspond to her mental image of ‘die 
jüdischen Yankees’, who should be expelled from her sacred homeland [AC: 24]. 
Frau Schnier has engrossed herself in a world of distorted mental images in a 
windowless attic, and her tragedy is that she is consequently no longer capable of the 
most basic human reactions: She is quite prepared to sacrifice even her children to 
the phantoms that permeate her existence. Redolent in some respects of the identity 
crisis experienced by Anatol Stiller/Jim White,159 the objective content of this 
illusory world which is being defended is fundamentally irrelevant: when one system 
or order has lost its efficacy as a mask, it is simply discarded and exchanged for 
another. Frau Schnier can thus be seen readily to oscillate between Nazism and 
democracy: ‘Meine Mutter ist inzwischen schon seit Jahren Präsidentin des 
Zentralkomitees der Gesellschaften zur Versöhnung rassischer Gegensätze’ [AC: 
30], Hans says of her, highlighting her thoroughly hypocritical and opportunistic 
attitude considering the anti-Semitic sentiments she uttered in a previous era. 
Moreover, it is made sufficiently clear that the differences between the political 
parties represented by the characters in the novel are negligible. Von Severn, for 
instance, is accorded celebrity status within the circle of progressive Catholics 
because he is both Catholic and a member of the SPD: ‘es [wurde] gesagt, dass er 
“zwar eben konservativ sei, aber der SPD nahestehe” [...] Er war langweilig und 
schien fest entschlossen, sich auf der sensationellen Tatsache, Konvertit und SPD-
Mitglied zu sein, endgültig auszuruhen’ [AC: 93]. The sensation itself seems to be an 
acceptable substitute for any serious political or conceptual reflection. He has 
identified himself with this contradictory mask – ‘von Severn war mir weder das eine 
                                                        




noch das andere’ [AC: 93] – but is delighted to be recognised in this way by others. 
In essence, these characters appear to be playing a game. It is as if the participants at 
a masked ball were to act out their assumed roles in earnest, which gives the novel’s 
title, Ansichten eines Clowns, its particular poignancy; in the end, Hans is perhaps 
the only one not wearing a mask. Under such circumstances illusions are taken for 
reality and the concrete truths of existence are either denied or twisted, which again 
evokes the fraudulent existence and identity crisis of Frisch’s Anatol Stiller. 
 
Frau Schnier’s hopeless addiction to ‘significance’, albeit in her case fundamentally 
farcical and arbitrary categories, also accounts for her failure to emotionally connect 
with her son. Hans is a clown by profession, yet his mother is unable to locate the 
designation ‘clown’ on her list of tolerable human conditions; she regards his choice 
simply as ‘berufliches Pech’ [AC: 36]. Since her inventory of adequate possibilities 
constitutes in her mind the very limits of being itself, Hans, as far as Frau Schnier is 
concerned, has lost his ontological status as a human being. This is perhaps most 
evident in her extraordinary recovery from the shock of Hans’s brother Leo’s 
conversion to Catholicism; the shock is only endurable because Leo is well on his 
way to becoming ‘ein führender Theologe’, thus satisfying her rigid, unyielding 
classifications of her fellow human beings. Although the reader has no reason to 
doubt the integrity of Leo, Frau Schnier’s permissible categories are by no means a 
guarantee of the integrity of those who fit into them. She is so blinded by her own 
clichés that the genuine artistic calling of her son is equalled only by her deplorable 
veneration for the phony and hypocritical figure of Schnitzler. She would be 
prepared for reconciliation if only Hans would consent to be born again into her 
category of ‘der ringende Künstler’, which Hans for the sake of his own self-respect 
is unwilling to do. He is fighting to retain his authenticity in a world of inauthentic 
fellow beings. 
 
On only one occasion, as far as the reader is told, does Hans detect a morsel of 
humanity in his mother, when he witnesses her violate her own fixed principles: 
disregarding her superficialities, her ‘Schlankheitsfimmel’ and fixation with various 
diet theories [AC: 157], Frau Schnier sneaks down into the cellar and ravenously eats 





wie sie im Keller heimlich in ihre Vorratskammer ging, sich eine dicke 
Scheibe Schinken abschnitt und sie unten aß, stehend, mit den Fingern, 
hastig, es sah nicht einmal widerwärtig aus, nur überraschend, und ich war 
eher gerührt als entsetzt. [AC: 225] 
 
Hans is not angry with her; for in this instant the natural human urge to satisfy 
hunger triumphs over abstract principles. This is a precious moment for Hans, a 
treasurable secret worth carrying to the grave, and he promises himself he will never 
betray it. It constitutes one of the most authentic moments in Hans’s experience of 
his mother.   
 
*    *    * 
 
A survey of recent developments in Böll scholarship reveals that, for all the obvious 
advances which new publications have provided, the general trend remains 
steadfastly to approach Heinrich Böll primarily as a moral voice, a national 
conscience, and a prized literary chronicler of West Germany, whose experience of 
the Second World War and its aftermath constitute the dominant thematic 
Ausgangspunkt. As a result, the attention of the bulk of the secondary literature, 
including the above-referenced works by Theodore Ziolkowski, Joachim Bernhard, 
Jochen Vogt, Robert C. Conard, Bernhard Sowinski, Werner Bellmann, Frank 
Finlay, and Bernd Balzer, to name a representative selection, generally tends to focus 
on the social, humanistic, religious, aesthetic and intertextual nature of Böll’s 
fictional works, which are, generally speaking, accorded praise for the ethical 
commitment which they express. To this extent, Böll’s literary legacy has come to be 
regarded as the epitome of Gesinnungsliteratur. The appraisal of such imaginative 
literature on artistic grounds is dominated by a widely-held complementary negative 
view that, his moral stature notwithstanding, Böll was an unexceptional author, 
whose works are thematically limited and repetitive, overly sentimental, thus 
undermining their socio-critical intent, and dualistic in their naive depiction of a 
world that is either good or evil. There is, therefore, in the eyes of many a critic, 
much in Böll’s writing that militates against the reputation it has achieved across the 





With this in mind, it has been the principal aim of this study to offer a reappraisal 
mostly of Böll’s early and mid-period fiction by drawing attention to its palpable 
existentialist dimensions, a topic that has received only cursory attention in the last 
fifty years of scholarship. As I related earlier, some notable publications in this area 
exist, including Theodore Ziolkowski’s essay ‘Albert Camus and Heinrich Böll’, 
Hans van Stralen’s Choices and Conflicts: Essays on Literature and Existentialism, 
Beate Schnepp’s ‘Die Aufgabe des Schriftstellers: Bölls künstlerisches 
Selbstverständnis im Spiegel unbekannter Zeugnisse’, and Gerhard Sauder’s 
‘Heinrich Bölls Léon-Bloy-Lektüre: Ursprünge eines radikalen Katholizismus’. Yet 
whilst each of these studies evidently recognises the potential for an existentialist 
reading of Böll’s fictional oeuvre, the results are often either too narrow in scope, or 
too cursory in their analysis. 
 
In an attempt to make amends for these deficits in the existing secondary literature, 
this study argues the case for a re-examination of Böll’s existentialist philosophical 
and aesthetic thinking. Part one of this chapter centres on the theistic existentialist 
undertones evident in Böll’s early post-war writing. Der Engel schwieg and Und 
sagte kein einziges Wort reinforce the author’s early concern for theistic 
existentialism, in particular the thinking of Léon Bloy and Søren Kierkegaard and 
their meditations on the theme of metaphysical suffering as a path to transcendence. 
Kierkegaard never hesitates to assert, pseudonymously or not, that our salvation rests 
in God alone. In his study on Léon Bloy, Pschera expands on this existentialist 
concept as follows: ‘der Schmerz ist demnach nicht nur die Wiege der christlichen 
Tugenden, sondern er durchdringt die gesamte Existenz eines Menschen. Der 
Schmerz bestimmt den Menschen als das, was er ist’.160 This notion has remarkable 
resonance in Böll’s early post-war fiction. The juxtaposition of Kierkegaardian 
doctrine, Bloy’s novels and Böll’s Der Engel schwieg and Und sagte kein einziges 
Wort thus reveals how these thinkers were united in what they saw as the ennobling, 
life-affirming and ultimately liberating nature of poverty; suffering may indeed be a 
wretched experience, but it is nonetheless, they would claim, an ennobling one. It 
serves to define the individual as who he is. Whilst Nietzsche saw Leiden and 
Mitleiden as, in Pschera’s words,  ‘Kennzeichen des Untergangs’ and ‘Merkmale der 
                                                        




décadence’,161 Kierkegaard, Bloy and Böll each look upon these painful and 
degrading experiences as a stepping stone to overcoming inauthenticity, tedium and 
the monotony of human existence. Man is propelled by suffering to re-examine his or 
her life, achievements, and aspirations; Kierkegaard articulates this metaphysical 
notion as follows: 
 
Yes, if my suffering, my weakness were not the basis for my intellectual 
activity, I would of course make another attempt to deal with it quite simply 
as a medical matter. After all, if one’s life is absolutely without significance 
anyway, it just isn’t right to suffer as I suffer and simply do nothing. But here 
is the secret: The significance of my life corresponds exactly to my 
suffering.162 
 
The second part of this chapter surveys some of Böll’s later writings, and plots the 
later development of his existentialist thinking. Specifically, I contend, the 1950s and 
1960s saw Böll retreat from his former existentialist influences and redirect his 
attention towards the at times conflicting metaphysical positions of Jean-Paul Sartre 
and Emmanuel Mounier. 
 
Böll’s notion of literary commitment, as it comes into fruition in his ‘Bekenntnis zur 
Trümmerliteratur’, was spawned, much like Sartre’s ‘littérature engagée’, from the 
social, political, and cultural upheaval of his ravaged, war-ridden homeland. Böll 
came to sympathise with Sartre’s insistence that individual acts and gestures are 
laden with individual responsibility and commitment. The writers are thus 
aesthetically as well as politically united in their belief that the role of the writer is 
unique in that he is obliged to take action and intervene politically in the public 
sphere in order to confront the deeper reality of a situation. Emmanuel Mounier was 
similarly concerned with the notions of literary engagement and ‘action’; for him, 
engagement entailed a sense of artistic duty and crucially also a need to move away 
from capitalist notions towards a more socialist and specifically Christian 
commonwealth. From Mounier’s Christian viewpoint, individual freedom should 
lead to an opening out towards others and a concern for the general freedom of the 
                                                        
161 Ibid., p. 101. 




other, a chief tenet also in Böll’s Christian treatment of freedom. For both Böll and 
Mounier, freedom is the encountering of that which is other to me, and this should 
unite men with other men, be they strangers or outcasts who have been marginalised 
by a hostile society. As we saw, these themes resonate throughout many of Böll’s 
fictional works, including Der Engel schwieg, Und sagte kein einziges Wort, 
Ansichten eines Clowns, and Der Mann mit den Messern. 
 
The principal difference separating Sartre and Mounier’s aesthetic thinking, namely 
Mounier’s notion of engagement as témoignage, or bearing witness, in contrast to 
Sartre’s engagement as action and a means to effect concrete temporal success, is 
made the focus of Böll’s 1959 novel Billard um halb zehn. Böll seeks here to 
correlate both Sartre’s and Mounier’s perspectives by studying the inevitable 
consequences that arise in situations when individuals come to believe that societal 
solutions to injustice no longer exist. As the novel moves from past to present, from 
stasis to activity, it reveals how the Fähmels each confront their personal 
Grenzsituation in different ways and shows how they have the choice to break out of 
their shell of memory, thereby making themselves fully liberated subjects of history 
(Büffel), or remain inactive observers who passively cling to an inauthentic existence 
in the usually unfulfilled hope of change (Lämmer). 
 
Yet if any existentialist thinker can function as an interpretative foil against which to 
read and interpret Böll’s later writing, it would have to be Albert Camus; it is he who 
constitutes the final focus of this chapter. At the heart of Böll’s works are, as I hope 
to have established, the themes of suffering, poverty, affluence, society’s enduring 
‘underdogs’, despondent ideal-seeking protagonists, unsung heroes, and the 
inconsequential Augenblicke that make up man’s existence; all of these themes are 
the very leitmotifs that inform and colour the ‘existentialist’ fiction of Albert Camus. 
What links Camus’s La Chute and L’Etranger, specifically with Böll’s 1963 work 
Ansichten eines Clowns is their satirising the plight of all those who found 
themselves adrift in the spiritual and economic calamity that, for Böll, was 
Wirtschaftswunder West Germany. Each of these texts underlines the vacuity and 
absurdity of the clerical, political and economic institutions which shaped the lives of 
the exploited, hopeless and somehow enduring ‘kleiner Mann’. In his quest for 




seemingly insignificant moments which serve to indicate the meaningless pantomime 
of human existence. Whilst some ‘héros insignifiant et effacé’ remain confined to 
their world of tedium, flatness and inauthenticity, Camus and Böll champion the 
cause of the individual who seeks solace in existential rebellion, prime instances 
being Hans Schnier and Katharina Blum. Unlike such despondent figures as Fred 
Bogner, these individuals strive for candidness, honesty and non-conformism in the 
face of the absurd, seeking by inference yet unwittingly to define themselves in 








Man’s feeling of homelessness, of alienation has been intensified  
in the midst of a bureaucratized, impersonal mass society. He has  
come to feel himself an outsider, even within his own human  
society. He is trebly alienated; a stranger to God, to nature,  
and to the gigantic social apparatus that supplies his material  
wants.1 
 
The terms ‘homelessness’ and ‘alienation’ characterise and sum up perhaps better 
than any other the thinking that lies behind the philosophy and worldview of 
existentialism. With these terms William Barrett seeks not just to size up the 
existentialist quandary, but also what marks out both the specific contemporaneity 
and timelessness of existentialist themes. Existentialism arose, one could say, when 
European philosophers and theologians began to see ‘man’ as losing control of his 
fate, when they experienced the self as becoming unstable, vacillating and 
questionable, when personal identity was felt as turning impersonal, when the 
individual started fading into mass society. What renders existentialism especially 
au courant as a subject of inquiry as well as a mode of reflection is less its concern 
with existence in general than its particular contention that thinking about human 
existence, as something distinctively temporal and tentative, constantly raises 
questions about the individual in the world, questions indeed to which the 
deliberative and speculative repertoires of ancient thought and classical philosophy 
were seen as no longer giving satisfactory answers, or answers that no longer 
seemed to apply. The existentialist themes around which these questions 
agglutinated most were self, angst, death, responsibility, Grenzsituation, suffering 
and authenticity. These key themes were not just abstract philosophical or 
theological concepts, hypothetical notions put into service as the basis for theoretical 
reflection; rather, for a whole generation – the mid-twentieth-century cohort of 
intellectuals who had just come through the distressing experience of violence, 
                                                        




oppression and suffering generated by World War Two and Nazi tyranny – they 
were the concrete leitmotifs of practical lived experience. It is for obvious reasons 
therefore that these key themes of existentialist philosophy and theology were to 
strike such a chord with postwar European writers. 
 
The aim of this study has been to explore not the literary writings of the French 
existentialists. Instead the focus has been on three of their German-language 
contemporaries – the Swiss writer Max Frisch and the German writers Alfred 
Andersch and Heinrich Böll – who never engaged in explicit philosophical or 
theological existentialist reflection as such, but whose novels have given implicit 
literary formulation to the range of existentialist concerns encapsulated by the 
above-mentioned philosophical and theological key words self, angst, responsibility, 
Grenzsituation, suffering and authenticity. In doing so, this investigation has sought 
to underscore not just the palpable impact of existentialism on German-language 
writers at a critical juncture of German and European history, namely the aftermath 
of the Second World War, but also to investigate how existentialist thought trickled 
down, as it were, into society at large, allowing people at that time, following the 
upheavals of war and totalitarianism, to give expression to their lived problems and 
predicaments.  
 
Our study began with an investigation of Max Frisch’s 1954 work Stiller, a novel 
which reveals how existentialist concerns about the nature of the self, authenticity 
and human freedom constitute the very essence of the Swiss writer’s literary 
repertoire. The world portrayed in Frisch’s novel is unquestionably that of 
existentialist philosophy, in which meaning is dubious, freedom is transient and 
identities are inconsistent, wavering between authenticity and inauthenticity. 
Stiller/White’s inauthentic existence is depicted in his obsession with images, 
symbolic of the individual’s mental imprisonment within a defined social role. His 
world is characterised as an attempt at physical and psychological Selbstflucht, and 
at the centre of his marriage to Julika is a perpetual experiencing of ontological 
guilt. These motifs are reminiscent of the themes of identity denial and 
nonconformity with one’s ‘true’ identity which lie at the heart of both Frisch’s 
Stiller and the novels of Sartre. Moreover, the concepts of the realisation of freedom 




‘leap of faith’, as first deliberated by Kierkegaard, are explored by Frisch in the final 
sections of the novel. Yet the question as to whether Frisch’s incorporation of 
Kierkegaardian themes lends the novel Stiller a missionary purpose remains a topic 
of scholarly discussion. The novel’s intentional open-endedness and lack of 
religious definitiveness prompt one to question whether Frisch also intended to 
depict Christian spirituality as a response to existentialist anguish. The novel’s 
epigraph by Kierkegaard notwithstanding, one must ask whether the thematic 
correspondences are direct allusions to the Danish philosopher, or whether it is only 
a case of Frisch engaging with issues that are central for existentialist philosophy 
from Fichte to Heidegger and Sartre. Irrespective of pedigree, the degree to which 
Frisch revisits and incorporates existentialist references and concerns in his postwar 
novels have considerable bearing on any interpretation of his work.   
 
Alfred Andersch underlays his novel Die Kirschen der Freiheit with a 
heterogeneous blend of philosophical positions which amalgamate religious and 
nonreligious existentialist concerns into a unique albeit not always consistent 
metaphysical standpoint. Andersch’s concern for Sartrean existentialism is 
unarguable, as are his political engagement in the résistance and his fascination with 
Sartre’s literary theory. The characteristically Sartrean concepts of littérature 
engagée, the flight into freedom, situational freedom in the form of ‘Augenblick,’ 
and bad faith similarly constitute a key existential backdrop against which to read 
and interpret Andersch’s 1952 novel. Yet despite the prevalence of Sartrean 
concepts in Andersch’s literary work, they appear in a new context. His re-framing 
of the Freiheitsbegriff by way of his belief in ‘eine von Gott verliehene existentielle 
Freiheit’,2 as a case in point, not only supports the above contention, but 
simultaneously signals an Annäherung an Christentum and, by inference, 
Andersch’s taking a counter-position to Sartrean atheism. Drawing on Andersch’s 
Gottesverständnis, one detects behind Die Kirschen der Freiheit a programmatic 
spiritual examination of the themes of fate and causality, themes which form the 
very core of the French and English reformist Catholic works of François Mauriac, 
Emmanuel Mounier, Jacques Maritain and Graham Greene. These religious 
influences combine with Kierkegaard’s concept of angst, as well as his notion of the 
                                                        




aesthetic and the ethical stages of existence, to form a theistic existentialist backdrop 
against which to interpret the characters populating Andersch’s literary oeuvre. In 
particular Kierkegaard’s consideration of the distinctive existential stages of human 
life, as explained for example in Either/Or, serves as an illuminating context for the 
interpretation of the characters’ actions and their decisions in Andersch’s thoroughly 
existentialist prose. 
 
The overarching aim of my investigation of Heinrich Böll’s posthumously published 
Der Engel schwieg was to re-evaluate the existentialist philosophical and aesthetic 
thinking of the so-called Gewissen der deutschen Nation. Der Engel schwieg vividly 
illustrates the author’s early concern for theistic existentialism, especially as it 
manifests itself in the thinking of Léon Bloy and Søren Kierkegaard and their 
meditations on the theme of metaphysical suffering as a route to transcendence. A 
comparison of their writings uncovers how Kierkegaard, Bloy and Böll each look 
upon painful and degrading experiences as a stepping stone to overcoming what is 
felt to be the inauthenticity, tedium and monotony of human existence. Notably, 
however, theistic existentialism is not the only existentialist foil against which to 
read and interpret Böll’s literary oeuvre. One can observe a maturation of Böll’s 
philosophical stance over the years that comes to the fore especially in his 1959 
novel Billard um halb zehn, which explores the relevance of the Sartrean concept of 
‘engagement’ as well as Mounier’s notion of engagement as témoignage for a 
critique of recent and contemporary German history. In the novel, Böll can be seen 
to correlate both Sartre’s and Mounier’s perspectives by studying the inevitable 
effects that arise in situations when individuals come to believe that societal 
solutions to injustice no longer exist. No less central to Böll’s fiction than Sartre’s 
existentialism is the philosophy of Albert Camus, for whom the themes of suffering, 
poverty, affluence, society’s enduring ‘underdogs’, despondent ideal-seeking 
protagonists, unsung heroes, and the inconsequential Augenblicke that make up 
man’s existence constitute pivotal existentialist leitmotifs, leitmotifs that Böll in his 
works adopts and adapts. 
 
My investigation of the aforementioned novels by these three German-language 
writers has resulted in three overarching conclusions. The first is that the movement 




phenomenon. This study has sought to examine the idea of existentialism as 
literature, outlining an image of existentialism as it developed also in literary rather 
than purely philosophical terms. The works of literature by Max Frisch, Alfred 
Andersch and Heinrich Böll, but particularly their novels that surfaced in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War, offer a crucial means of expression 
for and dissemination of existentialist thought. What my analyses of select German-
language novels have sought to highlight is existentialist literature’s ‘branching out’ 
from the stem of the arbre existentialiste, in particular through the novels’ 
engagement with the themes of freedom, authenticity, Grenzsituation, angst and 
suffering, which manifest themselves also, albeit in diverse ways and to varying 
degrees, in Sartre’s play Huis Clos and the prose text Les jeux sont faits, Camus’s La 
Chute, La Peste and L’Etranger, Bloy’s Le Désespéré and La Femme Pauvre, 
Mauriac’s Thérèse Desqueyroux, as well as Greene’s The Power and the Glory. 
What this diffusion reveals is existentialism’s broad appeal and applicability as a 
literary phenomenon. Whilst one can certainly approach existentialism through the 
lens of the abstract philosophical treatises and essays alone that first incited the 
movement, such as those by Kierkegaard or Heidegger, which continue to serve as 
the core philosophical pronouncements, one can glean more concrete insight into 
existentialism’s practical concerns from the literary works of Camus, Bloy, Mauriac 
and Greene, as well as on the German-language side Frisch, Andersch and Böll, 
among others, which – as I hope to have shown through my analyses – constitute a 
parallel albeit much less systematic and much less theoretical mode of articulation 
and communication. 
 
The second conclusion concerns the heterogeneous blends, or strands and strains, of 
existentialist thinking that have materialised as part of my study of these three 
authors. My findings have at times been both surprising and unexpected; close 
analysis of Böll’s Der Engel schwieg, as a case in point, uncovers an unusual 
metaphysical standpoint in this early work in that it merges theistic and atheistic 
existentialist perspectives while vacillating between Kierkegaardian beliefs on 
suffering and transcendence on the one hand and Camusean deliberations on 
absurdity and metaphysical rebellion on the other. To categorise Böll’s novel as a 
work of purely Catholic literature would thus be a hasty and overly prescriptive 




array of complex and, at times, conflicting existentialist positions. Andersch’s Die 
Kirschen der Freiheit similarly reveals an awareness of and interest in competing 
branches of the arbre existentialiste. Irrefutably enthralled by modernism and the 
innovative and experimental forms of Sartre’s atheistic existentialism, Andersch 
shows himself in his novel gradually deviating from Sartrean doctrine in favour of a 
programmatic exploration of such quintessentially theistic existentialist themes as 
fate, causality and salvation. Frisch’s Stiller, whilst coloured by the atheistic 
philosophical positions of Sartre and Heidegger, likewise probes the question of the 
restorative powers of religious faith, particularly regarding the inherent 
contradiction involved in the idea of God. Ultimately, although religious faith is 
unable to ‘save’ Stiller from his existentialist despair, the Swiss writer explores the 
theistic notions of the attainment of freedom by way of ‘choosing oneself’ and the 
triumphing over existential angst by means of a ‘leap of faith’, as first reconnoitred 
by Kierkegaard in significant depth especially in the final sections of the novel. 
 
Of course, it was never the intention of this study prescriptively to label Frisch, 
Andersch or Böll as theistic or atheistic existentialists. What my findings do reveal, 
however, is that they all engage with the multiple and often even conflicting 
branches of the arbre existentialist in creative ways to develop novel insights into 
and critical engagement with both the theistic and atheistic dimensions of 
existentialist thought. What is common and central to the literary fiction of Frisch, 
Andersch and Böll as well as the existentialist writings of Sartre, Camus, Jaspers, 
Heidegger and Kierkegaard, among others, is how the embracing and rejection of 
religious faith is continuously recast in relation to the human individual and the 
problems brought about by his, as Heidegger has put it, being cast or thrown into the 
world. My study of the three German-language writers ultimately serves to 
underscore the depth to which existentialist concerns and ideas had infiltrated post-
1945 German-language literature by the late 1940s and 1950s even where the 
writers themselves shied away from publically identifying with existentialism as 
either a literary or philosophical movement. 
 
Finally, what also emerges from my study of these literary texts is the continuing 
relevance of this philosophical movement which grapples in such fundamental ways 




What makes existentialism as an approach of inquiry and reflection so apposite is 
less its concern with existence in general than its claim that thinking existentially 
about human existence leads us to pose questions that reach beyond the conceptual 
repertoire of classical philosophy. As I write this in the twenty-first century, the 
human individual continues to be barraged with ever new existential conundrums. 
Man may have mastered his environment, transformed planet Earth, graced the 
surface of the Moon and multiplied the world’s population, yet the more he has 
achieved the more he seems to have spawned, as Barrett observes, a ‘desolating 
sense of rootlessness, vacuity, and a lack of concrete feeling’,3 all of which can 
thrust man back into spells of dizzying anxiety. Existentialist quandaries continue to 
arise, for instance, from the increased consumption of new media in modern society 
and the consumer’s perpetual quest for experiences of individuality and authenticity, 
or from the sense that the acceleration of life leaves us spiritually denuded – hence 
religion’s resurgence. Online environments, including social networking sites such 
as Facebook, online brand communities, video sites such as YouTube, and virtual 
worlds such as Second Life, constitute a uniquely modern opportunity for identity 
formation; they are mediators of an increased freedom of expression. Yet at the 
same time they represent sources of perplexing isolation and alienation for the 
modern individual. In the aftermath of 9/11 in 2001, the London Bombings of July 
2005, the Charlie Hebdo massacre of January 2015 and most recently the Paris 
terrorist attacks of November 2015, mass media coverage on the so-called war on 
terror has imposed, at times to an overwhelming degree, the binary oppositions of 
good/evil, right/wrong, East/West and us/them. Supported by a wide range of visual, 
audible and written material, these facile yet dangerous binaries, all of which evoke 
the intrinsic difference and potential malevolence of the ‘other’, seem the more 
palatable and easy to digest, the more people feel isolated and withdrawn by dint of 
their hypertrophied submersion in the cyber world of the new media.4 Regardless of 
era, time, space or place, existentialism tells us, the individual must remain the key 
locus of human curiosity and can be understood neither as a substance with fixed 
properties, nor as a subject interacting unchangeably with a world of objects. It is 
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their 2007 publication Authenticity: What consumers really want (Boston, MA: Harvard Business 
School Press, 2007), in which they describe the everyday life of the individual as becoming saturated 




precisely the primacy of individual existence, lived experience and human freedom, 
all of which vacillate from generation to generation, that lends and will continue to 
lend existentialism its particular weight and on-going contemporaneity, particularly 
in a world in which, according to Barrett, ‘modern man seems ever further from 
understanding himself than when he first began to question his own identity’.5  
 
It is in this vein perhaps that the reading of existentialist literature, such as the 
novels by Frisch, Andersch and Böll analysed here, takes on a contemporary 
function: it reminds us of the continuing relevance and centricity of existentialism’s 
key themes and of the – not yet answered – questions about angst, death, 
responsibility, freedom, suffering, authenticity, and more, that life continually puts 
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